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Preface
The followingpages pres_ :a detailedsummary ofthe resultsof the Near-Earth-Object
InterceptionWorkshop, hosted by the Los Alamos National Laboratory(LANL) on January
14-16, 1992 at Los Alamos, New Mexico. This document is the second of two reports
resultingfrom the directionofthe United StatesHouse ofRepresentatives'NASA Multiyear
Authorization Act of 1990 (26 September 1990). The National Aeronautics and Space
Admlnistration (NASA) was directedto undertake two workshop studiesto evaluate the
threattothe Earth ofasteroidand comet impacts and toexploreremedial actionsthatwould
prevent such disasters.The firstworkshop sought todefinethe spectrum ofthreatsand
proposed a detectionsystem to greatlyexpand the knowledge base of these objects.The
secondworkshop, reportedhere,investigatedthe range oftechnologiesand response options
thatmay be applicableifan objectposes an actualthreattothe Earth. The officialNASA
reportson both workshops were submitted toCongress in briefform in March 1992. The
detailedreportof the firstworkshop isavailablefrom NASA's OfficeofSpace Science and
Applicationsunder the title"The Spaceguard Survey: Report of the NASA-International
Near-Earth-ObjectDetectionWorkshop."
Since much of the required expertisefor interceptingand deflectingnear-Earth objects
residesintechnicalcommunities outsidethe civilianspacepro@ram, NASA acceptedthe offer
of the U.S. Departn_ent of Energy's Los Alamos National Laboratory to collaboratein
conductingthe secondworkshop and preparingthe finalreport.The meeting was chairedby
John Rather of NASA's OfllceofAeronauticsand Space Technology,wii.hJurgen R_.hsof
NASA_s Oflqce of Space Science and Applications as co-chair and Gregory Canavan of th,_
LANL seniortechnicalstaffas officialhost.
The presentdocument seekstoelucidatethe key findingsofthe Interceptionworkshop in a
manner understandabletonontechnicalreaders.A technicaldiscussion,Proceedingsofthe
NEO InterceptionWorkshop, containingindividualscientificontributionsby workshop
participantsisavailableas a separateLOs Alamos National Laboratorydocument editedby
Gregory Canavan
Since the 94 invitees represented many differentviewpoints and diverse technica]
backgrounds,a few words arein ordertoclarifyhow the resultsofthe Interceptionworkshop
evolved and were editedto form thisreport. After two and one-halfdays of technical
presentationsand discussionsin plenarysessions,the members ofthe workshop dividedinto
seven topicalworking groups to discusskey areas and issues.These groups subsequently
reconvened to discusssummary oralreportsin plenaryassembly. Written summaries were
then provided by the chairmen of each working group to serve as the basis for thisfinal
report. Each chapter heading bears the name ofthe working group which provided the
sourcematerial.The goaland the challengewas then tomerge the diversityofopinionsand
topics from the working groups and the participants at large to give a balanced
replesentationofthe overallfindings.
The consolidateddocument, includingthe ExecutiveSummary, was editedby John Rather
with detailedreview by members of the Steenng Committee. Thus, members of each
working group bear responsibility only for the materials treated within their
assigned topical areas as submitted for the finaledit. The reader should be aware
that the material| reported in Chapterl 2 through 7 therefore rJlect the opinions
of the associated working groups and not an integrated position for the entire
workshop.
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An exceptiontothe latterruleisChapter I,the Introductionand Systems Overview, where
the editorand SteeringCommittee melded the reportofthe Systems Analysisworking group
with an overallconsolidationofopinionsand technicalresults.This was deemed appropriate
to avoidunnecessary repetitionand toprovidean opening chapterthatshows the fullscope
ofthe deliberations,results,and opinions. Hence, the editor and Steering Committee
share responsibility for the opening chapter with the chai_man of the Systems
Analysis working group. The final draR of this report, dated May 26, 1992, was sent for
finalreviewby allworkshop participants.The largenumber ofdetailedcriticismsreceived
were then caref'.,llyfactoredintothe present versionof the finalrepot. While itwas
impossibletoachieveunanimous agreement on alltopics,we have sought toensure thatthe
resultingsynthesis represents the majority consensus of the workshop correctlyand
comprehensively. A questionnaire was provided to allparticipantsto poll the overall
approval/disapproval of the final report and of the individual working group
members/chapters. The resultswere 89 percentfavorable.Two members stronglydissented
and requestedremoval oftheirnames from the report.
The Steering Committee
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"Take all six, and I'll throw in the giant asteroid."
ix October, 1992, Sky & Telesc
PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NEAR-EARTH OBJECT INTERCEPTION WORKSHOP
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Los Alamos, New Mexico
January 14-16, 1992
ABSTRACT
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Headquarters sponsored the Near-
Eatrth-Object Interception Workshop hosted by the Los Alamos National Laboratory on
January 14-16, 1992 at the J. Robert Oppenheimer Study Center in Los Alamos, New
Mexico. The Workshop evaluated the issues involved in intercepting celestial objects that
could hit the Earth. It covered the technologies for acquiring, tracking, and homing, as
well as those for sending interceptors to inspect, rendezvous with, land on, irradiate,
deflect, or distroy them. This report records the presentations and technical options
reviewed.
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The workshop gready benefited from the wisdom of Edward Teller, who fully and
enthusiastically participated in all of our sessions, including those held on his 84th birthday. In
honor of that evenL Eleanor Helin and Brian Marsden went to considerable lengths to quickly
obtain officiaJt designation of minor planet #5006 as "Tellero" The announcement of this honor was
made at the workshop banquoL with special accolades delivered by another distinguished
participant, Prof. Fred Reines, the discoverer of the neutrino. Dr. Teller's citation follows:
5006 TELLER
(1989 GL5)
Discovered 1989April 5 by E. Helin at Palomar.
Named in honor of the distinguished Hungarian-born, U.S. physicist
Edward Teller. Known for his seminal work in physics and astrophysics, notably
on the Gamow-Teller relationship that is of fundamental importance to our
knowledge of the weak interaction and its roles in astrophysics. He has also made
signifi-cant contributiom in chemical physics, molecular physics, and quantum
theory. He served as professor of physics at George Washington University, the
University of Chicago, and the University of California. He respired the creation
of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, has served as its Director, and
now serves as Direc':or Emeritus to the present time. Since 1975 he has been
Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institute, Stanford University. He has been
highly effective in promoting open international science free of secrecy. Having
er, ered the worm a few months before the 1908 Tunguska event, Teller was
honored by the naming of this minor planet at his 84th birthday celebration, 1992
January. 15, during his participation in the NASA Workshop on procedures for the
interception of threatening near-earth asteroids and comets.
Announced at l.x)s AMmos National Laboratory on the occasion of the Near-
Earth- Object Interception Workshop.
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Preface
This report presents the technical papers presented and a summary of the issues
addressed at the Near-Earth-Object (NEO) Interception Workshop hosted by the Los Alamos
National Laboratory (LANL) on January 14-16, 1992. It is the second of two reports resulting
from the direction of the United States House of Representatives' National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) Multiyear Authorization Act of 1990 of 26 September 1990,
which directed NASA to undertake two Workshop studies to evaluate the threat to the Earth of
asteroid and comet impacts and to explore remedial actions to prevent such disasters. The first
Workshop sought to define the spectrum of threats and proposed a detection system to expand
our knowledge about them. The second Workshop investigated the range of technologies and
response options that ma.y be applicable if an object pose_ an actual threat to the Earth. The
attached official NASA reports on both Workshops were submitted to Congress in March 1992.
Since much of the required expertise for intercepting and deflectir, g near-Earth objects
resides in technical communities outside the civilian space program, NASA accepted the
assistance of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Los Alamos Natioml Laboratory on
conducting the workshop and preparing this report. The meeting was chaired by John Rather of
NASA's Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology, w ith Jurgen Rahe of NASA's Office of
Space Science and Applications as cochair and Gregory Canavan of Los Alamos as host.
Because the ninety-four invitees represented many different viewpoints and diverse
technical backgrounds, it is appropriate to indicate how the results of the Interception Workshop
evolved and were edited to form this report. After 2 1/2 days of technical presentations and
plenary sessions, Workshop members divided into seven topical working groups to discuss key
areas and issues. They subsequently summarized their conclusions orally in a plenary assembly,
in which the chairmen of each working group also provided a written summary.
Since there was not time to form an overall consensus, working group members bear
responsibil:.:y only for the materials treated in their assigned areas. They are not responsible for
the final version of those sections, which were submitted to a final rewrite. The section headings,
which bear the names of the working groups that provided source material, contain both the
submitted technical papers and the area summaries. The goal of the workshop was to merge the
diversity of opinions and topics from the working groups and the participants at large to give a
balanced representatien of the overall findings. There was not time to do so.
A consolidated document was egited by John Rather with the assistance of the California
Institution of Technology and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. It was reviewed by members of the
Steering Committee, the working group chairmen, and twenty other workshop participants who
had specifically asked to review the document. A large number of detailed criticisms were
received, carefully assessed, and incorporated, where possible. It was impossible to achieve
agreement on all topics. These Proceedings contain only the papers and workshop summaries on
which there was rough consensus. The final section discusses directions for future research that
emerged from the workshop, reviews some of the reactions to it, and indica,es unresolved issues
that could be profitably addre3sed by subsequent workshops.
The Steering Committee
Executive Summary
Introduction and Systems Overview: In the last decade, there has been a maior shift in the
perception of potential hazards to haman life from Earth-approaching cosmic objects. A vast
increase in evidence linking large-scale extinctions of species to past impacts on the Earth has
driven increased concern. Simultaneously, there has been a grea" _creasc in the rate of discovery
of near-Earth objects (NEOs), including some which have passed near the Earth. In response,
Congress direc,.ed NASA to study ways to increase the detection rate of Earth-approaching
objects and wa_'s to deflect or destroy objects that posed a danger to life on Earth, two Workshop
studies have been conducted. Their final reports were submitted to Congress by NASA in March,
1992. The detailed report of the NEO Detection Workshop was published under separately.
The technical papers and technical findings from the NEO Interception Workshop are
contained in the present volume, which is available from Los Alamos National Laboratory.
Interception Workshop members argued that there now exist tecimic:_l!y credible approaches to
preventing many impact catastrophes, provided that the requisite teciw,_)bgv capabilities could be
developed in a timely fashion. Progress could result from sharing exis.ting search, tracking, and
homing technologies with the civilian and defense sectors and with friends and allies, and from
implementing protocols to transfer data on NEO u _overies from dL'"c_.,;e and intelligence assets
to appropriate centers for determining precise orbits. The following [.,aragraphs summarbe the
opinions of each of the topical working groups.
Astrodynamics of Interception: Intercept;on of Earth-approaching a_;tcroids or comets cannot
be decoup!ed from comprehensive obse_'ations. Early detection gives a longer reaction time,
and inte_eptions far from Earth are much more desirable and easier tha_a interceptions nearby
Earth. For cases in which exact orbits can be predicted decades to centuries in advance, which is
happily the most likely case, it should be possible to _nd precursor missions to the object to
deflect it or prepare for its subsequent interception. In these cases, it is usually best to impart art
impulse to the object at its perit'_lion position.
If the warning time is only a few years, the orbit will be less certain and an imv_ediate
effort will be needed to refine it Precursor missions would be more difficult, and the required
launch energy would be much higher than for the first class of objects° With less than a year's
warning, e.g., a long-period comet on a collision course, a high-energy interceptor would have to
be launched in short order. For the worst case, z. large object discovered on a collision course
with Earth in a matter of days, there is currently no response with a high probability of success.
Thus, a program for their early detection is es_:,ential; improved interceptors can follow. With
proper development and improved detection, this worst case need never arise.
Energy Delivery--Materials Interaction: The kinetic energy of a mountain-si:,ed _.;bject
traveling at 20-30 knds is measured in thousands t,.) millions of mego ton_ If detected at great
range, or many orbits prior to impact, even quite large NEOs coald !'re deflec,cd with energies
available from chemical rockets or explosives. For intercepts during final approach, kinetic
energy from fast interceptors could bc adequate for NEOs of up to 70-1(IO m diameter. Other
options such as kinetic energy devices for dt;flection or pulverization, thrust from attached mass
drivers, solar sails, crack outgassing, laser deflection, etc., arc cither ic.,,s effective, requm-
extensive research _ 'd engineering, or appear expcnsivc. Nonnuclear kinetic cl;crgy payload.,, or
other nonnuclear in-._, tu options currently appear u_ful only for small NEOs, interaction at
perihelion, or for larger objcct:._ when m,'ny year_; are available to effect a change. Nuclear
energy could bc used to providc efficient propulsion for distant engagc,'nents.
Nuclear energy could also be u.,,cd Io pro,- idc explosive energy for dcfh:ction or
de.,,truction; it appears to be favored for NEOs over about I(X) m diameter. For kilomctcr-si_,cd
ohjecLs, the energy of the largest nuclear _:xnlosives ever built is small t,y ,'_)mparison, thus, it is
likely that nuclear technologies could play .m cssen,ial role in delivering enough cncrgy to
deflect a large NE() that w()uld otherwise impact the Earth soon. Buried expl,,_sions maximiTe the
efficiency of fracturc or pulverization. Stand-off itTadiation is robust, cffieicnt, al_d i:,,,cnsitivc to
uncertaintiesin NEd materialsandgeometry.Stand-offrequireslessknowledgeof theNEd's
geologyandtopography,carrieslessfractureprobability,andrequireslessknowledgeof the
NEO'srotationstate,centerof gravity,andothermechanicalproperties.Surface-burstscould
produce10-100timesmoredeflection,butwoulddosoat therisk of fracturingtheNEOinto
multiplepieces,eachof which is potentiallyhazardous.Any suchuseof nucleardeviceswill
requireappropriateinternationalagreementsandprotocols.
Acquisition, Tracking, and Homing: The telescope system proposed by the Detection
Workshop appears to be an efficient way to achieve a census of the large, threatening NEOs that
could approach the Earth from distances of about 1 astronomical unit (AU - 150 million
kilometers, the rougb distance from the Earth to the sun) within a few years. With upgrades to
accommodate existing and emerging technologies, sensors using visible-light cameras and
microwave radars could provide adequate acquisition and track of large objects and timely
search, dete,'tion, track, and assessment of the smaller ones of current concern within a few
decades. Computers and advanced algorithms could support automated detection and tracking.
Radars can measure physical characteristics, composition, and shape of objects with 13.1
AU from Earth for objects 100 m or more in diameter. Homing has been less well studied, but
ground-based optical and radar sensors could refine an NEd's trajectory and establish its
orientation for precise delivery. The interceptor then could be guided to within range of the
object and control transferred to on-board optical or radar sensors and computers. Impact
prediction on comets would be more difficult because their comas obscures their nucleus, but
that could be overcome with multiple probes and interceptors.
Vehicles and Payloads: Two types of missions have been studied: (1) precursor reconnaissance
missions and (2) missions aimed at diverting or fragmenting an NEd of any size. The prime
objective or precursor reconnaissance missions is to characterize the diversity of NEOs, because
objects with different material composition will respond differently to perturbations. Relatively
low-cost missions using small, lightweight spacecraft and launch vehicles could fly by,
rendezvous with, or land on NEOs. The Department of Defense has developed a number of
lightweight technologies which could be used for such missions in their present configuration or
after some modifications. NASA probes could also be adapted. The preferred alternative would
be for the two to be fully integrated. An active effort to divert or fragment an NEd would require
a large launch vehicle to carry a payload capable of changing the orbit or pulverizing the NEd.
Advanced upper stages and propulsion concepts offer significant potential increases in useful
payload weight in the long term. It would be feasible to perform experimental missions to
observe a representative sample of NEOs in the near term with small modifications of existing
capabilities in order to improve the required knowledge base for deflection.
Assessment of Current and Future Technologies: Intercepts distant from Earth are less
difficult than are close-in intercepts. ,Smaller deflections suffice, so less energy need be
delivered. Travel time is less of an issue, so deficiencies in deep-space payload capability are less
of a restriction. Opportunities exist to deflect, look, and deflect again; and distant intercepts offer
a greater range of propulsion, deflection, and destruction options. Existing options for distant
intercepts focus upon chemical rockets with chemical or nuclear payloads. Near-term innovative
options-potentially available within two decades-include nuclear rockets for fast transport of
heavy payloads, landing nuclear rockets on the NEd's surface to utilize in-situ water as a
propellant; mass dr'ivers on the NEd's surface, or, conceivable, laser transmitters on the Earth or
the moon to perturb the NEd orbit by ablating material from the surface. All require
development. Creative concepts potentially available many decades from now might include
solar sails and the use of small asteroids to deflect larger ones. These options appear technically
feasible, but affordability and risk vary greatly. Close-in intercepts, on the other hand, are very
difficult: large deflections require substantial energy; travel time is very important; time will
allow only one or two deflection attempts; and there are fewer technology options that appear
feasible. Existing technologies for close-in intercepts include only chemical rockets with
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explosivepayloads.Near-termpossibilitiesincludenuclearrocketswith nuclearexplosives.
Longer termconceptsarespeculativeandinvolvegreaterdegreesof risk.
Future Research Options Impacts on Earth from asteroids and comets occur infrequently, but
have potentially very serious consequences that justify initiating efforts directed toward
mitigation. It is essential to improve the detection capability to increase the warning time before
investing heavily in specific mitigation systems. In order of increasing commitment of resources,
several levels of programmatic efforts are (1) enhanced observational, laboratory, and theoretical
studies and analysis of the NEOs, which have estimated costs of a few $M/yr.; (2) construction
of dedicated telescopes and other instruments and systems to dramatically increase the state of
knowledge and detection rate of NEOs, together with augmented laboratory and theoretical
studies for both detectit,n and interception, which would cost about $10M/yr.; (3) robotic
spacecraft missions to sample and characterize representative NEOs, which might cost about
$100M/yr.; and (4) definition of appropriate interception system requirements. A later
implementation program might cost substantially more, even if pursued as an evolutionary step.
The nature of the hazard is global in scope, and planning should be shared among the world's
nations, although the U.S. is perhaps now best-suited to a leadership role. Presently, there is no
organized program to address the NEO hazard The rest-arch discussed above could form a sound
basis for formulating the appropriate national and international mechanisms.
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SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS
OF THE NEAR-EARTH-OBJECT (NEO) INTERCEPTION WORKSHOP
Background
In the last decade, there has been a major shift in the perception of potential hazards to
human life from Earth-approaching cosmic objects. A vast increase in evidence linking
large-scale extinctions of species to past impacts on the Earth has driven this increased
concern= Simultaneously, there has been a great increase in the rate of discovery of
near-Earth objects (NEOs), including some which have made near passes by Earth.
in response to a Congressional direction for NASA to study ways to increase the
detection rate of Earth-approaching objects and ways to alter the orbits of or destroy
such objects if they should pose a danger to life on Earth, two workshop studies have
been conducted. The NEO Detection Workshop held three formal meetings: 1) June
30-July 3, 1991, at the San Juan Capistrano Research Institute, 2) September 24-25,
1991, at NASA's Ames Research Center, and 3) November 5, 1991, in Palo Alto,
California; all these meetings were held in conjunction with more general science
meetings. Participants in the workshop came from the United States, Australia, Finland,
France, India, and Russia. The detailed findings and the technical papers presented at
this workshop will be available from NASA's Office of Space Science and Applications.
The NEO Interception Workshop was hosted by the Department of Energy's Los Alamos
National Laboratory on January 14-16, 1992, and the detailed findings and the technical
papers presented at that workshop will be available from the Los Alamos National
Laboratory in Summer of 1992. A summary of the Interception Workshop follows.
Importance of Eady Detection
The consensus of the Interception Workshop is that there now exist technically credible
approaches to preventing an impact catastrophe provided that the requisite technology
capabilities are developed. Important immediate progress can result from the utilization
of existing defense technologies and from implementing protocols to transfer data on
NEO discoveries from defense and intelligence assets to appropriate entities for
determining precise orbits and other relevant data
Interception of Earth-approaching asteroids or comets cannot be decoupled from
comprehensive observations. Early detection obviously gives a longer reaction time,
and interceptions far from Earth are much more desirable and easier to accomplish than
interceptions near Earth. For cases in which a threat has been identified and the orbit
can be predicted reliably decades or centuries in advance, it may be possible to send
precursor missions to the object to prepare for a subsequent interception.
Intercept.ion Techniques
It would be most efficient to impart an impulse to the object at its perihelion position,
defined as the point at which a body moving in an elliptical orbit is at its closest distance
to the Su, l. For the unlikely situation in which the threat is identified only a few years in
advance, the orbit would be less certain, precursor missions would be very difficult, and
the required launch energy would be much higher than in the first case. With less than
a year warning that an object (probably a long-period comet) is on a collision course
with Earth, an interception device must be launched in short order with a high launch
energy--perhaps 100 times higher than that required in the first case. However, the
likelihood of having less than decades of warning before a catastrophic collision is
minimal.
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The kinetic energy of a mountain-sized object traveling at 25 kilometers per second is
enormous, dwarfing the energy of the largest nuclear weapons ever built. Powerful
explosive devices would be needed to impart enough energy to a large NEO to perturb
it from a trajectory that passes through Earth, or to destroy it. Such explosives could be
used in either surface-burst modes or a stand-off mode: surface-burst modes would
provide two orders of magnitude more deflection, but would risk fracturing the NEO into
multiple potentially hazardous pieces. In comparison to other options, the stand-off
approach requires less knowledge of the NEO's geology and topography, carries less
fracture probability, and requires less knowledge of the NEO's rotation state and center
of gravity.
Other options discussed--including explosives at the surface or interior; kinetic energy
devices for deflection of pulverization; attached thrust by mass driver, solar sail, or crack
outgassing; or laser deflection--either are ineffectual, less desirable, or require extensive
research programs and the construction of major space assets.
Technological Requirements
With upgrades to accommodate existing technologies, sensors using visible-light
cameras and microwave radar will be adequate for detecting, tracking, and assessing,
within a few decades the most threatening objects during approachos to within 1
astronomical unit (AU: approximately 150 million kilometers). Computers and
algorithms could support automated detection and tracking. Radars can measure sizes,
shapes, spin vectors, and surface characteristics of most NEOs, often within months of
discovery.
Homing has been less well studied, but ground-based optical and radar sensors could
refine an object's trajectory and establish its orientation for precise delivery of an
interceptor. An interceptor could be guided to within range of the object and control
would then be transferred to on-board sensors (which could be optical or radar) and
computers impact prediction for comets would be more difficult than for asteroids,
because the comets atmosphere visually obscures the nucleus and because outgassing
causes nongravitational acceleration.
Mission Types
Two types of missions could be studied: (1) precursor reconnaissance missions and (2)
missions aimed at diverting or fragmenting a NEO of any size once a threat has been
identified. The prime objective of precursor reconnaissance missions would be to
characterize the diversity of NEOs because objects with different material composition
will respond differently to perturbation effects. Such relatively low-cost missions using
small lightweight spacecraft and launch vehicles could fly by, rendezvous, or land on
NEOs. An active effort to divert or fragment a NEO would require a large launch vehicle
to carry a payload capable of changing the orbit or fragmenting a NEO. Experimental
missions to characterize representative NEOs as fully as possible in the near term
would greatly improve the currently poor knowledge base fo" deflection.
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Interception Distances
Intercepts distant from Earth are, paradoxically, much less difficult to achieve than are
close-in intercepts: smaller deflections are required so less energy need be delivered;
travel time is usually not an issue; opportunities exist to deflect, look, and deflect again;
and there is a greater range of propulsion and deflection or destruction options. Existing
options for distant intercepts focus exclusively upon chemical rockets with high-energy
explosive payloads. Near-term options -- potentially available within two decades --
include nuclear rockets for fast transport of heavy payloads, landing nuclear rockets on
the NEO's surface to utilize in-situ water as a propellant, and mass drivers on the NEO's
surface. Options potentially available more than two decades from now might include
solar sails. All of these options appear technically feasible, although relative
affordability and risk factors need much further examination.
Close-in intercepts, on the other hand, are very difficult. Large deflections require
substantial energy; travel time is short; a short warning time will allow only one or two
deflections; and there are fewer technology options. Large high-energy explosives may
shatter the object into more projectiles, while the technical feasibility and affordability of
some of the other technologies are still under study.
Conclusions
Impacts on Earth from asteroids and comets occur rarely, but have potentially very
serious consequences that justify initiating efforts directed toward detection and
mitigation. In order of increasing commitment of resources, several levels of
programmatic effort are: (1) Enhanced observational, laboratory, and theoretical studies
and analysis of the NEOs; (2) Construction of dedicated telescopes and other
instruments to dramatically increase the state of knowledge and detection rate of NEOs,
together with augmented laboratory and theoretical studies; (3) Robotic spacecraft
missions to characterize a sample of NEOs that is representative of their broad
diversity; (4) Definition of appropriate mitigation system requirements and
implementation options concerning launch infrastructure, an interceptor vehicle, a target
acquisition capability, and explosive devices.
The nature of the hazard is global in scope, and planning should be shared among the
world's nations. The United States is best-situated to take a leadership role. Presently,
there is no organized program to address the NEO hazard. A decision to proceed
should not be delayed in anticipation that new data will soon substantially modify our
present understanding.
Fortunately, impacts of large near-Earth objects are extremely rare and in most cases,
the objects can be readily detected with current ground-based technology. If one were
on a collision course with Earth, it probably would be found decades in advance of any
collision, after which an orderly scheme of characterization and mitigation could be
implemented.
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SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS
OF THE NEAR-EARTH OBJECT (NEO) DETECTION WORKSHOP
Background
Impacts by Earth-crossing asteroids and comets (collectively known as near-earth objects
or NEOs) pose a significant hazard to life and property. Although the annual probability of
the Earth being struck by a large asteroid or comet is extremely small, the consequences of
such a collision are so catastrophic that it is prudent to assess the nature of the threat and to
prepare to deal with it. The first step in any pro(.jram for the prevention or mitigation of
impact catastrophes must involve a comprehensive _ea_ch for Earth-crossing asteroids and
comets and a detailed analysis of their orbits.
In response to Congressional direction for NASA to study ways to increase the detection
rate of Earth-approaching objects and ways to alter the orbits of or destroy such objects if
they should pose a danger to lite on Earth, two workshop stuoies have been conducted.
The NEO Interception Workshop was hosted by the Department of Energy's Los Alamos
National Laboratory on January 14-16, 1992, and the detailed findings and technical
papers presented at that workshop will be available from the Los Alamos National
Laboratory in Summer 1992.
The NEO Detection Workshop held three formal meetings: 1) June 30-July 3, 1991, at the
San Juan Capistrano Research Institute, 2) September 24-25, 1991, at NASA's Ames
Research Center, and 3) November 5, 1991, in Palo Alto, California; all these meetings
were held in conjunction with more general science meetings. Participants in the workshop
came from the United States, Australia, Finland, France, India, and Russia. The detailed
findings and the technical papers presented at this workshop will be available from NASA's
Office of Space Science and Applications. A summary of the Detection Workshop follows.
Impact HazArd
The greatest nsk from cosmic impacts is associated with objects large enough to disturb the
Earth's climate on a global scale by injecting large quantities of dust into the stratosphere.
Such an event would depress temperatures around the globe, leading to massive loss of
food crops and possible breakdown of society. Such global catastrophes are qualitatively
different from other more common hazards that we face (excepting nuclear war), because of
their potential effect on the entire planet and its population. The possibility of such a global
catastrophe is beyond question, but determining the thresh_ld impactor size to trigger such
an event is more difficult. Various studies have suggested that the minimum mass
impacting body to produce such global consequences is several tens of billions of tons,
resulting in a groundburst explosion with energy approaching a million megatons of
Ttinitrotoluene (TNT). The corresponding threshold diameter for Earth-crossing asteroids or
comets is between 1 and 2 kilometers. Smaller objects (down to tens of meters in diameter)
can cause severe local damage but pose no global threat.
Search Strategy
Current technology permits us to discover and track nearly all asteroids or short-period
comets larger than 1 kilometer in diameter that are potential Earth-impactors. These
objects are readily detected with moderate-size ground-based telescopes. Most of what we
now know about the population of Earth-crossing asteroids has been derived over the past
two decades f,om studies carried out by a few dedicated observing teams using small
ground-based telescopes. Currently, several new NEOs are discovered each month. At
this rate, however, it will require several centuries to approach a complete survey, even for
the larger obiects. What is required to assess the population of NEOs and identify any large
objects that could potentially impact the Earth is a systematic survey that effectively
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monitors a large volume of space around our planet and detects these objects as their
orbits repeatedly carry them through this volume of space. In addition, the survey should
deal with the long-period comets, which are thought to constitute about 5 to !0 percent of
potential Earth-impactors. Long-period comets do not regularly enter near-Earth space;
however, most Earth-impacting long-period comets could be detected with advance
warning several '_nonths before impact, using the same telescopes used for the NEO
survey. Finally, it is desirable to discover as many of the smaller potential impactors as
possible.
Lead Time
No object now known has an orbit that will lead to a collision with our planet during the next
few centuries, and the vast majority of the newly discovered asteroids and comets will also
be found to pose no near-term danger. Even if an NEO has an orbit that might lead to an
impact, it will typically make hundreds of moderately near passes before there is any
danger, prov;ding ample time for response. However, the lead time will be much less for a
comet approaching the Earth on a long-period orbit.
Spaceguard Survey Network
The survey outlined in this report involves a coordinated international network of
specialized ground-based telescopes for discovery, confirmation, and follow-up
observations. Observations are required from both the northern and southern
hemispheres, monitoring about 6,000 square degrees of sky per month. In order to provide
reliable detection of objects as small as 1 kilometer in diameter within a suitably large
volume of space, the telescopes should reach astronomical magnitude 22. The telescopes
that are suitaL,e for this survey have apertures of 2 to 3 meters, moderately wide fields of
view (2 to 3 degrees), focal-plane arrays of large-format charge-coupled device (CCD)
detectors, and automated signal processing and detection systems that recognize the
asteroids and comets from their motion against the background of stars. The technology for
such automated survey telescopes has been developed and demonstrated by the 0.9-
meter Spacewatch telescope of the University of Arizona. For purposes of this study, we
focus on a Spaceguard Survey network of six 2.5-meter aperture, f/2 prime focus reflecting
telescopes, each with four 2048 x 2048 pixel CCD chips in the focal plane.
Follow-up and Coordination
In addition to the discovery and verification of new Earth-approaching asteroids and
comets, the Sp_-ceguard Survey program will require follow-up observations to refine
orbits, determine the. sizes of newly discovered objects, and establish the physical
properties of the asteroid and comet population. Observations witn large planetary radars
are an especially effective tool for the rapid determination of accurate orbits. Radar data
will be required to ascertain whe_er potentially hazardous objects will miss the Earth or, if
this is not the case, to determine the exact time and location of the impact. Desirable for this
program would be increased access to currently operating planetary radars in California
and Puerto Rico, and provision of a suitabie southern-hemisphere radar in the future.
Although one or more dedicated follow-up telescopes would greatly improve our ability to
study faint and distant asteroids and comets, we anticipate that much of the optical follow-
up work can be accomplished with the survey telescopes themselves if they are suitably
instrumented. The survey program also requires rapid international electronic
communications and a central organization for coordination of observing programs and
maintenance of a database of discovered objects and their orbits.
Expected Survey Results
Numerical modeling of the operation of the Spaceguard Survey network indicates that
about 500 NEOs will be discovered per month. Over a period of 25 years we will identify
more than 90 percent of potentially threatening NEOs larger than 1 kilometer in diameter; a
dark-skysurveywill detect most incomingcometsseveral months before they approach the
Earth. At the same time, tens of thousands of smaller asteroids (down to a few meters in
diameter) will also be discovered, although the completeness of the survey dec=ines
markedly for objects smaller than about 500 meters. The advantage of this survey
approach is that it achieves the greatest level of completeness for the largest and most
dangerous objects; however, if continued for a long period of time, it will provide the
foundation for assessing the risk posed by smaller impacts as well. Continued monitoring
of the sky will also be needed to provide an alert for potentially hazardous long-period
comets.
Implementation of the Spaceguard Survey
The survey can begin with current programs in the United States and other countries, which
are providing an initial characterization of the ECA population and can serve as a testbed
for the technologies proposed for the new and larger survey telescopes. A modest injection
of new funds into current programs could also increase current discovery rates by a factor of
two or more, as well as provide training for personnel that will be needed to operate the
new survey network. For the new telescopes, we assume the use of modem technology
that has, over the past decade, substanti_ly reduced the construction costs of telescopes of
this aperture If construction were to begin in Fiscal Year 1993, the survey could be in
operation by about 1997.
Conclusions
The international survey program described in this report can be thought of as a modest
investment to provide insurance for our planet against the ultimate catastrophe. The
probabilitf of a major impact dudng the next century is very small, but the consequences of
such an impact, especially if the object is larger than about 1 kilometer in diameter, are
sufficiently terrible to warrant serious consideration. The Spaceguard Survey is an
essential step toward a program of risk reduction that can reduce the risk of an unforeseen
cosmic impact by more than 75 percent over the next 25 years.
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1. BACKGROUND FOR THE WORKSHOP
NEAR-EAP.T"I OBJECT INTERCEPTION WORKSHOP SUMMARY
by
Gregory H. Canavan and Johndale Solem
Los Alamos National Laboratory
ABSTRACT
A workshop heldatLos Alarnos inJanuary 1992 evaluated
the issuesinvolved inintercel_ingcelestialobjectsapproaching
Earth.Itcovered the technologiesforacquiring,tracking,and
homing on them, as wellas those forthe interceptorstoinspect,
rendezvous with,land on, irradiate,deflect,or destroythem. This
reportreviews the prc_ntations,issues,and conclusions.
1. Introduction
At irregular intervals, the Earth is struck by objects from space. Them is evidence that the
1
age of dinosaurs was brought to an end by thc._impact of an asteroid 10 to 20 kilometers across.
Such la,'_eimpacts apparentlyoccur e_'_-.ryfew tensof millionsof years.Smaller objectsstrike
more frequcndy,but do correspondin:'y|_ssdamage. In 1908 a stony meteoroid about 50 meters
acrossexploded inthe airabove theTunguska riverinSiberia,devastatingthecountrysideover
thousands of square kilometers. 2'3 Impac_ ,_:raters on the surface of the Earth and moons suggest
that such impacts occur every few hundred years and that objects of intermediate sizes impact at
essentially all intermediate frequencies. 4
Recognizing the potential seriousness of such impacts, in 1991 Congress mandated two
workshops on the detection and interception of s_ch near-Earth objects (NEOs). The ?urst defined a
plan for detecting--in the next few decades at distances of a few AU (1 Astronomical Unit is about
150 million kilometers, the distance from the Sun to the Earth)--NEOs a kilometer or larger in size
that might impact the Earth. 5 The first workshop on detection defined the expected threat and the
means to refine it. The second workshop studied potential responses. It examined the issues
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i,avoived in deflecting or destroying NEOs on trajectories that would impact the Earth; the
presentations, isstie, s, and conclusions are summarized in this report. The usefulness of the two
workshops was enhanced by considerable cross-fertilization and joint membership.
The remainder of this section introduces the v_trious perspectives on the NEO threat and
potential solutions that were provided at the Interception Workshop. The following sub-sections
discuss the elements of these solutions, organized by working group subjects that were used to
facilitate the Workshop: astrodynamics of interception; energy delivery and materials interaction;
vehicles and payloads for intercepts; acquisition, tracking, and homing on NEOs; the assessment
of future technologies; and future directions for research. The remaining sections expand on these
discussions, their conclusions, and the reactions to them. Each subject starts with a summary
assessment that was prepared by the working group members listed in the Executive Summary.
They are followed by the texts of the principal papers presented in each area, which were the
principal product of the Interception Workshop. The summary assessments were discussed at
some length within each woriong group, but there was not time to roach a consensus within each
working group, let alone on the overall conclusions and recommendations of the whole group.
Thus, this paper does not attempt to formulate priorities, which are addressed in a separate report
prepared for NASA by John Rather through the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of tbe California
Institute of Technology (JPL of C1T). 6 Remaining issues are addressed in the final sections.
"Background for the Workshop" gives the motivation; reviews the historical evidence for
NEO impacts; gives the rough size, velocity, warning time paramoters for threatening NEOs; and
indicates the order of mag,,,.itude of their frequency and expocted damage. It also reviews what is
known about the composition and frequency of different types of stony and metallic NEOs. It
concludes with summaries of representative exploratory and negation miss_.x'ts.
"The Impact Hazard" by David Mordson summarizes the results of the NASA NEO
Detection Workshop, paying particular attentior_ to the evaluation of the nature and magnitude of
the impact hazard. It argues that "Ear, h-approaching asteroids and comets pose a significant hazard
to life and property...[and that] the greatest risk is associated with objects large enough to disturb
the Earth's climate on a global scale by injecting large quantities of dust into the stratosphere."
Such impacts pose a threat much like that of nuclear winter, which was cliscmsed m the scientific
literature of nuclear exchanges in the depths of the cold war. The paper argues th_,t the threshold
for NEOs that could lead to g:obal crop failures and widespre._d starvation is not well known, but
is probably between 1 and 3 km in diameter, and that the first priority in dealing with the impact
hazard is to identify potential impactors in this size range.
"The Impact Hazard" notes that smaller NEOs, down to 50-100 m in diameter, could cause
severe local damage, but would not perturb the global climate. The individual risk from such
impacts is orders of magmtude less than that of a globally catastrophic impact. The paper argues
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thateven their cumulative effect is substantially less than that posed by objects greater than I km in
diameter. For stony asteroids a second threshold is passed at about 40 m diameters, below which
most of their energy is dissipated high in the atmosphere, and little damage is produced on the
surface. This second threshold is dependent on the composition of the impactor, iron objects down
to a few meters in diameter are capable of penetrating the atmosphere. Morrison argues that there is
little reason to be concerned with objects much smaller than 100 m in diameterma result that was
disputed by some attendees at the Workshop, who expressed concern over much smaller NEOs.
In summarizing the results of The Spaceguard Survey Report, 7 Morrison notes that the
NASA Detect/Gn Workshop group proposed the construction of a network of 6 ground-based
telescopes to carry out an automated sky survey for the detection of objects down to astronomical
magnitude 22, approximately to the brightness of a 1-km diameter dark asteroid at a distance of 1.5
AU. If pursued for two decades, such a survey could discover 90 percent of asteroids larger than 1
km in Earth-crossing orbits, while at the same time finding tens of thousands of additional smaller
objects. The great majority of these objects will be discovered long before they pose a direct threat,
thus providing decades of warning for any impact. This survey would also detect potentially
dangerous incoming comets, but with much less warningmin some cases less than 12 months.
"The Spacewatch CCD [charge-coupled device] Search" by Tom Gehrels described the
University of Arizona's 0.9-m Spacewatch Telescope on Kitt Peak. Federally funded since 1980 to
: search for NEOs, it is dedicated to the development of new techniques for their discovery. It
presently scans the sky with a 20482 CCD detector array, computer processing the output in near-
teal time. Its discovery rate in 1991 was 15 NEOs/yr, with new CCDs of higher qmmtmn
efficiency, the discovery rate is now about 30 NEOs/yr. About an order-of magnitude
improvement in detection rate is anticipated with the 1.8-m Spacewatch Telescope now under
construction. Gehtcls's data resembles that summarized in Morrison's "Impact Hazard," but has
higher impact frequencies for smaller NEOs. The impact of the differences between Ge&rels's and
Morrison_s data, which mp.,esent the major uncertainty in the asse_nent of the NEO hazard, are
discussed below at some length in the paper on "Value, of Space Defen,_."
"Some Perspectives on the Search for Near-Earth Objects" by Duncan I. Steel describes the
search for new and smaller NEOs by combining current technology and previous observations. He
describes the difficulties with new Aten objects (period < 1 yr, aphelion > 0.9833 AU), which are
difficult to cleux:t with conventional telescope searches because of their unfavorable geometry. Steel
also discusses the challenges of searching for new classes of NFX_ in highly inclined orbits, like
Halley's comet. He summarizes experience with radars, which can categorize NEOs easily. He
alr_ discusses the traditional difficulties in predicting the history or trajectory of NEOs subject to
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non-gravitational perturbations, which make distant impacts hard to predict. He ends with a useful
summary of the current debate on coherent versus stochastic catastrophism, i.e., the possibility that
much recent damage has been done by multiple intercepts by < 100 m fragments from large NEOs
that have broken up in the past.
"To Hit or Not To Hit" by Brian Marsden also questions the value of secular perturbation
calculations for objects that would not hit the Earth for 200 .years or more. He provides a useful
table of possible large NEOs that might become threats under such influences, but finds few threats
in the next few decades. He discusses the uniquely stressing threats posed by long-period comets,
which are numerically less likely, but more of a problem due to their short warning and very high
kinetic energy. He notes that satellites deployed on the opposite side of the sun would be useful in
detecting them early--if they were about 100 times more _nsitive than the telescopes proposed by
the detection workshop. The strong time-luminosity curves of such objects kept the IRAS satellite
from detecting anything that could not be detected easily from ground-based telescopes. Their
performance would improve if the telescopes were deployed very far from the _possibly
closer to the sun--and perhaps around Venus.
"Airblast Damage from Small Asteroids" by Jack G. Hills and M. Patrick Goda explores
the difficult and controversial subject of the damage from small NEOs that break up in the
atmosphere before they hit the ground. Using detailed models of the fragmentation of stony
meteorites as they decelerate at a few scale heights in the atmosphere, they find that the energy
deposition from NEOs of 50-250 m diameter can accidentally approach the "optimal height of
burst" used for nuclear weapons, and hence produce the maximum ground damage possible for a
given kinetic energy. They conclude that stony asteroids under 250 m and iron asteroids under 60
m diameter probably won't survive--tending to break up at a few scale heights. However, those
with diameters down to about 40 to 4 m, respectively, could produce great damage by depositing
their energy in the airblast and spreading their fragments over distances of kilometer" Their
calculations interp_t the Tunguska event as roughly an 80 m diameter .stony meteorite with a
kinetic energy of about 40 MT (megaton, the energy equivalent of 1,000,000 tons of high
explosive, or about 4x1015 joules).
These results make it possible to refine the qualitative threshclds in phenomenology posed
above by Morrison and make a more quantitative assessment of the damage from modest-sia,ed
NEOs, which has been one of the most divisive issues, in the field of late. The physics of NEO
breakup is far from certain; data are only starting to f'dter in. 8 The _.akup of meteoroids in the
Earth's atmosphere luas been thought to explain twin craters, but recent evidence indicates that of
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the30 largest craters, at least 6 occur in p_,Arsin configurations that Jay Melosh of the University of
Arizona asserts cannot be explained by the dispersion argument assumed in these calculations.
Instead, atteiition is shifting to the notion that NEts could circle in pairs or groups, in which case
NEt intercep'_s would also have to be executed in pairs.
While the physics of small NEt damage is better understood through the work of Hills and
Goda, the damage mechanisms for NEts with intermediate diameters of 50---2,000 m are still
uncertain. It would be useful to integrate the thoughtful scaling analyses of hypervelocity impacts
that have been performed by Russian and other Former Soviet Union scientists over the last few
decades, going back to the fundamental scaling work of Sedov and Zeldovich. 9
2. Astrodynamics of Interception
Detection and interception are interrelated. In general, the farther away a threatening NEt is
detected, the farther away it can be engaged, and the easier it is to deflect or destroy. The working
group summary paper on _Astrodynamics of Interception" reviews likely intercepts, from the least
to the most stressing, and attempts to assign the rough warning times, probabilities, interaction
distances, and velocity increments for each. It also gives elementary discussions of the key issues
associated with intercepts ranging from those many orbits prior to impact to those attempted during
the final approach, which establishes the rough hunch re,quirements for each type of intercept.
Table 2-1 illustrates these requirements. For a NEt whose exact orbit could be established
decades ahead of its projected impact, interaction could take place at a distance of several AU and
require only about I cm/s. Thus, it should be possible to send out a mission to rendezvous with it
at perihelion and apply just enough impulse to shift its trajectory enough to miss the Earth. A NEt
with a dian_eter of 2 kilometers and density _ ,- 3,000 kg/m 3 has a mass m = 4s_(D/2)3/3 --
1.2x 1013 kg. Changing its vel_ity by 1 cm/s at perihelion could be effected by ejecting about
1.2x1013 kg x i cm/s / 3 km/s _ 40 tonnes of material at a typical rocket specific impulse of 300
seconds, i.e., an exhaust velocity of c = 3 'km/s. That is arguably feasible, although stressing, with
nonnuclear means. For example, a singl,= Energia booster could put about 100 tonnes in l_w F.au',h
orbit and accelerate about 30 tonnes escape velocity. Higher specific impulse concepts ctuld in
time significantly lower these mass requirements.
For less certain orbits, which would only permit re,sponse times of about a year, the
velocities required increase by one to two orders of magnitude, and the masses and energies
required for deflection increase with them. For very short-warning objects such as smaller-
diameter asteroids or long-period comets, which are more difficult to detect, the interceptor would
have to deflect or &'stroy the NEt during its final approach. It is possible to illusu'ate the energies
required. If an NEt 2 km in diameter could be split in half at a range R - 1 AU, and each half
givenjust enoughtransversevelocityVTtOmissthe Earth, that would require a divert velocity of
VT = v(Re/R) = 30 krn/s (6,400 km/ 1.5x108 km) = 1.3 m/s, where Re is the Earth's radius. That
would require a kinetic energy of mvT2/2 = 1.2x1013 kg (1.3 m/s)2/2 = 10 !3 joule _ 2.5 KT
(ldloton), neglecting the energy to split the NEO, which could be much larger.
In short-warning engagements, this whole detection range would not be available for
deflection. A NEO approaching at a velocity v = 30 km/s that was detected at a range of R = 1 AU
would permit a response time of at most = R/v = 2 months. For an interceptor that flew out to it
with a speed of V = 3 km/s that could be generated by chemical rockets, the intercept would take
place at a time T = R/(V + v) = R/v after detection at a range of about Ki = VT ,= R V/(V + v)
R/11 = 0.1 AU. The transverse velocity required would then increase to about VT = 13 rrds and tltt
kinetic energy to about 250 KT. If the NEO was only detected at 0.1 AU and the intercept took
place at about 0.01 AU, the interceptor would need an explosive energy of 25 MT. This
pmg_ssion illustrates the strong sensitivity to warning and interceptor performance in the terminal
regime and demonstrates that for short-warning engagements during the final approach, the
energies required are about at the limit of those that can now be generated by man.
"Deflection and Fragmentation of Near-Ear_ Asteroids" by Thomas J. Ahrens gives a
good overall summary of the types of NEOs that pose likely threats. It bounds the requirements for
deflection at distant rendezvous, estimating the requirements to be in the range of a few m/s to a
few cm/s, depending on the warning and rendezvous time and the type of deflection attempted. It
indicates why parallel perturbation at perihelion is most efficient, and gives useful approximations
to the displacements generated as a function of the locus and magnitude of the velocity increments
applied. It then relates these velocity requirements to the capabilities of the small nuclear explosives
or mass drivers required for dispersal or fragmentation, which the paper suggests could be
developed through affordable programs.
"Dynamics of NEO Interception" by Claude Phipps provides a basis for independent
numerical estimates by those who are quantitatively inclined. It treats the whole intercept problem
m an integrated graphical fashion. It reviews NEO detection range as function of _attered light,
showing that for typical brighmes.ses, warning times could plausibly vary from years to days. It
then estimates the velocity vector change and energy momentum coupling required. That provides a
road map for interception, deflection, and fracture. These coupled estimates give an overall set of
nomographs for general solutions, within which the point estimates of other papers fit in a
reasonably consistent way.
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3. Energy Delivery and Materials Interaction
If the NEO can be inte_ _pted several orbital periods before coll_ion, it can be adequately
deflected with far less energy. Mass drivers, rockets, or possibly even Earth- or moon-based lasers
might suffice, although they would represent formidable engineering chores. For larger NEOs,
when the realities of energy delivery and coupling efficiency me taken into account, the energies
required are even larger than those estimated above. The most effective method of deflection is to
blow off part of the NEO's surface and obtain the transverse velocity needed by reaction. The
smallest NEOs might be negated by nonnuclear interceptors, which could use just their kinetic
energy to pulverize or deflect NEOs.
The "Work._hop Summary" on energy delivery argues that for NEOs 100 meters or larger,
nuclear explosives appesr to be mandatory for intercepts at ranges under an AU. The most
straightforward approach is to explode them at or near the NEO's surfaw,e, generating impulse as
the reaction to the ejecta blown off from the resulting crater. Detonations at an optimum sub-
surface depth could be an order of magnitude more effective than surfi_:e detonations, but the
apparatus neeMed for penetration could be so w"mive as to cancel this advantage. Furthermore,
subsurface explosions have a higher probability of fracturing the NEO into a few lethal chunks on
nearly the original trajectory, which could produce and even less manageable threat. The
probability of fracture is minimized by an enhanced radiation explosion at a distance of about half a
radius above the surface of the NEO. Energy deposition by neutrons would heat and blow off a
thin layer, whose recoil would deflect the NEO. While minimizing stresses and the need for
knowledge about the NEO's interior, this approach would require about a factor of 100 more
energy than a surface explosion.
"Nuclear Explosive Propelled Interceptor for Deflecting Comments and Asteroids on a
Potentially Catastrophic Collision Course with Earth" by Johndale C. Solem is motivated by the
observation that the effectiveness of kinetic-energy deflection increases rapidly with the specific
impulse of the interceptor rocket, because not only does the higher velocity interceptor create more
transverse momentum by producing a larger crater and higher specific energy blow-off, but also it
gets to the NEO faster, so a smaller imparted momentum can produce a given miss distance.
An interceptor using chemical propulsion might only be able to intercept an NEO at "about
10% of its detection range, which makes deflection dilTtcult. With much higher specific impulse
and thrust, the interceptor could be accelerated to a much higher velocity, which would increase the
intercept distance and reduce, the needed deflection, h_ the interceptor accelerated all the way up to
the NEO's speed, it would impact at about 1/3 of the detection distance, which would reduce the
transverse velocity required by a factor of 3 and the kinetic energy by a factor of 10. Its specific
energy release would be increased by a factor of [(30+30 km/s)/(30+3 km/s)] 2 = 3.3, which
would make it possible to reduce the interceptor mass by a like amount.
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A spacecraft uniquely combining high specific impulse and high thrust is one propelled by
nuclear explosives. An unmanned vehicle can be very efficient, because it can be designed without
a massive shock mitigation apparatus. The paper provides a set of analytical expre_ions for
evaluating the performance of a nuclear explosive propelled interceptor and compares it to a
chemically propelled rocket for the deflection of a 200-m asteroid detected at 1/10 AU. The nuclear
interceptor weighs only 2 tons rather than the 5,000 tons of a chemical rocket, has a much smaller
probability of fracturing the asteroid, and offers the option for multiple shots. The interceptor
would require about 100 explosives of about 2 KT each. If the nuclear propulsion was used only
in space, it should present no radiation hazard to the EaruJ
"Interception of Comets and Asteroids on Collision Course with Earth," also by Johndale
C. Solem, discusses optimal strategies for diversion or disruption of NEts whose collision is
imminent. Such scenarios would apply for launches when the object is less than one AU from the
Earth, which is a reasonable assumption for asteroids less than one km in diameter due to the
difficulty of detecting them. The paper treats the diversion of the objects by blowing mass off their
surface, whose recoil imparts transverse velocity to the NEt. Four mechanisms for imparting
energy are considered: (1) kinetic energy of impact; (2) surface-burst nuclear explosives; (3)
penetrating nuclear explosives that detonate at the optimal depth; and (4) stand-off nuclear
explosives, which heat and blow material off the surface with neutrons and x-rays.
"Interception" shows that kinetic-energy deflection is effective o_y for quite small bodies
intercepted at a substantial fraction of an AU from the Earth. Because most of the objects in this
range would produce tittle or no damage, kinetic-energy deflection seems to be of minimal use.
Nuclear explosive deflection is needed for larger objects. Nuclear surface bursts offer a 3-to-4
order of magnitude mass reduction over kinetic-energy _vices, although their advantage decreases
slightly with specific impulse and dramatically with NEt relative velocity. Fragmentation is a
problem for intercepts closer than 1/30 AU. Because of the weight penalty associated with the
penetration vehicle, nuclear penetrators offer no significant advantage over surface bursts for
deflection, but are better for pulveriz,gtion. Stand-off deflection gre_.dy reduces fragmentation
problems, but requires a 10 to lflO-fold increase in interceptor mass.
"Cosmic Bombardment III: Ways- and Means of Effectively Intercepting the Bomblets" is
the third in a series of unpublished reports by Roderick Hyde., Nicholes Colella, Muriel lshikawa,
Arno Ledebuhr, Yu-Li Pan, Lyn Pleasance, and Lowell Wood of Lawrence Livelmore Nation_
Laboratory that explore various ways of countering NEts. Only the charts ale available, which is
unfortunate, given the significant popular comment the presentation generated, but even the charts
are stimulating. They argue that NEts of all diameters greater than I(10 m are worth intercepling,
and pr,_vide economic calculations that argue that even smaller NEts are worth addressing. Such
NEts could be address_ by current technology. The paper argues that for humanitarian as well as
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economic reasons, we should address all the NEOs we can. That leads to an awkward point,
because the main challenge in intercepting small NEOs is in detecting them. Given that, the rest of
the technology seems to be in hand. Some advanced telescope concepts for detec6ng small, nearby
NEOs were presented, but not in enough detail to permit their evaluation in the context of the
sensors proposed by the Detection Workshop.
"Cosanic Bombardment III" argues that given our limited knowledge, big, fast NEOs on
their first pass appear to present the gravest danger. It advocates a defense with several layers:
flyby inspections, distant intercepts and deflections, and terminal defenses with successively larger
explosives. It recognizes the need to shove, not shatter, NEO, and that precise emplacement or
cratering looks hard. Thus, it also advocates standoff neutronic coupling. But it recogidzes that for
very big NEOs, the inefficiency of standoff coupling could impose unacceptable penalties. For
them, it advocates detonation of explosives deep within the NEO--using a chain of explosions to
emplace the final explosive at the optimal depth. Deflection could take hundreds or thousands of
MT of explosives, although the amounts could drop to hundreds of MT if the NEO was only
fractured and dispersed. It does not give quantitative estimates for the delivery systems required,
but overall estimates appear to be consistent with those given by Solem.
"Cosmic Bombardment" starts with the smallest and most frequent threats and stresses the
need to begin testing our ability to intercept them--an argument that was not generally accepted.
Their logic is that the "next one is due anytime--[there is] no known leading indicator'...The
empirical expectation is about "once per human lifetime of 10-100 MT events." While there are
controvt _sics over the details of these estimates--particularly over the damage due to very small
NEOs--it argues that "terrestrial life just now has a representative capable of actively defending
itself from the bombardment, after 4.0 cons of simply enduring iL"
"Aseroid/Meteorite Analogs and Material Properties" by John L. Remo presents analogs
between meteorites and asteroids that permit a classification scheme for NEOs in terms of their
mechanical strength and thermal properties, which could reduce the uncertainties strategies for their
interception. It presents and discusses an abridged data base to flesh out that classification,
includi:,g a u.sc[ui appendix on NEO materials properties, and discusses the material science work
needed to support intercept experiments.
"Some Notes on Terrestrial Blasting Design and NEO Interception" by Rict,ard Gcrtsch
gives a helpful review of experience with terrestrial blasting. The discussion is qualitative, like
blasting practice itself. It discusses the scaling of the "powder factor," which is the amount of
energy and mass required to fragment a unit of rock, and of the "geomeu'y," that determines how
energy is delivered in space and time, which has a profound influence on powder factor. While not
discussed explicitly, these concepts have dirrzt analo&s in the nuclear yield and placement
arguments in the papers above.
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The report illustrates the key problem with conventional explosives: standard high
explosive (HE) powder factors are 0.05-0.5 kg HE per toil of rock, so a l million ton asteroid
would need 50-500 tons of HE, which appear prohibitive. The preferred free-face geometry is
shnilar to the standoff preferred for nuclear explosives. So are the optimal energy placement in
space and time, the use of shaped charges and arrays, and the practical problems of material
rotation, gravel pits, overidll, and fratricide. Gertsch concludes that a large single point explosion
is generally less efficient than an array of smaller explosions, whose device size, number, and
energy depend on geometry. It concurs with the papers discussed above in concluding that
uncontrolled fragmentation is the least desirable result and that _ best defense is reasonably
designed overkill. Overall, most lessons from conventional explosive mining appear to carry over
almost directly to kinetic energy and nuclear explosive defenses against NEOs.
"Penetrator Device Applications and NEO Materials Properties" by John L. Remo shows
that penetrator devices can optimally place explosives within NEOs to optimize energy and
momentum transfer and pulverization, in accord with the discussions above. But it goes further to
show that penetrators have disadvantages in mass, particularly for conventional uranium alloy
penetrator cores. It discusses the metallurgical properties of penetrators optimized for NEOs.
"NEO Interaction with X-Ray and Neutron Radiation" by Peter Hammerling and John L.
Remo is a broad technical analysis that is intended to be accessible to a wide audience. It treats
repetitive and combined x-ray and neutron interactions, seeking synergistic interactions that could
reduce energy requirements. It provides analytic treatments of optimal deposition and impulse,
paying particular attention to an example of x-ray coupling from an explosion of about 1 MT above
the surface of the NEO. Its treatment of neutron coupling appears consistent with that of Solem. It
uses the earlier Snowmass Report to estimate the total impulses needed, concluding that both x-
rays and neutrons should be used to reduce the total energies required for NEGs of moderate sizes.
"Near-Earth Object Orbit Management by Explosive Impulse Thrusters" by John L. Remo
and P. M. Sforza discusses penetrators with high explosive or nuclear impulse generators for
orbital adjustment, surveying energy requirements for a wide parameter space. Where comparisons
are possible, its results correspond to Solem and others' point calculations.
4. Vehicles and Payloads
Interception involves two types of missions: precursors to measure, NEO dimensions and
composition, and intercepts to divert or destroy them. The former could involve relatively low-cost
interceptors derived from current defensive technologies. For useful ranges, the latter would
require much larger payload masses and higher velocities than those currendy available. They
couht benefit from research on advanced upper stages, electric, and nuclear propulsion. The
nuclear rocket discussed in the first of the two papers by Soicm illustrates their advantages.
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The "Workshop Summary" describes typical missions: precursors to examine NEOs,
intercepts to divert or fragment them, and collisions to destroy large N'EOs on short notice. The
report summarizes the payload mass requireA for each, which increase rapidly with size. It also
summarizes current capabilities for delivering such masses and energies to escape veloc'iti_. The
discussion of DoD capabilities is stronger than that of NASAs capabilities simply due to the
interests of the attendees at the Workshop. There would appear to be an adequate set of vehicles for
flyby and rendezvous missions. There is also an adequate s_t of small payloads with relevant
passive and active visible and infrared sensors for information gathenng missions from U.S.
strategic defense developmental programs, which are to be tested in the next 1-2 years.
"The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization Clementine Mission" by Col. Simon P.
Worden, Deputy Director for Technology of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO),
describes a small satellite whose main mission is to test the survivability and effectiveness of an
applicable set of advanced SDIO vehicles and sensors in realistic operating space conditions.
Clementine will test passive and active sensors that could be useful in characterizing NEO
composition and configuration through a flyby of Ge_graphos, one of the better-known Earth-
crossing asteroids. Clementine is to approach within a few kilometers, from where its iidar could
map Ge.,ographos's surface with resolutions of centimeters to meters. Its detailed spectral
information should also support useful resource maps and materials measurements.
The options for diverting NEOs at long range appear feasible, but are marginal and
undeveloped. There does not appear to be adequate payload for divert missions at closer range,
other than nuclear diversion of small NEOs. Tbe larger launchers of the former Soviet Union could
improve the capability for longer range, nigher-payoff divert and destroy missions, if they could be
harnessed to international needs, as suggested by current trends. The launch vehicles and payloads
needed for large NEOs that approach out of the sun with little warning, as could be the case for
long-period comets, appear well beyond current or planned capacity. Earlier warning with non-
terrestrial sensors could reduce the intercept requirements to feasible levels.
5. Acquisition, Tracking, and Homing
NEOs must be deflected very precisely; thus, their initial trajectories and composition must
be known preci._ly. NEOs discovered by visible sensors at ranges out to a few AU can be put into
secure orbits by tracking observations with existing radars when they approach within about 0.1
AU of the Earth, as demonstrated by Workshop member Steven Ostro of JPL. Donald Yeomans,
also of JPL, demonstrated that these orbits could then be extrapolated decades into the future with
sufficient accuracy to assess hazards. Daniel Prono of Livermore discussed advanced technologies
derived from DoD-SDIO work on free-electron lasers that could extend those ranges to _. 1 AU.
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The "Workshop Summary" describes the status of visible sensors, radars, and homing sensors.
Visible cameras are quite adequate to reacquire tracks established by the telescope survey system
proposed by the l_tectionWorkshop. Radars are a proven and valuablesensorforconverting
rough tracksintosecureorbitsthatcan be predictedforward withconfident. They can also
measure key surfaceand geometricpropertiesof NEOs. While thecurrentradarnetwork is
adequate forcurrentdiscoveryrates,itwould be swamped by theproposed telescopearray.Radars
inthe Southern Hemisphere would be usefulin speeding up searchand orbitsecuring.So would
brighterversionsthatcould securetheorbitsof NEOs detectedvisiblyatlongerrangesthanthe0.I
AU of current radars. Homing sensors for interceptors are demanding but straightforward
derivatives of current defensive technologies. For a comet, however, obscuration of its nucleus by
its coma may make detecting the appropriate target and precision impact more difficult.
"Acquisition and Track of Neat-Earth Objects" by Gregory H. Canavan uses simple scaling
arguments to compare optical and radar search and track for NEO reacquisition. Passive optical
search is superficially different than radar search, but is shown to scale similarly. Optical sensors
are good for long-range search; modest telescopes of a few meter diameter appear suitable for
reacquisition out to about 1 AU. Efficient visible detector arrays appear feasible and attractive;
recent advantages in processing could reduce false-track problems, increase speed, and automate
search. Radars are useful for track and characterization, although they have shorter ranges, because
they are active, and hence have better metrics, which areneeded fortheprecisetrajectory
information needed to secure the orbits of newly discovered objects. Existing defe.ns¢ radars could
have some useful capabilities for near-Earth search and track. Bis,.aiic geometries do not appear to
offer advantages. Radar and optical sensors are largely _mplementary. Optical sensors are best for
search at long range: radars are better for track a_.d NF.,O characterization at shorter ranges.
"Fireball Observation Via SaeRiie" by D. A. Reynolds shows that existing defense visible
and infrared warning satellites could have considerable value in augmenting searches for NEOs of
relevant magnitudes. It reports the detection by satellite optical sensors of an intense flash of light
over the Western Pacific Ocean on 1 October 1990. The sensors, though optimized for nuclear
bursts, gave high-quality intensity-time data on a fireball of visual magnitude -23. Even better
performance could be expected with more modern sensors and processing. It would be desirable to
fuse defense data with civil NEO searches. Had this event been recorded a year later over the
Mideast, it could have been misintergceted as the use of a nuclear weapon in the Gulf War.
6. Assessment of Future Technoh gtes
The "WoAshop Summary" gives a wide-reaching, if somewhat controversial view of the
technologies that might be available for lqEO interception at various future time periods. The array
of technologies surveyed is encyclopedic, ranging from lasers to "brilliant mountains." The
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assessmentsof the risks associated with the different approaches were not without controversy.
Many reviewers found the survey too speculative, but the authors suspect that if anything, it is
probably too conservative for the .cAb100 year time frame in which stressing threats are likely to
develop. Scientists ate generally too optimistic about what can be done in the next few years and
too pessimistic about what can be done in the next few decades. Those who try to predict even to
the end of the century are looked at askance by their peers. Anyone who speculates decades to
centuries ahead tends to be dismissed as irresponsible. Recognizing that, we have chosen to
suspend judgment on the "Workshop Assessment of Future Technologies" and present it as
written--not as a considered _ment, but as a collection of quantitative treatments of current
concepts---in the hope that it will stimulate a fuller discussion in the next Workshop.
Distant intercepts provide options for advanced propulsion and deflection. Nuclear rockets
could accelerate larger payloads to much higher velocities than current chemical rockets; materials
mined in space could be used as expellants for rockets or mass drivers on the NEO's surface.
Short-warning, close-in intercepts offer more of a challenge and fewer options. Flyout velocities
needed are very high and the energies required are immense. The greatest leverage would appear to
be in improving detection so that most engagements could occur at long ranges, which argues for
the placement of sensors in space.
"Space Optical and Low-Frequency Radio Searches for Earlh-Crossing Asteroids and
Comets" by Jack G. Hills argues that spacecraft closer to the Sun would reduce biases in searching
for Earth crossing asteroids. Lagrange points or orbits around Venus would net miss any NEOs
approaching the Earth, even from the Sun-ward direction. Comet outgassing generates low-
frequency radio emission by wiggling the magnetic field in the solar wind; thus, radio emission
from NEOs is expected, and could be observable from radio arrays in space or on the moon. While
there axe various options for basing, the main point is that the most stressing threats appear to be
long-period comets on their first approach, which tend to come out of the sun. Sensors in orbits
that could view these portions of space could increase warning from months to years, which would
reduce intercept requirements by orders of magnitude.
"Capturing Asteroids Into Bound Orbits Around the Earth: Massive Early Return on an
Asteroid Terminal Defense System" by Jack G. Hills advocates the capture, of 20-50 m asteroids
into bound orbits about Earth as a way of making NEO defense pay for itself from the outset.
Cap,ured asteroids would be valuable both for material and for manned activity. Close, slow
asteroids could be captu:ed with modified ICBMs. About 5% of them are nickel-iron, and a 30 m
nickel meteoroid comes within 10 Earth radii every year. Such a platform could be a major asset
for future manned space programs. It could be captured for a deflection of about 1.5 km/s, which
is within reachof about150KT of nuclearexplosive,s. It shouldbepossibleto practicecaptur_
beyondthemoon.Doingsomight take $ l- 10M/ton per capture with surplus ICBMs, which could
give a cost effectiveness ratio of about 10,000: I. Captured asteroids could be hollowed out for a
space station or used as platforms for railguns, solar furnaces, etc.
"Discovery in Near.Earth Space" by Anthony Zuppero notes that there are many kilometer-
sized objects in space with much water--some so rough that asymmetric evaporation continually
changes tl_ir orbits. Comet cores could be useful. They are massive and accessible sources of
mass. They could give simple fuels, which could provide big, early paybacks. The paper gives a
list of likely comet and NEO candidates that are close enough to be interesting to fu_l a tanker to
gather water for 10,000 ton payloads, which could push killer cornets out of Earth-collision orbits.
"Laser Deflection of NEOs" by Claude Phipps explores the option of using ground-based
lasers with mirrors in space to irradiate NEOs, generate, ablation, and use the reaction to deflect
them. Thrust rates are low ff warning times are long, so the concept does not look impractical. The
paper proposes innovative designs for space mirrors 10 to 1,000 m in diameter and lasers with
pulse energies of tens of thousands of megajoules, which might be built and operated for a few
billion dollars. Such lasers could also Ix_ used for metrics of as searchlights for re.stricted areas.
7. Future Directions for Research
NEO impacts are infrequent, but potentially serious. Impacts by very large NEOs are
potentially catastrophic, but it is unlikely that there are any in orbits that will intersect the Earth in
the next few centuries. This interval could give time for the development of more advanced
detection and intercept technologies. Smaller NEOs impact more frequently, but their losses are
bounded. Current data seem to imply that their impact frequency varies inversely with their energy,
i.e., inversely with the cube of their diameter, out to diameters of a few tens of meters. It then falls
roughly inversely with the square of diameters out to NFJ3s a few kilometers across, and a bit
more slowly for very large NEOs. 10 The NV_s' damage mechanisms are varied and uncertain, but
the total _ rendered unproductive by a NF:O is generally thought to vary roughly as the square of
its diameter. Convolving this impact frequency and damage area produces the total expected
damage in the absence of defenses.
"Value of Space Defenses" by G_egory H. Canavan uses the eml_rical data in the papers
discussed above to provide simple estimates of the expected losses from various classes of NEOs.
For nominal p_,:::+..,mrs, the staallest NE_, i.e., those with diameters of about 50 m or less,
produce localized damage. The predicted value, of the loss depends on the diameter of the smallest
NEOs that can penetrated down into the atmosphere far enough to cause damage on the surface.
Sm_ll stony NEOs cause little damage; the expected Ic_es from metallic MEOs appear to be on the
order of a SM/yr.
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IntermediateNEOs,with diameters from 50 to about 2,000 m, contribute more. Each
octave in diame._r contributes about equally to the damage, so the total damage from intermediate
sized NEOs depends logarithmically on the ratio of the largest to the smallest NEOs that can cause,
massive but not catastrophic damage. The total loss is sensitive to uncertainties in overall collision
frequencies; current data indicate expected losses on the order of $10bi/yr, which is perhaps worth
insuring against.
The largest NEOs, with diameters over about 2 Inn, appear to hit every few million years.
They have the potential to interrupt production of food and other ncce, ssides over much of the
surface of the Earth for decades. With warning and preparation, damage might be kept to the world
gross product for a few decades. In that case, the losses would amount to a few $100M/yr. A by-
product of this evaluation is the demonstration that detection alone would have great value in
providing warning, determining the supplies needed, and identifying the are,as to be evacuated.
Expected losses are sensitive to the variation of impact mte.s with NEO sire, which is not
known precisely; the area devastated by an NEO of a given size and energy; and the Earth's
rocovery rates. If impacted areas are only uninhabitable for a few tens of years, NEO defenses are
estimated to bc worth on the orc%r of a few tens to hundreds of millions of dollars per year. If the
devastated areas remained uninhabitable for much longer times, the value of defens_ could
increase by roughly an order of magnitude.
Thus, for nominal pararnctcrs the average loss rate b.a.s a bounded contribution from the
small and intermediate NEOs that regularly damage the Earth's surfaT, c and a potentially much
larger contribution from large NlSX)s, if any. Logically, we should properly insure against both,
but their premiums and programs vary widely. A few million dollars per year could support
observations with existing international Spacewatch facilities as well as theoretical and laboratory
work on advanced detection and mter_ption concepts. A few tens of minions of dollars could
provide the Spaccguard telescopes propo_xl for the detection of large Earth-threatening NEOs. A
few tens of millions per year could provide res_rch on improved sensors for the prompt detection
of smaller asteroids and long-period comets and t_st the robotic spacecraft missions needed to
characterize NEOs of all sizes. Actual defenses against intermediate and large NEOs could
ultimately cost hundreds of millions to develop and billions to deploy---but over times of docades.
Unfortunately, confusion over the relative priorities of detection and interception has thus far
tended todelay actionon either, 11 even though preliminary economic estimates above indicatetha:
tl_ return for either would justify the rese.a_h for both. 12 The hazards are global; the responses
should be, too. The requ,red actions are arnenable to international execution, but the most pressing
actions could be started even without international organization.
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"Why Now?" EdwardTeller'safter-dinnerspeechfor theWorkshop,givesa tentative place to
start. Observing that we weren't even able to foresee the major events 3f the last few years, let
alone predict the. rapid march in enabling technologies such as lasers, lidars, and radars, he argues
that we should proceed in stages. First, we should simply accumulate knowledge, f'mding out all
we can about mewo_tes from the Earth or space--and in the process, gaining useful information
on backgrounds and variable stars. Second, we should experiment, trying to rendezvous with
targets of opportunity, in order to see what we could do in practice. Third, we should try to
intercept an NEa that wouldn't hit the Earth. Fourth and finally, we should attempt to destroy or
deflect one that would.
Teller noted that the Baruch plan proposed after WWII for the international control of
nuclear technology offers some guidance for the intexnational control of the large nuclear energies
and delivery means required. He ended with a challenge: "We can solve the problems both of war
and metex)rites. But we shall not lack problems. Man has been called a problem-solving animal.
Man and woman should be called prcblem-creating animals. We will have new problems to solve."
8. Popular Reaction
NEO mtercoption in general and the Workshop in specific received a reasonable amount of
coverage in the media over the last year. This section gives a brief review of the main responses,
and relates them to the Work,_op's main thrusts, issues, and conclusions.
The earliest and most ac_.._ible of the popular articles was "When Worlds Collide: the
Beginnings and Ends of Worlds" by Call gagan, which stimulated much of the early interest in the
subject. 13 Sagan argues that close encounters between heavenly bodies tend to tear them to pieocs,
which tendsto leaveour solarsystem a ratherlitteredand somewhat dangerous shootinggallery.
Asteroids accumulate; they wander around; they hit things. The evidence is obvious on all the
moons and planets. Even the Earth shows damage, although it is protected by a thick atmosphere
and consoled by an environment that quickly smoothes damage to its surface.
"When Worlds Collide" focuses attention on about 150 Earth-crossing asteroids, many of
which make near mis._es---or "near hits," m Sagan's terminology--on geologic time scales. It
observes that "it may not be beyond our ability to bring a large rocket motor to the surface of an
errant asteroid and alter its trajectory just enough so it misses the Earth." It gocs on to point out that
"this is a much better idea than the. _temative--blowing an asteroid to smithereens with a 20-
megaton nuclear weapon and hoping that each smithereens burns up while entering the Earth's
atmosphere." In private correspondence, Sagan acknowledges that for the biggest and fastest
NEOs with the least warning time, nuclear thrust or explosives have an advantage due to their
million-fold higher energy per unit mass, but he also expre,sses concern over the relative haz:ud of
the N'EX_ and the control of the armadas needed to negate them. 14
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Sagan argues that "we must f'ust know where the asteroid is and where it's headed...we're
not doing a very good job in looking for them." He cites the efforts of two of the Workshop
participants, Eleanor Helin and Eugene Shoemaker, who were funded in pan by Sagan's Planetary
Society, and calls for "a much more comprehensive search...building on the work of these
pioneers." He concludes by arguing that it might be time for a "round-trip to Asteroid 4660. The
rocket technology to get there already exists. It's real exploration of a truly new world, rather than
the monotonous orbiting of the Earth at low altitude that is sometimes passed off as space
'exploration.' And it might not be too soon to start practicing getting to these worldlets and
diverting their orbits, should the hour of need ever arrive." (emphasis added).
A set of articles by Fran Smith, of the San Jose Mercury News 15 reviews the main issues
and controversies i_ the Workshop. A lively and acx,e_ible article in Mercury, the Journal of the
Astronomical Society of the Pacific, presents many of the is.,mes in the words of the participants. 16
It notes that a number of novices to NASA's rendezvous programs, ourselves included, tended to
dominate the meeting. It properly and correctly addresses the key issue: "What size of rock is the
biggest danger?" properly assesses the "micro-asteroid threat," and notes the contradictions in the
assertions by some that the Earth's atmosphere provides adequate protection against all NEOs. The
articles properly capture the tension some scientists felt when they had to come to grips with the
fact that the only energy sources that could keep us from shahng the fate of the dinosaurs might be
the ones that brought us to the brink of extinction in the cold war. That issue of Mercury also
contains accessible sumraaries of the Detection 17 and Interception 18 Workshops.
Perhaps the greatest publicity was generated by the editorial "Star Warriors on Sky Patrol"
by Robert L. Park of the American Institute of Physics. 19 It covered most of the controversies
raised in the Workshop, including Dr. Edward Teller's response that it should be possible to build
the nuclear explosives needed for intercep_ during final approach, although it would require "the
development of a new super bomb---4en thousand times more powerful than any bomb ever built, a
bomb so powerful it could never be detonated on Earth." The editorial also rr.corded one
participant's reaction--"nukes forever"--althcugh the author, who was not there, did not note that
this comment simply reflected a general recognition of the enormity of the energies..'equired for
negation on final approach, not enthusiasm for nuclear weapons design. The construction of such
immense explosives would involve only fe.idy pedestrian engineering details.
The rest of the article is a thoughtful review of the evidence for the role of NEOs in
dinosaur extinction, which it credits for permitting the rise of man; the frequency of impact of
NEOs of various sizes; qualitative comments on the damage they could produce; and the essentials
of the proposed of detection program for very large NEOs It concludes that very large Earth-
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hreateningNEOsarea _menace that' ff it exists at all, might not threaten Earth for millenniums--or
thousands of millenniums" by which time civilization will presumably be better equipped to deal
with the problem. It ignores the question of what to do if one is detected tomorrow, which is just
as likely as any given future date, as Swift-Tutde demonstrated soon thereafter.
The editorial states that "asteroids larger than a few hundred feet in diameter can be detected
and tracked with relatively modest telescopes; once located, their orbits can be refined using large
planetary radazs." Were that statement accepted, there would have been little controversy to report.
Unfortunately, the telescopes proposed for looking for NEOs larger than a kilometer in diameter
are not appropriate for _tecting ones "a few hundred feet [- 100 meters] in diamete|" in a timely
fashion, which was an issue that divided Intercept Workshop participants. Spaceguaxd telescopes
would detect smaller NEOs too close for action and too briefly for cataloging. There was also
disagreement among the optical community over the role of more and improved radars.
In describing the Workshop as a "revival meeting for SDI true believers [who] proposed to
defend Earth at stupendous cost against an imagined menace..." the editorial returned to the serious
issue raised earlier by Sagan. The technologies and energies req,atred for detection and defense
against NEOs are at the. limit of those possessed by man. Deciding how they should be controlled
could be as difficult as developing them. It may be time to begin thinking about those issues.
Roger Lewin's "How to Destroy the Doomsday Asteroid "20 covers many of the same
issues as Dr. Park's editorial, but characterizes the Interception Workshop's approaches as
"credible." It cites additional evidence from noted paleobiologists on extinctions, gives more data
about recent misses, and raises the connection with nuclear winter. It is less concerned with the
waste of resources than it is with the apparent enthusiasm some showed for finding something else
to do with our nuclear arsenals.
Robert Matthews' "A Rocky Watch for Earthbound Asteroids "21 gives more informauon
on the split within NASA and Dr. John Rather's role in directing attention to NEOs of diameters
down to 50 m or so. It gives a stimulating discussion of the Earth's near-impact in Ianuary of 1991
with a 10 m NEO that came within 170,000 km of the Earth only 12 hours after it was discovered
by University of Arizona astronomers with the 36-inch Spacewatch Telescope at giu Peal It
underlines the key economic issue noted above by reporting the estimate by Richard Binzel of MIT
that searching for smaller, more frequent objects could be an order of magnitude more expensive
than the te.lescopes optimized for very large NE(_ only The version of Matthews' story reported
abroad, "Missiles to zap metc_r menace," _ the secrecy of the meeting at Los Alamos, 22
although the Workshop was, in fact, unclassified. The press was not invited in an attempt to
prevent sensationalization of the subject. So much for good intentions.
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BobDavis's"Never Mind the Peace Dividend, the Killer Asteroids are Coming" in part iust
reflects the Wall Street Journal's wry humor, but it captures the essence of Solem's approach to
giving large NEOs a "gentle push. "23 Kathy Sawyer's Shooting Back at Space Rocks? 24 gives
more data on the Yucatan and Tunguska impacts, It also elicits a concrete answer from Dr.
Morrison on what he would do about the "undetected 10% of NEOs:" "My approach is rid
reduction, he said, not risk elimination." Time's "Talk About Star Wars" notes that atomic-
weapons designers [including its former man of the year] "appear to have been casting around far a
mission" but concludes that "keeping an eye on runaway asteroids makes sense. "25
9. Critical Reaction
In addition to the popular comment discussed in the previous section, there was a
considerable amount of technical correspondence between the authorz, which materially improved
the balance of the Proceedings, although it was ultimately unable to produce a consensus
document. This section discusses the main issues raised, indicates which ones were solved, and
reviews the state of play on those which are still open. The principal inputs from David Morri.son,
the Chairman of the Detection Workshop, and Clark R. Chapman of the Planetary Science htstitute
in Tucson, Arizona are discussed in order below.
Many objections had to do with me "Executive Summary and Program--Policy Options"
section of the draft Summary Report prepared by JPL for NASA from the working group
summaries from the Interception Workshop. 26 This Proceedings differs in es,_ntial ways front
NASA's Summary Report. The Executive Summary of the Proceedings differs from that of the
Summar?; Report by removing the statements on which there was no consensus, and the Summary
Report's "Program--Policy Options" was dropped and replaced by sections on "Future Direcuons
for Research and Popular Reactions." The "Program--Policy Options" section of NASA's
Summary Report is reproduced here as Appendix A--not by way of recommendations for this
report, but as background for interpreting Morrison and Chapman's correspondence.
Much of the disagreement centered on the need for early deflection experiments, which
could divert funds needed for the timely upgrading of existing and implementation of new detection
capabihties. A second point of conteation had to do with the desirability of early experiments on
NEO deflection, which could lead u_ a preliminary capability for the interception of small NEQs. A
third point had to do with the ad hoc suggestion that existing nuclear arsenals could be mohilized
for protection against larger NEOs, which most found to he premature and undeveloped.
David Mormon summariTt:d many of the criticisms of the draft Summary Report in a letter
that was circulated to many of the workshop participants. 27 It stressed "a general failure to
distinguish the greater hazard ass_ciateti with 'large' impactors (greater than about a million
megatons) from the smaller hazard posed by smaller bodie.,_. [which] leads to an equally large
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failureto apply any measures of cost-effectiveness to the various schemes proposed to deal with
the impact threat. Note that I am not objecting to the discussions of mierception and deflection of
objects in the 100 m to I km size range, but only to the lack of context in which some of the
discussions are presented." (emphasis added). The c',dculations by Hills and Goda, which were the
only quantitative estimates of damage presented, provide additional information on the damage
from small and intermediate NEOs. They were used to estimate expected losses in the "Value of
Space Defenses." Although there are significant uncertainties in the data, it appears that detecting
and deflecting NEOs of both intermediate and large sizes is economically justified and that a
responsible program would do both in an integrated fashion. Smaller NEOs appear to be of lesser
concern for nominal collision rates; although, small metallic NEOs aptw, ar to be significant if more
recent data is used in the evaluations.
The calculations in "Value of Space Defenses" form a rudimentary version of the cost-
effectiveness analysis requested. They give expected losses that can be used to r,aeasure the
effectiveness of proposed intercept schemes. They also give an expected value of detection alone,
because they give an estimate of the expected frequency and extent of damage, which can be used
to bound the effectiveness of evacuation and preparation. The calculations also attempt to bound
the losses from very large NEOs, given warning and preparation. These estimates involve
additional uncertainties due to current technical controversies over the extent and duration of global
damage, which are discussed further below.
Morrison commented on the iterated draft of NASA's Summary Report in a 10 June letter,
which was also circulated to participants. 28 The positive part was its statement that "as a member
of the Program/Policy Options group, I can say that our chapter [of the Summary Report] seems to
fairly represent the consensus conclusions of this group." The negative part was its assessment that
"the [Suranuary] Report as a whole...remains unsatisfactory." The letter cited two major problems:
"First, it is consistently and pervasively biased toward discussions aimed (!) at the smaller and less
threatening objects...Second, Chapter 6 is simply dumb, irresponsibly so, and seriously
undermines the credibility of the entire Report." It concludes that "I do not want to be associated
with the [Summary ] Report in its present form." It suggests that it would be better to "refer to the
Morrison Report, summarize its conclusions, and note that the [Summary] t_eport differs in it._
interpretation and conclusions. You might even consider explaining why you differ..."
This Proceedings incorporates Morrison's suggestions to the maximum extent possible.
"Future Directions for Research" follows the _h recommendations of the Program/Policy
Options group and presents a balanced view of large and small threatc,ling lqEOs. However,
Chapter 6 is retained, albeit in modified form, for the reasons given above, in the long term we
will need to address large, fast objects that approach with little warning. Current technology would
notbeeffectiveagainstsuch threats, and even those on the horizon appear marginal. Different and
more powerful techniques are needed. T'here is apparently time to develop them, but no time to
lose, so some stimulating discussion is essential. Having reviewed these changes, Morrison
indicated his desire to be associated with the Proceedings.
Clark Chapman's initial criticisms of the Summary Report were transmitted in a letter of 8
April 1992 "In the hopes that the report will be modified so as to be improved and acceptable...the
draft report demonstrates a lot of conscientious effort and it represents a nucleus of material that
could be converted, in short order, into a good and acceptable report. I applaud everyone
concerned for bringing the report to this state of readiness in only two months. Appropriate
modifications could be made within a matter or weeks. ''29 However, a second letter of 8 June
1992, "_hich was also circulated and is reproduced as Appendix B, criticized the revision of the
Summary Report, stating it is "biased and technically flawed...I do not wish my name associated
with Jr..land II ask that my name be removed from the report.." It objects to technical material in
the working group summaries in the Summary Report and to the impl,'cation that the working
group members are responsible for materials on which no consensus was produced and which
were rewritten by NASA and JPL. The Proceedings defines their re,sponsibilities explicidy.
Chapman also objects that the "Executive Summary" contains a recommendation for an
experimental program that was not present in the summary NASA prepared for Congress. The
Proceedings deletes that recommendation, which was not a consensus position of the workshop.
Chapman also objects to the "improper treatment" of the "relative impo_ of the
q'unguska-cla.is' impacts versus larger ones..." The estimates in the "Value of Space. Defenses"
attempt to remove this bias; its results support Ch_:man and Morrison's estimates that for nominal
parameters the largest NEOns, make the largest contributions to expected losses. Chapman objects to
dismissing search as "futile." "Value" shows that search and warning have considerable value in
preparing for impact, even in the absence of defenses. Chapman also objects to what appears to be
a premature push for potentially expensive spe_ce experiments, which were not endorsed by all
workshop participants. T'he Proceeding just notes that they will be appropriate at some time, but
that a number of i_sues must be resolved Ixfore one can design a credible experiment. Chapman
objects to "a bias toward SDIO spacecraft [that] ignores all NASA studies of NEO missions."
Experiments should clearly involve the best of both NASA and DoD-SDIO technology. SDIO does
have a requirement and program to develop relevant sensors and launchers. It would be
shortsighted to neglect capabilities that could be applied with little cost to a pressing national
program for purely jurisdictional reasons.
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Chapman also criticizes the "crazy and dangerous option of outfitting the world's arsenal of
rockets with the world's arsenal of nuclear weapons in order to address an aspect of the NEd
hazard," which is a colorful restatement of the concern raised earlier by Sagan. Many participants
felt that it was premature to consider nuclear tests in space, let alone outfit a nuclear armada. It is
not even clear that the intercemors should be deployed in space. It is clear that discussions of
deployments of nuclear weapons in space are premature. Most participants would apparently be
critical of even nonnuclear deflection tests that preceded a demonstrated ability to measure
trajectories and perturbations well enough to as,sure that the deflection would do more good than
harm. Chapman is equally colorful in his asmssment of the section on new technologies. The rest
of his letter offers positive suggestions for improved wording.
Having reviewed the draft of the Proceedings, Chapman accepted our offer to publish his
letter of 8 June, 30 and provided additional comments, which are included as Appendix B. He
stated that he wished to do so because time prevented our iterating to convergence, not all of his
points were addms_d in the draft Proceedings, and his earlier comments are still relevant to the
Summary" Report, which may be published separately by NASA. Most of his points serve to
clarify the impact of "Tunguska--class" NEOs. He argues that they are not worth insuring againsL
which agrees with the evaluation of "Value of Space Defenses," which lumps "Tunguska--cla._"
impactors into the small NEOs that only appear to justify a few $M/yr premium. Chapman also
rightly notes that these small NEOs am difficult to detecL so it is unlikely that effective protection
could be provided for so small a sum, which is also the conclusion of "Value of Space Defenses."
Chapman states the caveat that "if the prelixninary results of the Spacewatch Program are
correct about an enhanced number of .50-100 m objects, and if the threshold for global catastrophe
is near the upper end of the range of mr.ertainties, then the annual_d risk of fatalities might
actually be dominated by Tunguska-class impactors...[but he] would still argue, however, that the
globally catastrophic impactors deserve our attention far beyond their strictly numerical hazard.
That is for the simple reason that if civilization is thre.atened, then all of history and everything that
•_simportant to us is at risk." This statement disagrees with "Value of Space Defenses" and raises a
fundamental point.
Chapman and Morrison effectively argue that any NEd over a few kilometers in diameter
could end civilization if not all life on Earth; her, ce, their potential loss is unbounded. "Value"
assumes that with warning, evacuation, and preparation, civilization could bound its losses from
most NEOs to the economic value of the structures destroyed, the production lost, and the cost of
the fo_xtstuffs and supplies that would have to be stored ahead of time for survival. This argument
breaks down for NEOs of sites that could literally fracture the Earth and dissipate its atmosphere,
but that only for NEOs whose diameters were orders of magnitudes larger than the few kilometers
Chapman and Morrison associate with global cmastrophe--by which they actually just mean global
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climateimpact.TheNEOcommunitywill probably have to repeat the le_r, ing prcce_ the "nuclear
winter" community went through before it can estimate with confidence what it takes for
catastrophic damage to society. Experience suggests that it will probably be easier to impo_ those
arguments than to solve them. Thus, the debates over expected losses from very large NEOs are
likely to broaden and deepen rather than simplify over the next few years.
Similar civil defense efforts cocld offset the global impacts of either nuclear war or the
impact of large NEOs. There is a difference. Civil defense as a response to nuclear war is opposed
because its implementation might make war more thinkable and hence undercut its deterrence.
NEOs cannot be deterred, so there should be no such popular impediments to the implementation
of civil defense measures and evacuation, given adequate warning° For the same reason, there
should be no popular impediments to the development of active defenses against NEO impacts.
10. Summary and Conclusions
Congress mandated two workshops to tmr_mve the means to detect and negate NEOs; this
report reviews the results of the latter. It summarizes the Interception Workshop held at Los
Alamos in January 1992, which evaluated the. technical issu_ involve_l in intercep6ng approaching
NEOs. The Workshop covered the technologies for re-acquiring, tracking, and homing on NEOs
as well as the technologies for inspecting, rendezvoasing with, landing on, irradiating, deflecting,
or destroying them. It records the presentations and technical options reviewed, outlines the main
points of agreeement and disagreement, summarizes the status of the main remaining arguments,
ad outlines apparently fruitful areas for further research.
A background paper reviews t,_ rough size, composition, velocity, and warning time for
threatening NEOs, indicating the order of magnitude of their impact frequency and expected
damage. It also _ummarizes representative intercept missions. An invited paper by David
Morrison, who chaired '.he Detection Workshop, argues that NEOs pose a signifscant hazard to life
and property and that they could disturb the Earth's climate on a global scale by injecting large
quantifies of dust into the stratosphere. He introduced the discussion of the relative importance of
small and very large NE()s, which dominated the meeting, arguing for a long-term telescopic
search that would first concentrate on identifying large NEOs.
Prominent astronomers discussed details, results, and prospects for NEO searches. Some
were somewhat less ._anguine than Dr. Molrison about predicting the hL_tory or trajectorie.s of
NEOs, once discovered, due to perturbations, which eventually randomize their orbits. They
stressed threats posed by long-period comets, which are numerically less likely, but give less
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warning, and have very high kinetic energies. Hills and Goda introduced the difficult and
controve_ial subject of the damage from NEOs that break up in the atmosphere before hitting the
ground, which made it possible to quantify the impact of smaller NEOs, and ultimately to reduce
much of the confusion over the relative importance of very small and large NEOs.
It became clear during the workshop that detection and interception are interrelated, becaum
the farther away a threatening NEO is detected, the farther away it can be engaged, and the easier it
is to deflect or destroy. NEOs whose exact orbits could be established decades or centuries ahead
of impact could be addressed by rendezvous missions that could apply impulses of centimeters to
meters per second at perihelion to shift the NEOs' trajectory just enough to miss the Earth. For less
warning, more deflection would be required, ultimately requiring nuclear propulsion or explosion.
For short-warning NEOs on collision courses, the interceptor would have to deflect or destroy the
NEO on its final approach. The energies required are at the limit of those that can now be generated
by man.
The most effective method of deflection is to blow off part of the NEO's surface and use its
reaction to obtain _fftetransverse deflection of the, NEO needed. A number of scientists discussed
the advantages of emplaced, surface, and standoff explosions in a thorough and consistent manner.
They argued that for intercepts on final approach, NEOs 100 meters or smaller could be addressed
by nuclear rockets and kinetic energy kill, but that for larger NEOs, nuclear explosives appear to be
essential. There appears to be a set of technologies that could provide some intercept capability
against the smallest, most frequent impactors, although their detection would be dilficult. The
largest, fastest NEOs am the easiest to detect, but their intercept looks formidable. Enough is
understood about NEO materials and geometries to reduce uncertainties in interception to levels that
could make tests profitable and safe.
There are two types of precursor missions: those which seek to measure the properties of
NEOs and those that seek wodivert or destroy them. The former could involve interceptors derived
from current defensive "and civil technologies. There is an adequate set of lightweight passive and
active sensor s available from defense development programs. Inspection and interc2pt missions
could both require larger payload masses and higher velocities than those currendy available. If
available, the large launch capacities of the Former Soviet Union could greatly improve the
capability for longer range, larger payoff divert and destroy missions.
NEOs must be deflected very precisely, which means that their initial trajectories and
composition must be known precisely. NEOs discovered by visible sensors at ranges out to a few
AU can be put into secure orbits by tracking observations with existing ra,aars when they appros_:h
within about 0.1 AU of the Earth. Their orbits could then b_ extrapolated decades into the futun_-
with sufficient accuracy to assess hazards. Homing sensors for the interceptors could be derived
from current defensive technologies. While the current radar network is adequate for current
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discovery rates, it could be swamped by the discovery rates from the proposeO telescope array.
Existing defense radars and optical and infrared sensors could have some useful capabilities for
near-Earth search and track. Radars and optical sensors are largely complementary. Optical sensors
are best for search at long range; radars arc best for track and characterization at short ranges.
The report contains a section that gives a wide-reaching, ff somewlmt controversial, view
of the technologies that might be available, for NEO intemeption at various future time periods. The
array of technologies surveyed is encyclopedic. Many found the survey too speculative, but the
authors suspect that, if anything, it is probably too conservative for the 50-100 year time frames on
which the most stressing threats are likely to develop. The assessments are presented, without
endorsement, to encourage further discussion. One of the most intriguing concepts was capturing
NEOs into bound orbits as a way of making NEO defense pay for itself from the outset.
NEO impacts are infrequent, but potentially serious. The average loss rate has contributions
from NEOs of all sizes. Their contributions can be lumped into three rough categories, which are
determined by the empirical variation of impact frequency with NED diameter. Stony NEOs down
to about 40 m in diameter can produce damage on the Earth's surface, but the damage is local and
modest; hence, their contribution to the total loss only amcums to a few SM/yr for nominal
parameters. Intermediate size NEOs with diameters from 50 m to about 2 km contribute about
equally to expected damage, giving a value of warning or defense of $10--100M/yr, depending on
uncertainties in impact frequencies. NFX_ with larger diameters can produce global effects. There
is some controversy over how to estimate their impact, but it appears that their contribution is one
to two orders of magnitude greater than that from interme_ate size NEOs.
Logically, both intermediate and large NEOs should be insured against, but their premiums
vary gready. A few $M/yr could support observation._; and theory on detection and interception. A
few $10M could provide the Spacegua_ telescopes proposed to search for large Earth-threatening
NEOs. A few $10M/yr could provide research on improved sensors for the prompt detection of
smaller asteroids and test spactx'raft missions to characteri_e NEOs of all sizes. Actual defenses
would ultimately cost a few $100M to develop and a few $B to deploy over a few decades.
Unfortunately, confusion over the relative priorities of detection and interception has delayed action
on either. In his concluding talk, Edward Teller proposed a knowledge-driven, multi-stage
program as a way to break this logjam.
The Workshop received a reasonable amount of coverage in the media. The report gives a
brief review of the mai_ responses, and relates their main thrusts with the Workshop i_ues
discussed above. The m )st publicity was generated by an editorial that reported most of the
controversies raised in "tie Workshop, including "the developntent of a new super bomb," which,
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as indicated above, just reflected a recognition of the enormous energies required for intercepts in
the final phase. The rest of that article, and most of the other popular covcmge, gave thoughtful
reviews of the role of NEOs in dinosaur extinction, frequency of imrmct, the damage they could
produce, and me _ntials of the proposed detection program.
There was significant, constructive critical reaction, which is also summarized. The
comments by Morrison and Chapman were particularly helpful. They clarified the extent of
agreement over the preferred emphasis on large versus small NEOs, readine_ for test, the role of
conventional and nuclear technologies, and the relative priorities of detection and deflection and of
early and late intercept. This clarification could pave the way for a very productive follow-up
meeting on NEO Interception. In preparation for such a meeting, it would bc useful to peer review
the detailed estimates of damage from small NEOs presented here, obtain quantitative estimates of
global effects, and complete the bounding calculations of economic loss. It would also be useful to
continue the exchange of information on NASA, DoD, and Russian launchers, payloads, and
senmrs, and solicit and integrate sensor inputs from multiple and national source.,. It would also
be appropriate to establish inmmational cooperation on analysis, for which this volume provides
some of the data needed, and to begin discussions on means for implementing and controlling the
defensive concepts for NEO impacts, which now appear feasible.
13. Epilogue
It has been almost a year since the Interception Workshop was held. Much has happened in
that time. Many of the subsequent technical exchanges, which led to much more of a consensus on
the relative importance of NEOs of different sizes and other technical i_ues, are disc_ above.
A singular stimulating event was the reappearance of the comet Swift-Tuttlc, which seemed to
present just the stres._,ng threat identified by the Workshop. Its orbit had enough uncertainty to
cause Brian Marsden, a Workshop participant who runs the Smithsonian's NEO watch, to issue its
first NEO impact war_ng, 31 giving a probability of about 1 in 10,000 of an impact on Swift-
Turtle's return in 2126. That set off a vigorous round of interaction 32 and rechecking, prominently
mv_/vmg many" of the Workshop participants, 33 which is reviewed in the timely and accurate
News_'eek repc, rt hy Sharon Begley which is reprinted as .Appendix D. 34
FhLx interaction and rechecking has led to a lowering of the probability of impacL so the
threat has receded. But the process gave a check on the relevance of the topics covered in the
Workshop that is worth reviewing. As noted, the reappearance was noted and interpreted by the
cxistang observational network, which attests to both its capability and the relevance of the
improved Spacegu_rd network proposed by the Detection Workshop. Moreover, the main issues
involved in the assessment of risk from Swift-Tutfle--uncertain observations, imprecise.
predictions, and non-gravitational effects--were precisely those debated by Brian Marsden, Don
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Yeomans, Duncan Steel, and others at the Interaction Workshop. Even though Swift-Turtle is
enormous---about 10 km across--the participants were all comfortable with our ability to deflect or
destroy it, given a century of warning, on the basis of the astrodynamic and energy delivery
estimates presented at the Interception Workshop--even though it would in all probability involve
a rather large nuclear weapon. The workshop also defined the materials information that would
need to be measured by rendezvous missions prior to intercept m order to assure that the NEO
could be pushed aside, rather than just fragmented. It even appear_ that there might be relevant
sensors and adequate lift capacity for the intercept.
If there was one area in which there were deficiencies, it was in the area of the sensors and
boosters needed for rendezvous missions. Had we needed to inspect the materials, geometry, and
integrity of Swift-Tuttle, the options for sensors and launchers were quite limited. At present only
the visible and infrared active and passive sensors of the SDIO's Clementine mission have been
lightweighted to the extent needed for the chase. Swift-Tuttle is out of the plane of the ecliptic and
moving fast, so velocity increments of up to 30-40 km/s would be required for direct rendezvous.
Even with a 3-l0 kg instrument package and a specific impulse of 300 seconds, a chemical rocket
would need to put about 3- l0 kg e( 30 km/s / 3 km/s) ,, 70-200 tonnes into escape velocity, as
opposed to the few tens of tons now available from even a full international collaboration. Thus,
work on more appropriate lightweight sensors, higher specific impulse and thrust rockets, and
I_ger and mo_ flexible payloads would be appropriate in preparation for another such alert. StiR,
it would appear that the deliberations of the Workshop carried over rather directly into the
evaluation of Swift-Turtle. The organizers might even persuade themselves that some of the
relationships established at the Workshop were of value in the process. If so, the melding of the
two communities should be of value in future alerts as well.
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THE IMPACT HAZARD
David Morrlaon"
NASA Ames Research Center
*Chair, NASA International Near-Earth-Object Detection Workshop
ABSTRACT
Impacts by Earth-approaching asteroids end comets pose a significant hazard to life and
property. The greatest risk is associated with objects large enough to disturb the Earth's
climate on a global scale I_ inj_"ting large quantitites of dust into the stratosphere. Such an
event would depress temperatures around the globe, leading to massive loss of food crops end
possi_e breakdown of society. The possibility of such a global catastrophe ts beyond
question, but determining the threshold impacior size to trigger such an event is more
difficult. Various studies have suggested that the minimum mass Impacting body to produce
such global consequences is tens of billions of Ions, resulting in an explosion with energy
approaching a million megatons of TNT. The corresponding threshold diameter for Earth-
crossing asterok:ls or comets is between 1 and 2 km. Smaller objects (down to 100 m) can
cause severe local oem_e but pose no global it, teat; the risk of such explosions is small
compared to other common natural hazards such as earthquakes and severe storms. For
sizes below 100 in, most projectiles disintegrPte high in the atmosphere end pose no
significant threat. Current technology permits us to discover and track neaerly aft Earth-
crossing asteroids or short-period comets large enough to threaten global catastrophe. We
require a long-ter_ telescopic search that reaches stellar magnitude 22 in order to achieve
a nearly complete census of objects 1 kin or larger. If any object threatens impact with the
Earth during the next century or _o, we c_n expecl it to be identified with a lead time of at
least several decades, sufficient to plan an international campaign to deflect or destroy it.
THE IMPACT HAZARD
David Morrlson"
NASA Ames Research Center
*Chair, NASA International Near-Earth-Object Detection Workshop
BACKGROUND
The Earth resides in a swarm of cosmic debris that can, and do, impact its surface. The solar
system contains a long-lived population of asteroids and comets, some fraction of which are
perturbed into orbits that cross the orbits of the Earth and other planets. Spacecraft exploration of
the terrestrial planets and the satellites of the outer planets has revealed crater-scarred surfaces
that testify to a continuing rain of impacting projectiles. Additional evidence concerning cosmic
projectiles in near-Earth space has accumulated since the discovery of the first Earth-crossing
asteroid nearly sixty years ago, and improvements intelescopic search techniques have resulted
in the discovery of dozens of near-Earth asteroids and short period comets each year. The role of
impacts in affecting the Earth's geological history, its ecosphere, and the evolution of life ,serf has
become a major topic of current interdisciplinary interest.
In the following discussion, we examine the risks posed by irnpactin_ objects of various sizes.
These projectiles could be either cometary or asteroidal. In terms of the damage they do, it
matters little whether they would be called comets or asteroids by astronomP,,alobservers. We
term these objects collectively NEOs (Near Earth Objects). This analysis is derived from the NASA
document The Spaceguard Survey, dated January 25, 1992, which is the report of the NASA
Internationai Near-Earth-Object Oetection Workshop.
E_imates of the population of NEOs large enough to pose a global hazard are reliable to within a
factor of two, although estimates of the numbers of smaller objects are more uncertain.
Particularly uncertain is the significance of hard-to-detect long-period or new comets, which would
generally strike at higher velocities than other NEO's, although asteroids (including dead comets)
_,:e believed to dominate the flux. However, the resulting environmental consequences of the
impacts of these objects are much le_._,_',! understood. The greatest uncertainty in comparing
the impact hazard with other natural hazards relates to the economic and social consequences of
impacts.
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THE RELATIONSHIPOF RISK TO SIZE OF IMPACTOR
Small impacting ol:_)cts -- the meteors or fireballs -- dissipate their energy in the upper
etmoaphere and have no direct effect on the ground below. Except for the rare iron ob_s, it is
only when the incoming projectile is larger than about I00 m diameter that it begins to pose
significant hazard to humans. The hazard can be conveniently divided into three broad categories
that depend on the size or kinetic energy of the impactor:
(1) Impacting body generally is disrui_ed at high altitudes, with its kinetic energy
dissipated in the atmosphere.
(2) Impacting body reaches the lower atmosphere (withln 2 scale heights of the surface)
or the ground suffidently intact to infllcl widespread local damage.
(3) Large crater-forming impact generates globally dispensed dust to produce a
significant, short-term change in climate, in addition to devastating Mast effects in the
region of impact.
The threshold size of an impacting body for each category depends on its density, strength, and
velodty as wetl as on the nature of the target. The threshold for global effects, in particular, is not
well determined.
Category 1: lO-m to lO0-m diameter Impactors
Bodies near the small end of this size range intercept Earth every decade. Bodies about 100 m
diameter and larger strike, on average, several times per mUiermlum The kinetic energy of a 10-m
I:XO_eCtiletraveling a_a typical atmosphedc enlry velocity of 20 km/s is about 100 kilotons TNT
equivalent, equal to several Hiroshima-size bombs. The kinetic energy of a 100-m diameter body
is equivalent to the explosive energy of about 100 megatons, com_rabie to the yield of the very
largest thermonuclear devices.
For these pmjectiies, only rare iron or _,dony-kon projectiles reach the ground weh a suffiden(
fraction of their entry velocity to produce craters, as happened at Meteor Crater (Arizona) 50,000
years ago or in Ihe Skhole-Alln region of Siberia in 1947. Stony bodies are crushed and
fragmented in the upper atmosphere, and the resulting fragments are quickly slowed to free-fall
velocity,whilethekineticenergyistransferredto anatmosphericshockwave.Partoftheshock
waveenergyisreleasedinaburstoflightandheat(calleda meteoriticfireballorbolide) and part is
trans4x_rtedin a mechanical wave. Generally, these disruptions oocur so high in the atmosphere
that no damage occurs on the ground, although the fireball can attract attention from distances of
600 km or more and the shock wave can be heard and even felt on the ground.
With increasing size, asteroidal projectiles reach progressively lower levels in the atmosphere
before disruplion, and the energy transferred to the shock wave is correspondingly greater.
There is a threshold where both the radiated e.ergy |tom the shock and ihe pressure in t,heshock
wave can produce damage. A historical example is the Tunguska event of 19G8, when a probably
stony body 50-100 m in diameter was disrupted in the atmosphere at an altitude of about 8 km.
The energy released was about 12 megatons, as estimated from airwaves recorded on
meteorological barographs in England, or perhaps 20 megatons as estimated from the radius of
destruction. Siberian forest trees were mostly knocked to the ground out to distances of about
20 km from the end point of the fireball trajectory, ar¢l some were snapped off or knocked over at
distances as great as 40 km. Circumstantial evidence suggests that fires were ignited up to 15 km
from the endpoint by the intense burs_of radiant energy. The combined effects were similar to
those expected from a nuclear detonation at a similar altitude, except, of course, that there were
no accompanying bur_s of neutrons or gamma rays nor any lingering radioactivity.
Category 2: lO0-m to 1-km diameter Impactors
Incoming asteroids ol stony or metallic composition that a_'elarger than 100 m in diameter may
reach the ground intact and produce a crater. The threshold size depends on the density of the
irrc)actor and its speed ar_ angle of entry into the atmosphere. Evidence from the geologic
record of impact craters as well as theory suggests that, in the average case, stony objects greater
than 150 m in diameter form craters. They strike the Earth about once per 5000 years and -- if
impacting on land -- produce craters about 3 km in diameter. A continuous blanket of material
ejected from such craters covers an area about 10 km indiameter. The zone of destruction
extends welt beyond this area, where buildings would be damaged or flatlened by the
atmospheric shock, and along particular directions (rays) by flying debris. The total area of
destruction is not, however, necessarily greater than in the case of atmospheric disruption of
somewhat smaller objects, because much of the energy of the impaclor is absorbed by the
ground durir_ crater formation.
Comets are composed in large part of water ice and other volaliles and therefore are n'K)reeasily
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fragmented than rocky or metallic asteroids. In the size range from 100 m to 1 kin, a comet
probably cannot survive passage through the atmosphere. This is a subject that needs additional
study, requiring ;zbetter knowledge of the physical nature of corne_s.
Category 3:1 km to 5 km diameter Impactors
At these larger sizes, a thres.holdis finally reached at which the impact has serious global
consequences, although much work remains to be done to fully understand the physical and
chemical effects of material injected into the atmosphere. In general, the crater pmKJucedby
these i*TIpactshas 10 tO 15 limes the diameter of the projectile; i.e., 10-15 km diameter for a 1-km
asteroid. Such craters are formed on the continents about once per 300,000 years. At impactor
sizes greater than 1 km, the primary hazard derives from the global veil of dust injected into the
stratosphere The severity of the global effects of large impacts increases with the size of the
impactor and the resulting quantity of injected dust. At some size, an impact would lead to
massive world-wide crop failures and might threaten the survival of civilization.
What happens when an object several kilometers in diameter strikes the Earth at a speed of tens
of kilometers per second? Primarily there is a massive explosion, sufficientto fragment and
partially vaporize both the projectile and the target area. Meteoric phenomena associated with
high speed ejecta could subject plants and animals to scorching heat for about half an hour, and a
global firestorm might them ensue. Dust thrown up from a very large crater would lead to total
darkness over the whole Earth, which might persist for several months. Temperatures could drop
as much as tens of degrees C. Nitric acid, produced from the I:xJmingof atmospheric nitrogen in
the impact fireball, would acidify lakes, soils, streams, and perhaps the surface layer of the oceans.
Months later, after the atmosphere had cleared, water vapor and carbon dioxide released to the
stratosphere would produce an enhanced greenhouse effect, possibly raising global
temperatures by as much as ten degrees C above the pre-existing ambient temperatures. Both
the initial months of darkness and cold, and then the following years of enhanced temperatures,
would severely stress the environment and would lead to drastic population reductions of both
terTestrialand marine life.
THRESHOLD SIZE FOR GLOBAL CATASTROPHE
The threshold size of impactor that would produce one or all of the effects discussed above Is not
accurately known The geochemical and paleofitoloQical record has demonstrated that one
impact (or perhaps several closely spaced trrc)acts)65 millionyears ago of a 10- to 15-kin NEO
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resulted i_,1total extinction of about halt the living species of animals and plants. Such mass
extinctior_; of species have recurred several times in the past few hundred million years; it has
been suggested, although not yet proven, that impacts are responsible for most such extinction
events. W;_know from astronomical and geological evidence that impacts of objects with
diarnete,'s of 5 km or greater occur about once every 10 to 30 million years.
Death by starvation of much of the wodd's population could result from a global catastrophe far
less horren(k:_JSthan those cataclysmic impacts that would suddenly render a significant fraction
of species actually extinct. The threshold almost certainly lies between about 0.5 km and 5 km
dia,n'_ter, and it probably lies near 2 kin. In addition to all of the known variables (site of impact,
time of year) and the uncertainties in physical and ecological consequences, there is the question
of how resilient our agric_dture, commerce, economy, and societal organization might prove to be
in the face of such an unprecedented catastrophe.
An estimate of the threshold size was derived by Brian Toon, of NASA Ames Research Center.
(31the various environmental effects of a large impact, Toon believes that the greatest harm would
be done by the sub-micrometer dust launched into the stratosphere. The quantity of
submicrometer dust required for these effects is estimated at about 10,000 Tg. (1 Tg - 1012 g)
For a 30 krrVsimpact, this translates to a threshold impacting body diameter of between 1 and 1.S
km diameter. At the 1991 Near Earth Asteroid Conference in San Juan Capistrano, California, the
most frequently discussed estimate of the threshold irrtpactordiameter for globally catastrophic
effects was about 2 km, which is generally consistent with Toon's estimate. Impacts of objects this
large occur from one to several times per millionyears.
RISK ANALYSIS
If this estimate is correct, then the chances of an asteroid catastrophe happening in the near
future -- while vory low -- is greater than many other threats to lifethat our society takes very
_eriously. For purposes of discussion, we adopt the once-tn-500,O00 year estimate for the
globally catastrophic impact. It is important to keep in mind that the frequency could be greater
than this, although I_obably not by more than a factor of two. The frequency could equally well be
a factor of two smaller.
Because the risk is very low of such an impact happening in the near future, the nature of the
irnl:)acthazard is unique in our experience. Neath/aH hazards we face in life actually happen to
someone we know, or we read about them happening in the newspapers, whereas no large
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Impacthastakenplacewithinthetotalspanofhumanhistory.(Ifsuchaneventookplacebefore
the dawn of history roughly I0,000 years ago there would be no record of the event, since we are
not postulating an impact large enough to produce a mass extinction that would be readily visible
in the fossil record). But also in contrast to more familiar disasters, the postulated impact would
produce devastation on a global scale. Natural disasters, includingtornadoes and cyclones,
earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, firestorms, and floods often kill thousands of people,
and occasionally several million. But the civilization-destroying impact exceeds all of these other
disasters in that it could kill a billion or more people, leading to as large a percentage loss of life
worldwide as that experienced by Europe from the Back Death in the 14th century. It is this
juxiaoOsltion o| the small _robabiiiiy of ocoJrrerK_ebalarce_ against the enormous
consequences if it does happen that makes the impact hazard such a difficult and controversial
topic.
We begin to address the risk of cosmic impacts by looking at the frequency of events of different
magnitudes. Small impacts are much more frequent than large ones, as is shown in Figure 1,
which illustrates the average interval between impacts as a function of energy, as derived from the
lunar crstedng record and other astronomical evidonce. For purposes of discussion, we consider
two cases: The threshold globally catastrophic impact discussed above, and for comparison, a
Tunguska-class impact from a smaller objecl perhaps 100 m in diameter. In all of the calculations
given below, the numbers are approximate and are used only to illustrate the general magnitudes
involved.
For the globally catastrophic impact (assumed 2 km threshold)
Average inteNal between impacts 500,000 years
For the Tunguska-class impacts:
Average interval between impacts for lotal Earth:
Average Interval between impacts for pop,Jlated area of Earth
Average interval between impacts for world urban areas:
Average interval between impacts for U.S. urban areas only:
300 years
3,000 years
100,000 years
1,000,000 years
We see from this simlNe calculation that even for a large country such as the US., the Tunguska-
clam impacts on urban areas occur less often than the globally catastrophic impact, emphasizing
the fact that the large impacts dominate the risk. This point is also made in Figure 2, which plots
the expected fatalities per event as a function of diameter (and energy) of the impacting object.
The figure shows schematically the transition in expected fatalities per Impact event that takes
5_
placeastheglobalthresholdisreachedforobjectsbetween0.5and5 kmindiameter.
Onewaytoexpresstherisksis in terms of average annual fatalities. While such an index is
convenient for comparison with other risks, we also stress the artificialityof applying this approach
to the very rare impact catastrop_s. The concept of equivalent annual deaths strictly applies only
in a static world in which the population and the mortality rate from other causes do not vary with
time. This figure is obtained by multiplyingthe population of the Earth by the :otal annual
probability of death. In the case of the U.S equivalent deaths, we allow for the higher than
average population density in the U.S.
For the globally catastrol:)hicimpact: (assumed 2 krnthreshold)
Total annual probability ol death:
Equivalent annual deaths for U.S. population only:
Equivalent annual deaths (worldwide population):
1/2.000.000
125
2.500
For the Tunguska-class impact:
Total annual probabihty of death:
Equivalent annual deaths for U.S, population only:
Equivalent annual deaths (worldwide population):
1/30.000,000
15
150
These figures can be compared wilh the morlalify rates from other natural and man-made causes
to obtain a very rough index of the magnitude of the iml:)act-catastrophe hazard.
The above analysis is presented to facilitate comparison of impact hazards with others with which
we may be more farn_liar. However, there is a major qualitative difference between in,pad
catastrophes and otl'_r more common natural disasters. A global impact catastrophe could lead to
a billionor more fatalities and an end to the wodd as we know it. No other natural disasters,
including the Tunguska-class impacts, have this nature. They represent just one among many
causes of human death. In con;,ra.qt,the potential consequences of a large impact set it apart from
any other phenomenon with the exception of full-scale nuclear war.
STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH THE HAZARD
The greatest dsk is from the impacl of the large_ obje_s - those with diameters greater than the
global threshold, probably near 2 kin. Such irR:)acfs,which occur on average from once to several
times per millionyears, are qualitatively as well as quanlllallvely different from any other natural
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disastersinthattheirconsequencesareglobal,affectingtheentireplanet.About90percentofthe
potentialEarlh-impactingprojectilesarenear-Ear'h asteroids or short-period comets, called
collectively ECAs (Earth-crossing asteroids). The other 10 percent are intermeoiate or long-period
comets (those with periods longer than 20 years).
The first step in dealing with the cosmic impact hazard is to identify potential impactors, with emphasis
on the objects that pose the greatest risk:the ECAs. The ECAs have orbits that closely approach or
intersect that ol the Earth. Their normal orbital motion typicallybrings them rulatively near the Earth at
intervals of a few years, permitting their discovery. The objective of an ECA survey is to find these
objects during their periodic approaches to the Earth, to calculate their long-term orbital trajectories,
and to identify any that may impact the Earth over the next several centuries. If any appear to be on
Earth-impact trajectories: there will generally be a period of at least several decades during which to
take corrective action.
It should be emphasized that 1he ECAs are readily detectable in reflected sunlight and distinguishable
trom the stellar background by their motion. To deal with the threat posed by these objects, there is
no requirement for either a six>rt-range search or a quick .re._pense defense system. The chance that
an ECA will be discovered less than a few ye3_s b_c,r._ impact is vanishingly small. The nature of the
ECA orbits allows us to carry ou_a deliOerate, comprehensive survey with aml:_ time to react il any
threatening ECA is found. Jnoontrast, the warning time for impact from a long-period comet might be
as short as a few months, requiring a different class of response.
In order to carry out a deliberate and comprehensive search, we must detect, over a period of a
decade or more, the ECAs larger than our size threshold (nominally 1 km diarneter) that pass near the
Ear1,1. This requires that we monitor a region o! space extending outward from the orbit of the Earth
approximately as far as the inner edge of the main asteroid belt, at a distance of 200 million kilometers.
The easiest wa_ to detect these ECAs is by olt)servingtheir reflected sunlight, although they can also
be s_,enin the infrared using their emitted thermal radiation. More exotic technologies are not
appropriate; search radar, in particular, is limited to targets close to the Earth, _nd so is unsuitable to a
survey extending 200 million kilometers into space. In principle, the survey could be carried out either
from the ground or from orbit. The brightness of a 1-kin object at 200 million kilometers, assuming a
reflectivity of 3 percent or .Ttore,corresponds to stellar magnitude 22. Although they are quite faint,
such objects are readily detectable with conventional ground-based telescopes; thus there is no
requirement for a more expensive space-based system. This brightness limit also determines the
minimum telescope aperlure of aboul 2 m that is required for a complete survey.
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We have it within our currenlcapability to construct a network of survey telescopes at relatively modest
cost that can discover and track essentially all of the ECAs greater than I km in diameter. If the
program is continued for several decades, it will eventually yield most of the smaller ECAs (from 100 m
to 1 km diameter) as well. In addition, this same network of optical survey telescopes will be capable of
det6cti,._9,most incoming intermediate- or long-period comets and determining if any of them is has
the potentiai to st;'_.e the. Earth. However, the time between detection and possible impact will be
much shorter for the long-period comets.
The Spaceguard Su,_,ey described by the NASA International Near-Earth-Object Detection Workshop
has the potential to alter fundamentally the way we view the threat of cosmic impacts. To date we have
take_; about a relatively undefined threat, to be discussed in terms of probabilities or statistical risks.
While we know that such impacts must take place from time to time, we do not know If there are any
specific bodies in spac,_ r_ght impact the Earth over the next few centuries. If this search program is
carried out, however, we can answer this question for the ECAs, thus dealing with at least the 75
percent of the potential hazard. If such an object is found, than we can turn our attention to
addressing the threat it poses. In other words, we have the c_pability to achieve at quite modest cost
at least a 75 percent reduction in the hazard posed by cosmic impacts.
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FIGURE CAPTIONS
Figure 1. Estimated frequency of intpacts on the Earth derived from the present population of
comets and asteroids and from the lunar crater record.
Figure 2. Schematic indication of the risk of impacts measured by the expected average fatalaties
per event. Large impacts dominate the ris_, but there is considerable uncertainly in the threshold for
global catastrophe, as indicated by the hatched region in the figure.
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SOME PERSPECTIVES ON THE SEARCH FOR NEAR-EARTH OBJECTS
Dunca_ Steel
Anglo-Australian Observatory, Coonabarabran, NSW _357, Attstmlia
Introduction
This contribution is aimed at giving some views on: (1) Presently-available techniques for searching
for near-Earth objects (asteroids, comets, and fragments thereof) and how these might be enhanced
at _ttie cost; (2) The importance of objects in orbital classes about which little or nothing is known;
(3) The importance of flux determinations for smaller NEOs; (4) Other areas in which _lded effort
is required in the immediate future; and (5) Some very personal views upon the actual hagard
which have not been voiced in the other documents pertaining to the NASA NEO Workshops.
1. Presently-available search techniques
Apart from the Spacewatch telescope, now performing admirably at Kitt Peak, the other three
main NEO search programs use photographic techniques. Spacewatch operates by letting a large
CCD chip scan across the sky at the sidereal rate x, and this basic technique (except with faster
scan rates) has been selected by the NASA NEO Detection Workshop as the method of choice for
a search for large NEOs under the proposed Spaceguard Survey 2. The three photographic sur-
veys use images gained with wide-field Sclunidt telescopes: the Planet-Crossing Asteroid Survey
(PCAS) under E. Helln and the Palomar Asteroid and Comet Survey (PACS) under E. and C.
Shoemaker both use pairs of short exposures made using the 0.46 m Schmidt at Palontar Obser-
vatory: whilst the recently-started Anglo-Australian Near-Earth Asteroid Survey (AANEAS) uses
single long-duration exposures made with the 1.2 m U.K. Schmidt Telescope (UKST) at Siding
Spring Observatory in Australia.
These programs are all well documented 2 and little more will be said about them here. However,
it should be noted that often a newly-discovered object may have its orbit refined to a very large
degree if a previously-unrecognized observation can be found. For example, tke UKST has been
operating for a period of about 17/ears, and very often it is possible to fred earlier images of newly-
recognized objects amongst the _15,000 plates taken so fat of the southern sky. The P&lomar 1.2
m Oschin Schmidt has been operated for even longer, over 40 years, so that again the plate library
contains invaluable data yet to be exploited. The same comment applies to many other smaller
Schmidt (and other) telescopes such as the ESO Schmidt in Chile, the Uppsala Schmidts in Sweden
and Australia, and so on. For example the orbit of 2060 Chiton, discovered in 1977, has been refined
b2
with astrometric positions dating back to 1895. However, the problem in many cases is sccessin 8
the plates, and their availability: this argues for either copying or (preferably) digital scanning such
that interesting objects recorded thereupon may be searched for automatically. This is in fact being
carried out at this time for the UKST plate library (stored at the Royal Observatory, Edinburgh),
with the d_ta gradually coming on-line. This will allow rapid deter_nations of accurate orbits for
many objects, especially the larger, brighter ones, as this field develops.
To give some idea of the situation I will again concentrate just on the UKST plates, although
the same sort of considerations apply to Schmidt plate libraries elsewhere. Prom the start of routine
sky survey observations in 1974 through to 1990 five NEOs were discovered by chance on UKST
plates. Since May 1990 AANEAS has resulted in the discovery of about one new NEO per month; it
is important to note that there has been no change in the actual data collection with the telescope,
all that has happened is that the plates are rigorously scanned with binocular microscopes soon
after processing. Thus it is reasonable to suppose that there are about 200 unknown NEOs which
are actually recorded on old UKST plates, but have passed unnoticed. This compares with the
presently-known inventory of about 190 NEOs, largely discovered as a result of the PCAS, PACS,
Spacewatch and (latterly) AANEAS programs. It is entirely feasible that _1000 or more NEOs
have retrievable images spread amongst the plate libraries of the world's large Schmidts. Even if
orbits for these are not c_culable now, with the pointing history of the telescopes (well known for,
say, the UKST) the previous 'discovery' rates of NEOs would lead to a great refinement in our
knowledge of their population and flux by the Earth.
Quite apart from the shove it is feasible that large NEOs cou/d be discovered, a_d their orbits
determined, at a greatlyincreasedrate with a very modest increasein funding of the present
programs. In the caseof AANEAS no specificobservations&re made fordiscovery,due to the lack
of manpower and the financesto purchasefilm:only platestaken as part ofthe routineoperations
are available.However, up tc 30% of potentialobservingtime on the UKST isnot currentlyused
due to poor seeingor bright-of-moon.Ifmoney and staffwere availablethen .many shortexposures
could be taken towarclsthe eclipticand opposition,and thus NEOs found more efficientlyWe
estimatethat a discoveryrateoforder 100-200 per year could be achieved in thisway, esse_,tially
i_stantaneously.
2. Objects in little-known orbital classes
Itisjustover 15 yearssincethe firstAten-type (period< I year,aphelion> 0.9833xu so may im-
pact the Earth) asteroidwas discovered.Sincethen a littlemore than a dozen have been foundsthe
latesthaving been announced on the day thiswas being written(1992 BF: [A U Circ.5_3). These
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are especially unlikely to be found since they are largely observable only at large solar elongations,
whereas most planned searches concentrate on opposition. The fact that the Spaceguard Survey
as presently planned will be fairly ineffective in detecting Atens is well-recognized 2. Therefore it
is difficult at this stage to ascertain the importance of Atens with respect to the terrestrial impact
hazard: is it a contribution of 1%, 5%, 10_ or 50% of impacts?
However, at least this is a class of objects about which we know something; what other classes
await identification? In February 1991 a new asteroid (1991 DA) was discovered in the AANEAS
program, having perihelion near Mars, aphelion beyond Uranus, and a high inclination. This
appears to be the first of a class of asteroids in Halley-type orbits. Its large size (5--8 kin) would
argue for there being hundreds or thousands of smaller, but very significant, asteroids in similar
orbits. Whilst at present it has perihelion well beyond the terrestria_ orbit, numerical integrations
show that it may spend ,,-10% of its li_e on Earth-crossing paths 3'4. In the same way 2060 Chiton
is likely to evolve into an orbit which makes terrestrial impact possible s , and the same may apply
to 1992 AD, found even more recently. The huge size of the latter two objects (150-200 kin) would
mean that they could decay to produce a very large pop_ation of objects in near-Earth space,
enhancing the present NEO population by a factor of 100 or more.
3. The importance of flux determinations for smaller NEOs
The excellent modelling done by E. Bowell and K. Muinonen in designing the optimal search strat-
egy for the Spaceguard Survey s has demonstrated that it is not feasible to discover and determine
the orbits of all NEOs smaller than about 500 m on a time-scale of less than decades; although
many will be found over the course of a 20-25 year program they will still be only a small fraction
of the total. The problem then arises, in connection with decisions about the sizes of object to
be tackled by any space-based interception and deflection/destruction system to be planned in the
shorter (5-year) term, as to whether the influx of such objects to the Earth warrants expensive
attempts to intervene with these (cf. discussion of hazards in ref. 2).
In this respect [ point out the following. My own earlier background was in the field of the radar
detection of meteors. By far the largest part of the mass flux of solid objects h_ the near-Earth
environment, if one excludes the very large objects under consideration here (NEOs), is in the form
of 10-s-10 -2 g particles which are detected as radar meteors (e.g. see Fig. 1 of ref. 6). At the
start of the space age these were viewed _ being a significant potential threat to spacecraft and
therefore much money and effort was expended in detecting them and determining their fluz (and
it was found that the hazard that they posed was acceptably low). It was not until later that more
emphasis was placed on their orbits, and that was n_inly out of scientific interest (e.g. ref. 7). It
_4
appears that a lesson should be learnt from this piece of history: for large NEOs the near-F.ah'th
flux is so low that it is necessary to determine the orbit of each NEO and thus calculate the influx
to the planet and predic_ future impacts; but for the smaller objects (say, sizes < I00 m) it is
feasible that suitable instruments would be able to determine the )¢luz on a f_irly short time-scale
(years) without the huge effort required in order to measure their orbits. That is, the _tual hazard
may be categorized fairly swiftly, and then a knowledgeable decision as to the necessary steps can
be taken.
Again harking back to the lessons of meteor observations, of significance here would be deter-
minations of whether the flux of these smaller (< I00 m) NEOs changes during the year, from year
to year, and also whether they arrive in showers (cf. section 5). It seems likely that, judging from
the achievements of the Spacewatch telescope;, the sort of instruments proposed 2 for the Space-
guard Survey will be able to determine the fiuz of of small NEOs with some rapidity, without the
additional problems inherent in attempting to foUow these to determine their orb/is.
4. Other areas requiring L,nn_diate attention
Whilst much attention has been paid to how to detect NEOs of substantial size, and how to then
determine their orbits, comparatively little attention has yet been paid to the requirements of
precise numerical integrations to elucidate their future d:'namical history. There axe, however,
several groups world-wide why have performed such integr._tiozu of NEOs s and other objects (e.g.
3-5, 9) which will eventually lead to a much better under_mding than that presently available 2,1°
of which classes of NEO, and which particular objects, pose threats to the Earth. My intention
here is to h_light that it is by no means possib!e at this time at predict the *-°;_* .... of a NEO
•,, ,,,_ pr_.ci_io_ zequi.-_d for prognoses of Esa_h acts,
especially since non-gravitational forces -- notoriously difficult to model -- are apparently acting
on some NEOs 11. This area is also one which requires further investigation urgently, as indeed does
the whole field of physical studies of NEOs.
5. Coherent ver#tuJ stochastic catastrophism
The mainstream of thought with regard to terrestrial impacts by NEOs holds that such impacts
happen randomly in time; th_t i_ that these ¢at__strophes occur stoch_tics_Lly_ Contrary to thi. is
the view held by a few that in fact the impacts to a large extent, and most certainly in the preseat
epoch, <,ccur coherently12; that is, there are periods in which there are many impacts occurring
at the ssa'_e time (within days to weeks) in cyclic periods as the Earth is intercepted by clusters
of NEOs, mostly smaller (< 100 m) in size, produced by the disintegration of larger bodies. In
the present epoch impacts by such objects may be dominated by the influx of the products of
the hierarchical decay of a giant comet over the past 20,000 years, forming the meteoroid stream
termed the Taurid Complex xs. Impacts of the TunKusks elms from this complex are apparently
evidenced in the historical record 14. Addin K to this view is the recent recognition that there were
multiple impacts at the KT boundary eventlS:
"Shoemaker thinks the most probably source of multiple impacts is a comet that broke
up and then pummelled Earth with its debris year after year" Is
If the above contentious suggestion, or some variant upon it, in fact reflects the actual situation then
any NEO defence system must be capable of dealing with multiple NEOs at one time, possibly from
a nea_-Earth flux of several thousand objects within a few weeks, with Earth-intercept occurring
at the same time of year for many years.
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TO HIT OR NOT TO HIT
BRIAN G, MARSDEN
Harvard-Smi_hsonisn Center for Astrophysics. Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
It was the view of the companion Detection Workshop that we should attempt to dis-
cover and follow up astrometrically and physically any moderately large near-earth objects
(NEOs) that have the potential to collide with the earth during the next few centuries. Strict
examination of this potential requires that in appropriate cases we should secure exhaustive
astrometric data (optical as projected on the plane of the sky over as long a time span as
possible and radar range and rate) and perform detailed numerical integrations of the future
orbits, including the gravitational effects of all perturbing planets and also the nongravi-
tationfl reactive effects of the vaporization of cometary ices. Palticularly in the cases of
comets that might be subject to both nongravitational effects and repeated encounters with
Jupiter, the process is necessarily one of successive approximations as time goes by.
It has also been suggested that, at least in the case of asteroids, tile application of
secular-perturbation theory allows one to establish just which objects do or do not pose
a long-term threat; this has led to the definition of "earth-crossing asteroids" (ECAs) as
a subgroup of the general near-earth asteroids (NEAs). While the computation of secular
perturbations may have amrit, the procedure is not applicable to object_ (mainly comets)
that make frequent approaches to Jupiter, or even to objects that reme.in well separated
from Jupiter but that have orbits strongly resonant with that of Jupiter. Nevertheless, while
secular-perturbation theory may sometimes have some validity for, say, 200 000 years or
more, there seems little reason to take an excessive interest in objects that have absolutely
no possibility of striking the earth during the next 200 years.
I therefore maintain that, before undertaking extensive numerical integrations, and in-
stead of applying secular-perturbation theory, it is sufficient to examine whether the orbds
of the earth and a newly discovered object are currently close to intersecting each other. If
the current osculating orbit indic_,.tes a minimum separation of, say, 0.1 AU or more, and
provided that there are no large perturbations, there is obviously no cause for concern. Even
if this minimum separation is 0.05 AU, there can be little threat, although one may wish to
repeat the computation using orbital data integrated forward to other epochs. The principle
is similar to that utilized by those astronomers who examine whether particular cc,mets (or
asteroids) are likely to produce observable meteor streams.
The most obvious point to examine is whether the object crosses the earth's orbit plane
near the earth's distance from the sun, i.e., one should ascertain whether either value of
N-_ q(l+e) 1 ,_, (l)
q and e being the perihelion distance (in AU) and eccentricity of the object's orbit and w
the argument of perihelion, and with e = 0.05 AU it is certainly reasonable to ignore the
eccentricity (0.017) of the earth's orbit. All orbits with q < 1 AU and inclination _ < 3°
(or > 177 ° ) to the ecliptic obviously approach the earth's orbit within 0.05 AU, and this
suggests that it is also useful to examine the component perpendicular to the earth's orbit
when the object is at the earth's distance from the sun, i.e., whether either value of
M :- Isin(_-_ v)lsini < _, (2,)
where
+.) l]e
(with _ _ 1 AU and e > 0) are thv true anomalies at which this occurs; it is necessary also
to periorm this computation when l 5 q (; l + e AU, supposing then the single value v --.-0..
As a general rule, criterion (2) is of greater significance than criterion (1).
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Table I is a tabulation of asteroids with M and/or N meeting these criteria. To save
space _ has been lowered to 0.04 AU, and the first 48 entries give the cases where one or
both M meets the criterion, in increasing order of the smaller value; M values followed by
an asterisk represent the aforementioned cases where q > J AU. If N also meets its criterion,
the relevant vMues are also given, and the last seven entries in the table (still in order of
increasing minimum M) show the remaining cases where the N criterion is met. The notes
L and R refer to objects that were under observation for less than two or three weeks; L
indicates that an object is lost, while the cases denoted with 1_ indicate that the availability
of radar observations ensures that these objects, like those with longer observed arcs, should
be recoverable in the future.
On the right-hand side of Table I actual minimum separations (in AU) between the
objects and the earth during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries are indicated: this
list of actuM approaches is not exhaustive, particularly for the twenty-first century, but it
is evident that the more extreme approaches (within 0.015 AU, say) are confined to the
smaller values of M. The approach of (4660) Nereus to within 0.007 AU in 2060 is the
closest predicted for the future, although it is entirely possible that lost objects like 1-937
UB (Hermes) could come closer than this during the time interval of concern to us. Because
the earth's orbitM eccentricity is ignored, there are also other objects that pass within 0.04
AU of the earth, notably (1620) Geographos, which has M = 0.046 AU and approaches the
earth to a distance of only 0.033 AU in 1994.
It is Mso important to note that, although (1915) Quetzalcoatl currently has q > 1.07
AU, the effect of its 3:1 mean-motion resonance with Jupiter is such that q < I AU before
1940 and that in 1906 this object passed only 0.025 A(! from the earth (with M -- 0.08.5
AU, N = 0.033 AU). More to the point, we can say that, with minimum M -- 0.187 All,
N = 0.110 AU, (1866) Sisyphus (which has q = 0.87 AU and is one of the largest NEAs)
cannot possibly be a threat to the earth, asituation that was already apparent when the first
orbit determination for this object was made from observations (including only approximate
data) within six days of its discovery in 1972 (M = 0.180 AU, N = 0.10.5 AU).
Table II is a corresponding tabulation for comets. The eight comets with revolution
periods of less than 200 years (six of them less than ten years, although comet Lexell wRs
perturbed away by Jupiter long ago and now comes nowhere near the earth, and comet
Biela, Lot observed since 1852, is generally thought no longer to exist as a coherent, body)
are indicated by name, and the codes M and U indicate that th,re are either known meteors
associated with the comet or that the comet's orbit is particularly uncertain. Although
comparison of the tables may be of some interest, Table _I is clearly of much less significance
than Table I, for the fact that short-period comets frequently approach Jupiter means that
their M and N vMues experience rather larger changes, while the values for the comets with
periods much longer than 200 years are moot because these objects will not return to the
earth's vicinity during the time interval that concerns us. With a long-period comet, the
significance is only whether there will be a close encounter during; its discovery apparition,
and even with smMl M or N, non-threatening cases can be completely eliminatedgiven an
orbit determination from observations within a few days of discovery. Comet Halley, which
currently has M : 0.067 Air, m 0.151 Air, does not show oil the list. A millennium and
a hMf a_o, however, this comet had M -: 0.003 AU, N = 0.010 AU, and there was an actual
approach to within 0.038 All of the earth in 837.
By con_.tructing hMf a dozen ground-based telescopes in the 2-3-meter class and equipped
_vith modeln charge-coupl d devices, and by cor, centrating searches each month over some
6009 square degrees of sky opposite the stin, the Detection Workshop concludes that it will
he posqthle to find, over the course of only a couple of decades, almost all of the NEAs that
pose a global threat. The proposed search will oick up most of these bodies when they are
quite far from the sun, perhaps even near aphelion, and this is reasonable because that is
where they spend most of their time. The same search should also be effective for short-
period comets, which have rather similar orbital characteristics. The catalogues currently
contain 108 asteroids and 15 short-period comets (of period less than 20 years) with q < 1
AU. Given that the average asteroid has a period of 3 years and the average comet one of
5 years, the known asteroids sad comets pass perihelion at an annual rate of about 30 and
3, respectively. The relative threat of the short-period comets can thus be judged as about
10 percent that of the asteroids. The contribution of the one-shot, long-period comets is
harder to estimate. The catalogues contain 401 such comets with q < 1 AU, and although
the majority of them have appeared during the present century, some of the records go back
more than a millennium. It is therefore difficult to select a characteristic period, but even one
of only 200 years would _iye an annual rate of no more than 2, which is also the observed
rate (excluding the tiny Kreutz sungrazing comets detected by the SOLWIND and SMM
coronagraphs) during the past decade or so, or about 6 percent of that of the I_EAs.
Unlike the asteroids and the short-period comets, the long-period comets have orbital
poles that are distributed in an essentially random manner, and inclinations in the vicinity of
90 ° theref_re dominate. Although there are four times as many known cases of long-period
comets as asteroids with q < 1 AU, the number of entries in Tables I and II are comparable,
suggesting that the relative threat of the long-period comets can be reduced by a further
factor of four, down to at most 2 percent, say. Such a ratio is not inconsistent with the
actual near-encounters listed in Tables I and II, given that the actual minimum distances for
the asteroids are only representative for each object and that the list is far from exhaustive,
and considering that there is really only one good case, that of 1983 VII, of the earth's near
encounter with a long-period comet (the 1491 comet being uncertain and comet 1743 I in
fact very probably of short period).
One can object that this argument on the relative threat of long-period comets and
asteroids is flawed because I am comparing earth-approaching comets that were all bright
enough to be seen with the naked eye and asteroids that were often so faint that they taxed
the largest telescopes. But the intrinsic total brightness of comet 1983 VII was toward the
low end of the observed distribution for long-period comets, and its nucleus, which was
detected by radar, was comparable in size to the larger NEAs. Modern searches for NEAs
are also rather consistently picking up comets, and for reasons that are not entirely clear,
there is ar ._.pparent dearth of long-period comets that are intrinsically very faint. I am still
therefore inclined to stick with my figure of 2 peEcent, rather than with the figures as high as
2.5 percent that were discussed by the Detection Workshop. Certainly, with its significantly
higher velocity with respect to the earth, a typical Ions-period comet will be involved in a
much more energetic impact than a typical NEA, but that is a separate issue.
The appreciation that earth-threatening long-period comets may represent a smaller
fraction of the threatening NEOs than has previously been discussed should be counteracted
by the realization that it is very difficult to discover them with a warning time of more
than a few months. If comet 1991hl (see Table II) had been 38 days earlier in its orbit,
there would have been a very near miss, but comets invariably brighten according to a
higher inverse power of heliocentric dist_.nce than the square, and detection at a previous
opposition _vould have been quite impossible. Long-period comets on collision courses with
the earth spend an inordinate amount of the previous year at small angular elongations from
the sun. Although the possibility of making searches from telescopes in orbit about the
earth has also been discussed, this would not help unless the space instruments were large
enough to make detections near opposition 100 times fainter than proposed by the Detection
Workshop. Infrared searches from space have also been mentioned, h,t it i_ important
to note that IBAS did not detect any discrete objects that were not or could not also be
detected rather easily from optical telescopes on the ground, that its astrometric accuracy
was at least 20 times worse than that of optical telescopes, that it could not observe at
solar elongations significantly less than optical telescopes and that it was often difficult to
distinguish between detections of discrete planetary or cometary objects and harmless dust
trails. If the international community feels that it really is necessary to guarantee the early
detection of long-period comets, searches would best be made using optical telescopes located
far from the earth. Since the other class of potentially earth-threatening objects not easily
discoverable in earth-based opposition searches are NEAs with aphelia only slightly outside
the earth's orbit--or even at the earth's orbit--it might make sense to establish a surveillance
system in heliocentric orbit closer to the sun, or perhaps in orbit around Venus.
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Table I. Minor plamets.
Object M N Actua!
1981) Midas 0.000 0.030 1947
2201) Oljato 0.002
0.021 0.001 1991
0.003
Hermes 0.014 0.027 0.005 1937
(4581) Asclepius 0.017 0.005 1989
0.008 0.012 1991
0.006 0.005 1991
4660) Nereus
4179) Toutatis
2340) Hsthor
2101) Adonis
3361) Orpheus
(2135) Aristaeus
(3362) Kbufu
0.028
0.029
0.015
0.020
(3757) 0.030
4034)
4769) Cast,is
5011
3200 Phaethon
4450 Pan
2061 Ansa
1882 Apollo
1973 EA 0.000
1947 XC 0.000 0.009
L 1991BA 0.001 0.020
1989 yTp 0.002 0.040
L 1937 UB 0.003 0.005
1989 FC 0.004
L 1991VA 0.005
L 1991TU 0.005
1988 XB 0.005 0.023
1982 DB 0.005 0.021
1989 AC 0.005 0.007
1976 UA 0.007
1988 TA 0.007 0.027
R 1986 JK 0.007 0,037
R 1990 OS 0.009 0.018
1990 HA 0.010
L 1990 UA 0.012 0.017
1936CA 0,013 0,022
1982 HR 0.013 0.034
1977 HA 0,014
1989 UQ 0.015 0,021
L 1991 VG 0,015 0,025
R 1990MF 0.018 0.032
1984 QA 0.018
L 1989 VB 0.019"
L 1990 SM 0.019
1982 XB 0.020*
R 1991AQ 0.020 0.035
L 1990 UN 0.021 0.035
L 1983 LC 0.023 0.025
1986 PA 0.023
1989 PB 0.623
L 1991 BN 0.023
1988 EG 0.024 0.034
6743 P-L 0.026
1983TB 0.026
1987 SY 0.027
1960 UA 0.027"
1932 HA 0.028 0.032
l, 6344 P-I, 0.028
1980 QF 0.028
1980 PA 0.031"
1989 UR 0.031
1991EE 0.034
1991JX 0.036"
L 1954 XA 0.037
1959 LM 0.038
=
1991VH 0.047
1991JW 0.053
L 1978 CA 0.059
1984 KD 0.095"
1975 YB 0.117
1991 ('S 0.140
L 1991TT 0.156"
(3908)
(4183)Cuno
3671) Dionysus
2102) TantMus
0.007 2060
0.011 2004
0.008 1976
0.010 1988
0.021 1958
0.040 1990
0.036 1990
0.020 1990
0.015 1936
0.032 1982
0.032 1977
0.003 1991
0.034 1990
0o016 1917
0.038 1982
0.026 1915
0.029 1989
0.032 1998
0.037 1931
0.036 1963
0.027 1930
0.038 1900
0.032 1091
0.014
0.036
0.027 0.019 1910
0.033 0.031 1984
0029
0.032
0032 0.031 1991
?0
Table II. Comets.
Object M N Actual
1962 IV 0.000
1991h1 0.001
Gi_obini-Zinner M 0.001
1967 II 0.003
1864 II 0.004
1491 II U 0.004
1680 0.005
1882 I 0.0O7
568 0.009
1439 U 0.009
1080 U 0.010
1911 II M 0.010
1861 1 M 0.010
1969 VII 0.011
1833 0.013
1976 IV 0.013
1907 II 0.013
Lexell 0.013
1014 U 0.014
1743 I 0.014
-148 U 0.016
Biels M 0.016
1969 IX 0.016
1917 II 0.017
1245 U 0.018
1812 II 0.018
Fialsy 0.019
1763 0.020
1957 IX 0.022
1779 0.024
1862 IV 0.025
1857 1 0.025
1862 II O.O27
1973 XII 0.028
1939 Ill 0.028
1702 0.029
1854 Ill 0.030
1368 0.030
1898 X 0.031
1351 U 0.032*
1910 I 0.035
905 U 0.035
1983 VII 0.036
868 U 0.036
1845 III 0.037
1854 IV 0.038
1737 II 0.040
1925 XI 0.044
TempeI-Tuttle M 0.044
1911 VI 0.051
Grigg-Skjellerup M 0.054
1718 0.057*
1977 XIV 0.070
Swift-Turtle M 0.075
Pons-Winnecke M 0.077
1954 X 0,077
1849 I 0.085
1539 0.095
1684 0.097
1900 ][ 0.191'
1870 I 0.266"
1947 Ill 0,270
0.020
0.034
0.023
0.038
0.018
0.027
0.030
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.020
0.033
0.011
0.030
0.026
0.014
0.003
0.007
0.004
0.014
0.020
0.026
0.018
0.028
0.008
0.028
0.028
0.017
0.014
0.039
0.024
0.040
0.026
0.028
0.004
0.027
0.021
0.039
0.014
0.029
0.005
0.029
0.011
0.018
0.028
b 014
0.019
0.037
0.026
0.027
0.035
0.038
0.022
0.009 1491
0.015 1770
0.039 1743
0.037 1805
0.031 1983
0.023 1386
0.039 1927
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AIRBLAST DAMAGE FROM SMALL ASTEROIDS
Jack G. Hills and M. Patrick Goda
Los Alamos National Laboratory
ABSTRACT
The fragmentation of a small asteroid in the atmosphere greatly increases its cross
sections for aerodynamic braking and energy dissipation. At a typical impact velocity of
22 kin/s, the atmosphere absorbs more than half the kinetic energy of stony meteoroids
with diameters, DM < 250 meters and iron meteoroids with D_, < 60 meters. Most of this
energy dissipation occurs in a fraction of a scale height, which causes large meteoroids to
appear to "explode" or "flare" at the end of their visible paths. The dissipation of energy
in the atmosphere reduces the damage due to direct impacts (e.g., craters and tsunamis),
but it produces a blast wave than can cause considerable damage to structures on the
ground. The area of destruction around the impact point in which the over pressure in
the blast wave exceeds 4 pounds/inch 2 = 2.8 xl05 dynes/era 3, which is enough to knock
over trees and destroy buildings, increases rapidly from zero for chondritic asteroids less
than 50 meters in diameter (9 megatons) to about 2000 square km for those 80 meters
in diameter (40 megatons), the approximate c_ameter of the Tunguska impactor of 1908.
The area of destruction produced by _he blast wave from the impact of stony asteroids
between 70 meters and 200 meters in diameter is up to twice as great as it would be
wi thout fragmentation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Aerodynamic pressure fragments all large meteorites except iron ones that enter the
atmosphere at low speed. Fragmentation greatly increases the rate at which a meteoroid
dissipates its kinetic energy in the atmosphere. The fragments of a large stony meteorite
are typically strewn over an area about I kilometer in diameter if the zenith angle of the
impact is not laxge. The area increases for !arge zenith angles. An extreme example is the
recently discovered Rio Cuarto meteor crater fieId in Argentina (Schultz and Lianza 1992)
that was produced by art asteroid 3P9 meters in diameter. Its impact produced a series of
large craters over an axea about 2 kilometers wide and 30 km long.
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It is evident that atmospheric fragmentation is important for any stony asteroid less
than 1 kilometer in diameter since fragmentation causes its impact footprint to be of this
order irrespective of its initial size. This does not imply that the atmosphere will mitigate
the damage done by all stony meteorites less than 1 km in diameter. The Tunguska
impactor was an ordinary stony asteroid about 80 meters in diameter that dissipated
nearly all of its kinetic energy in the atmosphere, but it destroyed an area of 2000 square
kilometers (Sekanina 1983). If the asteroid is larger than about 200 meters in diameter,
the mass per unit area of its debris, even when spread to a diameter of 1 kin, exceeds that
of the atmosphere, so its debris is not significantly slowed by the atmosphere. It is clear
that we must allow for fragmentation and energy dissipation in the atmosphere to fully
characterize the damage done by small asteroids and to determine which asteroids we need
to intercept.
The authors find that a fragmented asteroid wiU expand out to about twice its initial
radius before significant holes appear between the fragments when viewed from the front
of the meteoroid. Until this occurs, the meteoroid appears as a solid expanding object
behind a single bow shock. Its mass remains constant, except for ablation, but its surface
area and drag increases by a factor of four. If the meteoroid is small enough, it slows
enough during this expansion after the first fragmentation that it does not undergo further
fragmentation. Its various fragments proceed independently behind their own bow shocks.
Larger meteoroids (small asteroids) suffer little deceleration during this first expansion,
so when the fragments start to decouple from the parent body and develop their own
bow shocks, they are deeper in the atmosphere, they feel more aerodynamic pressure
than the original parent body, so they promptly fragment into even smaller pieces. The
greater aerodynamic pressure gradient across these fragments causes their own fragments
to disperse at higher velocities than the fragments of the originr_[ parent body. This higher
dispersal velocity during each subsequent stage of fragmentation causes the fragments to
fill in the gaps between themselves, so during this continuous fragmentation process, the
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object can be treated as one body behind a single bow shock. The increase in its effective
drag radius is determined by the dispersal speed of the fragments. This process continues
until the debris cloud has slowed enough that the aerodynamic pressure can no longer cause
further fragmentation at the time when the subfragments start to develop their own bow
shocks. The subfmgments then proceed as independent objects through the atmosphere.
This fragmentation model has been put into a computer code that follows the motion
of the meteorite through the atmosphere allowing for changes in its aerodynamic cross
section due to fragmentation and in its mass due to ablation. This code has allowed us
to compute the rate of energy deposition in the atmosphere as a function of height and
compute the damage due to the resulting blast wave.
2. DAMAGE DUE TO THE BLAST WAVE
Fig. I shows the energy deposited in the atmosphere as a function of height for an
ordinary stony asteroid with a radius of 50 meters, which isa littlelargerthan that of the
Tunguska impactor of 1908. We see from the figurethat the bulk of the energy deposition
occurs in a fraction of a scaleheight, which explains why large stony meteoroids including
Tun_aska appear to "explod(' or flaretowards the end of their paths. The rapid decrease
in veIGcity and the large increase in the rate of euergy disposition in a narrow range of
atmospheric height isdue to the combined effectof the increasing drag area of the debris
cloud resultingfrom fragmentation and to the exponential increase in atmospheric density.
The peak in the energy deposition curves of Fig. 1 occur near the height, hhot/, by
which half the kinetic energy has been dissipated. We saw in Fig. 1 that most of the
atmospheric energy dissipation occurs in a narrow range of height around hhQIl. This
allows us to approximate the energy release as a point explosion at hh,t/. There ismucn
experimental data from the 1940's and 1950's on the effectsof nuclear explosives fired
at various heights, h, and yields,E. Johndale Solem (Theoretical Division, LANL) finds
from this data that the radius r4 within which the over press_.-edue to the atmospheric
burst exceeds _.psi,which isenough to knock down trees and economically destroy most
buildings,can be approximated by the fittingformul.-,
r4 = ah - bh2E -1/3 + cE 1/3 (1)
where a = 2.09, b = 156 ergl/3/cm and c = 0.0146 cm/erg 1/3. Here r4 is measured along
the ground from the point below the detonation. For r4 and h in km and E in Mgtons
(Megaton of TNT = 4.2 x 10 _2 ergs), r_ = 2.09, b = 0.449, and c - 5.08. (Similar results, in
less convenient form, may be found in Glasstone and Dolan 1977, Chapter 3). Determining
r, directly from theory is difficult because it depends on an interplay between the shock
propagating directly from the point of energy release, and that reflected from the ground.
Fig. 2 and 3 shows r4 derived from Equation (1) as a function of impactor radius for
stony and nickel-iron meteorites: respectively. Here 1_ is the total kinetic energy of the
impactor. For h in Equation (1) we used hh_tl, the height at which half the energy was
dissipated. We assumed that the energy dissipation occm_ at h = 0 if less than half the
energy was dissipated before the meteorite hits the ground. (The values of r4 given in
these figures are somewhat larger than those given in Fig. 1-3 and 1-4 of the Summary
Report of the Workshop (Rather, et. al. 1992). The error in the earlier figures was caused
by p, miscommunication between the authors that resulted in 0.5 E rathe,' than E being
put into the computer code to evaluate r4.)
We see from Fig. 2 that the blast waves from soft stony meteorites, which constitute
about 95% of the total meteorites, only cause ground damage if their radii exceed about
25 meters. For V - 20-25 kin/s, the radius of destruction increases very rapidly with
increasing asteroid radius. It reaches the area of Chicago for R = 32 meters.
There has been some controversy about the nature of Tunguska impactor (Sekanina
1983), but Fig. 2 shows that its area of destruction is consistent with the impact of e_-_
I stony a 40 meters and a probable impact energy
ordinary mcteorite with r_MiiILq of about
of about 40 megatons.
The radius of destruction continues to increase rapidly with increasing asteroid radius.
A stony asteroid with a radius of 150 meters, which is about the size of the one that
produced the Rio Cuarto crater field !a Argentina, would wipe. out (at 4 p.s.i or greater)
an area the size of Connecticut. This would have an impact energy of about 2 Gigatons
= 2,000 Magatons with most of this energy being dissipated after the fragments hit the
ground. An object of this size hits the Earth about every 3000 years. The Rio Cuarto
impactor fell "considerably less" than 10,000 years ago (Shultz and Lianza 1992), after
humans came to America.
We see from Fig. 3 that airblast damage frcm nickel-iron asteroid impacts begins at
much smaller radii than that for stony ones. This is largely due to the iron meteorites
fragmenting and dissipating their energy at much lower h. They are also nearly 3 times
denser than stone, so they have nearly 3 times as much ldnetic energy for a given radius.
Fig. 3 shows that nickel-iron meteorites with radii R > 2 meters cause airblast damage
on the ground if Vo = 11.2 kin/s, the lowest, parabolic, velocity available to a meteorite
hitting tile earth. The minimum R for ground damage increases to 10 meters for Vo = 30
km/s due to the fragmentation and energy dissipation occurring higher in the atmosphere.
Fig. 4 and 5 show the value of r4 as given by Fig. 2 and 3 in units of what r4 would
have been had all the energy been dissipated at h = 0. We see that for stony asteroids
with radii in the range of 35 to 100-_ meters, the radius of desttalction, r4, is larger than
it would have been had all the energy been released at h=0. The atmosphere forces the
energy to be dissipated close to the "optimum" height that produces the maximum airblast
damage. In some cases the area of destruction is more thazl twice a.s large as it would have
been had the energy dissipation occurred at h=0.
3. CONCLUSIONS
We have found that most of the damage done by small stony asteroids (less than 1O0
meters in radius) results from the blast wave produced by their dissipation of energy in
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the atmosphere. For larger asteroids the ground impact damage (craters, earthquakes, and
tsanami) dominates over the blast wave. The authors have in preparation a paper that
computes these ground effects as well as giving a much more detailed treatment of the
a2rblast. We find that the most devastating result of the impacts of asteroids with radii
in the range of 100-1000 meters is probably tsunami. Tsunami have a long range. They
are basically a two-dimensional phenomena with the height of the wave dropping off only
as the inverse distance from the impact. An asteroid with a radius of 200+ meters that
drops anywhere in the Atlantic would wipe out the low-lying coast line on both sides of
the ocean.
MPG would like to thank the Department of Energy for an ".mdergraduate SERS
(Science and Engineering Research Semester) Fellowship that supported his work at Los
Alamos. MPG and JGH would like to thank Johndale Solem for supplying Equation (1)
that determines the ground damage done by an airburst.
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FIGURE CAPTIONS
Fig. 1 The energy dissipated by an impactor as a function of height in the atmosphere.
This is given for a range of initial impact velocities into the upper atmosphere. All im-
pactors are stony asteroids with radii R = 50 meters.
Fig. 2 The radius of destruction around the impa:t point of a stony asteroid due to the
atmospheric blast wave. This radius is defined to be where the overpressure isat lea.st4
psi,which isenough to knock down treesand economically destroy buildings. T_s isgiven
as a function of the asteroid radius for several values of the impact velocity at the top of
the atmosphere.
Fig. 3 Sa_me as Fig. 3, but for nickel-ironasteroids.
Fig. 4 The radius of destruction for stony asteroids as given in Fig. 2 in units of what it
would be if the sarae amount of energy were released at h = 0.
Fig. 5 The radius of destruction for nieicel-iron asteroids as given in Fig. 3 in units of
what it would be if the same amount of energy were released at h -- 0.
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LAffl_OD_C_OF_C_ION
S.1 Workshop Summary
Near-Earth-objects (NEOe) m highly diverse in their intrinsic natures and in their orbital
characteristics. Even the nomencla;urs can P_e confusing. Many near.Earth asteroids
_), including Em'th-crossing asteroids (ECAs), have been perturbed by gravitational or
colllsionsl encounters from their primordial orbits between Mars and Jupiter. Thus they are
usually found in orbits of moderate eccentricity (e - 0.6), revolving about the Sun in the same
sense as the Earth and the other planets, and not greatly inclined to the plane of the Earth's
orbit (te., the ecliptic plane), although inclinations up to 70 ° are sometimes found. Long-
period comets (LPCs), on the other hand, follow highly eccentric orbits, often highly inclined
to the ecliptic Short-period comets (Sl_s) seem to have been trapped h'on the class of LPCs
(or perhaps more directly from objects with orbits in the vicinity of the outer planets) by close
passage of the giant planets (e.£., Jupiter and Saturn). With repeated passages moderately
near the Sun, it is possible thsat some of the SPCe lose their near-surface ices that vaporise to
form their glowing heads rJJd tails, leaving only an inert regolith of material that shuts down
eometmry activity. They will then be classed as ECAs in spite of their sometimes more
eccentric orbits, thus broadening the ECA parameter space.
A wide spectrum of pesss_ilities exists for impacts of near.Earth objects with the Earth. The
beet and most likely ease involves objects _vhose orbits are so well-known so many years in
advance that threats from them can be mitigated with certainty. The worst ease obviously
would be an overwhelming, unpredicted disaster caused by a large object not detected in time
for us to react. Warning time is the principal distinatfishing factor among these different
cases. Practical interest does not exceed many dec.des on the high side bemuse the expected
pro_'sss of humans in space will open many new options for dealing with threats far in the
future, and is limited on the low side by that time interval for which no astrodyntmic
response is possible, essentially a few d_)_J or weeks. Table 2-1 shows how the working group
partitioned the astrodynamic8 problem for consideration, beginning at the most favorable
extreme, and working toward the ]exe predictable cam. First let us expand and clarify the
deflaitim_s of the four cases identified.
Case I. Case I considers Earth-crossing asteroids with well-determined orbits, which have
predicted Earth-encounter position errors of the order of Earth's radius, or smaller.
Therefore. it is possible to predict with reasonable confidence which orbital apparitions will
bring an asteroid into Earth impact. Provided that detection resources allow them to be
discovered and catalogued, the positions of these objects can be predicted precisely enough to
Idlow warning times of decades or even centuries.
As de_ribod abow, some of these threatening ot_cte rare in highly inclined, highly elliptical
orbits, and will require iarge rocket velocities to intercept, but long warning time permits the
use of minimum.energy interception orbits. Long available time also permits precursor
missions to remove uncert_nt_es from the intercept. If a high intercept velocity (e.g.,
25 kin/s) is aeeepteble, then it would be possible to fly a mission to intercept the object at the
intersection of the orbits of the NEO end Earth. However, s given energy impulse will
produce maximum perturbation to NEOs (other than Aten-type asteroids) if the impulse is
delivered at perihelion, In the case of Aton-typ, asteroids, which have samir.major axes
shorter than 1 AU and thus spend most of their time inside the orbit of the Earth,
interception is best attempted at aphelion, where minimum energy imparted will produce
maximum _ ofthe NEO away from theEarth.
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Table S-L /n_oa cue definitions
Category
1. WeU-deflned
orbits.
Precursor missions
are strongly
advisable for
detailed evaluation
2. _ore uncertain
orbit.
Luxury of
precurlor
mission may
be absent.
Imermed_e
wamir_ firm
(but still
urgent).
Object motion II
affected by
nongrav#stional
forces (cometary
bodies).
ii
3. Immediate trveat.
Best scenario:
discovery at
10 AU.
Discovery Jrdtiato8
emergency,
4, NO wllmdng,
Tittle
Warning
Decades
Yolm
:2
Months
to1
Month
0 - 30
Days
Action
Lon0-
term
rn_k)nm
Ulgell
re_m
wlUlout
much
room
lot error
Every
tvaila_e
engl.
nee_n0
rnellSUIll.
Continue
to refine
the ort_
Evacuate
_pacl
8reu
Probably
of Scenlrb
lot l-kin
Ot_cts
Now Future
5% 96%
(95% 04
presentty
unknown)
Unknown
Unknown
95% 5%
(5% of
ot)_s
remain
unknown
I_er 20-year
uarch)
I
Unknown
I
Tyr_cai
Inlerl_ion TIrget
Distance AV
(AU) (om_)
2
i
2
0.1 -1
(ECA)
1 ECA;
only
10 - I00 Newly-
(more disco-
error) vered
ECAs
(less
en_r)
>IOO0
ItO.1 AU
>100
llt 1.0 AU
In'Oact
velocities
I0-40
knW
Short-
perk)d
cornets
Long-
perk)d
comet8
Small,
newly
dicoo.
vered
ECAs
Long-
period
comets
and
unknown
ECAs
Presume treating Cue I will have beneficial spin-otis for other NASA programs and for
science because the long warning times permit detailed scientific explorations and
investigations of extrate_ resources.
2. Newly discovered Earth-croseing asteroids may have poorly determined orbits. In
addition, short-period comets may be perturbed by eifpfiflcant nongravitational forces from
rocketoifl_e outaaseing, leading to unpredictable temporal variations. In either case, orbital
uncertaint7 reduces the lead time with which we can predict probable Earth impact to a few
yearL Since nearly all such objects will be faint, the response must be more urgent to deal
with the uncertainties and the difl3cu]ty of acquisition.
Every available mean8 should be employed to refine the orbit. Once an object in this
eatesory is determined to be a threat, much higher intercept velocities are likely to be
required because of the short mission profile. The launch energy needed, therefore, could be
enormously higher than in Case 1, and there may not be the luxury of using an extra orbit
for s reconnaimmce flyby. On arrival at the target, the required impulse to be delivered may
be an order ofmqgnJtude larger than for Case 1. It is poesibl® that a launch window might
not exist for some reason, putting the object into Case 3 (described below). Surest at the
first attempt is critical for the intercept mission in this ease, since failure may also have the
emeequence of'changing the interaction into Case 3.
Came $. Here the threatening object is identified to be on 8 vollision course with Earth with
a warning time of about one year or kss. The oi_ject typically will be a long-peried comet
approachin8 Earth for the first time. The most favorable scenario is discovery at a range of
10 AU at visual stellar magnitude V w 22, which is extremely faint and requires a large
telescope for discovery. Such ei_ect8 are likely to be 10 kin or more in _ze to be visible at
this distance. At 5 AU, much of the comet's light will be in the coma, making discovery much
easier although localization of the nucleus may be difficult. But at 5 AU the warning time
will have de:teased typically to a few months.
opposed to comets, newly discovered asteroids in this category are likely to be small
bodies (less thJm a few hundred meters across), provided that an adequate search for ECAs
has previously discovered most of the larlpr ones in short-period orbits. In other words, Case
$ asteroids have somehow slipped throui_'_ the detection net.
Response in Case $ requires an entirely different approach. Launch must be with shortest
respense time possible, and wit_ the highest feas_le velocity to make the inter©eption as far
from Earth as possible. Launch range is 0.1 to 1 AU, with a specific energy (C__)up to 100
(km/sP, associated with flight times of about 1 week to $ months. The zone of feasible
tntereeptien will oAen be within 0A AU in this ease.
Ca_ d. This is the "horror" seemtno in which a _ object strikes with little or no warning.
With the preens state of low observational a_ivi_, this is by far the most likely scenario
becalm 98'7t of t_ laqre objects and euenti_lly all small onem remain undiscovered at the
preens t/n_. Since an intercept is very difficult or impossible in such a case, evacuation from
impact areas may be the only possible approach, and this may be futile.
8.8 Pm, ib_ l_reeption 2_eetort_
The unique feature of the astrodyrmmic problem of intereepting an Earth-impact-threatening
NF, O i8 that the erbits .fthe NEO and of the Earth intersect at the ascending or descending
node of the NEO orbit where the impact is predicted to oecur.
_6
Pigure 2-1 shows a maneuver to achieve a nmduvous with sunNEe, starting from low-Earth
orbit (LEO), A large launch impulse, essentially equal to the difference between the
predicted Earth-impact velocity of the NEe and the Earth orbital velocity of the spacecraft,
must be applied at the time Earth passes the nodal longitude where the two orbits intersect.
Th/8 injects the spacecraft into an orbit approximately matching that of"the NEe, except for
oridtal phase and & small orbiLa] period mismatch. This period difference is chosen so as to
cauN the two bed/ca to drift together, tt which point an orbit trim maneuver completes the
randy. YJhe total hunch velocity, AV, for such missions is typically in the range ? to
18 ksn/L The Case 2 threat, with • warrdng time of'only • Jew yearr_ may require th/s type OF
interaction, perhaps modified to increase the driA _ato at the east OFa higher orbit trim AV;
this mod_cati0m will de_sse the t/me spent in the _ phase of'the mission.
Figure 2-2 shows an alternative interception trajectory wkich reduces the mission _V by
relszing the rondmn_us requirement and using • high-velocity approach, typically in the
range 10 to _0 km/L The intercepter is injected into • heliocentric orbit with • period
slightly under or over one year, at • point near the node OFthe NEe orbit (the point where
impact with I_.rth is p_dicted to occur). Interoept/on occurs at that same nodal point,
several years later. A modified version of'th/s strste_ may be useful _ptinst Case 2 threats,
when, mission AV is to be minimised, and the time available i• tightly constrained.
An. alternative iow-AV strategy (Figure 2-3) uses multiple planetary gravity assist
maneuvers to approximate • globally optimal tranoFor f_om LEO to • rendezvous with the
taqpt asteroid. This strat_y is appropriate for h/gh-impact-velocity Case I Oor_ warning
time) threats,whenever the doFons/vs Wstom requires either • rendezvous with the target
object, or an interception far from Earth's orbit, e.g., at the perihelion poinL For a
rendezvous, the final gravity-assist maneuver will pnerally be an Earth flyby at the node of'
the NEe orbit, to inject the spacecraft into • matching rendezvous orbiL The mission AV for
this ty_ oF t_ajectory is the sum of the impulse needed to inject the vehicle into an
intsrphmetary trajectory to the fSrst flyby planet (probably Venus or Mars: setimated AV • 4
to 5 kin/s), and • small amount (probably < 0J5 kin/s) for juidance and orbit trim maneuvers.
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DEFLECTION AND FRAGMENTATION OF
NEAR-EARTH ASTEROIDS
Thomas J. Ahrens, Lindhurst Laboratory of Experimental Geophysics, Seismological
Laboratory 252-21, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125;
Harris, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 4800 Oak Grove Drive, Pasadena, California, CA
91109
ABSTRACT
Collisions by near-earth asteroids or the nuclei of comets pose varying levels of
threat to man. A relatively small object, MOO ra diameter, which might be found on an
impact trajectory with a populated region of the Earth, could potentially be diverted with a
velocity of ~1 cm/sec from an Earth impacting trajectory by impact (at 12 km/sec) by a
rocket launched, 102 to 103 Kg impactor. For larger bodies, the use of kinetic energy
irnpactors appear impractical because of the larger mass requirement. For any size object,
nuclear explosions appear to be more efficient, using either the prompt blow-off from
neutron radiation, the impulse from ejecta of a near-surface explosion for deflection, or,
least efficiently, as a hagmenting charge.
for Proceedings: Near Earth Object Interception Worluhop,
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1. INTRODUCTION
Several hundred asteroids and comet nucleii with diam_eters > 102 m, in Earth
crossi, g orbits, have been discovered. Upon extrapolating this known population of near
Earth objects (NEO's) to those not yet discovered, it is estimated that -2 x 103 objects > 1
km in diameter are present in a transient population. The largest earth crossing asteroids
have diameters in me - 10 km range. It is unlikely that any still larger objects remain
undiscovered, however, it is likely that additional objects as large as 3-5 kin in diameter
may remain undiscovered.
Scientific interest in NEO's is great because it appears that many of these objects are
main belt asteroids which have been perturbed into terrestrial planet crossing orbits, and
thus give rise to a large fraction of impactor flux on terrestrial planet surfaces[Binzel et al.,
1992]. Objects as small as 5-10 m in diameter, can be telescopically observed. Recently
1991 BA, in the 5-10 m size was detected. This object passed within -105 km of the
earth[Scotti et at,, 1991]. Small objects with diamemrs > 0.6 and 0.2 m for stony and iron
objects are believed to be representative of the terrestrial meteorite collection. Since the
number distribution of different meteorite classes correlates poorly with asteroid type as
inferred from reflectance spectra of main belt asteroids, it may be that the present terrestrial
meteorite collection is a poor sample of the asteroid population. To further study asteroids,
one or more unmanned flyby or rendezvous missions to near earth asteroids (NEA's) are
currendy being planned by NASA[Veverka and Harris, 1986]. Moreover, the composition
of NEA's is of great interest since these represent possible ruinable resources which, m
principle, could supply raw materials, including water, and hence, oxygen and hydrogen
for extended space flights in the future.
New comets are brought into the swarm of NEO's by gravitational perturbation
from their orbits in the Kuiper belt and/or Oort cloud [Weissman, 1990]. Some objects
currendy classed as near-earth asteroids may be devolatilized comets.
Planet crossing objects are removed from the population either via collision with a
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planet or by gras4tational perturbation which causes them to be ejected into hyperbolic
orbits.
Although earth-crossing asteroids have been recognized telescopically since 1932,
when Karl Reinmuth discovered 1862 Apollo, it was the American geologist, G. K.
Gilbert who_ work on Meteor Crater, Arizona. and many later workers, made it apparent
that the impact of earth-crossing asteroids and comets produce the -120 known meteorite.
impact craters on the earth and virnmlly all the craters on the moon.
The concept that the impact of any asteroid or cornet with the earth could, in
principle, have a catastrophic effect on life on the earth logically followed from the 1980
discovery of Alvarez et al.[Alvarez et al., 1980] of the worldwide platinum group element-
rich impact ejecta dust layer at the Cretaceous-Tertiary (K-T) boundary. The gradual great
acceptance of the Alvarez hypothesis that the impact of ~ 10 kan or larger bolide with the
earth at the K-T boundary (65 Ma ago) gave rise to a great extinction of more than 50% of
th_ blown genera and probably 90% of all species, recently motivated several technical
meetings, focussed on this topic, in several countries. Sparked by public concern, the
United States Hou:e of Representatives in I991 requested that the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration to conduct a (workshop) series of studies of the asteroid-impact
threat to the earth [Morrison, 1992], and the means to prevent it [Rather et al., 1992]. The
recent Near-I:'_.arfl_ Object Detection Workshop [Morrison, 1992], quantified the hazards to
populations of different size earth impactors based, in part, on the, results of an earlier,
1981, workshop [Shoemaker, 1983]. Using the estimated population of NEO's and their
size di.q*ribution, objects with diameters of about 10 m impact the earth almost annually,
and although visible and audible for distances of 102 to 103 km, these objects largely break
up and expend fl_ir typically 10 kton (of TNT)energy in the atmosphere. Objects of al_ut
100 m diameter include the 1908 Tunguska event (.-10 Mton) energy. This size impactor
has a frequency of about once every -300 yeats "l'he Tunguska bolide did not hit the
earth's surface and yet did great damage. These objects, although inducing i_cal rueas of
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devastation of -5 x 103 krn2, have an annual probability of leading to the deaths of a given
individual of only 3 x 10-a/year. Although less frequent, once every 6.5 Ma, earth
impactors of the -2 km diameter sire are inferred to be the minimum size which can
produce global catastrophic effects (25% human mortality). Thus the annual individual
death probability from such an event is of the order of 5 x lff 7, which is comparable to the
annual worldwide probability of an individual succumbing in _, commercial airplane
accident. When viewed in this way, it appears to us that for society to deal with this
problem rationally, it ought to expend not more tha,'_ perhaps a fraction of the amount
cormitted to air safety and control. We believe this would be in the range of 107 to 108
dollars per anrvlm worldwide. As wa_s concluded by the Near Earth Object Detection
Workshop, funding at this level would vastly improve our knowledge of the population
and distribution of near earth objects using ground-based and possibly space-borne
telescopes. The technologies which might be employed to divert asteroids can be expected
to change so rapidly that it appears premature to conduct detailed engineering studies or
build prototypes.
To quantify the present work especially with regard to nuclear explosive cratering in
the low gravity asteroid environment, we emp,oy recent studies of cratering at varying
gravities and atmospheric pressures [Housen et al., 1992] and in,pact ejecta scaling
[Housen et al._ 1983], which were not available to earlier studies [MIT Students, 1968;
Solem, 1_,:_2].
_ 'he p_nt paper we examine the orbit perturbatiort requirements to deflect
oh.: ,::t:; ! ,.., the Earth, which upon astronomic_.! orbit determination are found to have
each lmpac'tmg trajectories. We then examine several physical means for both deflecting
and explosively fragmetJfing such objects. We consider NEO's in three size ranges, 0.1,
1, and 10 km ila diameter. Their fluxes, on the total area of the earth per year a_.
tv.spectively, 10 "3, 10 -5, and 10-g. II is unlikely that any undiscovered objects > 5 km
exist. Significantly smaller objects pt_se ve_'y little threat, because they do not penetrate the
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atmosphere intact, Shor duration responses, which might be considered for new comets,
have recently been described by Solem [1991; 1992]. This study addresses the physical
means of encountering NEO's with spacecraft-bearing energetic devices many years, or
even decades, before projected earth impact.
2. NEAR EARTH ASTEROID ORBIT DEFLECTION CONSIDERATIONS
Two possible approaches to orbit deflection are perturbation perpendicular to orbital
motion and perturbation along the trajectory of motion, e.g. either speeding up or slowing
down the orbital velocity relative to the Sun.
An increment of velocity, Av applied trat,_versely to a cLncularly orbiting particle
induces an eccentricity or inclination which results in an oscillation about t!-,; original
orbiting point of amplitude.
Av
- V0-oa (1)
where vo is the orbit velocity (?g} km/s for the Earth) and a is the semimajor axis. Thus to
perturb a particle by 8 - 1 R_. The Av required is
av ~ v--°--_ - 1 m/s (2)
a
To perturb a body on a time t short compared to the orbit period, a simple linear estimate
suffices:
8 = Art (3)
To perturb a body 1 R_ in time, t, requires
Av - _-_ -, 75 m/s
t t, days (4)
Note that the linear estimate, reduces to the orbital oscillation after ~ 1 radian of orbital
motion.
In contrast, an increment of velocity Av applied parallel to the orbit motion changes
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the orbital semimajor axis, but more impolaantly, changes the orbit period which results in
a secular drift of the perturbed I:./y fi'om its original path. For an initially circular orbit,
the mean drift velocity, Av' is in the opposite sense and larger than Av:
Av' = - 3Av (5)
An even larger amplification occurs if the impulse is applied at the perihelion of an eccentric
orbit. For an eccentricity of 0.5, Av' = -5Av. Thus, over a time long compared to the
orbit period, an increment Av applied parallel to v produoes a deflection of
- 3Avt (6)
Hence, for 1 R, deflection
Av--_ 0.07m/st, years (7)
Thus, with a lead time of the order of a decade, a velocity increment as small as -4).01
m/sec could suffice to divert an asteroid from a collision course with the Earth.
3. IMPLEMENTATION OF ORBITAL DIVERSION
Several .scenarios are considered, including deflection via kinetic energy impactor,
mass driver systems, as well as nuclear exrflosive radiation and blow-off, and ejecta
impulse from cratering explosions.
A. DIRECT IMPACq" DEFLF?XTI'ION
It is feasible to deflect a small (~ 102 m diameter) asteroid via direct impact because:
(1) The kinetic cherry delivereA fi_r even a modest ence_mwr velocity (-12 km/sec)
of an upper stage launched spac_crafl is much more efficiently coupled (70 to 80%) to the
a_teroid [Smither and Ahrens, 1992] than surface explosions. The energy density at 12
krv/,w_c is 70 x 1010 ergs per g of impactor. This is much greater than typical chemical
explosive energies (4 x 1010 ergs/g), and as demonstrated below the ejecta throw-off from
such an impact will suitably perturb the NEO.
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/(2) The cratering efficiency on a small (100 m diameter) asteroid (escape velocity 5
cm/sex) is unmeasured. However, _.xtrapolating small scale studies (at high and low
gravities) it is expected to be -104 times [Holsapple, 1992; Housen et al., 1983] the earthly
value of 2.8 tons of rock per ton of equivalent explosive yield [Cooper, 1977]. For
example, we calculate the impact of a 200 kg projectile onto 100 m diameter, 106 ton, 2
g/cm 3 asteroid, mduces a gravity limited crater with 105 tons of ejecta ha,Ang greater than
escape velocity. This will perturb the velocity object --0.6 cm/sec even if a (30 bar)
strength controlled crater formation is assumed [Holsapple and Schmidt, 1982] and -i02
tons per equivalent ton of explosive is calculated.
it is possible that for small asteroids, an impactor device, e.g., the U.S. Space
Defense Initiative's technology derived from the Boeing Company's Lightweight
Exoatmospberic Projectile, could be utilized.
At larger asteroid diameters of 1 kin, the increase in asteroid mass by a factor of 103
reduces the resulting perturbation velocity by the same factor. Moreover, the cratering
efficiency declines on account of the increased gravity of the asteroid and thus direct m_pact
deflection m this size range becomes impractical.
10/5/92
B. MASS DRIVERS FOR DEI-I_,ECT1ON
As a long-term respond, one might imagine employing a mass driver system which
is in operation for many years. A lead time of three decades, prior to earth encounter
would, from Eq. 7, require a Av - 0.2 cm/s. It might be _cnnically feasible to deliver a
reaction engine or "mass driver" to an asteroid which will launch ejecta mined from part of
the asteroid. Such a device operating on a small asteroid over a decade time-scale, provides
the needed Av. For an eiection velocity of-0.3 km/sec, the ejected mass necessary to
produce a recoil of 0.2 cm/sec is
0.2cm / _c
Am m a - 7000 tons
0.3kin / sec
where ma is the asteroid mass. Although such a system might be technically feasible, it
will bezome c1 "-ore what follows that nuclear e,aergy offers a much less expensive
C NUCLEAR EXPLOSION RADIATION DEFLECTION
By detonating a nuclear e×plos_ve which emits a large portion of its yield via
neutrons, a large area of the asteroid/comet surface can be irradiated [Hyde, 1984].
Subsequent blowy-off of surface material in excess of the escape velocity can provide the
necessary impul_ for <,__qtal dellection as sketched ir_ Fig. I. We have found that by
detonating a charge at a normaliTed altitude i"dR = _-1-_-'0.4, where h and R are the altitude
of the charge at_ve the a._teroid surface and R is the radius o[ the astt_roid, a maximum
do_ of fmax = 0.27 times thc total radiative yield is delivered to .).296 times the unit area of
an a._sumed spherical a.,_croid For a mean neutron cross-_tion t,f 1t) -24 cm -2. an
assumed astcrc, id density of 2 g/cm 3 and mean atomic weight of 25, a characteristic neutron
wnetration depth of--20 cm is inferred. Thus an asteroid volume corresponding to a 20 cm
dccp surface st',cll covering 0.296 of the surface area is irradiatcd, which f_r a _) m radius
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object with a densit 3" of 2g/cm 3 will nave an irradiated shell of mass 3.7 x 109 g. We
further assume that the fraction, e--0.3, of the. explosive yield is delivered as neutron or
other radiation and this radiation is completely converted to internal energy, AE, pe.r unit
mass in the irradiated shell. The energy per unit kiloton o;"_,- p'_,osive yield delivered to the
irradiated shell is thus
AE = fmax e (4x1019) ergs (8)
where 4 x 1019 is the equivalent number of ergs in a kiloton of explosive yield. This
heating at constant volume of the shell will result in an increase in the pressure (per
kiloton), AP of
AP = "¢p AE (9)
where _, is the thermodynamic Gruneisen ratio. We assume ",?to be unity, and p is the
asteroid/comet density which we assume is 2 g/cm 3. This irradiation occurs in less than the
~ 102 ItS required for the sonic g ave travel time through the shell. From Eq. 9, this energy
density will raise the shell thermodynamic pressure to -1.7 kbar (per kiloton). As depicted
in Fig. 1, this pressure increase accelerates the irradiated shell to the right and a stress
wave pulse is propagated to the left within the asteroid. The right moving irradiated shell
and left propagating stress wave causes the irradiated shell to break away from the asteroid
(to conserve momentum) as depicted in Fig. 1. The su'ess wave propagating to the left in
the as_roid appears to be sufficiently low amplitude such that little further destruction of
the object is expected to occur.
krrffsec, we find
By assuming a compressional wave velocity, Cp, of 2
Avr = AP/pCp (1())
m the a.steroid material, the resulting outward particle velc, city of the shell material is 44
n_L,,ec/Kton. Considering _nly the coml',onent of velocity along the direction between the
explosive and the asteroidal center yields a reduced velocity of -31 m/sec/Kton. For the 50
m radius asteroid, this velocity is much greater than the e_apc velocity of 5.3 era/sex'. By
conservation of momentum, the rebounding surface material translate._ into an asteroidal
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pe_rbafion veloci'oyof 11crn,eclKton. For 1and 10km diameterol-,jects,the
comparablereboundvelocitiesare11xl0 -3an,:!11x 10-6cm/sec/Kton.However, if e =
0.03 rather than 0.3, these velocities will decn;ase by a factor of 10. Thus we conclude
that to achieve deflection velocities on the ordzr of 1 cm/sec requires detonation of 0.01 to
0.1 Kton, 0.01 to 0.1 Mton, and 0.01 to 0.1 Gton nuclear explosives, for asteroids of
diameter 100 m, 1 km, and 10 kin, respectiw.qy.
D. DEFLECTION BY SURFACE I_dJCLEAR EXPLOSWE
Ancther approach to the use of nuclear explosives employs the u_ of a surface
charge to induce cratermg on the asteroid. The thrown-offejecta effectively induces a
velocity change in the asteroid and the ejecta is highly dispersed and i:, not expected to be a
hazard wl_ea it is encountered by the Earth. This method suffers the disadvantage in that
the astermd may be inadvertently broken into large fragments which may represent a hazard
to the Eorth. For 0. 1, 1, and 10 km diamet,_r, we examine the nuclear explosive surface
charge rtatuired to pert Jrb asteroid velocity in the case that gravity limits ejecta production.
and the a_;teroid is weak. For the case of a 0.1 km asteroid, it is conceivable that craterhtlg
protests are limited by asteroid yield strength. We examine this case, also. The mass of
ejecta cralcrcd per unit _naxs of explosive, when cratenng is limited by gravity, is given by
Hou_n e! al.[ 19831
v._, = {0.16-0.24 (d/a) rt20.194 + 2.11 [(d/a) _20-194] 2 - 238 [(d/a) 7t20.19413
+0.663 [(d/a) _20 19413}/[n20.581! (11)
Eq. 11 wa._ obtained on the ha.sis of small-._ale lal_ratory centrifuge cxpe.rimenLs under
high gravity, reduced pres.,;ure, and large-scale nuclear explosive tests. Equation I 1 ai_)
d_ritxxs a limited number of small st:ale experimenLs conducted by Johnson ct al. [ 1969]
at reduced gravity ant ',,:ed atmospheric pressures. Here _v is the mass of material
ejected from the cralcr pt nil mass of explosive. It is assumed that nuclear explost _.....an
be assigned an equivalent -FNT (high explosive) mass based on their yicld. Hen; d ,rod _'
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are explosive depth and equivalent explosive mass radius. Also, n2 is defined as the
gravity scaling parameter
n2 = (m/&l/3 g/Q (12)
where m ks the equivalent charge mass and 8 is charge density. For simplicity, we again
assume that charge density and asteroid density are equal at a value of 2 Mg/m 3. Q is the
energy per unit mass of "INT which is 4 x 106 J/kg and g is asteroid surface gravity. Since
the only ejecta which will alter the orbit of an aster,girl must be thrown off the object at a
velocity exceeding the escape velocity, we use the generMized equations of Housen et al.
[1983] m calculate the mass of ejecta, m e launched at speeds greater than escape velocity
me/(p Rc 3) = 0.32 [2R/Rc] -0.61 (13)
where R c is the final crater radius. The ma_s of ejecta escaping the asteroid and the
resulting asteroid velocity perturbation versus surface explosive charge are shown in Fig.
2. To relate Rc to me, we assume a conical-shaped crater with a depth to dianieter ratio of
5. Thus far for surface explosions --0.1, 102 and 104 Kton of explosive energy, detonated
at the asteroid surface, are required to perturb 0.1, I, and 10 km diameter asteroidal or
cometary object's orbital velocity by ~1 crrdsec. Moreover, for a 100 m asteroid strength
scaling [Hol_pple and Schmidt, 1982] may apply. In the case of an effective yield
strength of 30 bars, Fig. 2 indicates only 500 kg would be required to perturb a small
asteroid by 1 cmJsec.
Thus at besL surface explosions are no better than radiative stand-off explosions,
and the requirements are subject to greater uncertainty.
5. FRAGMENTATION AND DISPERSAL
Small sc',de fragmentation experinaents on solid rocLs demonstrate that the bulk of
the fragments of a collisional disruption have velocities of- 10 m/s. However, the "core"
or largest fragment has been demonstrated to have a differential velocity of no, more than ~ 1
m/s (e.g. Nakamura and Fujiwara 11991]). From equation 4, il the body is fragmented
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-75 days before earth enco,mter then most of the > l0 m fragment will still impact the
Earth. For a small object (0.1 to 1 km) dispersal of the bulk of the fragments into the
Earth's atmosphere may be sufficient, as long as no fragments >10 m are allowed. For a
really large object (> 1 kin) fragmentation would need to be conduced one or more orbits
before intersection with the F,arth to assure that most fragments miss the Ear_. In general,
the debris cloud would spread along the orbit according to Eq. 7 and in the transverse
direction according to Eq 2. For a charac_ristic velocity of ejecta of 10 m/s, the debris
cloud would be -10R_ in radius (with some oscillation about the orbit) and grow in length
by -200 R_ per orbit period. Thus, if the asteroid were destroyed one orbit before
encounter, the Earth might encounter as little as 0.1% of the debris. But more
conservatvely, if many large fragments with Av < 1 rrts remained, as much as 10% of that
mass might be intercepted. Thus fragmentation is likely to be a safe choice only for long
lead-time response (decades) or for relatively small bodies where the fragmen'..s may sti'd hit
the Earth.
"Catasu'ophic disruption" is generally defined as fragmentation where the largest
fragment is < 1/2 the total mass. The energy density to accomplish this decreases with
increasing siz_z of body, and becomes rather imcertain when extrapolated to 1-I 0 km size
bodies (e.g. Housen & Holsapple[Housen and Holsapple, 1990]). However, for the
present purpose, we are interested in the energy density necessary, to break up an asteroid
so that all fragments are. < 10m in size. This is obviously a higher energy density than that
W_ "to just "break it in t _, and we suggest shoutd be of the order of the e_rgy density
needed to "break ir_ two" a 10 m object, ~107 ergs/gm.
Bccau.w. _f the large energy requirements to fracture a well consolidated a_teroid,
only nuclear explosives are con._idered. In order to relate the energy density a.s a function
of radius for a completely coupled (buried) nuclear charge, we employ the empirical
relations of shock-induced particle velocity, v, ,,ersus energy .scaled radius (rlkT 1/3) of
Co,;per 119771. For hard (mainly igneous) terrestrial rocks of Cooper finds
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/nl0 v(m/s) = 5.233 - 2/n10 (r/kT 113) (14)
where, the r, radius is hydrodynamically scaled by the one-third power of explosive yield
(kTl/3). Similarly, for soft rocks, Cooper finds
tnl0 v(_s) = 4.590 - 2 in10 (r/kT 1/3) (15)
Since the shock wave energy per unit mass is equal to v 2, the quantity
Efrac = v2(r, kT 1/3) (16)
where v2 can be specified via E,q. (14) or (15) and Efrac = 103 J/kg = 107 ergsdg. Upon
substituting Fxt. (15) into Eq. (16) for 1 kT, we find r = 35 m. Thus, a 1 kT explosive is
expected to fragment a 35 m radius sphere of rock, if the explosive is placed well .within the
asteroid. Also, a ! megaton charge of explosive will fragment 350 m radii of rock and 1
Gton of explosive will fragment 3.5 krn of rock. In contrast, for hard rock (Eq. 14),
which describes less attenuative rock, gives the radius of fracture of 74 m for 1 Kton
explosion. From Eq. 15, to deliver 107 erg_g to 0.1, I, and 10 krn diameter asteroids
requires 3 kT, 3 Mtons, and 3 Gtons, centrally placed.
The above discussion is based on the premise that the charge is buried to sufficient
der, th so as to obtain optimum fragmentation. There ks g,'x_ reason for desiring some
nuc !,:ar charge burial, as s_:rface exploded nuclear charges couple only a small fraction of
their energy to rock (0.2 to 1.8%) for radiative and hydrodynamic coupling [Schmidt e't al.,
1986], whereas the large fraction of the energy of a 6eeply buried charge is coupled into
rock.
Figure 3 shows the charge depth for different d/a values and yield required to
completely excavate asteroids of 100, 1,000, and 10,000 m diameter. The yield values
required for an excavating charge are less by a factor of 3 x 103 to 4 in going from 0.1 to a
10 km asteroid, than _ose calculated for fragmentation. These charges _ in the 0.15 to 3
kton range for 100 m asteroid, 0.007-3 Mton for a 1 km asteroid, and 0.3 to 3 Gton for a
10 km diameter asteroid. The effect of gravity on the radius of excavated volumes is .seen
to be substantial. Notably, the optimum (largest radius of excavated volume) depth of
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charge decreases with increasing asteroid size and surface gravity. Fig. 3 also sh,3ws the
radius of excavated volumes between craters oll the Earth and a 10 krn asteroidal object
differ by a factor of up to 5 in going from the gravity of a 10 km diameter object, 0.3
cm/sec 2 ,,o that of the Earth (982 cm/sec2). Dispersal seems to require abo,at the same
energy as deflection, and also is benefitted by charge burial. Hence, asteroid deflection
rather than destruction, via fragmentation, appears the favorable choice.
CONCLUSIONS
We have examined the velocity criteria for perturbation of the orbits of earth-
crossing objects (asteroids and comets) _ as to cause objects which have trajectories which
inter,._zt the Earth f,) be defle_:ted. For objects di_overed only as they approach on a
collision course,, th_ veh_iw perturbations required are _ns to hundreds of m/see. Energy
levels are prohibiti'_ e for larger b_)dics, and the requi_d pe_urb, ation impul_ would disrupt
the body.
We also no,e that pe_,,fr, ation of an object perpendicular to its orbit is more
effective by applyi lg a change m velocity, (Av) along its original orbit and thereby
inducing a change in orbital period, and hence the radius of the orbital axes. Upon
applying an impuise at perihelion, gives rise to a Av, which, in turn, provides a larger
deflection 8, after time, t, of the order of 3Art, than can be achieved for perpendicular
deflection.
For a -I(_) m diameter asteroid, the kinetic _.nergy of 102 to 10 3 kg impactors,
intercepting at ' 2 l,-.m/_-c will provide enough energy to crater and iauncb ejecta in the low
gravity cn_Arovment of the_ objects to induce velocity pe.nurbafions of in the order of !
cm/_'_:. For larger diameter asteroids, deflection via this method appem_ impractical
because of the large mass of impactors requin'.d. Mass drivers require launching - 103 to
104 tons of asleroidal ma_rial to deflect from the Forth impact a 1 km as_roid over an
interval of 30 years pritJr to encounter. Nuclear explosive irradiation may be u_d to blo_-
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off a 20 cm shell encompassing (q_l.3 times) the as,eroid surface area by expl< ding a
charge at an optimum height ofh/R = _ -1. Minimum charges of 0.01, 102, and 104
Kton of explosives are required to cause this shell to blow-off and perturb the velocity of
0.1, I, and 10 km a.steroids by ! cm/sec. Hov,ever, less radiatively efficient explosives
may require an order of magnitude more explosive yields. Surface charges of 10 -2, 10,
and 105 Kton may be used to eject crater ma_rial to greater than local escape velocity, and
hence, perturb O1, 1, and 10 km diameter asteroids by a vel.,:szity increment of-1 cm/sec.
Burial of nuclear charges to induce fragmentation and dispersal requires in-situ drilling
which is difficult on a low gravity object or technically challe'aging if dynamic penetration
me,h_:xls are. to be enipioyed. Optimally buri_ cratering cha_ Z_ required to completely
excavate (working only against local gravi_/) 0.1, 1, and 10 kin diameter asteroids requ re
energies of - I ton, 30 Kton and 0.8 Gtons, respectively.
Upon examining the deflertion or fragmentation options, deflection appears to be
the most promising goal l_..cause charge burial is not required or desirable. For a small
(100 m) asteroid, "he kinetic energy impact dellection method is both technically feasible
o_d dCxz.snot involve the politically complex issue of p;_,.mg nuclear explo;ives on a
spacecraft_ For the 1 to 10 km range asteroids which includes the largest e_'th-crossing
objects, only the nuclear option is practical. For this task. deflection _ia nuclear explosive
radiation appears to be the simplest method Th,.s would apw-_ to require less detailed
knowledge of the. physical characteristcs of an earth-crossing object, and the develorment
of the ckarges requina'l to de'.lect large earth cros.qing obj_ts appear to be technically
feasible.
Finally, we sh_uld note that while further study .of the fcasibihTy of di,crting an
as,.elx_id m_y be. warranted, we. do not believe it i_ al:proprime to conduct engi_enn_
designs ol systems becau_:
1) low earth impact probability of hazard_',u_; a_tcroids; 2) high c_st con'.[,aa'd to
low probability; 3) caI id changes in defen_ systems te_chnol_,gy.
! ()i'_/_7'
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FIGURE CAPTIONS
Figure 1. Sketch of the use of nuclear explosive radiation to induce a (- 1 crrdsec) velocity
perturbation in a re.ar earth asteroid. (a) Nuclear explosive designed to provide a
substantial fraction, e, of its _eld as energetic neutrons as- -_gamma rays is detonated at an
opfimt_m height, (,,]'2 -1) R, above an asteroid. At this elevation asteroid subtends 0.27 of
the area of a unit sphere around the explosive and explosive irradiates 0.296 of the asteroid
surface area (b) Irradiated to a depth of 020 cm, surface material subsequently expands and
spalls away from the asteroid, inducing a severn! kilobar stress wave in the asteroid. (c)
Blow-off of the irradiated shell induces a cm/sec velocity perturbation in the asteroid.
Figure 2. Mass ejecta accelerated to greater than escape velocit3/(left) for crater_:_g
explosive charges on surface and 0.1, 1, and 10 km diameter asteroid as a function of
explosive yield. Plotted on right is the resultant asteroid ,,elocity change resulting from
momentum con_rvation, G, indicates g_avity scaling and $, strength scaling of crater size
and dynamics. "[he curvature of the velocity curve for strength scaling for a 0.1 km
diameter asteroid, arises from the substantial fracfon of the asteroid ejected by an explosive
crater _ the 30 bar strength material.
Figure 3. Radius of excavated sphew. _f asteroidal ma_rial for O. 1, l, and 10 km
asteroids, versas, normalized charge depth Effect of nominal vietd explosive for each siz.e
asteroid indicat,,_d The efhu:t of gravity is demo_zgtr-ated by the curve labeled "Each
Gravity" whict_ give.:; lbe e×cavamd crater volume assuming terrestrial rather thar_ a.steroidal
grav_;_" _or the 10 km _ster_fidal case, where a 0.83 Gtcm explosive chargt, yields a radius
of excavated volume of crater ot5 a:_d 1 km or_ the astervid and Earth, resw.ctively.
10/5102
lob
REFERENCES
Alvarez, L. E., W. Alvarez, F. Asaro, and H. "V. Michel, Extraterrestrial cause for the
Cretaceous-Tertiary extincfion_ Science, 208, 1095-1108, !980.
Binzel, R. P., S. Xu, S. J. Bus, and E. Bowell, Origins for the Near-Earth asteroids,
Science, 257, 779-782, 1992.
Cooper, H. F., Jr., A summary of explosion cratering phenomena relevant to meteor
impact events, in Impact and Explosion Cratering, edited by D. J. Roddy, et al., pp.
11-44, Pergamon Press, 1977.
HolsapFle, K. A., "lhe scaling of impact processes in planetary sciences, Ann. Rev. Earth
Planet. Sci., 22, in press, 1992.
Holsapple, K. A., and R. M. Schmidt, On the scaling of crater dimensions, I/: Impact
processes, ,/. Geophys. Res., 87, 1849-1870, 1982.
Housen, K. R., and K. A. Holsapple, (_ ,he fragmentation of asmroids arid planetary
satellites, Icarus, 84, 22{ -253, 1990.
Hougen, K. R., R. M Schmidt, and K. A. Holsapple, Crater ejecta scaling laws:
Fundamental forms based on dimensional analysis, J. Geophys. Res., 8e, 2485
2499, 1983.
HOUgh, K. R., R. M. Schmidt, M. E. Vow, and H. E. Watson, D. O. B. _:aling and
critical depth of burst for ctatermg (pre._,;ttre and strength effects), Boeing Company,
Tcchmcal, DNA-TR-92-24,439 p., 1992.
Hyde, R. A, Cosmic bombardmen,, l.mwrence l,ivermore National Laborat(u.y, lnf_)nnal,
UCID-2_h62, 7 p., 1984.
Johnson, E. W., J. A ,qmith, E. G. Franklin, L. K Moracki, and D..!. Teal, Gravity and
atmospheric pressure etfects on crater formati:m m _nd, J. Geophvs. Res, 74,
4838-4850, 1969.
MII" Students, Project remus, The MIT Press. Cambridge, Massachu_tts, 1-162, 196g.
I I )_)
Morrison, D. (Ed.), The Spaceguard Survey: Report of the NASA International Near-
Earth-Object Detection Workshop (January 25, 1992), 1992.
Nakamura, T., and Fujiwara, Icarus, 92, 132-146, 1991.
Rather, J. D. G., J. H. Rahe, and G. Canavan, Summary Report of the Near Earth Object
Interception Wo&shop, NASA Headquarters, 47 p., 1992.
Schmxdt, R. M., K. A. Holsapple, and K. R. Housen, Gravity effects in cratering,
Boeing, S_,..atde, WA 9812,1, Defense Nuclear Agency, DNA-TR-86-182, 1986.
Scotti, J. V., D. L. Rabinowitz, and B. G. Marsden, Near miss of the Earth by a small
asteroid, Nature, 354, 287-289, i991.
Shoemaker, E. M., in NASA Workshop, Collision of Asteroids and Com, et_ with the
Earth: Physical and Hum,Tin Consequences, pp. unpublished, Snowman, CO, July
13-16, 1.o81, 1983.
Smither, C. L., and T. J. Ahrens, Melting, vaporzadon, and energy partitioning for
impacts on asteroidM and planetary objects, in Proc. int. Conf. on Asteroid_,
Comets, and Meteors, June 24-28, ]991, edited by A. W. Harris and A. Bowell,
Flagstaff, AZ, 1992.
Solem, J. C., Nuclear explosive prot_lled interceptor for deflecting comets and asteroids
on a potentially cat. _'ophic collision course with Ear_, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, LA-UR-91-3765, 1991
Solem, J C., Interception of comets and asteroids on colhsion course, with Earth, Los
Alamos National Laboratory, LA-UR-231, 1992.
Veverka, J., and A. W. Hams, Near E,arlh asteroid mndezw)us (NEAR) Science Working
(iroup Report, Jet Propulsion l.aboratory, Pasadena, CA, JPI.-86 7, 112 p., 1986.
Weissman, P. R., The cometary impaclor flux at the Earth, in (;Ic#_,l ('atostrr,phe.v in Earth
History, vol. 247, edlted by 'g. l... Sharpton and P. D. Ward, pp. 171-180o Geol.
Sere. Arner. Sp. Paper, 1990.
I ()/'_/92
l_.J/
8A
U
v
108
Asteroid
qa
O
TTT"T--r--F-- -I.....
©
Z-<
Velocity Change
I
rn"r'r-r__'"t---t_-
(_
t_
m-r_'---_ CD
e4
°_
109
.-]--._ -_
<
0
[
_ i_ i i i --T------Ti i I ,
,..N
O
0
0
' i r I II I'_T "i' ' _!
I
E--
<;>
_ _ XO
J
0
f
n
J
i
-0
I
I
u
i
I
]
or;
0 0
0
0
xZ
@
q;
_C
o_._nIo A p a_eAeoX S
°i_
I10
DYNAMICS OF NEe INTERCEPTION
Claude Phipps, los Alamos National Laboratory
NASA Near Earth Object Interception Workshop
Paper C1, Tutorials and Technology Summaries, J. D. G. Rather, presiding
The energy density of kinetic objects with relative velocities in the 5 - 50 km/s range
typical of NEO's is quite large, being grea_r than hot chemical reactions, and more
like that of plasmas created by laser ablation. Especially when warning time is short
(as it will normally be prior to accurate, NEe orbit determinations), efficient response
suggests addressing the NEO with an energy density similar to its own.
COMPARING SPECIFIC KINETIC ENERGY
WITH CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR
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The ques_io_ comes, how tt, inter-relate the _arSous parameW.rs of ir.tercept_on in a way
that shows t_e amount of deflectian energy required in vm_ous situatmns.
The first step is t_ relat_ detection diecanoe zt_:, to the object diamete, r I). We will
illu_strafe haw this works for the simplest scheme: using scattered _lar radiation at
night to mak,, the object stand out against its background. If we use a diffract.ion-
II1
limited telescope against a field with background irradiance i HwattW(cm<sterrad-nm)
then the back_oToundp,,wer collected by the telescope P_is aperture-independent,
dPJdk = 3.67 V _, watts/nm [ 1]
since the diffraction-limited solid an_e dc<reases at the same rate as aperture in.
creases. In the night sky near 550 nm, 4_= (4x10-n / S ) watts/(cm<sr-nm) _, where S is
the eif_tive width of the visual star-color response curve (about 60 ram). Ob_rvational
experience is consistent with _B _ 6x10-_3 watt._(cmLsr-nm) b. The peak solar spec-
Lrum ¢ near Earth is I. = 1.85x10 -4 watts/(cm<mn) , so solar flux on the NEO surface is
I,_ = I. (1+_.0 '_ watts/(cmLnm) [2]
where Z_ = z_ expressed in A.U. Taking both spectra as flat near peak visual acuity
at 550 nm, detection occurs for an optical sisal-to-noise ratio (S/N) when received
power P,
N
= (Sqq)P,.
(l 4. Z_t_)Zu_:r = 1.8% 10 q°
Detection distance in AU for the
solar Illumination scheme
If the NEO has scattering coefficient E into 2_ s_rrad, the result is:
DaDR f- - _
lx10 4
Tx_O S
Ix10 5
where D and D R are.the
asteroid and receiver diame-.
ters. Eq_mtion [3] is plott_d
in Figure 2, at left. No_ rn_
= 24 is consistent _Sth about
1 photons%ec per 1-m-diame-
_" :..er aperture, within theI1
._ visual st_r-color respon_
curve. The g-ray curves m
Fii_rtwe 2 represent that dis-
I-1
F tam:e at opposit.ion at. which
E
lll
m_ object with the in(hca_d
alhedo would become visual
magnitude 22. It is see;_ that
warning Lime may be a fi,u,
days for the smallest, darkest
obje_-_ whicl_ ,:an p_,r.etraW
the atmosphere. Here, we have implicitly considered the most dii_,,'ult case in which
the object is first detect_'<twhen it is already on a collision course, because this ctzse is
currently most probable. See "Astrodyrmmics of Interception" working group repor_
VelocitvVector Chan_e
Ha_dtW determined zi)er we now need to relate it to the required perpendicular velocity
cbange required to produce a 1 E:,. miss. To do this, we make a linear approximation to
the true Keplerian velocity vector and take
0d -- Vj _ Rl:. [4]
Vii ZL-_W
The required perpendicular vebx:ity cb:-.mge t_om Eqaafion [4] is shown in Figure 3,
fullo,_.fing, along with parallel velc_ity change required to capture, for comparison.
He.m, we note that the actual ZDF_ to
be. used in Equation [4] is zt,_r'.
,-_luced from the origitra] value due
to finite interceptor velocity v,,_.r
according to:
ZDET
ZOET' = V!NT tINT = 1 + (Va,_VlNT) [5]
Energy-Momentum Coupling
The final step is to estimate the
energy required to be delivered to
the NEO in order to produce this
velcx:ity change. Although a very
wide rang_-, of interception and
energy-coupling phenomena arc
involved, the plasma teml_,_ratur(,:_
will pro,mbly lie in _e 1-...I(Y0 eV r_mge. Accordingdy, we choose h) follow ia_r--inWrac-
Lion work by relating interception ene_:y to the NEe momentum pr_h_ced using an
eue,'_-,v-momentum coupli.,_ o_effident C,,. This relates the mome,_tum pr_luced by the
,_u_ace-ablatJon-rocke_ of[0ct to the delivered energy needed t__ cause the ablation:
C,,, = my dvne-sec/J. 16l
w
i 13
2.04x1041]_Ira fact, Cm--: rl,_j_ = [7]
(vAr,/_×10v) L_
wher_ q_ is t_e energetic efficiency of the ablation , v._ is its velocity eald I p is t0ae
specific impulse. In most situation.% C m will r_mge from 0.5 to 5.
The density p and diameter D° of the NEe give its mass, wh!ch, combined ,with the re-
quired velocity change and the correct coupling coefficient C m gives the required inter-
action energ2v, the goal of this presentation. This ca]culation is contained in a third
graph, which is combined with Figmres 2 and 3 im a general roadmap for detemmning
deflection energw, in the Figure follo_4ng this page. The Figure treats a 100-m-diame-
ter object moving toward Earth at 30 l_I_/s. It is detected just beyond 1AU, but -- with
an interceptor whose velodty is only L/6 that of the NEe (5 kin/s) - Zr;_z' (the distance
at interception) is just 0.2 AU. Because the object is so clc_se, it must be _,fiven a trans-
verse velocity increment of about 500 cnx's. The NEe density is 8 _cm a and the C m we
are counting on at its surface is 2 dyne_s'J, _ the shift, between the second arid last
graphs is a factor of 2. Intersection with the 100-m-diame_r line .gives a reqtfired
energy of about 200 kT. ttowevo-, note that the application of this ener_- in one pulse
will likely rupture the object, since 15kT is sufficient to rupture a density-1 _hject t.his
size. The nearly vertical shaded "rupture?' line in the Figure is a plot of the relations,hip
333__ _ 11 j [81Wrupt,ure = 0.29 Da !.,
which derives from biastwave theory d. To halt the same object, would require 1.5 (IT.
t_,low tl_e size threshold f,3r threatening Iitb on Farth, it is important tt_ note that the
same blastwave theow together with a likely size-frequency plot demonstrate that the
smaller object._ prodlme more d,am_qge by blast. ,_venaI data sources" f seem to indicate
N(D_) _: 80 Oa -25 for the cumula2ive prohabilityof a size _ I) over the range from a_×mt
2 m to about 10 kin. Since theory predicls destroyed area A,,ec_ =t_.Wt._-_ a'3 ....,_.[.1_,
the differential probability for each size _.3'pe is _ :: dN :_-200 D_. 3 5 and one ,:htains.
ct Da
_" f,t_ d_::: 4l")0 Da °5 [91
lr,e,teee, a, t' W. A)k,n. A_tmphy._al Quanti'_ _, :h,l tq_t:_,n, _.thlone, ltmd_m _1973_ p 1:_
h Thin _t_ten_ent agrv, o_ with a pn_at_, mnw_r_a:,_m _.ith l)r Ted P._we_l, l_w_.ll Ot_cv,_n--v, A_n.ma
c C W Alk'n., _p cit. P 172
d S Gla_n_, "Th.'. Eff_vta of N_u'h,ar Weap_m_'" I:qAEC, /_pnl, l!_i2, pp 2g9 2_i
E S_,rnak_, _ al. 1990 /;__ Nr Am _p_wia[ _ue
r ,"_nowr_ W_rk_.}_p (1_111 _tata _,_rlg '_ krrW and aver_l_' &'rta_ty
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iLLUSTRATiNG THE USE OF
DEFLECTION CARPET CHARTS TO
CALCULATE DEFLECTION EIIERGY
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3. ENERGY DELIVERY/MATERIALS INTERACTION
Workshop Summary
The working group on energy delivery and materials interactions deliberated on the variety
of options offered for deflection or pulverization of comets and asteroids on collision ¢our_
with Earth. A consensus was reached on the best course of action. A summary of the
associa_:] observationsand opinionsis givenbelow.
Similarto the approach taken by the working group on the astrodynamics of interception,
describedinChapter 2,we segregatedthe problem ofpreventinga collisionwith a comet or
asteroidinto two characteristicdomains: (1)actionsto be taken ifthe collisioncan be
predictedseveralorbitalperiodsinadvance and can be avertedby impe,rtinga small change
invelocity,most effectivelyatperihelion,and (2)actionstobe taken when the objectis!css
than an astronomicalunit (AU) away, collisionisimminent, and deflectionor disruption
must be accomplisheda the objectcloseson Earth. For thisreport,we callt.hefirstdomain
of actions, _em_e interdiction and the second domain of, actions terrnir._/rater:apt/on.
3,1 tree of Nuclear EJrplosivts
Nuclear explosivesmay be used inthree,modes depending on the locationofthe explosiveat
t_e time ofdetonation:(1)buriedbelow the surfaceofthe objecteitherat an optimum depth
for cratering or an optimu_n depth for pulverizing;(2) right at the surface,or more
grac_ical]y,slightlybelow the surface;and {3)above the surfaceat an op_mum heightfor
i.,i_._rtmga uniform impulse---generallycalledthe "stan:l-ofl"mode. All three modes are
applica_,letoboth the remote-interdictiona d terminal-interceptiondomains.
3.1.1 Buried Nuclear _plmive,. An optimaily buried nuclear explosive will expel
about an o_lerofmagnitude vnorernau from itscraterthan a nuclearexplosive_etonatedat
the surfa'=e, thus transferring proportionately larger momentum to the object.
In the terminal-interceptioncase,the interceptorcould use itskineticenergy to I_netrate
the object,requiringa heavy probe or billeto displacethe matter in frontofthe nuclear
explosive.The billetwillerode as itpassesintothe object,and itsrequired mass _,_Ibe
determinedby _e relativevelocityat_nterae.pt,he delireddepth md the c_mpomtion ofthe
object.Itwil!increasethe mass thatthe interceptormust deliverto the objectby about an
orderofmagnitude, and according]yitisnot obviousthattotal-systemadvantadFeisrealized
by using d burie!expiosivein _eu ofa surfaceexplosive.The buried _xploaiveisbelieved
bestforpulverLo_tio_nthe casewhere the expected optimum craterwould be near the sise
ofthe object(Le.,sn att_.pt to t_tsllydisruptthe object),in that case,burialnear the
center of mass of _ re_,_cnablyhomogeneous objectshould pr_:lucethe most uniform
pulverizationwith c_t toisotropicexpansion(i.e.,unifor_ inalldirections).
In the remote-mterdL_._or,case,whe_ e year_ are _,aJiable to design specializedpaylo_da,
lightweightd.dllmi/_.__llow the explosiveto be emplaced at arbitrary depth, with less
weightpenaI_,y.This _.,_:ires a _ehiclewit_ an _,_-e formaneuvermg a_d landingon the
objectand an auger ti_'_%r boringb_neath t_e _urf_tce w_t_ power _upply attached. This
optionrequire_more stud:,
A severedifficultywith the subsurfaceexplosionoption_sthatt_ use iteffectivelyand in a
_redictablemanner requires_sme fairlydetailedknowledge of the object'smorphology.
,/chilethismight be done relativelyeasily_-_thprecursormissionsiftime permits,_tcouldb_
extremely difficult ifPerformed _nlyby a vanguard spacecrs_Y for the terminal-interception
case. TJ contr',_l the d_rection and magmtude ofthe imparted momentum, it will be necessary
to know the object'srigidb_dy mechanical properties(mass, center of mass. angular
momentum, and rotational characteristics) •s welJ as its _mposiUon and topo&T•phy. Of
th_ y_ol_rties, the mass, center of maubs, and mol_ compos/tion are very important,
but • number of f_.ndamenta] st1_ctura] c_tract_ristics •_ _z_ _,ore important. Is it dirty
_e, • snowball with • r_ky core, iron. _ck, chondrite, or uickel-iron? Is it one big chunk, two
chun}'._bound by microgr•_ty, many looselybcunc!small fragments, or • solidcorewith
I_ the terminalAnterception ca_e, knowledge of theoe properti•_ is not on]yStupor.antoplan
end predictthe effectof the explo_o_ but also i_portwnt to pl_-,ningthe path of '.h_
peneLr•t.ion vehicle. In _e remote-interchcti_n e._i_,• _boti¢ auger, as desm'iLed ab v_
might al_o have the f•cili_ to carefully prepa_ the turf•re and c_•rscter_e the materiaa m
wh_-..h the explosive is embedded. Th_s tech,ui_ue ___ght direct the thrust vector most
eecur_ely tow•_ the e_t_r of mus, min_m:_r_ the ,_rqpt_r momentum imparted to the
object(Le_,the resentittodi_placothe b_O, not toimpartrot_ toi_.
&J_ Sur_ce-bur_t Nuclear Explmiv_. T_e m_rfsewburtt mode can be utilized
with t_s_ knowledge •bout the in'zr_ar of the object, but requ_ru more knowledge about the
_rfa_e e_nto_ s_d co:_po_it_on m the vidmty of the explosion. _e _d_mrface mmpoeit_on
i_l_s cri_c_l L_ to _tim_t_s of tb.eblow-offmass and to utim•tas of the imparted
mo_ntxt_e. The surfave-bu.,_ mode., eliminates the de_ for geological information
r_,..e_.sary io p_ic_ the performu_nce of a pcnetr_ioa _hicle. The _ua'fao_.bur_t mode,
_er, suffe_ from _h_ _ pr_b_m_ of u_ umnt_ f_,'a_e = _h_ _ mode. ff th_
cro_er /_; _oo _r_¢, tJ_.e o_jeC_ m_y epli_ mW _ fcuo [_ ¢hll_]_l. loeb o_ w_ ¢o_ do
_,x_l d_. ,_uch • _ br, m_ wo_dd lilly J#.ay the op_ ,_,r deflection by
sui_u_r._ iaterc_p_r_
&JJ C_d-o_'N_e/_nr F.zp/_i_. The fracture preblm san be much mitigated by
det_.,,.st.ing the nuclear explosive _ome distance from the ebj_ Pat, her than forming •
crater, the neutrons, x-rays, pmm•-rsyt, an_ _no hi_]y ion_d debris from the rt_clear
axplo_ion will blow-off • thin hyer _f the cbject's surface. This will spread the impu]_ over •
much larger ar_ and lessen the shear streu to which the ob._t _ t-abje_ )f these four
_er_y transfer mt_tanisms, the most effective (at raa_o_al)_, heights of bur_t) U neutron
_n_rgy deposiUon, su,l_,estLng t.nat "primarily f_ts/on" explo_ive8 would be most effective
be_.au_ they produce maximum neutron yield. Neutrons ars m_ s_V_'_.ive than x-rays for
tr_fferringener[y, owing to their depth of penetration.
Fo_ t_._ m_ _mpo_ed momentum, tAe_ is far le_ deep ma_ er.#gl_ion w_en th_ e_rgy U
i,_r_rted m t._ s_ond-off m_de Th_ _ i_ l_s_ _iti_ to _ daa_ of _opograp_y a_l
l_s _m_ of co_po..t_u,d m_orr_ion. A pr,_ur_>r _ _c'ecra_ may not
be _quir_d becau_ tAe e_c_ cmth,. NEO i_ bel_ved to be ,_i_tdy predictable. Th# m_in
dx_back of t_ stan, d-off mc_e _ that _ requwcs one to two order_ of m_n_tude more energy
yfud_ th_n th_ _ac_ bur_t for th_ _ VWxv't_ momentum, and h_l_ yilld i_npl_ h_r
payload weight.
11/
$.2 U#e of lm_reeptor Kinetic Ener_
For su._Scientlysmall objectsand su_ci_,ntlylong warning times,itmay be possibleto
produce the requiredorbitaldeflectionby non-nuclearkineticimpacte on the NEO. (The
thresholdforthiscapabilitydepends upon many parameters. For detailedexplanations,the
reader thou}d refer to the technical discussion in the Proceedings of the NEO Interception
Workshop, available from Los Alamos National Laboratory). If for some reason it is deemed
undesirabl_touse a nuclearerplosive,the kinetic-energyof the interceptorocketcouldbe
usod to pro_,ide deflection in the surface-burst mode described above or to attempt to produce
pulverigation of maller objects, An object traveling at 25 km/s has about 75 times the
kineticenergy ofthe same mass ofhigh explosive,to that placinga mass in the way ofthe
oncoming objectwould provideenergy foritsdeflectionordestruction.Obdous1_, the use of
chemical explosivesisineffectualand unnecessarybecsu=e the kineticenergy ofimpact isso
much greaterthan the explosiveyieldper unit mass. Ifthe interceptorwere traveling
toward the objectalsoat 25 kin/s,the energy releasedon collisionwould be 300 times the
interceptor'smats in hi_ explosive. While thi,k_t_c _:ru_r£y _ sub_an_ial, the specific
eneq_y of a nuclear explmive il l0 s to I0 _ times 8rester..u_zing tat nuclear option t_ only
for la_e _ and late in_r_ptior_.
3.2J Kinetic.ener£y Deflection. Knowledge requirements for both mechanical and
gtologieJd properti-J of the NEO target are similar in kinetic energy encounters to those for a
nuclear surface burst. For the propellant inverted, terminal deflection is most effective
because t_e interceptor velocity is usually diametrically opposed to the object velocity, but
the intercept point m,_tt still be far enough away to cause the NEO to miss the Earth, For
remote interdiction, the impulse ia most effectively imparted at perihelion, as described in
Chapter 2. Ifthe objectisdetected long enough in adv_,.nca,the interceptormight take
advantage of planetary flybys to dramatically increase the energy at h_terception. Since the
interceptor can be injected into a retrograde orbit, both interceptor and object will be
traveling at '.heir highest orbital speeds if they collide at perihelion.
In terminal defense, the ,_rocture probability is quite hig_ for smaller objects, even if they are
only to be d_verted to an unpopulated area of the Earth. Furthermore, for objects whose
diameters are greater than about I O0 m, _quired intez_ptor ma_ses approach 1,000 tons. A
practical object-size cutoff for terminal non-nuclear kinetic-energy deflection appears to be
about 70 m.
3_._ Kinetie-em_rg,y Pulverization. Kinetic-energy pu}_rization may be possible for
small objects (leas than 100 meters diameter). An array of spears (darts) is an intriguing
concept,and such apparatus might De deployed with a minimum investment of kinetic
energy in the interceptor. The spears let the object impale _Utelf. However, the intercept
must take placefarenough from the Earth toensure separationofthe debris.Ifthe chunks
ofdebrisa!lfollowthe same trajectory,the conglomertte energy in,parted t_ the Earth's
atmosphez_ may produce damage on the Earth's surface.
The scheme i_ a bit complicated,and some knowledge of the mechanical and geological
propertiesofthe objectmay be necessary Itwould be relativelyineffe¢_.iveagainstnicke]-
i_¢_ t_steroids.
3.3 Attacked.thrust De/faction
To attach a thruster to the threateni.g object involves a necessarily complicated process of
rendezvous, matching velocities, landing, preparing footings in the microgravity
environmemt, characteriution of the varifies mechanical parameter_ of the object, and finally
I_!!,
deploying the propulsion apparatus. Practical considerations preclude its use in the
terminal-interceptiondomain
3_.i M_s Dr/pore. Steam rockets, conveyer belt, electrou agnetic guns, etc. seem
viableinprinciple,but involvemuch more sophisticatedengineeringand fargreaterexpense
than the impulsiveapproaches,
3_.2 Solar Fm_s. Being passive, huge solar sails deployed so as to tow the asteroid
enjoy some simplicityover the mass drivers,but are equallyformidableengineeringtesks.
Despitethe ecologicallyorientedappealofthe solarsail,we didnot finditattractivebecause
the i_pu]liveapproaches ailseemed simplerand cheaper.
3.3.$ Cratck Outgo#wing. Some uteroidb are believedto containvolatilesin their
cores, A noveldeflectiontechniquewould be to drillto the core_generate some subsurface
fractures (as is done for geothermtd energy), and uauathe outgauing to propel the object to a
ne_' orbit. But t_s also involves exceedingly complicated engineering,and would be
resC_ctedtoobject_endowed with such a volatilecore. Itwould requirea greatdealmore
knowledge than we p_sently possess.
3.4[ lamer 12_flectio_
Perhaps the most conspicuoas advantage of lair deflection by induced mlrface blow-off is
that it would be Earth- (or Moon-) based. It ii therefore unnecessary to fly out to meet the
object. A second advantage is that it is ury to "fire. for effect" (Le., fire and observe the
velocity change). The beam could be applied for a while and the reaction ¢ou)d be measured
from Earth. Thus, preciseknowledge ofthe object'smechanical and geolo_calpropertiesis
unnecessary.Although we admired thistechniq,leforitsoriginEtity,we feltthatitwould be
limited to remote interdictionon _ prior orbit pas_ing near Earth, and would be a
gargantuan enginee,_ingproject,even fordeflectingmodest-sizedobjects.
3.5 Conseru_uJ of the Energy Deltaeryl Mt_terio_ Interaction Group Member_
General agreement was r_.ached that the _priraariiy fusion" gand-off nucbtar _cplasiv¢ was by
far the most robust and defen_ible option for all gapects of th_ NEO defen_ problem. It is
relatively iz_s_nsitive to mechanical and. geologica_ properties and obviates the n_ed for a
precursor reconnaissance spacecraf_nec_ry for surface and sub-_u,_.ace bursts. It imposes
less fracture probability. It can be applied in both remote interdiction or terminal intercept
domains. For technical reason& [he m_zi ¢x_-effec_iv_ "primari.[y fusion" device will be about
100 MT as detailed i_ the Proceedi_s (available from Los AIamos Na_£ona_ Laborato_) If
an object were encountered that was larger than could be adequately deflected by the device
in stand-off mode, it could be switched to the surface-bur_t mode to impart s factor of ten to
o_e hundred t'_mes m._re momentum, at so_.ewhat eza_ :rba_d fracture probabili _,. (The
devils of stress _.nd fracture versus range and yield ot the explosion should be a topic of
extensive _eoretical study mad eventual experimentation. In the terminal intercept domain,
t]_e i_rger the object, the _maller tk, e fracture probability.)
The Energy DeliveryfMsterialsInteractionsworldr_ggroup alsoconcludedtha_ if¢/,e defen.se
of or . pk_et i_ r_ally taken _..";ouMy, and u,e con_er termite.} d_fen_ to be as important
remote interdictiot_, then it will be irnperatwe to have ground-ba_ed interceptors available for
use oa _la_ively short no_ive. The most versatile and _.ffective interception system might
consist of several large gvound-ba_d rockets which could be quickly brou_ght frc,m storage
and armed with the required explosive de,hoes trader the appropriate international cootro]s.
The number is somewhat arbitrsry, but it should allow for a reasonable level of _edundancy.
ghould there be • ma]f_mctaon Furthermore, having a number of int_rcepb_rs would allow
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operation ha a "fire-for-effect" mode; i.e., car,_.fal measurement of the response of the first
interceptor could provide s great deal of information on how to apply the second interceptor.
Itwould allowrepetitivedeflectionshouldsuch be necessar)',and itwould allowswitchingto
marface.burst mode at sa-,:¢stage of the engagemenL
This group felt, further, that if any other option is selected, it must be with a motive beyond
,he _t straigh_,orward defense of our planet. A key consideration is the very serious political
implicatio,_ t,f maintaining euch a potentially devastating fleet of inttrotptors, even though it
would $gill have miniscule threat potentials compared both with the $housands of war rockets
and warheads now still maintained in the worM's arsenals or with the devastation of a single
large NEO impact. Clearly, there is a need for a well thought out policy with regard to these
matters. It ts particularly important to keep the above recommendations for (presently
h_c_hetical) interceptors in perspectit_e _n comparison with the existing vastly is _'ger nuclear
defense forces. Contrary to uninformed criticisms that a small number of specialized
interceptors would entail enorwwu.s cost and hazard of accident or misuse, such irfferceptors
could be notably straightforward to create and taft to maintain because they derioe from vast
research and development _:penditur_s and experience accumulated during the forty.free
years of the Col,, War.
Comb1- _,_ interdictionmission with a scientificresearch program might be another
_end,_.,_m. Conve:rdon ofthe threateningobjectintospace uset_ ofsome aortmight also
be co,_i,?_.re_.,e_. a benchmark accomplishment forhuman space flight,rosettastone for
solar _ _'_.; _:, :-istory, space station, remote outpost, supply source for valuable materials, etc.
But i_a,e 8,__,_,usobjt_tiveilrobustand cost_effectived fenseofthe Earth,members ofthis
working group generallyagreedthatthe "primarily6asion_nuclearexplosiveiJthe opbon of
choice.
To further assess the efficacy of such a defen_e ¢ystem, we reeommer, d a re.arch program
incorpora:ing the following elements: : D detailed numerical simulation of the respoaae of
representative NEO geometries to stand-off and surface.burst nmclear explozions; (2)
optimization of the deflection astrodynamics problem combined with the detection and
tracking prc, blem; and (3) establishment of a data bate in support of the numerical
simulations, including mechanical propertizs, thermal properties, equation of _$ate, opacity,
and nuclear prap_rtits oftheN_O material.
Nuclear Expi_ive Propelled Interceptor
For Deflecting Comets and Asteroidl
Jn A Potentially Catastrophic ColliJion Course "With Earth
Johndale C. Solem
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ABSTRACT
Nuclear explosive spacecraft propulsion offers the high specific impulse required
for intercepting interplametary intruders (comets or asteroids) rapidly closing or,
Ear:h. The exceedingly high relative velocities provide anti,dent kinetic ener_ to
deflect these mMignaut asu'al bodies without resorting to an explosive warhead,
nuclear or otherwise.
I. Introduction
Since Alvarez 1amlounced evidence for asteroid impact u the putative cause, of the cretao
ceous-tertiaxy extiactioa, there hM been a hcighteaed alrarene_s that our fair planet is
snd ,_w_ys ha_ been ha a state of merci1_ cosmic bombL, ximent. Not _ thiscannonade
has been deleterious, for ex_aple, the event Alvarez suUents may have cleared the way
for the rise of homo sapien_. But being a selfish sub-species, we would rather hold on to
our domin_ion of the Earth, and deny a chance to any more well adapted creature for as
long as we can. Le_ facetious il ttm possibility of a strike from an interph_etary body
with radiuJ on the order of i00 m. If an uteroid, such an object would likely have a
relative velocity of about 25 kin- sac -_ , which would _ive it a kinetic energy of _bou_; I000
megatons. In a populated area, the damage would be catastrophic. If it were e, comet,
the relative velocity would be mo_ like 50 i_rn. sac -l _td the e_aer_iy would quaxiruple.
The '13azlguskA Event 2 (I908) offers sobering evidence that such potenti_Jly catastrophic
collisionsare not so mfrequen¢ th_ they can be ignored. That impact was about I0
mel_a_ons and could be expired every few htmdred yearl. Recent e.atimat_ _ indicate _hat
e 20-kiloton (Hiro6him_-mze) event should occur every y_m'. This would be conspicuous,
apparently much of the ener_iy is dissipated in penetrating the atmosphere. That such
cataclysms axe not generally recorded in the archives of natural disaster seerr_ somewhat
of a my_tc'ry. Perbatp_ tt can be attributed to the fact that until the 20th century, very
l.ittt_ of the E_'th'_ surface, was populated. _ Neverthelem, the risk of being killed as a
result of _terc d impact is s,._newhat greater than the nak of being killed in an sarpla_
crlciaih. $
The problem naturally divide_ intotwo parts: (i) detection of these relativelysmall astral
int/ntders; and (2) _ma_hing or deflect_o_ them should they be on an end_aagering course.
If all of the Earth-threatening aster.rids _.re known, the orbits could be calculated a_d
the process of deflection could be carried out in a leisurely manuel. Bu_ 99_ _ave not
ILl
yet been discovered. _ Furthermore, there are a_n enormous number of unknown cornets for
which a thorough search is completely impractical.
Asteroids in the 100-m size range axe exceedingly difficuh to detect unless r.b.ev are ,.erv
close. Comets axe more conspicuous owing to their coma, but they will be :novmg a ',or
f_ter and can be n retrograde orbitq or out of the pla_.e of the ecliptic. In either case, it
seem q likely we w.,[ have little time to respond to _ potential collision. It therefore appears
that deflection at re!ativeiy c_ose r_nge is one of the most important issues.
In 1984, Hyde 7 suggested using nucle_ explosives to counter the intruders. In 1990, Wood,
Hyde, and Ishika.w_ 8 showed that defense against sm_l intruders could be accomplished
with non-nude_" interceptors, l_gely using the kinetic energy of the intruder itself. In
this paper, [ show that large intruders could be deflected using an extremely high-specific-
impulse interceptor. The effectiveness of using nuclear-explosive propelled interceptors
derives mainly fi'om the fact that the deflection co_9.d be accomplished further from the
Ea._h.
IIo Interceptor Flight and Intruder Deflection
The finalvelocityof and interceptormissilere_tive to tlzeEm-th, or the orbit in which it
isstationed, isgiven by the rocket equatios,
v= z.,av--7' I11:
where M', and M! _ the initial and _ ma_ of the interceptor and I,, is the specific
impulse of the rocket fuel. In genera/, the time required to _a, ch thls relative velocity w_ll
be short compsxed to the totalflighttime. _ the range _t which the intruder isintercepted
willbe given by
_,=_,(1 v + VV), (2,
where Rt is the r_.nge when the interceptor is launched a_d v is the speed at which the
intrude: ia closing on the E_th. If the impact giv_ the intruder a tranwer_e velocity
component vj. teen the t_e_tening intruder will miss its target point by a dist_-nce
v v+V '
3)
where I have neglected the eff_t of the E_th's gT _vitation_l field. To obtaan the tr_.nsverse
vdoc:ty component. ,,-e. would tL_. the kinetic energy of the interceptor tc. blast a crater on
t t_e side ot t.b.e intr_2der. The momenttun of the ej_ta would be bel_.nced by t b.e transve_rse
momentum impsated to the intm.der. F_om Gla._stone's empirical fits _ , the m_._ of m_ten_i
in lhe crater produced by _ l_age explosion is
M, --, a a E_, ( 4 )
where 3 _ 0.9 and (x _ $.'t x !0 -'l gm_l (l-,s) • era -;_ . sac '_ for an explosive b_xried at tb.e
optimal depth for maximum ejection of dirt. For ._ surface burst, Gla_tone uses the same
value of 3 but takes o( _ 1.6 x 10 -_ gm_ (l-s) • cm -a. sac _. 'rNs depends on gravity,
density, EOS and other paxmneter_. Seebaugh !0 suggests the same vMue of 3, but a __
5.2 x 10 -_ gm_lil-a) . cm-,_, sac J for a surface burst, about half that used by Gla.sstone.
K,"eyenhagen and Schuster il have noted that imp_u:ts in the 20 kw_,. sac -I rm',.ge couple
50-80% of their energy to the ground, while surface bursts couple only 1-10%. The correct
v_ue of a is somewhere between a surface burst aud an optimaliy buried expiosion. For
the purpose of the es_im_e, in this paper, I will take a _ 2 x 10 -4 gm_(l-o) • cm -a . sac J.
but the reader is invited to choo_ any value in the range, the essential conclusions will
not be aignificantly altered.
The kinetic energy ava'dable when the interceptor co!iid_ wUh the intruder is
1
,(V _-.t,) 2. (,,j:'
About half thit energy go_ into the dirt ejected from the crater. So the trtmsver,ze velocity
imparted to the imruder iJ
1 /PM, M/(V + u) _ e_(MI(V+v)2) a':tja
where M, is the mass of the comet or ,.-,retold. We can combine Eqe. (3) _d (6) to obtain
M.v I_. 2 / (7)
Equation (7) reveals the importance of the intercept vdocity V, which is proportional to
t_ific impul_ l,t,. If V _ v, the deflection m proporta, onal to ",', and if V _ v, the
dt_e_ion is proportiom_l to V I_'_t .,, V _.
HI. Optimum Mau lt_tio
Sub,_titutmg F-xl. (1) into Eq. (7), _etting d_/dA,ff --, O, tuld ttolving, we find the maim ratio
that produces the iarg_t value o_ *,
M!
where
[
V 1-/J t'
Q i 2gl, t + ! + l+3gI_
Iza the litrat of vet 7 hi# specific impulse, the optimum mau ratio it
]1/[, e2"
Mf
(10)
The maximum displacement of the impact location on Earth is then given by
Figure i plots the dimensionless p_ameter _)d,z/c_vz._lM, _'tz+l) versu3 the dimensio_ess
parameter gr,,p/t, for d =0.8, 0.9, _d 1.0. !t shows the increasing advantage to higher
specific impulse derived from Eq. (I1).
WbAch size a_teroid is most threetening rem_ias a controvemiaJ question. By di_t of the=
frequency of occuzrence and the dam_e they could do, I believe the mo6t thteatemng
asteroid is about 10(} m in radius, and I will use it for my example. With a specific gravity
of three, such em asteroid weighs 1.26 x 1013 g, and at a relative velocity v = 2._ × 106, its
impact energy would be about 1000 megatons. To divert the asteroid to a nearby ocean
wo'_d generally reqtdre a deflection of no more them a Mm. While it would churn up quite
a wave, the damage would be trivial compared to impact in a populated area. The nearest
1 .g,range at which we maght comrmt to launch the interceptor would be about I-6-6A = L.5
Gm.
Equation (11) can be resrrt, mged to give the requ.h'ed L,'fitial ma_ of the interceptor,
r M,v_ (M, = 2e Q I a_gi.pQ
L
(i2)
The best chemical hxel_ might have a specific impulse _ high a_ 50n see. Thus if we choose
chemicaZly propelled interceptor i_ the scenario d_cnbed above, the initial mass of the
rocket would have to be
._r_ = 4.74 × 10 _ g.
An adequate interceptor _:_uld have to weigh nearly 5,000 toa._. Clearly tlxi_s :,._not a very
viable option.
IV. Nuclea_ Explosive Propulsion
Nuclear explosive propulmon was first consider_i in the late 50s and early 60s ucder the
OPJON _ program _t Lo_ Alames 1_ and General Atomics Corporation x4. To get a feel for
the tremendous potential of nuclear-explosive propulsion we need _ estimate of the specific
_mpulse, cbtaic, ed by calculating the pr_ure im'galse imparted, by a bomb e×pl,_ded in
a vacuum. P ,u_.umat to th_ estimate, we mu_t fred the density _nd velocity dist_bution
(_f the sttdden e_q_ar_siou of a _phere of g_. There is ao ex:,_"._m_Jyt_.c solution :o this
problem, but an approxim_,te _oiutiou can be constr_c_,._ _, on the basis of an anr_iogous
plane problem i_ At b_gh temperatures we can let the azliaba:.ic exponent 7 = 5,3 +_._d
the debris density _s g_ven by
15m_( r _ )
- 8_R_ 1-_-_- ,
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where
R = t_/_
V rnb
and E m'ld mb axe the energy a_d mass of the bomb :espectively. In the limit R --- _
velocities of the fluid p_ticles approach constant ,,_ues _d u _ r/t.
SLy the interceptor pusher plate is at a distralce r from the bomb. The debris stagnates
W_mnst the pusher plate, which -n the frmne of the debris, m:ts like a piston moving at
vdodty u. The piston produces _ shock in the coRidm_ debris. The presau.re behind this
shock 16 i:
_ud because it is • shock, the der_i'_y wiIl increase a fmztor of (V + 1)/("I - i), and the
impu_ve presoure i-q
<j
p = 2. (16)
An additiona_ thrust will be Lmparted by the re.-expaz_ionof the debris. The laxgest
_ble impul_ve pressure includinl;alleffectswould be P = 2_ _,but because the debris
will radistively cool during sta_ation, we will ignore the imptd_, from re-ex-pa.n_ion.
Then the ttpprommate pressure applied to the plate is
Of course, the thrust is zero until the flint debris arrives at th_ canopy, which occurs _,t
time to = r_/rn,/IdE. The velod_y imparted by a singleexplosion is
rr_ .
25A__ 2/'_ra,E
whe_ rn is the ma_ _t the time of the explosion and A_ i_ its projected axea of the pusher
plate,
I_we u_ n bomb_, the finalvelocityof the interceptor is
j,_O
=here M, is the izaitia2 ma_ of the interceptor. La the _irnit of ,, very l_.g(_ at, "_ber of
oon_ (n --* vo ), we can _ppraxun_te
V
_)
- 24 _rr _ VSm_ M t
where 9M/ = j_3,l, - ,qmb) is the "'dry weight" of the interceptor. By analogy" with Eq
(l_, we have
25 ' /' ?E
-% p .-_ .
I_p :-=
the specific impulse goes as the square root of ttxe yield-to-weight ratio. If the pusher
plate subtends a solid angle of 2r, a bomb weighing 08 kg with a yield of 25 kiloton.,
= l0 a° ergs wou.id produce a specific impu1_ I,p _- 4.25 x 104 sec, assuming r:-.oat of the
energy goes into debri_ motion. The best chemical f-aels have specific :repulses o.: ---500 sec,
nuclear ,fizrnaces such a.s Rover-NERVA could spprosr& ---1000 sec, and g_-core reactors,
perhaps ,-,2000 see.
V. Performance of the Nuclear-Explosive Propelled Interceptor
L¢ we t_sume the specific impu.l_ given above, them from Eq. (12) for • t3-pical asteroid,
M, = 2.46 x I06 g.
The interceptor need weigh a mere 2_ tons.
From Eqs. (8) and (9) we obtain M,/M I = 7.!9, so the intercepto_ c,msists of ibout
2150 kg of nuclear explosives mad about 350 kg of inert components: pusk.er plate, shock
absorbers, missile body, gnxid_nce, etc. The 86 nuclear explosive, would ,'-_ve atotM yield
of 215 "kiloton,. From Eq. (!), the interceptor velocity at imp_t is
V = gI, p In _-_ = 821 kin. se¢ -°
The energy of impact is
MI(V + v)a
= 1.23 x 10 al ezg = 29 kilotons, (22)
whic.b, wo-ald probably be eno,xgh to shtttter the intruder as well aa deflect it. From Eq.
(3), the t_nge at interceg_ i_
R'=]_( V )=146Gm't,+V c,23)
The tlzne h'o_ Immch to intercept is about a bMf hour. Thus there would be ample time
to !attach a .second interceptor, ab.ould the first malfunction. From. Eq. (4), the mas, of the
eject_ is about 2.82 × l0 *l g or about 3c_ of the astereid'_ m_, The interceptors would
most likely he stationed at am Ear_.h-Moon Lag-range point; so the fission-products from :_;e
noclemr-explos_ve propeliant would be dispersed well outside of Eaxth's m_.gnetosphere.
"I'abie I compares the chemical- tract nucie_-propelJed interceptors t*. _a_mched when the
1 ,U, -'asteroid i.s _ A from Earth. If detected at that r_.nge, about: 17 houxs w,,,ld remeun
1 L't}
before the intruder collides with our dem" pln,aet. The chemic_-propeUed interceptor would
h_ve ordy one chzmce.
VI. Tentative Conclusions
It is fmr a_._cl appropriate to h_e over the numbers I have used for the sake of ex_ple.
But the d.rmnatic n,dvam_ea of nucle_ exph_ive propu3_oa are cle_. A Lingering question:
Why I have avoided giving the interceptor • aucle_ wn,rhend? I submit that s.n interceptor
with n.n inert wm'hendt wou2d be perceived by world politics _ fax leu tkreatenmg, even
though i+; is propelled by nucleLr explosives. And it is su_cient to do the job.
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'_Lle !
Compari_n of chemic¢l- _md nucle_-propeUed interceptors. Auumed 100-m radius as-
teroid with density 3 g. cm -3, mass M, = 12.6 MT, velocity v = 25 kin. ,e¢ -_. CraTer
parzaneters: 3 -- 0.9 and a = 2 x 10 -4 gu,.i_:-_) , cm-a _ec_ L_erceptors launched when
the uteroid is l_0 A,U. from Earth.
Chemical Nuclear
Mtu Rttio (M,/,_fr)
i_tm Mm (M_)
Pin_ Mr. (m,)
RocketVelocity (V)
Intercept Raz_ (_)
Intercept Tix_
ColI_on F.,uergy
Era,, M*-- (M.)
500 see 42,500 _,e
3.44 7.x9
4,740 totm 2.5_ toaJ
1,375 tc_ 342 kg
6.06 km.,ec -z 82J kin. _c -1
_.3 Mm 1.,:_ Gm
13.4 hotu_ 35 rain
6.63 x 10 _l erg t 1.23 x 102° erg
I_8 kT H.E. 29 kT H.E.
1.74 MT 382 kT
13.8% 3.03%
t Colli._ion will prob_ly caau_ _t_'oid to bre_ up.
1Z_
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ABSTRACT
i derive a series of expremio_s to delineate the utility, perfotmsace, and rsnb-e
of applicability of rocket intsrceptors d_ to deflect or pul_ comets or
aageroids t n coUimon course with Earth. The two quantities of grestest interest
are: (1) the nut_ /_ or6/t or initial maas of the interceptor, which will usually
dominate the cost of the system; sad (2) the blow-off _tion, the fraction of
the amaih_ object's mass expelled to impart transverm momentum, which ._o
urovides a measure of the probability that the object will fractltre. The interaction
]s calculated for both kinetic-energy dettection and zm_losive deflection and
uses a fairly general relations_p-1_-t_een the energy deposited grad the bicmr-off
In I the --d
effect for ,__ above the s_t..,_ce aad below the msdace ms wel] ms directly on
the surface of the a_dlant. Becam_ different amailant, could pcmmm a wide range
of densities and material properties, the principal value of this work is to show the
relation_pe among the sslient pea'smeten,. However, uJinS typical values for ,,he
various physical properties, I make. the fo/lowing obeervatiotm. (1) ginetic-en_
deflectioniseffectivefor ocean divermon of assailantsmmaller than alxmt 70 m, if
the interceptor is launched when the range to the amsailant is more than _ AU. At
shorter range, in__t0. _ _ _apr4cticany massive. Probability 0f fracture
also mcrea,e, rapidly _th _ range. An interceptor with an order-of-
_tude larger mare m required to caxu,e the tma/lant to mira the pbmet rather
than _pt_,A.,10_ in an ocesa. The more mamive in--tot introJuces • larger
proba_illty of fracturi_ the assailant. Higher specific impulte interceptors are
more effective at mcreuing deflet_ion ,rod 'reducing fracture probability, mahlly
because they divert the amailant at a greater distance. Objects less than 10 m
are b_tter pulverized by interception at short rsa_ with special mass arrays.
(2) Nuclear-explmive d_ection is imperative for amailaute greatel than about
100 m detected ctmer than _ AU becatme of int_x-pt,Jr size. N,,dear-s-_u-f,_e-
burst deflectionoffers• three-to-fourorder d magnitude rvductioe in interceptor
d_. reues slightly m_ specific tmpulae and decrem, m dramatica/ly with assailant
veiomty. _atum m • problem for nuclear explosive interceptl launched
clo_er thaa about t AU. (3) Nucle._r penetrators offer no advanta4ge for ct_-ction,
but are better for pulverization. (4) Nuclear stand-off _tion greatty reduces
fragmentatioa probability, but with a substantial increase in intercep_c-4r ms_.
1. Introduction
The problem of preventing • collision with a comet or asteroid can be conaide-'ed two
_: (1) e_tioas to be taken ff the co!liaion can be predicte,_ several orbital periods
ta advanc., s_d can be averted be imparting a small _ in velocity (most effectively
at at perihelion) and (2) actions to be taken when the object is le_ than an utronov-_ictl
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uni; (AU) away, co_sion is imminent, and deflection or disruption must be accomplished
as the object closes on Earth. I call the ft.-st domain of actions, "remote interdiction" and
the second domain of actiov.s "terminal m_erceptiom"
If all of the Earth-threatenlng asteroids ",rare knowra, the orbit_ could be c,dculated ea_d
the process of deflection could be carried out in s. le;.s_trely manner. Remote interdiction
would be the option of choice. But 99% have not yet been discovered, l FLu-thermore,
there axe an enormous number of unknown long-orbit comets for which a thorough sezxch
is completely impractical.
Astet-oids in the lOO-m size reaxge axe exceedingly dif_cult to detect unless they axe very
dose. Comets in this sizerange are morn conspicuous owing to theircoma, but they will
be moving a lot fasterand can be in retrograde orbits or out of the plane of the ecLiptic.
ha either case, itseencm _kely we win h_ve Littletime to respond to a potential collision.
Ittherefore appears that terminal interception,cl_ruptiou or deflectionat relativelyclose
range, is _.ikely the moat important issue.
In i984, Hyde 2 suggested using nuclear explosives to counter the comets or asteroids,which
Icollectivelycall"aJtralaasa_/ants"at the riskof creating a pathetic fa]lacy,ha 1990, Wood,
Hyde, and Ishikaswa _ showed that defense against small _safilants cotdd be accomplished
with non-nuclear interceptors, largely using the kinetic energy of the aeamlant itself, ha this
paper, I consider the dynamics of the terminal intercept problem. / explore the po_bility
of using kinetic-energy deflection _s wel as nuclear explosives. Nuclear explodves can be
employed in three different mode:_ depe _ding on their location t_t detonation: (1) uried
below the assailant's surfar.e by penetrati_t vehicle; (2) detonated at the ass,,filant's surface;
or (3) detonated some distance above the "arface
Figure 1 shows the interception scenario. The aste_,jidot comet iaheaded toward Earth
at a velocity v. The interce.ptortravelingat velocity V '.sabout to engage the assailant
object. The _lant has a mass ._r and the interceptor, because it has long since
exhausted its:fuel,ithas its fanalmass MI. We cannot hoge to deflectthe assailantlike
a billiardball because M, _, MI. So the interceptor must supply energy to blot_.offa
portion of the _aaailant'ssurface_ that biow-off material being very massive compar_ to
the interceptor, .;',_..'_ .Mr, _ M/,. One might think that a conventional high explosive
would s_fflqce, but the enf'-,'Ky it would supply would be relatively infig;niSc_t. Stasada.._-
high explo_ive xd_ 10 s cedories = 4.184 x 10 x° ergs Fer gram. An n_teroid moving a,
25 km• sac -I has a spec._fic enerKy of 3.125 × 1012 erg.,, per gram .... _._,out 75 times the
specific energy of high explomw,. If the interceptor is moving _t the sn.me speed in the
opposite dircc,_on (V = v --- 25 km. so'< -1), the interceptor would impact with _ specific
energy 30_) times that of lfigh explosive. There is a whol_e iot of kinetic ene_gh' ttvnal_.ble;
a chemical energy reiease would be in the noise. However, ever. this tre_endou_ kinetic
energy wo_dd be completely swn.tnped by a nuclear explosive. The yield-to-weight r_tio of
nuclear explomves "_ generalir y measured i:_ kilotons per kilo_tn, that is, toxin per gram.
A typical specific er, ergy is a million times ;hat of chemical high explo_ve, oz about foux
orders of mah_fitude h_gher that the. kinetic energy of the interceptor collision.
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2. Kinetic-Energy Deflection
The final velocity of an interceptoc missile relative to the Earth, or the orbit in which it is
stationed, isgiven by the rocket equation,
M,
v =9/.,_S, (11
where M, and M! are the initial and final mz_ of the interceptor and I, v is the apeciflc
impulse of the rocket fad. In general, the time required to re_.h this relative velocity will
be short compared to the total flighttime. 'The time elapsed from latmch to interceptis
RI
/xt - _ (2)
v+V'
where _a is the range when the interceptor in iauached and v isthe speed at which the
as._ilant s dosing on the Earth. So the range at which the assailant is intercepted will be
given by
_, = _, 1- ;-_), (s)
Ifthe impact gives the aat_lazata transverse velocity component v± then the th.reateni_
aasaila,v.twillmiss itstarget point by a distance
= (4)
v v._.V '
wher_ I kave neglected the ¢_'ect of the E_h's grffivitatiouAl focussing _d used,, a linear
approximation to Keplerian motion. Tc obtain the transv_=e velo¢_- eotupon_nt, w_
would use the kineticenergy of the interceptorto blast a crates o_ the sideof the asma/imat.
The momentum of the ejectswould be balanced by the tra_vcvte momentum imparted to
th-.aasa,ilant.From Glatmtone'a empirical fits4,the mass of material in the c.rate_produced
by a large expiotion is
M. = a2 E _, (5)
where a and B depend on the location of the exiAoaio, the soil compo_tion lind a myriad
of other p_rarneter_. Clearly the crater co,,_ta_t a and :he c_r etpom:n_ ,_ will be
vax'y depending on whether we are c.nsider;_t_, tm attmilaat :otnpo_xl of aickeJ-ixcrn, stony-
nickel-iron,stone, cbc_drite, or d_y sa_ For almost evvxy situation,however, we. find
_ __ 0,9.
The kinetic energy availablewhen the inter_ptor collideswith the astralaaaaila,utis
= _Mv(v + _)2 (_)E
_.iy a fraction of the i_te_ceptor_ kinetic ez_er_D, i_ converted to kinetic _ergy of the
,u.:-,__e_l ,)r "blow. offf matc'_ial. Let this fraction be. equal to ]b "_, or
= 4/2 ejecta kinetic en_'gy
inte_eptor kinetic energy" (7)V
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The reanoafor this strange definition is that it greatly simpfifiesthe _lgebr_. I will call the
parameter $ the energy_actwn. Then the trax_versevelocity imparted to the _saila.nt is
(s)
where M4 is the mass of the comet or asteroid. We can combine Eqs. (4), (5), and (8) to
obtain
" ._.v (9)
Fxluation (9) reve_ the importance of the intercept velocity V, wMch isproport*onal to
specificimpulse I,p. If V < v, the deflection is proportional to V, and ifV _ v, the
d_flectionisproportional to V a+_ ,_ V 2.
2.1. Optimum Mass Ratio for Kinetic Energy Deflection
The energy on mapact is proportional to the from m_s of the interceptor _md the squaze of
itmrelativevelocity a_ given in Eq. (fl).The smaller it8finalma_s, the higher its rel_ive
velocity, so there il _ame optimum _ ratio th_ produces the greatest deflection f_ a
given initial m_. This would be the optimal interceptor de._ign, the moot b_g for th_
buck.
Sub_itutiag Eq. (1) into Eq. (9), setting
de
"_ 0,
d(MdMl)
and a,clv'i_, we lind the ma_ r_io th_ producel the l_ge_ value of e,
Mi eq
M!
(to)
(lt)
where
v _ l-B v ( v "\ 22_,,i,+ 1+ l+Z.o , + " (12)
V_re note that thJs optimal ma_ ratio depends only on the velocity of the a.ssailamt relative
to earth v and the interCel_tor's specific impulse Io,. The value of ,5 is a constant of the
assailant's sod composition and is _,ery close, to 0.9, and g _ 980 cm _c -_ is a con.stoat
of Planet Ea_tia. In tb.e iiafit of ve:y high specific impul_, the optimum mass ratio i_
M, e_ ' 13)
MI
The m_imum displacement :ff the impact location on Earth is then given by
u. \ 2 ]
1 !4
Figure 2. plots the d_mensionless parameter _,_.[, / _6v _ Rr M, _ _+ l) versus t he dimensio_dess
parameter gI, p/v for _ =0.8, 0,9, aa_d 1.0. It shows the increasin_ a_Ivantage to higher
specific impulse derived from Eq. (14).
A great deal of physical insight can be obtained just by studying the axis labels of the
dimensionless plot. From the ordinate, we see that for the same value cf 9[ap/v, which is
more or less fixed by interceptor design, the asteroid deflection x. is
o Proportional to the range of the assailantat launch (Rt).
, Inversely proportional to the mus of the us_lant (M_).
• Nearly proportional to the velocity of the assailantrelativeto Earth (v# _ v°'9).
• Nearly proportional to the initialmass oi"the interceptor(M, }(_+I) _ M_°s_).
• Proportional to the crater constant (a).
• Proportional to the square root of the fraction of interceptor kinetic energy con-
verted to blow-off kinetic energy (]<5:_).
Equation (14) can be rean'_nged to give the required initial mass or maaJ in orb*i of the
interceptor,
M,=  6 ,g1.,Q+ fz. (151
The mass given by Eq. (!5) will generally be the laxgest singlefactor in the cost of a
defensive system of this sort. To appreciate the ma_tude of the problem, it is now
uecessary to put in a few numbers. The best chemical fuels might have a specific impulse
a_ hlgh aJ 500 sec, which I will use to make the point. The density of potential a_tral
assailants varies greatly, from less than I gin. cm -_ for a snow-ball comet to a little
over 1 gin. cm -_ for a dirty-ice comet to about 3 gin. can -$ for a chonch-ite to about 8
gin. cm -_ for a rnckel-iron asteroid. An agreeable average is 3.4 gin. cm -_. The velocity
of the a_saZlant relative to Earth could range from 5 kin. sec-_ for an asteroid in nearly
coincident orbit with Earth to 70 kan. sec -: for a long-period comet in retrogracie orbit
near the plane of the ecliptic. I will take 25 kin. _c -I for this _xample.
Because the material properties of _teroicks and comets vary so widely, an esthn_te of
the crater constant and crater exponent is sorr_ewhat arbitrary. Here I will make an esti-
mate for impact crt_terhag of mecfittm hard rock. Glasstox_e uses ;3 _ 0.9 and c_ _ 8.,4 ×
1O -_ gm_ (: -_) • ctra -_ • sec 's for an explosive bt_ried at the optima_ depth for _a,x_mum ejec-
tion of dry soil_ For a surface burrer, Gladstone takes o _ 1.6 x i0 "-_ grn'_ (_-'_) - cm -_ • sex: _.
"]['he correct va_ue of a for the impact crater is somewhere between a s,'_rface burs_ a_.,d an
optimMly b_ed explosior_. Fo, _.he purpose of the estimating the crater size for kinetic
energy deflection, 1 wiU take a _ 2x 10 -_ gm_ (_-_) • cm -'s . _c _ Kreyenhagen and Schus-
ter '_ have noted that impacts in the 20 kin. sec -'_ range couple 50-80% of their energy to
tbe ground, while surface bursts co,_ple only 1-10%. I _ll assume about 60% co_plir_ and
about hall that t_oe_ to the blow-off. Thus about 30_ of the interceptor's kinetic energy
is converted to kinetic euerg:_" of the blow-off., corre_ -_nding to 6 _ 0.775.
1._IB
Figure 3 ahows the initial ma_ of the interceptor reqtdred *,o deflect the wtral amailant
by 1 Mm, u a function of the a_ailants diameter a_d its range when the aMailant is
launched. The one-mezame)_ deflection is typical of the course change required to divert
a.u assailant from impact in a populated area to a nearby ocean. To interpret Pig. 2 for
a ten-megame_er deflection, which wo'_ld be conservative for missing the planet entirely
(R_ = 6.378 Mm), we need to multiply the mmsses by about a factor of ten*. Figure
3 makes a clear statement about the applicability of kinetic-energy deflection. Kinetic-
energy deflection is practical only for a_ailants coaJiderably le_ than 100 m in diameter.
To handle a 100-m a_sailant would require a I000 ton interceptor even if launched wheu
the assailant w_ still _ AU away. The ma_ w_uld go to 10,000 tons if the a_sallant were
deilected to mi_ the planet entireJy rather than diverted to an ocean. Thus dealing with
100-m assailants requires another technology. For practicai p_, the kinetic-energy
interceptor is limited to the 3- to 30-m a.ssaila_at, which would require an in_ercep*or m_
of 1 to 130 tons.
2.2, Kinetic-Energy Fragmentation and Pulverization
Equation (15) _v_ the initial ma_ of an optimally designed interceptor for deflecting an
utral assailantby blowingooff itssurface. It w_ derived under the _umption that the
amount of ma_ blown off is small compared to the assailant's ma_. If the ejected m_ is
too large,the crater w_Llhave dimensions a significantfractionof _he a_a_la.nt'sdimeaaion,
and it is more likely that the assailant will break up. If the fragments are tcx) large and are
scattered at random, they may stiff be able to penetrate the Earth's atmosphere and do
damage. A twz_-meter fragment of a nickel-h'on _teroid has about the same average pr as
the atmosphere measured vertically fl_m sea level, and thus will penetrate the atmosphere
loosing only al_out half its energy. A ten-meter choadfite, however, will probably break-up
owing to the dynamic strem of traversing the atmosphere. Shock from the energy o_ ira
explosion may stilldo damage. In order to curare that no damage is done, it will be.
necessary to pulverize the aa_.ilsnt,that is,break itinto very _nal] pieces that _ sure
to dissipateallof theirenergy in the atmosphere.
To get a handle or, the problen_ of whether the a_ailant will be deflected, fragmented,
or pulverized, we need as estimate of whP, t fraction of the ass_.ilant will be blown off in
the collision. By c.x_mbming Eq_ (1), "'_:, ,,, , (!1), and (15), we find that the k_ction of the
assailant blow-a-o_ is given by
M, a_ (M,) _ )_]" = "-_ = M"-'.- 2.e'-Q (gI0, Q + v
where Q is again given by Eq.(12). Some qualitative feature_ of the blow-off fraction am
immediately apparent.
* I'_'_n Eq(15), M, ,x e_b r , so a factor of 1_ in _. correttpouda to a factor of 11.3 in M,
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® blow-off fraction isnearly independent of assailantmum (M_ __ M_'°'°s_°).
• blow-off fraction is nearly proportionM to the crater constant (ar'_ _ a TM) .
• blow-off fz_tctionis nearly inversely pmportion_i to the energy coupling (_r_
 0.947)°
• blow-off fraction is decreases uymptoticdly w_th spedflc impt_e.
U_ the pexameteru above, Fig. 4 ahows the blow-off fraction for ocean diversion as
a functi_ of use_e_t diameter for three differentra_4geeto the sasailant at interceptor
launch. If more than 10% ia blown-off, the aemila_ will probably break-up. What we
learn from Fig. 4 _ tb_t if we cannot launch the interceptor at about _ AU or bet+_sr, we
cannot deflectthe mtutilantwithout fracturing it. Under throe circun_ances itisbetter
to try to pulverize it with an array of mmmes, probably resembling spears for maximum
penetr_.tioa°
E_luation (16) suggests a way to beat the fracture problem. The blow-off fraction can
be reduced by increasing the _>eciflcimpulee. Figure 5 ehowt the blow-<_ fr_tion u a
function of specificimpul_ for a 10¢-m _t with the mimion launched at a range
of _l..AU. With a specificimpulse of 500, over 14% of the assailantmm is blown-o_,100
where_ at a specificimpul_ of 5000, lessthan 4% is blown-off.
3. Nuclear Exploeive Deflection
Much more deflection can be obtained _ _ nuclear explosive is uaed the provide the crateri_
energy. In thi_ scenario, most of the we_h after the rocket ftml is expended would be the
nuclear explosive, which produce_ a yield of
E = (IZ)
where _ is the yield-to-weight ratio.Again, 62/2 of thisenergy goee into the dirt ejected
from the crater,so the transverse vek_ty imparted to the ammilant is
v± = M"-: = M"_ (_MI)L_i'_" (is)
We can combine Eqs. (4), (5), and (18) to obtain
:-
Mov V+,
3.1. Optimum Mmm Ratio for Nuclear Explosive Deflection
Substitutir_ F-xl. (1) into Eq. (19) _ud solving F_l. (10), we find the logarithm of the mass
r_tio that produces the largest value of e,
Q = 2 I., + (1 + + ('20)
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gu the Limit of very high apec.ific i.mpxLiS¢, the optimum mass nttio is
_=I. (21)
MI
la the limit of very low apec./fic impulse, the optimum mass rstio ie
The maximum d_t of the impa_ k_cati_ _ Ear_ i_ then given by
tg:l_
M,v gl.pQ + v
F_ a _ bu_, G_ u_, _ = 0.9, but takes a = 1.6 x 10-4 gmiO-P), cm-_
o.ecS. Hede._'ibe. the mediu-_ udry.dL Medium_h rock w_klbem_e _¢_t
with a _ t0 -_ _i (l-n) • <_n-# • ._y_, and, in the 20-kt nmg¢_ would roughly _ with
Cooper'. If about 5% d the tmdear exVi_ve eaet_ goes iato kinetic eaer_ of the
b_-dr, th_ 5 = X/v_ _ _.le
_o_.iou (23) ca_ be. resx'_rLgvd to give the required initial mere of the interceptor,
i+g (24)
It i, _ known _tt nue.h_ _ c_n be a few kilotm, per _ if th_
weigh mct-e than about • hevdr_ _o F_ the _ d _e e,_aa_te., I wiU
_ke the comerv_ved_., t h_.k_logma -_. Figure _. i, saalogo_ to F_ a,_
the ",'ffilu_ of a sad 6 given above.
A good way to compare k/netic-euergy detbcti_ with nachsr-e_tosive detiectio_ ia to look.
at the ratio of the iaitial mM.e. d the iat_ceptor,. If _e di_e _q (2_) by gq. 05). we
that _ _._, _ o_t _t _ _ (I_,), the ..m_nt'. vdo_y (,,), u_
et_ergy _ion (_)_ a,zd Che _ cotmtsat (a). Fro" a compafiaoa of the techaiqu_,
we _ keep the aarae value, d l,,v and _. We ddiae the ratio
_, _i,_._ by F_. (2_¢) _,_)
F_ = Mi g_v_ by Eq. (15)"
Th,'. the appropriate dh_emfio_ rt_io for the. compM'ia_ is
'_"_" (2e)
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where the subiN:_ipts n r,d¢_ to the parameters for nuclear-explo_-,e deflection and the
subscripts k refer to the parameters for kinetic-energy deflection. This il the _tual ratio
of initial interceptor weights for _ne¢ie-energy v_sus nu_ax-e_q_lo_ve deflection. Fibre
7a shows this r_ti:_ _ a function of amailant velocity (v) for specific impulse l,p - 500 _c.
Figure To shows , !_ ,*._me ratio aa a function of specific impube (J',p) for assailant velocity
v = 25 kin. 0e¢-I Figure 7c Ih_v_ the same ratio u _ function of both mpeciflc imp_e
e_d eumailant veloc;?.y. For the numerical examples we have chcoen, we have
a,,6. 10 -¢ x 0.316
-.---- ffi = 0.204. (27)
am,&, 2 x 10 "_ x 0.775
So for my particulax I_ectkm d parameters, we c_au read the mau ratio, in Figs. 7a, 7b,
sad lc by multildying the number on the vertical a._ by 0.204.
PVc_n Figs. 7a, 7b, and 7c, we leax_ the followi_ qualitative features.
, The interceptor _eight iJ about three oedere of magnitude _ for nuclear-explosive
d_ectiau than for kinetic-energy d_.
, The adv_tage of nu_k_ve deflection decreu_ _$n_caatly with amailant
velocity.
, The advautMe _ nuck_-e_pkmve detiection decreue_ slightly with specific im-
ped_
3.2. Nuclear-Explodv_ _nt_tion and Pulverisation
/io( (2s)
whereQ #yen by Eq. (20).  what remffir ty,  n&pendent of aud
hu the ,_e f_'m u _q. (16). T_ oa]y d_mc_s are: (I) th_ _ereat forxn cf Q, (2)
the value of the ea_rgy fractioe 6, and (3) the valt_ _ the (raterin_ cmaz_t o
Fitp_e 8 sho_t the biota-off fr_.tkm for pl_etary mi_ (10 _m) ,_ a ftmct_tm of ama_ltm_
d meter for t_ ditTe_nt rtag_ _ the ataaihmt at _tot" launch. I.f the intet_.ptot
_s lauu_ at a raa/_ much c/o_ tEau _ AU, the a¢_dlaat wiLl be _te_ rather than
de,tee.ted.
3.3. Penetratore
The bisect ertter k not produced by. a _ace burst, but _" s_ explodve bmled mine
disttmce 'below the m_fa_. Clearly if it i_ buried too deeply, it will p, xM_ce no crater at
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all.The optimum depth for _ isa function of all_he ususl p_.1_mcter8 describing
m_e_rial pzol_n'tiel,but most importantly, Ipmvity,which_ to a large extent, can be il_nored
for comets and u_roid_. For dry soilon the surface of the Earth, Gl_mtone gives the
optimum depth as 150 E °'3feetand he would obtain the crater constant and exponent
fl-_ 0.9 and a _ 8.4 x I0-4 _n_ {l-n) •cm -# ._P for use in Eq. (5). F_r the m0caent,
letus say that the v_lu_ of a isincreased an order of mJ_nitude.
Looking at F.,q.(24), we might expect the imtial mau to decrea_ an order of ma@_itude,
but in order to pen_rate to the optimal depth the explosiveh_ to be fittedwith s weighty
billc_:a cylinder of metal (probably ttm_ten) that willerode during penetration of the
_t'8 m_lo In _.ner_ this will_ the w_ht by Mmut an order of m_nitude,
or d_ the yield-to-__i_ht _ by about an order of magnitude. Thu_ in F_q. (24), the
decrea_ in iv.iti_linterceptorms_ Mi owing to the ineream in the cmtering constant a
isjxmt about compemmted by the decrease in yield-to-_ _.
However, the blow-off fr_'tion _iven in Eq. (28) becomes an order of m_p_tude lar_r,
it does not depend oa yield-to-_ _. The eonel_ion _ thez a penetra_or h_
_o wlue enhancing _ion, but may be of g_U value if we choo_ to pulverize the
astrals_ddant.
3.3. Stand-o_' Deflection
The fracture problem can be much mitigated by deton_tin_ the nuclear explosive some
distance from the _ral _t. Rather th_x forming a crater, the neutrom,, x-ray's,
7-r'ty,,and _me highly ionized debr_ from the nucle_ _ willMow-<_' a thin layer
of the w_m_', surface. Tl_ will_pre_i the imp_ _ • _ _ and _ the
shear strum to which the _ issub_._zted.Of the_e fm_r energy t:_mder _,
by far the most effective(_t re_ma_le hei_t_ of bur_t) is x_,utr_n energy depo_tkm,
_th_ that primm_y-fu_io_ explosive, wo_Id be most e_ective.
the problem of c_c_,J_tin_the mon_um t_ fix_na g_nd-o_ detos_ion is_-
_J_tly complicsted that itis _t to _ddrem _ytic_Uy. Computer _imulatio_ mere
the most effectiveap_ Ho_ev_ _ general s_ts c_mnNe m_l_. At _ ol_i-
m_ height of bur_t, about 2 to 8% of the _lmi_'s _ is o_ul_l to _ _t't
_a'{_'_,ag_iu d_1_ndi_ on the _t'_ _'tuM composition _ud the neutron spectrum
and total nc.utro_ _ outImt of the _plo_ive. Thi= _nds to an _ _io_
6 of 0.2 to 0.4, Most of the en_gy is deposited in _he fi-_rt 1O can of the _1. The crater-
ing conat_nts can ,tiU be used _ in Eq. (5), but f_ thin _ blow-off, fl _: I and a
ranging from I0-s to 2 x I0-_ cm -_ •sec. Ifwe _e.Jectan _._tila.at_or which _ = 0.3 _md
a = 1.5 x _0"' cm -_ ._c, _e find from Eq. (24) th_z tl_ blaw-_ _-_ction _ be about
factor of _5 times smaller than the _u_rfaoe burst. The blr_w-o_ "frt_ctio_ given in Fig,
(S) would be. in the range _ 1% for _t = _ AU and in the ra_n_ of i% for _, - i AU.
Simal_ly, from Eq. (28) we find that the initial mare of the interceptor would hatv,, to be.
_out 411 times as large, _ in Fig. (6) the mmm wo,_d be multiplied by 40, i.e. ra.ngin_
from abe,at 28 tons to td:_out 28 kilototm. The lattea" would not be very pr_ticM.
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4. Comments, Summary, and Tentative Conclusions
Since AlvarezTLnnounced evidence for utexoid impa_ct as the putative cause of the creta-
ceo_-terti_"y extinction, there has been a heightened aw_en¢_ that our fair pl_v.et
and always hms been in a state of merciless cosmic bombardment. Not all this cannonade
has been deleterious, for example, the event Alv_r_ suggests may have cleared the #ay
for the rise of homo sapiens. But being a sel_sh sub-species, we would rather hold on to
our domination of the Earth, and deny a chance to any m_t'e weLl adapted creature for as
long as we can. Less facetious is the po_ibility of a strike from an interplanetary body
with radius on the order of I00 m. H an asteroid, such as assailantwould likelyhave a
relativevelocityof about 25 km_ 8v¢-l, which would give ita kineticenergy of about 1000
meg_onl. In a populated area, the dama_ would be catastrophic. If it were a ¢xxneL
the ,-_lativevelocity would be mor_ like50 kin. sec-Iaud the en_ID- would quadruple.
The Tunguska _vent s (1908) offerssobering evidence that suc_ potentially_c
collisionsarc not so inL_quent that they can be ignored. That impact w,,_ al_t 10
megatons and could be expected every few hunted y_ara Recent estimates 9 indicate that
a 20-kiloton (Hh-oshimb-size) event should occur every year. This would be conspicuo_,
apparently much of the energy is dissipated in penetrating the atm_phere. That
c.sts_y_ are not generally recorded in the archives of x_atura_ disaster seems somewhat
of a mystery. Perhaps it _n be attributed to the fact that until the 20th century, very
little of the Earth's L_u'face w_ populated, t° Neverthelem, the r_ak of being killed as a
result of asteroid hnpact is_z_mewl_t greater than the riskof being killedin an airplane
crash.II
The problem naturally divides into two patti: (I) detection of these relativelysmall as-
sailants;and (2) smash_ or de_ecting them should they be on an endangcrb_ courm.
In this paper, I have addressed the l_ter i_ue_ The rclatiomhips I have derived should
guide thinking on how to counter such a_sailan_s.Thor main value is to show the func-
tional relationshipamong the parameters. This paper isnot intended to be an er_h_u_tive
Itudy, and much research will be required to ev_u_te the con_tas_ in the eq ,tuttio_ I have
derived. But the following ob_e_tio_ are compelling and unavuldable_
• Kinetic-enerKy deduction ise_'ectivefor ocean diversio_nfor a_ailasts smaller than
about 70 m, ifthe _uterc_ptorislaunchcd whe_ the assailantisfurther than _ AU
At shor_ex range, interceptorsbecor_e impx_cticaUy _ve and the proba-
bilityof fracture in_ r_pidiy
- Ocean impact i_probably unaccepteble for ia_g_ assailants,_d an order-
ofmagnitude largerinterceptoris requir_ for mis_dng the planet with con-
comits_ut inct'ea_e in £_acture probability
Higher specificimpulse interc._ptorsare more effectiveat inczea.sLugdeflection
and reducing fi-actureprobaLility,ma_aly bccau_ they divert the assailant
at a _'e_er distance.
Objects le_ than 10 m axe better p ,a.lverized at short range.
, Nuele_lo_ive deflection is impe_ativ_ for e_ailan_ greater than about I00 m
detected clo_r than _ AU bec_u_ of the e.no[mou_ m_ of the. interceptor required
for idnetic-energy diver_ou.
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• Nuclear pmetnC.on otrm. no _mata_ for _ but b_ter for pul_
• Nucie.or .t.ad.o_ _ Iprm_ reducm, fn,45mmmLio¢_ probal_ty, but invol-e.
eL_ ixm'mm in i_termptor sum
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F_ure Cantion_
Figm'e 1. I_terce_t, on S_n=rie. (_) The ute_d or comet i= heevted toward Earth at a
ve.iocity v. The __tor, traveling at a diametric velocity V, _m abo_t to _ the
_t. The s_ailaat ha= a roam M,, 6.ud the _uterceptcr, becatmv it has long I_nc_
exhwumteci it_ fund, it h_ its Eual rosa8 MI. (b) The interceptor supplies ene:_ to blow.o_
a portion (ma_ M,) of the assail_t'$ surface to impart a tra_verte velocity v_..
blow-o_ IIl_eri_ is ve_ msasive co_ to the i_terceptor, t¢/, _, M, _, My.
Fifu_ 2. D/mena/,_J Plot o/Kine_i¢.gnen)ll Def_ect, a_. Diz_emfgmkm pezmneter
eMo/o6_M_ tC#+_ _ the _te= puffie=_ fl,,/v _ _ =O.& O.9,cad X.O.
3. Initi_d Me=,e, oj Opt, n'a_b/ D_,_ lltte_tvtora Ua*_ Kinet, c-Er_ern De-
Re_tioyt for Ocea_ Diversion (I Mm). ]z_t_=] ma_ of the interceptor required to deflect
the &_aihtat by 1 _ u a __uction of the amaih_t's diamvter and its nmge when the
u_,_le_t i_ _ A_vcued quantities: p = 3.4 gin. cm-*, v = 25 kin. =e¢:-_ , _ = 0.9,
a = 2 x 10-'* _|(=-_) • cm -_ • ee¢_ =rod _ _- 0.775 The one-mel;m_ter _icm is typ-
ical of _ ¢ou_ ¢ha_ req_dredto divert au _t from im_ i=. populated m_.
to e nearby ocean. To interpret a ten-megsmeter deflection, which _ "be _ve
for miming _ planet _:_tireiy (P_ = 6.378 Mm), m_dtiply the _vl by about a fact_
of ten (Mi c_ ¢_]_, _o a factor of 10 in e _d_ to a factor of _I.3 in M._.).
Figure 4. Blo_-o_ _c_n /or O_=n D_er_ion (I _Im) _,i_ _ine=U._e,W D4t=-
t_n. Amumed qmmtitie¢ p == 3.4 Ig=' an -=, v = 7,5 _l. =e¢ -x , /; = 0.9, _z _ 2 x
10"4 _;m I(I-_) "c-m-#" _ec# and _ _ 0.775. If more than 10% i_ bk_wn-o_ the amuu']aat
probmblybr_k-up.
fr_ion e= = ftmctic= of _ impulse for a ZO0-m _t with the mimo_ __
at a ran_ of y_ AU. W_th , specific impulse d 500, o_r 14% of the am_htat man i_
blown-eft, where_ at a _ impuhe of 50_, leas than 4% i= blosm-clf.
F'qgure 6. I_ial M s_e_ of Op_m_llV Dea_ lnterceptor_ Utin_j Mffi._tr.]g_'j_la_i_e De-
flectio_ _ _tT_e_o_ o_¢ 1 _ _ _. Ae_ume_ qu_mtit_ p == 3.4 gin. cm-*,
= 25 k_. ,e,:-t, _ = 0.9, c_= 10''_ g_ 4(_-'e)•cm-'s •,e_ and 6 = 0.3i_.
i_.) /_ & It _ctk:_ o_ _t velocity (_) for _:_. impulse I, e = 500 =ec. (]3) A,=
_ction of _s:iflc impulse ([o) for e_aila_t vel.ocity v = 2,5 kin. _e_ -_ . (c) As a function
of ho_,h _rpecific _mpul_. _ad u_ihmt velocity. For the present numerical -.x_.mples we
have c_ c_,,_,_/_=_t = 0.204. So figures can be _ by multiplyi_ the number on the
vertica, l _ by 0.204.
Figure 8. Blow_o_ Pm_tion /or Colli_ion A_oi_n,_ (I0 Mm) _inf Nucl_-Exploz_e
Deflect/on. If the interceptor m launched at a range much _ _]_lu2 i AU, the nm_u]ant
_l] be fra_nented r_-r than deflected.
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Abstr_¢t_ Analogs between meteorites and asteroids are organized
to permit a classification scheme for Near Earth Objects (NEO's)
in terms of their mechanical strength and thermal properties. An
abridged database on meteorite mechanical and thermal properties
is presented with a brief discussion. Some materials science
approaches to meteorite analysis are discussed. There is a need to
carry out systematic experiments on meteorite properties.
Recommendations for NEO material classification scheme (NEOM) is
suggested and a NEOM Interception-interactions matrix is outlined.
This paper has three objectives. The first is to utilize
associations between metecrlte mineral st_-actures and observational
spectra of asteroids in order to establish a classification of
NEO 's based on meteorite mechanical and thermal properties
anticipated dynamic response to kinetic and radiation energy
interactions. Second, a preliminary database is ID,itiated based on
currently _vailable laboratory measurements which may not be
representative of the NEO properties in their environment. Third_
a material science approach to the analysis of meteorite properties
is discussed. Because of these objectives, the contents of this
paper are preliminary, limited in detail, and in some cases
incomplete. Also, recent significant experimental results are not
included; we hope to present them elsewhere. Nonetheless, it is
anticipated that some of the suggestions contained herein will
spark interest or even controversy that will provide s_appert and
motivation for continued research, which is the main objective.
In the past, the major objective of modeling asteroid types
according to meteorite analogs has been to associate the o_igin
and evolution of asteroids and meteorites in terms of the origin
and evolution of the solar system. This objective has met with some
success in enhancing our understanding of the solar system.
Additional understanding of the solar system may also be derived
from a study of Near-Earth-Objects (NEO's) in general arid Nea_-
Earth-Asteroids (NFA's) in part icu}.9_, which are regarded to come
primarily from mai_elt asteroids ( These objects are expected
to further increase our scientiflc knowledge because:
I. Many NF_'_ are believed to be remnants ef the original planeta_
building blocks as well as being meteorite p_rent bodies.
2. Some NEA's may be related to extinct comet nuclei and thereby
provide Jnslght into the orlgi_ and evolution of comets.
3° TerreBtrial impacts of N_A's are generall> regarde,l to have
significantly influenced geological and Diological evolution on
the earth, ie K/T eMtincrlon hypothesls _).
4. NEA's may provide a bas|s for space resource exploration.
5. Some NEC_s may be related to unknowD mineral assemblages.
Our approach is to characterize NEO's as asteroid-like objects that
have mineralogical analogs with meteorites and analyze how such
classes of materials will respond to technological processing
during NEO orbital adjustment. This approach does not minimize the
importance of this material serving as a link to the origin of the
solar system. Understanding the mechanical and thermal properties
of meteorites will aid in anticipating likely NEO characteristics°
This will assist the technology of NEO orbit management while
conserving as much as posslble the integrity of the asteroid, comet
nucleus, or whatever the NEO turns out to be, for the natural
history record.
2. As_groid Commomf_iq__
Both mainbelt asteroids (MBA's) as well as NEA's have been
classified photometrically using reflectance spectra in the visible
through infra-red (VIS-IR) and in a more limited manner by radar
reflectivity measurements, thereby establishing some important
mineralogical characteristics that set limits for plausible
meteorite/asteroid materials analogs for the most populous
classes (4._°'T). Additional detailed (astrodynamIc) data on asteroid
size, spin rate, orlentation, and surface properties is provided
by radar reflection (_. A _rief example of some of the results
comparing asteroid composition types with meteorite mineralogy and
relating them to mechanical properties is given in table one. From
the population of dozens of classified NEA's, the (major types)
S:C:M ratio is approximately 7:3:1; while among the hundreds of
class_fled Malnbelt-Asterolds (MBA's) the ratio is approx%mately
7:5:1 () .
Asteroids as the source of meteorites is based on the following
generally accepted JudgMents:
i. Petrographicf physlcal, chemical, and isotopic differences among
various meteorite groups imply that at least 80 separate parent
bodies are needed to account for the origin and evolution of
known meteorites° Characteristics of chondrites, irons, and
eucrites imply formation in parent bodies with radii of I00 to
600 ks.
2. Orbital and petrographic data of recovered meteorites and high
density meteoroids generally rule out the moon, active comets,
and extra--solar objects as the source for a significant number
of the recovered meteorites. However, there is the possibility
Mars may be the source for SNCs; highly shocked shergottites,
mildly shocked chassignJtes, and slightly shocked nakhlltes.
3. Only a few of the thousands of recovered Antarctic meteorites
_re c!eari_ recognizable as lunar in origin.
4. Analogs between asteroid and meteorite reflectance spectra
suggest the Earth _eceives a nonrepresentatlve sample of
meteorites. Complete resolution of the asteroid/meteorlte
analogs wilil not be realized until the asterolds are sampled.
In terms of relative abundance among fallen meteorites, the
choudrites make up the overwheImlng majorlty of the meteorites with
roughly 84% of the total. The achor_drltes represent about 8%; the
iron meteorites represent about 7% with the remaining 1% consistlng
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Table I: __q_t Abu_D_ada_ Near-Earth As_e__Q_os_tion Typest
Posslble Meteorite Analos_d_ch___ Streng__h
I.__C_qJ_ and G (Primitive and MetuKqZp__l
Inferred M__ngrai ic 1 Sure _Q2_p_q_t_on _(2T_ Hydrated
silicates and carbon/ organics/ opaques. Low a]bedo, 2 - 7 %.
S_c__t__J_@/_J_v__x: Neutral, slight blue absorption, and strong
UV absorption.
Po____e M_teorit@ AQ__Carbonaceous chondrites. CII-CM2
as weli as assemblages produced by aqueous alteration and/or
metamorphism of CI/CM precursor materials. Low crushing strength.
IX. D and P_
IMSC: Carbon organic rich silicates. Low albedo,
S_tral Re_lectiv_t3_i Red
2 - 7 %.
_MA: Carbonaceous chondrites. Organic rich, primitive, cosmic dust
grains; CII - CM2 plus organics; low crushing strength.
_i Enstatite and/or other iron free silicates.
S_t_E_ Reflectivity;. E; High albedo >23 % and appears slightly
red but otherwise featureless (no diagnostic spectra)° R; Moderate
albedo_ is very red with a strong infra-red absorption due to
pyroxene.
P_/_: Enstatite chondrite and enstatite achondrite (E); pyroxene-
olivine achondrite (R); moderate structural strength.
IV. M {Iqneous}
_MC: Metal (Fe-Ni) with possible traces of silicates.
_/L_r_a_ Reflectivitv; Neutral, moderate albedo,
reflectlv_ty.
High radar
__JXk[ NiFe metal with possible silicate inclusions. Enstatite, NiFe
metal, or a combination of both and enstatlte chondrltes
derived from differentiated parent bodies; very strong
structurally if metallic.
Y_S___i;_neeus and/e! MetaIoEp_h_ig/_
__$_¢_ Olivine, pyroxene, and FeNi metal combined.
S_P___c_al__l__iv_i_i Moderately high albedo, " 7 - 23 %;
Red; absorption band at 0.9 to 1.0 and neaI
2 m_crons: Broad absorption band in the
blue and bV.
_[_: Ordinary cbondrites and/or stony irons; possible parent body
of chondrites. Only the extreme metal poor and olivine poor
members of the S group have spectra that approach the ordinary
chondrites; moderate structu_;al strength if chondrltlc; strong
_f stony-iron.
l_5
of stony iron meteorites_ The proportional representation amon9 the
meteorite classes is vet_ different for finds which _re heavily
weighted toward irons and stony irons because their dlstinct_ve
metallic characteristics are so different from terrestrial rocks.
The observed fall statistics are generally regarded to represent
the proportions of meteoroids orbiting in the vicinity of the
earth, and this statistic heavily favors the likelihood that most
asteroids are stony. However, there are other factors to consider
with regard to the probability of an encounter with a large NEO.
In Table 1 the most abundant (not all) asteroid composition types
are categorized with meteorite analogs that will have generally the
same mechanical and thermal properties. This allows the
classification of a meteorite-like NEO to be divided into three
structural classes. Based on the inferred mineralogical surface
composition (IMSC) and the possible meteorite analogs (PMA) the
composition types B, C, D, F, and G am we'l as D and F are likely
to be mechanically (structurally) weak and can be placed in the
same category. Similarly, from the IMSC and the PMA we may assume
that the E and S have compositions similar to chondrites and
achondrites and are somewhat stronger mechanically than the than
the B, C, D, F, G, D0 and P types. Cos_tlnulng this argument, we
consider the M type asteroids to be predominantly metallic and
structurally resemble metallic meteorites which are mechanically
the strongest class, which is apparent from the data in Table 2 and
other experimental work (ILI_19).
Although meteorite-like asteroids may be divided into three
structural classes and present a relatively limited range of
materials, there is still an extensive range of mechaz_ical and
thermal properties on the micro and macroscopic scales caused by
inhomogeneities originating from the circ%_stances of origin and
evolution. Most of the data from which the mineralogical properties
of asteroids is inferre,l comes from telescope observations of NEA's
which are generally faint and must be observed within a narrow
spectral window (figure 1 on the last page) which compare_
reflectance spectra of minerals, asteroids and meteorites.
Data presented in tables 2, 3, 4, and !5 which describe the
mechanical and thermal properties of meteorites is taken from
individual samples with relatively hom oggn_ous mlcrostructure, but
this is only sometimes the case (_'11'I_D3) . However, there rare
complications arid factors to consider in understanding asteroid
properties based on meteorite analogs:
i. First is the effect of large scale (more than a cm)
inhomoge cities within given microstructural phases.
2. Second is the possibility that totally different phase are _n
physical and structural contact or fusion, possibly as a result
evolution within the same parent body or from collision. One
phase masks the other, giving a deceptive spectral analysis,
which my yiell en incorrect asteroid composition, creating
uncertainty in anticipated mechanical and thermal properties.
3. Even if there is an ideal homogeneous microstructural
composition, there may have been thermal, radiation, or impact
I _'1(_
interactions throughout the history of the asteroid which
altered its integrity from an ideal structure.
4. There is the effect of small scale inhomogeneities (less than
1 e_m) in the microstructure such as inclusions or grain and
phase boundaries. Collectively, these can present either large
or small scale discontinuities to a propagating shock wave.
5o The NEO object may not be a contiguous object. It may be
composed of meteorite space debris nucleated around a solid
object or a swarm of rocks or small silicate and metal grains.
The received spectral signal would correspond to integration of
the individual spectral components.
6. The NEO object may be a two (contact binary) (I*), three, or many-
body system composed of relatively large components (on the
order of hundreds of m).
7. The NEO may resemble an e_tinct comet (nucleus), implying a
density of around I gm/cm _ or even less.
8. 9
Other factors to consider when applying the values in Tables 2,3,4,
and 5 to a model is that these measurements of the meteorite
properties were most likely performed in terrestrial laboratories,
at room temperature and atmospheric pressure. Therefore, it would
be desirable to carry out a more exteDsive and systematic set of
measurements of meteorite samples at conditions similar to those
found in the region of space between Earth and _%_ asteroid belt.
We have already started such an undertaking.
3. Irom [Nile] Moteor__-_@
Predominantly iron meteorites (M t)_e anal_s) are sometimes
relatively easy to detect by radar (reflectivity is enhanced by the
metal or stony metal surface). Because of their structure they are
probably the most lethal per unit mass to the earth of all the
NEA's. Obse,_ations indicate that there are currently at least two
M type NEA's (1986 DA and 1986 EB) (15'_6) which have a mineralogy
identifiable with iron meteorites. Additional M type asteroids are
thought to exist in the main belt. These asteroids, which are
either partial_y or completely composed of iron-nlckel, are
generally thought to be fragments of large cores and/or localized
metal reservoirs of differentiated parent asteroids. Their
survival, after the outer layers were (presumably; stripped away
by collision, demonstrates an ability to withstand a high velocity
impact with other asteroid bodies. This is not surprising from
detailed studies of their mechanical properties and microstructure.
Their suI_J :ability is based upon two physical properties; first,
the relatively high mechanical strength, especially when Ni
enriched (taenite phac;e) and second, their density (?.8) and
hardness %,h_ch _s an _mpedJment to external penetration and the
ensuing p_ l,_erizatio_ _echanismso For parent asteroids tens of
kilometers in size, ar_ additi<_na] structural factor is internal
(hydrostatic) pressure on the _iore which can lower the ductile-
brittle transition temperature thereby strengthening the core
against catastrophic failure. However, the asteroid must be well
over IC0 km for this effect to be significant.
10/
t_
The great mechanical strength of H type asteroids can elth_r be an
important asset or pose a formidable problem to NEe Inte[action
mlsllons w_ose aim is to modify %be orbit. One of the assets of
such robust materials Is their presumed ability to absorb the large
amount of energy (impulsive forces) necessary to undergo the
requlred change in _oMentum to satisfactorily adjust their orbit.
Another advantage is the relatively simple modeling afforded by
an ideal Iron-nickel surface which is not complicated by several
variables associated wit_ a variety of Mineralogical components as
well as the presence of extensive regolith and/or breccia.
Disadvantages it, dealing with M type asteroids include resistance
to penetrator devices, the presence of a network of inclusions
which may introduce faults which can weaken structural properties,
and large scale _Iscontinultles (eg. stony -iron mixture).
Materials properties and design methods to optimize penetrator
device effectiveness for M type asteroids or planetary surfaces
will be discussed elsewhere. Also, the high density of M type
asteroids indicates a large inertial mass to size ratio which will
re_llre a precisely targeted payload delivery system.
Some mechanical properties of iron-nickel meteorites are listed in
table 2. These results are based on a limited number of select
samples which do not take into a_count inhomogeneities and other
variations in the material propel lea. In addition, the actual
asteroid analog to these meteorite properties may be composed of
internal layers or regions of silicate material mixed with the iron
nickel phases. Such a structure will present gross mechanical
discontinuities to a penetrating projectile or HE. Other surface
complications external radiation photo-ablation HE impulsive force
are structural discontinuities much as a substantial regollth
layer. Ideally_ the velocity vector of the asteroid should be
changed with a minimum amount c f work done on the structure of the
asteroid, preserving its structural integrity. An example cf the
gross mechanical property dependence on microstructure, or in
particular the weight % Ni, is the ductile-brlttle transltlon
temperature as shown in figure 2. The yield strength for an impact
depends on the Ni content. In figure 3, the impact yield energy for
the three iron meteorite classes, octahedrlte, hexahedrite, and
ataxite are plotted as a function of temperature. Other factors,
such as the effects of mlcro-inclusions as a function of
temperatur_ are
studied_6JL1s. _"
also important
Figure
F_g,J t-e 2
and are currently being
t_
t_
to ---/t ......
i. Density; Iron Nickel
Mesosiderites
Pallasites
7.29 - 7.88
5.20 - 6.20
4.74
2. Hardness; Brinell, correlated with Ni content-Taenite 90 - 660
Kamacite 90 - 3t0
Brinell, hard inclusions (cohenite,troi!ite,
schreibersite, and chromite) 950
Vickers 200-350
3. Tensile strength; 0.58 - 1.8 x 10 I° d/cm 2
4. YoungJs modulus (tensile) 2.0 x 3012 d/cm 2
5. Compressive strength; I.i - 3.4 x I0 I_ d/cm 2
Compressibility; Bulk modulus (all s_des cQmpression )
1.67 x i0 TM d/c_ _
6. Surface tension; 1200 d/cm
7. Coefficient of viscosity; 0.026 to 0.019 poises (d s/cm 2)
molten meteoritic iron; 0.92
at effective temperature of vaporization; 0.01
_£___T__ Promerti_# of Iron-Nia_ Retwrlto|
Modification of the NEO orbit should couple as little energy as
possible into thermal modes of melting and vaporization. However,
an instantaneous alteration of the asteroid trajectory is likely
to require a larqe amount of energy to be imparted in a very short
time. Examples of such heat generating methods include high speed
impact by penetrators with or without HE or nuclear devlc_s,
external nuclear explosives and the associated X-ray photo-ablatIDn
and vaporization, or e_cavation and vaporization effects ass_ciatmd
with surface nuclear detonations. Ther ...._vnamic properties of iron _-
nickel meteorites are presented in T_ ,i_ three.
Little effort _,as been Oirected toward, understanding meteorite
properties in farms cf the tec_hnoloo_ of materials science, or
mining engineering Characterizatior_ _,f impulsive loading from
hypervelocity impact and associated shock, radiative scatterimg,
and thermal cycling effects over a bro_d temperature ra|ige
simulating NEO space interception should be carried out and added
to the database. Such data can assist in validating compute_ codes
that may be used to simulate complex materials response to
arbitrary stress loading and to determina strain levels required
for a material to fail either locally or catastrophically.
I. Melting point (with 10% Ni): 1770 K
2. Boiling point: 3680 K
3. Average specific heat:
a) Solid ( O - 1500 C)
b) Liquid
c) Gaseous
6.91 x 106 erg/g-deg
6.66 x I06 erg/g-deg
Cp = 3.7_ x 106 erg/g-deq
C v :: 2.23 x 106 erg/g-deg
4. Latent heat of vaporization: 3.72 or/atom = 6.40 x 101° erg/g
5. Latent heat of fusion: 2.69 x 109 erg/g
6. Thel_al conductivity (deg/cm):
7. Vapor pressure:
4 x 106 erg/cm2-s
a) Iron
b) Nickel
log p = 10.607 - 16120/T
log p = 10.725 - 16120/T
It Is suggested that to address the issues associated with the
benign modification of NEO, a systematic and detailed study should
be carried out on the iron-nickel and related stony iron meteorite
analogs of M type asteroids. From this study, one may be able to
determine what is known, what can be extrapolated from similar
terrestrial materials, and what research must be carried out to
ga_erate critical new data. To generate predictive models on the
results of explosive and impulsive interactions with any type of
asteroid or comet, we must attempt to understand such mechanical
properties;
I. Low strain rate impact properties.
2. High strain rate impact properties.
3. Shock wave plopagation and microstructural effects.
4. Effects of inclusions and dislocations on plastic structure and
fracture characteristics.
5. _adiation effects in meteoritic and comet-like materials.
Measurements must be carried out on synthetic sample_ of (extinct?)
comet nuclei to determine the distribution of CO_ and J?O ice, dust,
carbonaceous and other meteorite related mlneralg. Generally
required are accurate values of those thermodynamic properties t]lat
will be of assistarlce in modeling interactions with high enerqy
generated X-rays if _uclear explosives are used.
In addition to the above proposed new work, many of the iron
meteorite properties listed in Tables 2 and 3 should be re-
calibrated and extended with special emphasis on the effects
stony-iron mixtures, inclusions, and other imperfections in the
FeNi phases. There are critical gaps ill the data base, especially
those involving high strain rates, effects of inclusions, shock
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wave effects, and high energy x-ray and i,eutron flux interactions.
Some additional experimental work may have to be carried out on the
mechanical and thermodynamic properties of iron meteorites if one
wishes to accurately model and predict the effects of orbital
modifications by the methods discussed in this communications.
7o Ston_ Asteroids
The physical properties of metallic meteorites are more homogeneous
than those of the stony meteorites. The origin of iron-nickel
meteorites is generally regarded to have occurred wben the iiquJd
metal solidified yielding the important steel alloys kamacite and
taenite which have been extensively studied by metallurgists. While
meteorite structures of kamacite and taenite differ f_om steel,
they still regain many of the same properties and resemble a
manufactured mate_iai in uniformity. Stony asteroids on the other
hand can be divided into three groups with significantiy different
physical and chemical properties:
i. Primitive (C, D, and P types): Dominate the outer part of the
asteroid belt.
2. Metamorphic (F, G, B, and T) Peak in the central regioD of the
asteroid belt.
3. Igneous (S and E): Common in the inner part of the belt. The
metallic (M) asteroids may also be considered in this group,
although its materials properties are very different from those
of the S and E.
Table 1 categorizes asteroid type_ based on their VIS-IR spectra
and relationship to known meteorite t}_es (analogs). From the point
of view of interacting with the asteroid by means of HE and/or
penetrator systems, we will regard the asteroids to be further
classified into the above three materia_ groups.
Additional complications for the interaction with stony asteroids:
1. They may not be composed of one type of (meteorite analog)
material.
2. They may have cracks ._nd f_actures or be otherwise degraded
which will considerably red_:ce their structural integrity. This
is less likely for the stronger metallic meteorites_.
3_ The may have extensive regolith or regolith breccia <-n their
_sur face.
Tabl e[-" 4 an-d 5 out] ine some of the mechanice I ,_nd therma.i
properties of stony meteorites. A_ i_ the case of the iron
meteorites, the values presented are representative of a very
limited sampling of idea] specimens and do net take into _ccount
inhomoc_eneities, structural, or chemical variations _itbin a Given
meteorite class. Also, the conditions under which tl,e_e
measureme_its wer_ _ obtained did not properly take into account space
cond it ions asso(_ ._.ated wi_ h asteroid orbits. We are currently
c]esigning 3 series of experiments to more accurately determine
the_e chemical and physical properties-
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_L_hdKt_9_4___f 5tony Neteor£tes
I. Density: Range 2.38 - _.84
2. Mean atomic weight: 23
34 Porosity: a) micro 2.7 - 3.59 %
b) macro 3.0 - 12.4 %
4_ Surface tension: at fusion 400 d/cm
_it volatilization 360 d/cm
5. Compressive strength: 0.062 - 3.7 kb.
6. Viscosity: 1.3 x 104 poises at 1400 C.
7. Seismic velocity: chondrites
a) Longitudinal 2050 - 4200 km/s
b) Transverse 600 - 1220 km/s
TablO _:
I. Average melting point: 1350 - 1800 K
a) Magnesia olivine
b) Iron olivine
c) Magnesia pyroxene
d) Ferrosilicate
Tho:sel_p_q_ej of 8ton7 meteorites
1890 C
1100
1554
II00
2. Boiling or dissociation point: 2960 K
3. Average specific heat: solid, 0 - 1200 C ; 8.95 x 106 deg,'g-deg
liquid, I.I _ 107 deg/g-deg
4. IAte _t heat of fusion (fayalite): 2.65 x 1011 erg/g
5, l,ate_t he_t of vapor izatJen faverage for meteoritic stone)-from
scan lattice energy: 6.05 × 1010 erg/g
5. Thermal conductivity (at 50 C) : 3.6 5.8 x I0 "] cal-cm/deg-sec
8. Recommendations
In terms of the mechanical and thermal properties NEO--mateJ'ials
(NEOM) are divided into three meteorite related groups a_d one
comet related group:
NEOM 0: NEC's identified as being similar to what is regarded to
resemble extinct comet nuclei are expected to have a ve_j
low density " 1.5 gm/cm 3, poor mechanical strengt.h,
variable compositions, and variable the_ma! properties.
NEOM i: NEO identified as being composed of materials similar to
the structurally weakest (friable) meteorites, and
resembling the (primitive) asteroid classes; Cs D, P_ B,
F, G, and T. These materials will also have similar thermal
characteristics.
NEOM 2: NEO identified as being cGmposed of metamorphic and
igneous materials and corresponding to asteroid classes E,
R, and S, and have similar thermal properties. Thi_ group
is stronger than the NEOM 1 group.
NEOM 3: NEO identified as resembling metallic meteorites and
corresponding to the M type asteroids. This is the group
with the strongest mechanical structure and similar
thermal characteristics.
This classification is not ideal and may need revision or
expansion. However, this appears to be the simplest startin9 point.
Note that if a NEO object is classified into one of the above
categories, it does not necessarily mean that it is homogeneous.
Indeed, a NEO might represent fus_ collision fragments from two
or more different type of asteroid-like bodies, thereby leaving a
macro-heterogeneous object which falls into two or _ore of the
above groups.
The NEO _steroid mitigation methods mission will take into account
interactions with objects from each of th6 four materials groups
which gives the fo].lowing interactions matrix:
N_M0 NEO_I
Surf HEZ__I_
Subsurf HEI'NE
Stand-off NE
Laser
Kinetic E
Th_-uster
The interactions matrix elements is meant to describe the
interaction of a given material type (NEOM) with an interactive
device, and does not take into account such parameters as the size
of the object or other gross material characteristics. Therefore,
each matrix element in the materials interaction group may have an
additional parameter associated with NEO size, thereby giving a
three dimensional matrix.
m
_gure1: Reflectance I ..-d_ .----_--____ '"_
spectra for olivine,
pyroxene, and iron- L / /_ ' _ //o_
nickel metal. Meteoritic _,0,
material consisting _ L0_ /_\ /_.X-/_'_'q i
of a mixture of these _ i__// ._f/_j/_
minerals would have a ,0
composite spectrum formed ;/
by the weighted integration
of these curves.To the left I
is a comparison of the <- 0!, ,!o ,!, _ ,,
reflectance spectrum of _,_
asteroids and meteorites.
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_ort of I_O _n___H_hoDs _De_dlx to Workshop 4,
I_Kator£al ProDsr_le_
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Brackenwood Path, St. James New York 11780
Detailed information on the possible range of NEO material
properties is critical to the successful application of NEO Defense
Options, the Systems Analysis evaluation, and the establishment
Program/Policy Options. Therefore, a strategy to mitigate the NEO
threat must be based on a comprehensive analysis of the NEO
material properties and their response to:
* Buried, surface burst, and stand-off nuclear explosives
* Kinetic-energy deflection and pulverization
* Laser deflection
Attached thrust deflection methods
The working group report of NEO Interception Workshop 4," Energy
Delivery/Materials Interaction" evaluated the above options.
The Materials Properties appendix briefly outlines additional
scientific and technical efforts on the likely NEO materials that
should be carried out in order to provide the best data possible,
given the current uncertainties in knowing the NEO composition.
Efforts should be directed towards:
i. The establishment of a high probability property database
(HPPD) for the range of NEO compositions and structures based
on asterold/meteorite analogs_ The HPPD should provide
information on the mechanical and thermal properties as well as
atomic compositions. Input to _he HPPD will be obtained by means
of a series of experiments on a set of meteorites which will
serve as analogs to the observed asteroid types from which a
portion of the NEO population is likely to have originated.
Other laboratory work is necessary to measure basic physical
properties of meteorites.
2. Development of detailed modeling of both the macro and
mlcro-structure response to thermal, mechanical, and nuclear
radiation alteration as encountered In a NEO response strategy.
q%is modeling should be based on experimentation and simulate
the NEO orbital (encounter) environment. The HPPD wi]] be
enhanced by such ex_erlments and i_,tegrated into the modeling.
3. q_he HPPD and modelln_ may be extended to (extinct) comet nuclei.
4. A satellite reconnaissance mission to remotely sample one or
more NEO objects should be carried out to test the model
ana]ogs.
We have already started to conduct research in the first two
categories.
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Some Notes o_, Telrestrial Blasting Design and NEe Interception
Richard Gertsch
Earth Mechanics Instltute
Colorado Schoel of Mines
Golden, CO 80401
These notes result from experience in terrestrial blasting
practice. They are very qualitative, llke terrestrial practice
which is dominated by trial and error.
The design of rock fragmentation with conventional explosives as
terrestrially practiced is controlled by two broad
considerations: powder factor and blast geometry.
Powder factor is the amount of energy (commonly measured as mass)
of explosive required to fragment a unit mass of rock. Geometry
determines how the energy is delivered in space and time.
Geometry has a profound lafluence on powder factor.
These considecatlons have implications for deflecting and
fragmenting asteroids. While unconventional point sources are
obviously orders of magnitude higher in energy than conventional
chemical explosives, there will be similarities in application.
Previous workshops have already incorporated the concept of
powder factor into the problem definition, although defined in
different terms.
POWDER FACTOR
The basic measure of explosive application is powder factor: the
amount of blasting agent required to fragment a unit mass of
rock. It is, more properly, the amount of energy dallvered to a
unit mass of rock (Morehard, 1987).
A common conventional powder factor measure is kg/t. To fragment
hard crystalline rock (e.g. basalt) into pieces smaller than
several meters requires a factor of about 0.03 to 0.5 kg/t.
Making several gross assumptions, a million t asteroid would need
50 to 500 t of conventional chemical agent or equivalent
unconventional agent.
Even I f this overly simp] If led analysis would work, It says
nothing about the geometry of applicatlon. Powder factor tells
how much explosive energy should be delivered, geometry tells how
that energy should be dell vexed.
it is interesting to note that powder factor as used Jn mining is
largely an economic measure. Since explosives cost money, a
great effort is made to reduce it and still maintain the required
(legree of fragmentation.
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BLAST GEOMETRY
In terrestrial blasting, poorly applied explosive energy can
result in uncontrolled fragmentation, which is particularly
undesirable in NEO interception. At least as bad is using more
sources than necessary because of poor application geometry.
Efficient blasting results from well designed blast geometry.
There are two related geometries to be discussed: space and
time. Both are the result of the concept of free face.
FREE FACE
The most inportant design factor in terrestrial explosives is the
free face, which is a rock face at some distance from the
explosive source (Figure I). In reflection theory, the explosive
charge initiates a compression wave. The wave hits and is
reflected from the face, in tension. The wave action causes
fragmentation at the f_ee face. Other theories such as gas
expansion, flexural rupture, nuclei, etc_, still require a free
race (Morehard, 1987; Langefors and K!hlstrom, 1978).
Consider two conditions without free face: If the source is too
deep, the shock wave is dissipated before it can transfer energy
to fragmentation at the free face. If the source is outside the
rock mass: little energy is transfered to the rock.
Fragmentation, conventional or othez_ise, requires a free face.
This necessity controls the geometry of the sources both in space
and time.
OPTIMAL ENERGY PLACEMENT: DELl ERY in SPACE and TIME
The ubiquitous terrestrial method used to place explosi" _s in
rock is to drill holes in the rock and load the holes with the
blasting agent (Figure 2). Each hole with its explosive is
designed to break a cylindrical column of rock. While a drill
emplacement for NEO is very unlikely, a look at mining practice
should be illustrative.
A single point source Js aimost always not a desirable
fragmentation geometry, ir_ general, fragmentation is improved by
diffusing the explosi_,e throughout the rock mass as milch as
practical . However, diffusion is probably more of a
consideration for low energy co_ventiona] chen,lca] agents
compared to h_gh energy u,_conventlonal ones.
Terrestrial drill hole placement is defined by burden, spacing,
hole depth, e×p]osive energy, and rock strength (Figure 2). The
holes are placed so that ove_ time each hole fragments rock using
the same locally optimum powder factor. Rock strength combined
with hole spaclng, burden, and dephh define the volume o[
breakable rock. Explosive energy and the rate o_' app]Icatlon of
that energy are controlled by the type of explosive.
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In Flgure 2, the drill holes are designed to be fired
sequentially in order to have each one break to a free face. The
exact pattern may vary, e.g. one hole at a time or each row at
once. The timing may also be varied in order to cause
interaction of the explosive columns; one fast firing method
detonates a hole when the shock wave from its predecessor
arrives. Within the free face principle, there are many
variations on firing methods.
Rock strength is an extremely difficult variable to quantlfys yet
it has the most influence on charge placement. The stronger the
rock, the higher the powder factor. But cracks or faults
profoundly change the fabric of the rock strength and can direct
the energy in unwanted ways, causing uncontrolled fragmentation
and energy waste.
As a minimum, the effect of very powerful point sources within
large rock masses Js unknown. The geometr_ - of explosive
application Is an important question. To fragment a body, Jt may
be far more effective to apply 100 hits of 100 kt than to apply
one hit of 10 Mr.
Deflections using mass ejected from _he object raise the same
questions. A series of smaller ej_ctlons could possibly out
perform one large one, while maintaining better control over the
object.
Deflection with stand-off shots may also be improved with point
source arrays. To ensure no rogue fragments hit the earth, a
stand-off plane of point sources may give better odds against
uncontrolled break-up than a large single source.
SHAPED CHARGES and ARRAYS
The concept of shaped charges is not new, but the concept of
shaped arrays is. A shaped charge directs energy through the
geometry of the blast. An early application was the antl-tank
rocket (bazooka) that employed a forward focused parabolic shape
to direct energy toward the tank armor.
it should be possible to direct the energy with an array cf
unconventional sources to enhance both deflection and
fragmentatlon. In deflection fo,_ example, a shaped array could
ensure that a rogue fragment, in the case of an uncontroled
break-up, will still be deflected away_ Similarly, several
fragmentation scenarios may be more tractable with shaped arrays.
SOME IMPLICATIONS for NEOs and UNCONVENTIONAL SOURCES
Object Rotation: The whole notion of delivery in space and tlme
is contradicted by rotating objects, t lmost all NEOs rotate.
How a.e point source arrays delivered to a _7otatJng ob]ect?
II_
Flying Gravel Pits and Other Nasty Surprises: It was established
at workshop 4 that some NEOs are completely unconsolidated. What
else is out there? How to deliver energy to such a body has not
been considered. In the terrestrial excavation business, the one
major unknown, the source of all problems, is the rock itself.
Given a six month warning scenario, a quickly delivered and gross
over-kill is the only solution.
The need for over-kill increases as the size of the body
increases. Large bodies are far more destructive, mechanically
less predictable, need far more energy application, and need,
consequently, far more overkill.
Timing and Fratricide: Point sources delivered in time need to
be far enough apart to prevent fratricide of the sources. In the
scale of space, the equivalent of a five second terrestrial
blasting round may last days.
Available Point Source Inventory: The available size
distribution inventory may dictate the point source array
delivery design. Are there other implications of the available
inventory?
Critical Size: There is an asteroid size threshold were a single
point source will sufficiently fragment the NEO. For NEOs larger
than this critical size, the blast design is critical.
CONCLUSIONS
Terrestrial experience tells us that, geometrically, large single
point explosions will probably be less useful than smaller
multiple patterned blasts. Our thinking should l,_clude arrays of
point sources.
Similarly, the number of devices and their total effective energy
t1T]nsfer will depend heavily on delivery geometry. Good point
source delivery geometry will lower the number necessary. The
time to begin the design of the delivery geometry is now.
Uncontrolled fragmentation, either during a deflection or a
fragmentation attempt, is the least desirable result of he
attempt. Blast design for either case must have the ability to
cou_teract it.
P_obably, the best defense is highly reasoned and well designed
overkill.
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AbS_rao__ Penetrator devices (PD) represent a robust technology
that may play a key role in NEO (or planetary probe) diagnostics
missions, initial NEO orbital adjustments, and dispersing secondary
threats originating from NEO fragments. The advantage of PDs is
location of the payload within the NEO body and thereby optimizing
coupling for analysis, momentum transfer, or pulverization. The
major disadvantage of some PDs is large mass, especially uranium
alloy penetrator cores, which can reduce the NE or IrE payload.
Metallurgical properties of uranium alloy penetrator are discussed
and some design requirements to faciliate the N}_O interception
mission are addressed.
I. Introduction
Penetrator devices (PD) may play a key role in modifying the NEO-
orbit by directly imparting momentum with or without a high energy
(HE) or nuclear energy (NE) explosive payload, depending on the
size, densityw mechanical structure, and the amount of orbital
change or pulverization desired. The PD can also be used as a NEO
or planetary and satellite probe in general. HE and NE payloads
are generally available and lend themselves to integration with the
penetrator system. The mission criteria for the penetrator will
likely require a design configuration based on a high strength
alloy and/or a depleted uranium alloy core or component with a hard
tip or insert to maintain structural integrity to facilitate the
optimum depth penetration by the (payload) inertial mass into the
NEO target. Designs not requiring a large inertial mass and the
associates weight penalty are more desirable. Whatever the eventual
design configuration, the ultimate goal is to achieve the optimal
depth penetration into the target in order to maximize the momentum
coupling and explosive yield directly to the NEO the NEO.
Advantages and factors to take into ccnsideration with respect to
the use of a PD include:
1. Xf there is a thick regolith and/or breccia like surface layer
which must be penetrated to deliver the HE or NE payload to the
main NEO body. The PD must be protected as much as possible
against deformation and fragmentation during the initial impac
even at at high velocity ( order of I or 2 km/s) by recessing
the tip and sheathing the (payload) core. The specific design
options _hpould be infl_lenced by the range of NEO target
materials and structure.
2. The amount of mom,,ntum transferred to the NEO target wlll depend
on the depth at which the HE or NE payload is detonated and thwe
structural integrity. Again, this will be a function of the NEO
material density, mechanical structure, and HE or NE yield.
187
3. If the purpose of the mission is to pulverize the NEO, the PD
should embed itself to optimize fragmenation and crater s_ze.
This implies that the buriel should be as near to the center of
mass as possible and still allow the shock wave to be reflected
from the free face in tension. The pulverization interaction can
take place during the primary NEO interaction with the use of
NE or can be used to neutralize secondary fragments from the
original NEO mass. the secondary interaction may rely only on
kinetic energy to ,_eutralize the fragments_
4. The PD may be able to overcome the barriers presented to HE or
NE emplacement by penetrating through regolith and outer strata
to achieve optimal emplacement for momentum transfer and/or
pulverization. Optimal application requires a knowledge of the
mechanical, geological, and dynamic properties of the NEO.
2. Depleted Uranium Alloy 8vste_
There has been a extensive amount of full scale testing and
engineering design to penetrate metal targets (az_or) and a range
of penetration depths as a function of velocity, mass, aspect
ratio, and tip configuration. Much data is available and can be
applied to the NEO problem. For instance, depleted uranium alloy
penetrator cores (PC's) have been extensively tested and used for
numerous missions. Several robust configurations of penetrator
cores are available with excellent aspect ratios for deep
penetration w_ ile delivering a high energy HE or NE payload at a
rapid spin rate and under extreme g (acceleration) levels.
a. PC technology can be adapted to be used with a high speed rocket
payload for use in either an (instrumented) diagnostic or
payload supporting interections mission.
b. HE or NE payloads for PC's are standardized and readily
available for NEO missions with a variety of equivalent TNT
yields.
c. Currently available combined penetrator core and HE
configurations cad penetrate 50 meters iDto tuff and several
meters into hard rock.
d. With modification PC technology can be adapted for use with a
variety NEO class objects.
However, depleted uranium alloy may not be the best choice for all
three of the possible PD missions.
review of the literature indicates there are some metallurgica_
issues that must be addressed _f the PC technology is to be applied
in the space environment and perform at temperatures as low as 150
to 200 K. A primary concern regarding the utilization of penetrator
cores with o[ without HE or NE pa _oads for the asteroid intercept
misslon is the ductile-brittle t_ _]sit_on temperature _f depleted
uranium alloy, such as U-0.8 wt% Ti, which exhibits a ductile to
brittle transition at abou_ 24] K (I°2.3_. It has been demonstrated
that tensile ductility of polycrystaiiine uranium decreases rapidly
with decreasing temperatures < .25 T. (306 K). The ultimate tensile
strength also decrease_ with decrease in temperature in this range.
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the impact energy vs temperature for U-0.8 wt% Ti is _hown in
figure i. The anticipated asteroid temperature range at impact is
(shaded) is below 50 C. The fracture of uranium alloys versus that
of iron-nlckel meteorites shown in figure 2 where the Charpy impact
energy as a function of temperature is plottedc on the same graph
a_ the charpy impact energies for three crystalline classes
(function of wt% Ni) of iron nickel metereorite. The PD yield
strength does not compare favorably to the iron at these low
temperatures. This indicates that unless precautions are taken, the
PD will fracture in a brittle manner upon impact with the NEO.
Other metallurgical factors that are of concern which will enter
into the model (depending on the mission) include the plastic flow
and strength of the uranium alloy, and fracture characteristics_
Sinze the strength of uranium and its alloys as well as other
candidates for the penetrator device are influenced by the crystal
structure as well as the point, planar, and volume defects, the
temperature and strain rate influence the various strengthening
mechanisms in different ways. Some strengthening mechanisms to
censider for PD's in general include:
I. Textural, strain, and solid solution hardening
2. Intermediate and high temperature hardening > 35 T_, where
T,= 1225 K is the absolute melting temperature of alpha uranium°
3. Grain and subgrain boundary hardening.
4. Precipitation and dispersion hardening.
5. Superplasticity of uranium and its alloys.
6. Utilization of composite materials.
7. Low temperature ductility.
4, Rocommemdstions for PeDe_zator TegJ!_o!o-47
Table 1 shows the ductile-brittle t_ansition characteristics of U-
0.75 wt% Ti pentrator cores. This data indicates that the impact
energy required to cause fracture is a function of temperature,
being extremely brittle at -54 C. To effectively carry out the NEO-
Asteroid mission, this brittle behavior must be supressed before
impact. The impact energy required to cause fracture appeared to
be insensitve to microstructural and hardness variations.
Therefore, modifications to the penetrator core design should be
analysed principally to overcome the effects of the high dlctil-
to-brittle transition temperature. A possible solutions is the
complete heating of the PC to at least 300 C prior to NEO impact.
219 3.3
296 5.0
347 6.4
373 6.5
47] 12.7
500 18.3
TJ_Z!9__II Ductile to brittle transition of U-0.75 %t% Ti
2 Penetrator Cores
5, B_Ima_r_
An optimally buried NE will eject a considerably larger amount of
mass from a crater and thereby provide the opportunity to optimize
the momentum coupling effect necessa_, to adjust the NEO orbit
which cannot be achieved with either a surface or stand-off NE.
Also, the penetrator device may overcome boundary discontinuities
of the NEO such as regoiith layering or other inhomqeneous effects.
Information regarding these inhomogeneitles _nd other physical
characteristics may be obtained from a precursor penetrato_ mission
which can provide diagnostic information on NEO geology, macro-
structure, and other dynamic characteristics. Another advantage of
the penetratcr with a NE payload is the ability to provide a highly
efficient destruction of the original NEO or one of the larger
fragments by pulverization, if that is deemed necessary. The
penetrator may be able to place the NE close to th_ center of mass
and interact with as much material as possible.
A drawback of the PD is the large increase in mass to the
interceptor payload that might otherwise be used to transport NE.
This is especially serious in the case of the U alloy PC which also
have the added problem of brittleness at temperatures typical of
NEO orbits. On the other hand, if a lightweight terrain penetrator
can be dev61oped that is ductile in the NEO orbital interaction
environment, the NEO penetrator device may provide an optimal
solution for orbital adjustment, pulverization, or a diagnostic
interception.
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NEO Interaction with X-Ray and Neutron Radiation
P. Hammeriing and J.L. Remo
Quantametrics, St. James, N.Y. 11780
INTRODUCTION
One potential approach to dealing wixh a large near-Earth-objects(NEO'S) on a
collision course with the Earth 1 is to attempt to alter their orbits by means of radiation
induced momentum transfer produced by the surface blow-off from stand-off nuclear
bursts. This effect will depend primarily on the NEO composition via the atomic cross-
se_ion_, and is therefore partic,.Jlady advantageous in mitigating uncertainties
associate _ _' "'_' _: _ observational characterization of NEO'S. Reflection spectra and
radar refl,_ :__i:.y ,ate at best provide limited information on material composition, and
current i_lfon,,_:ion on matedal compositions makes it d_fficult to establisll meteorite/
asteroid analogs. Another advantage of using nuclear irradiation to deliver the
specific impu!se is that it could first be used to provide a diagnostic of the NEO size
and composition and then subsequently be used via a sequence of repetitive
intera_ t_ons to impart precision orbital adjustments to the NEO. At each step in the
nuclear burst sequence the NEO surface will "be "fire-polished" thereby setting the
stage for a penetrator device or surface detonation if it should appear desirable. The
blow-off and "fire-polish can also mitigate other physical characteristics such as
regolith layers, past fragmentation history, shape, center of mass, and structural
integrity, which present various levels of uncertainty to a surface nuclear explosion or
per;etration device.
It is therefore reasonable to sugest that nuclear irradiation in the form of X-rays and
neutrons will provide, via ablation induced momentum transfer, a means to adjust the
NFO orbit sequentially The interaction cross-.se_lions wil; vary between those
appr,)pna.[e to silicate and metallic(FeNi) values with a density range from 2 to 7.8
gm/cn, _ However, if the NEO resembles an extinct comet head the density may be 1
gm/c,_F j or less and the use of stand-off nuclear irradiation may be prob!ematic<-_l The
NEO is expected to range in size up to several kilometers
We present below some order of magnitude estimates to help evaluate th.
concept ;he estimates are intended to provide a guide to the problem and are not to
be considered a substitute for more elaborate computer simulations
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lANALYSIS
The specific impulse(momentum per unit area), I, imparted by ab!ation due to x-
ray or neutron absorption is found by integrating the differential relationship:
where
(2i v_ / 2 = _: -_:,
p is the density, E and Cv are the incident energy per unit mass and vaporization
energy per unit mass respectively, and dx is the radial differential to the NEO surface.
is related to the fhJence F, and the opacity, I- , by
(3) _ = I_F
Therefore"
X w
(4) I=
O
Additionaily, it is assumed that the fluence varies with the penetration depth according
to
(5) F = Fo exp(-pl.ux / cos ¢)
where _ =0 is normal to tile surface
For simplicity w_ take the obliquity fa_lor to be unity and ignore the temperature
vadatioq of the opacity.
bsing the scaled variables
(6)
F_ = Fo /F,_
F,,,,_ :: % / p.
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The evaporationdepth, X, inthe integralisgiven by'
(7) X, = (1! Pt_)lnF_
With this forth, the integrai can be readily evaluated:
(8) i°= 2 q';2{'_/Fo- 1 "- t_n-' [_ - 1]}
which should be compared to the resuli' quoted in the APS study 2, re-expressed in the
same non-dimensiona quantities as above
(9)
If. instead of an exponentially decreasing absoq_tion one used a constant
absorption modei up to X, and zero thereafter, the above calculation gives
These and other similar models also have been discussed by Lawrence 3. In the
asymptotic regime, F_,>> 1, and, using Equation 6
(11) = .42Fo,-_i
f,
=
exponential absorption
constant absorption
APS form
tt is seen that the results are relativel_ insensilive to the rnodel used, ar_i ;_ven to
&oproximations.
I is usually measured in taps (gm/cm-sec).
Assuming a nuclear device with its entire yield in x-rays or neu!. Gns explodes at
a distanoe L from the NEO's sudac_, the resulting ftuenoe is
Fo:Y/L _=4.2x10_(YIL_) J/cm_
whore the yield,Y, Isexpressed inMT end L inkin. If I: ckenotesthe "bum_time" of
the explosionthen the !ntens_, ],is,with I:inunitsof IOILS,
1= 4.2xl 0"(Y / L'_)W/¢m'.
X-RAY FLUX
We f_rstwil!applythe above to ablation by x-rays,TyplcaieyforI keY x-raysthe
opadties lieinthe range
(13) 1 0 3 < _ _ 10' cm 2 / gm
and the vaporization energy:
(14) 10' <-_, <-10' JJgm
so that i0-' <_F,,_<_10 J/cm _
For example witha I MT yieldexpl_-ded at a distanceof 1 km and taking
I_ = 10' crn2 / gm and ¢, = 10' J / gm, F_ = 4.2xl 0', and I = 5.8x10' taps,
assuming e_ ix_nential absorption of the x-rays.
Let us compare this baseline result to some spe¢_ _ls. For silica, using
mass averages of the rebuked data, I = t3xl0 6 tapsat 1 keV and a._older of
magnitude higher at 10 keV. For iron, i = 6.5xl0'tap6 at 1 key and ! = 4.Txl05taps
for 10 keV x-rays. We see the senc_t_v_tyt_ the spe_rum of x-rays in'adi_.ing the NEO.
We c',can_i._o make contact with studies of x-ray driven ablation in the context of
the ine,,'tiai confinement fusion (ICF) program. This can be ck_neby u_ng the results
of Murakami and Meyer-ler-Vohn 4 for the mass e_:Aationdue to soft x-ray absorp_on:
(t 5) m, _ t°'_rn_m / ctmz
and the ablatior_ pressure
(t6) P. (Mbar) - 4.01°_ I _o,o
I_._
In the 3hove, time is measured in units of 10ns and the intensity in units of
1 0'" W / cm 2. The specific impulse is related to the ablation velocity, v., and the
ablated mass by:
(17) t = ra.v.
The ablation velocity is related in turn to the ablation pressure and mass ablation rate
by:
(!8) v. = P, / (dm, / dt)
Combining Eqns. (15)-(18) results in an expression for the specific impulse:
(19) i= [m,/(dm, /dt)]P.
(20) ! ---4.7xl 05 l°'t °_ taps
= 2.3xl 0 s taps for a 1 MT burs1 at I km.
The simulations on whk:h, the above results are based used a 20 frequency group
Planc_Jan .,_eclrum, tabuiated equations of state (SESAME) and tabui_.ted opa¢_es
assuming LTE(Iocat therr_namic equilibrium). The radiation temperature
corresponded to the absorb_ flux,
It should be noted that if the x-nay intens_ is too high, a supersonic heating
wave rather than an ablative heating w_ve may result. The breakpoint i_ in the region
of 10"_-10"W/cm _.
Estimates based oil these order of magnitude calculations or numeric, al
simulations require more detailed kno-_edge of the composition, opacities, and
equations of st-3te for typical NEOS as well as the correcl spectral profile of the x-
radiatior_
NEUT RON IRRADIATION
We now consider the effecl of ar_ intense flux of -14Mev neutrons.The neutron
cross sedion, Q, is aboL_t a barn for all elements of interest tl_nce the mean floe path.
I=(1/NQ),Is, assuming an average solid density, N= 5X1022 crr1-3, !=20 cm, or
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an opacity, # --- 0.01crn _ /gm, on using an average density ot 5gin/cm 3. Again
using a vaporization energy of 10,000 J/grn, we see that F*<i for Y=IMT and L.=I km.
Putting in the exact numbers for iron, which is worst case from this point of view,
F*=0.7, hence for neutrons, due to their deeper penetration depth, the fluence must be
increased, for example, using Y=10MT, L=0.5km., we have for iron using the above
expressions, I_- 2.6xl 0k taps (expenential deposition) and i = 1.8xi 08 taps (uniform
deposition).
DISCUSSION
What spastic impulse is required to deflect the NEO'! This depends on its size
and orbital parameters. The required velocity change, Av, has been calculated for a
vadety of Earth-crossing asteroids in the Snowiness reporl 5 and range from
centimeters to hundreds o; centimeters per second. The specific impulse can be
estimated from the expression:
(21) I=m Av
where m is the areal mass density of the asteroid, m ~ lP( R/3 ) where R is the asteroid
radius.. For 13= 5gm / cm "_,
(221 2X10' _<_m_<.2xl0Sgm/cm 2
where the lower and upper bounds correspond to R=lOOm and R=lkm respectively.
For velocity increments !nth_ ra_.ge
t < A v <200 cmJsec
the necessary spe_fic impulse to produce such deflection velocities lies within the
range:
2x10' _1<4x10 _ taps _.£=l_X) m)
2xlO:" <_!__. 4x10' taps (R=1_,m)
We see th_,t by a judicious comlL _ation of x-rays and neutrons from a
thermonuclear device one should be able to achieve the desired Av's. The time delay
between the tim,9 of amval of the x-rays and the neutrons is around f5-16 I,tsac/km
yielding a 2-stage specific impulse. Since even with a neutron enhanc _,] device there
will be copious x-rays the effect of the tra,nsient x-ray precursor needs more study
With lower yields than those required to define, one could "fire polish" and prepare the
surface, by removing surfa_ rego!ith, for subs, ug,Jent penetration devices. The blow-
off vapor also could be analyzed to help deduce the corr,posilion of an asteroid. In any
event the above simple considerations indicate that more comp!ete simulations are
worth making in order to better quantify the conclusions.
1'_?.
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Abstract The non-catastrophi: NEO-Asteroid orbital management by
explosive impulse thrusters such as a penetrator device with a HE
or NE payload is considered. Computations estimating the amount of
energy required to achieve desired orbital adjustment (velocity
change) for asteroid radii from i0 m to I0 km and densities from
2200 to S000 kg/m 3 are carried out for the case where the asteroid
orbital velocity is 30 km/s. Computational results are presented
from thcee independent analytic methods; Crater Ejection
Characteristics (CEC) 0 2) Kinetic Energy Transfer (KET), and 3)
Impulsive Momentum Transfer (IMT). Range of validity and limitaions
of each method are discussed with special emphasis on how the
inferred material properties data from meteorlte/asteroid analogs
of the NEO affect the mechanical properties. Within the defined
ranges of validity, the three independent computational methods are
found to yield consistent results. These computations cap serve as
a basis for more detailed analysis utilizing the equations of state
for the three phases ass, elated either HE or NE explosions; the
coupling, hydrodynamic, and non-hydrodynamic regimes.
I. Xnt;oductlon
To safely d_al with a massive (106 kg or more) near-earth object
(NEO) whose orbit brings it on a probable collisLon courses with
Earth, it is necessary to either pulverize it into harmless
fragments of much smaller size, which upon entry, i_,to the Earth's
atmosphere are likely to be cons[_med by ablation; or adjust its
orbit sufficientl_ that thele is no longer a threat to the Earth_
It Js the purpos_ of thi:_ communication to describe a means of
achieving the [_tter through the use of an impuls_ ve force
generated by e_plosive charges detonated below the surface of the
NEO within a boreho]e ._ crater formed by _ penet_ator reD'tie, l'he
total tl_rust levels -qui__ed to ._;uccess_ully alter the NEO
(asteroid) orbit may L cbieve(_ by carrying out one or more high
energy explosi%e (HE) _ ni/clear explosive (NE) events. Since the
encounter ve:locity coulu range from one to several km/_, a wide
range of peDetration phenomena will be confronted. At very hlgh
velocity encounl-ers it may _Iso be necessary to consider,
depen,_ing on the mass *f the NEO, the initial tIansfer of kinetic
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energy in addition to the explosive thrust of the HE or NE payload
yield. However_ it our purpose to concentrate on the dynamics of
a penetrator device (PD) delivering a HE or NE payload to a depth
within the NEO body and estimating the momentum transfer to the
NEO from the buried HE or NE. From the beginning, we realize that
these results will strongly depend on both the mass and material
properties of the NEO, the pentration depth and the yield of the
explosive device. _ur approach is analytical, using methods similarto those o_ Sedov ( ) and Ze!dovich and Raizer (_). Crater scales have
been adopted from Teller et al. (3)
2. The Dynamics of the Problem
There ar _ several possible approachcs to NEO asteroid orbital
managemez_n which will leave the main asteroid mass intact and non
threatening to the Earth° Examples of such methods include
* X-ray (nuclear) generated surface material blow-off.
* Very high energy laser radiation pressure or photo-ablation.
* Stand-off or high energy surface explosions with HE or NE.
* Very high velocity PD's.
* Thruster devices.
PD's with HE or NE sub-surface detonation.
While the above approaches to NEO (asteroid) orbital management
have both advantages and disadvantages, any approach will strongly
depend on the range of material and physical properties of the NEO
including densities, st_ictures, chemical composition, mixtures,
as well as regolith associatlons which will allow little "a priori"
certainty. Given the uncertainties we choose the last method, POs
with a HE or NE payload and compute momentum coupling within the
constraints of current technology and the level of uncertainty that
is likely to encountered by the internal and external structure of
the _EO <_]. This approach which enhances momentum coupling allows a
latitude of response and may mitigate risks associated with
asteroid identification and surface characterizations that can
complicate the application of other methods. Furthermore, this
app,.oach has the aesirable featnre_ through repetitive application
of highly reliable and robust modular units (see Penet_ator
Mat_iaJs Properties), of providing a means t_ control the asteroid
orbit in a predictable way that may present the optional capability
of captnring NEO's into an Farth or Moon orbit for utilization as
_ resour<i_e. We present an initial set of computational result_
b&:;ed o;_ the a_plic_tion o_ H_ or NE with PDs.
The dynamic problem involves a ['D vehicle ,-:hic;l can penetrate a
predetermined distance into the body of a NEO {asteroid), at which
point ,_]HE or N_] i_; detonated. The high pressures and temperat'_Ires
at the burst, depth are communicated to the solid material around
the crater. Some high velocity gas will vent back through the
penetrator bore hole, follo_ed by a massive ejectio1: of mo!tel_ and
fraqmented target material. The e_}ecta momentum from the
accelerated escapl_Ig ga'_ will pl-ovide an impul:;e to the NEO
to p_l-ttl._!) i%s, motion J,nto the desired orbit. The absence of an
atmosphe_'e makes it preferable that the explosive release of energy
be carried out below the surface while the reduced gravity
relegates the iithostatic pressure field to a diminished level of
importance. The two factors of atmospheric and gravity effects are
generally of importance for planetary scale impac_ or explosion
events which are the source of most present data,
3. Composition of tho _O iAsteroid} Material
The nature of the NEO-asteroid material, its strength arid
ther]nodynamic characteristics (¢), are, as in planeta_j studies_ of
considerable significance in determining the performance of the
penetrator/thlrester HE/NE system. An additional factor is the
relatively small mass of the asteroids which will limit the amount
of impact energy and HE that can be used to adjust its orbit.
This is especially true for NEO objects that do not fit our
idealized preconceptions, i.e. burnt out comet heads, rock
co_!ections, etc. Composition of the NEO-Asteroids, based on
laborat_lq_ aneiysis of meteorites, may range from relatively soft
and friable carbonaceous objects ( density _200 kg/m 3 ), to
stronger stony objects ( density 3500 kg/m ), and to very _ard
and structurally strong iron-nickel bodies (density 8000 Kg/m ).
Comet material is thought to have a density of about i000 kg/m but
may be 50% more or less. Such an object presents problems
particular to the application of PD technology. There is less
dispersion in the heat of va_rization for the different types of
asteroid which, based on meteorite analogs, will vary from 6 x 10 I°
ergs/gm for stony meteo.ites to 6.4 x I0 erg/gm for the iron
meteorites _5)
It is possible that the NEO asteroid encountered may be composed
of two or more meteorite types (eg. stony-iron) or may be coated
with massive regolith. Such large scale inhomgene_ties or surface
irregularities are likely to cause coupling problems to the bulk
of the NEO mass from stand-off HE or NE. However, a th_st
penetr_:tor, if embedded deeply enough, may overcome this problem.
While only the larger NEO-Asteroid bodies_ (radius = 1 k_ with mass
I_._: to 33_5 x _01rkg) pose a serious global threat to the earth,
smal _er iron-nickel mete,rites can pose a serious local threat. A
i k_ crater, Meteor Crater, Arizona, is considered to have been
causc_ by an iro_-nJckel object (meteorite) about 50 m in size <_.
The _{:.-:hanic_i _:qd thet_odynamic properties o_ the asteroid will
_tfe._:t the penetrator design characteristics if we wish [o er,sur_e
appropriate crater depth and shape without produci|]g ul_des_i[e_!
l_rge scale fraqmentatioo of NF.O asterold fragments. The mass of
the asteroid will[ determine the amount of energy required to adjust
the orbit.. However, the amount cf energy carried by each payload
in the delivery sequence will depend on the inferred structur_]
characteristics so that a catastrophic failure of the entire mass
can be avoided while still achievlnq the orbital adjustment qoals.
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The targeting of a penetratoF with a HE payload must be accurately
achieved in order to minimige spinning and/or chipping which will
not only affect the orbital, adjustment but _Iso create difficulties
for additional targeting. Perhaps a precursor interaction (X-ra_
or neutron radiation(7), remote laser sensing or modified PD with a
NE) can 9"dide the final tal°geting parameters. All of the above
factors will be influential in determining the type and yield o[
the explosive device used to produce the desired impulse by the
ejection of bore hole material from the cratering event.
In order to achieve the required orbital adjustments the necessa_-_,
energy yield and placement required to produce the velocity change
must be determined. Three methods are outlined and used to provide
computational results to estimate the energy requirements.
A. Crater E_Jecte Charscteristlcs Lq_CI." This approacI_ treats the
penetrator and HE or NE a_ thrust device. A mass of material is
ejected and its momentum, is related to the energy yield and
charge placement, if one can estimate the effective exit
velocity of the target material generated from the crater cavity
originating from the explosive device, the effectlve velocity
change of an asteroid of _ given mass can be determined. This
method will give reliable results when _:he ejecta m_ss is much
less than the asteroid mass. Fi_fe I shows the relationship
between the energy yields as a function of exp],_sive yields in
equivalent kT of TNT and the effective velocity (m/s) for a
variety of NEO (asteroid) size_ and for densities of i000, 3500,
and 7500 kg/m_ Ejecta velocities are strongly dependent on the
target density and scale depth (2_,
B. Zinetic E_ __rq]£_Transfer I_K_T_L_, This method utilizes the change
in _inetic ,nergy in conjunction with _stlmates ef energy
par ition resuiting from the HE or nuclear charge. This method
is ,_ighly dependent on the amount of heat, compression wox'k, and
shock wave effects within the asteroid body and will therefot-e
be highly dependent on the asteroid material Droperties. Compu-
tational Fesu!ts of the energy _equirements tot a range of
asteroid sizes and compositions will depend oD the equation ef
state (EOS), density, mehanicai structure, defect_ and inhomgen-
eities. Obtaining values for the F_:T model to a_ree with the CEC
& IMT (below) mc_eis depends on *:he material parameters chosen.
C_. •_mp___l__!K@_Mom_ontulR Tr__an___O_r_.l_tM/_.__)-From the explosion o_ a
chat-go at a given depth an im_ul'__ive force i.; 9enerat,::d in_-_t,_n-
taneou_;"y, g_vinq r_.qe to the s_Ibs_quent shock _n(J ejeL't_
proce_ses. The _.ota! impulse is then determined fro:_ the
p_essulTe pl:o[ile of the shock 'wave. This approach exp_,o[ts the
conditions behind tt_e ,<;hock wave, expanOing through, the
materia] as a rcs_llt of ,_ su[-f_ce or burled explos_or_ <_)
Advantages of this technique is that the computational method
is Inherently accurate and there i5 a sufficient amou;_t ot
shock data available to pvovide reliable comp_Itationa] re._{_ults.
The results obta._ed I!rom this method _,_-e analytically
equiv,_icr.t to those obtain_:d from the EC model.
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Figures 2, 3, and 4 show NEO velocity increments for effective
ejecta velocities of 30_ I00, _nd 300 m/s plotted _s a function of
radius for explosive yields of .01, ], i0, I0_; 1,000, and i0,000
}¢T of TNT. The target density }s 3500 kg/m _ and the scale depth is
!0m/KT I/3"4 In figure _ the I!)0 m/s ejecta exhaust velocity is
plotted as a dotted line to indicate the greater effectiveness of
higher ejecta velocity (I00 m/s vs. 30 m/s) in transferring
momentum. Similarly, in figure 3 the 300 m/s is plotted as a dotted
!iDe and the original ejecta velccity of 30 km/s is referenced by
notches at the top of the abci_sa° Figure 4 shows the NEO asteroid
velocity increment for an effecti.ve ejecta exhaust velocity of 300
m/s. Figure 5 is similar to fi_plre 3 except that the scaled depth
is now 20 m/KT (_/3_'. The I0 m/KT 1113"_ for ejecta velocity I00 m/s is
plotted as a dotted line. These figures show the strong effect of
NEO material properties and ,+_cale depth on the ejecta exhaust
velocity whio.h directly af.fects the momentum transfer to the NEO
the velocity chanqe. All of three of the above methods estimate the
amount of energy necessary to modify the asteroid orbit. Depending
en the asteroid size, density,, orbital velocity, and desired
velocity change, the requisite energy can range from 101° to I0 ;6
joules. This is a large range of energy demands for this mission,
even if the most likely scenarios are cohfined to an enerqy range
from I 0 I_ to I015 jo'.lies. ,._u<.)"_ _ large, amounts of energy should
probabiy not be cont,,_ined with.ii a single device. To effectively
take into account thi,.t energy range it would be prudent to give the
mission greater vers0tilJty_ reliabikity, and minimizing of risk
i[ a standard module Dr umit can b_ used repetitively.
One must realize that these numbers are only based on idealizations
which are not the lesult of detailed modeling taking material
properties into accolmt. Such modeling will be corried out in the
future only after a better understanding of the physical properties
of the asteroid/ comet/ meteorite ana].¢_s is achieved. Nonetheless,
it is significant t|'at two i_dependent theoretical approaches to
the same problem yield the same analytical expressions and _re
consistent with %he third approach over the same parametric range.
These results ind[,:ate that the pentrator/thr ..ster ne;;hanism can
effectively "mtr,_uce minor velocity _d+!.u_tments to the orbital
t+,-a]ectory o_- a NE<) such that it _-ill avoid a c:oilJ_;io_ wi_.h the
E_-th _tnd oven"come many ma;',y of the di. ffkcu[ties a._s;o:_i<_t_-+d w_.th
_;ode[ing mo_?ent_m tt'an_.:fer to NEO nst.eroids (summer_z.e(; in the
Ap_)endix. Therefore, penet[4tor devices with HF: or NFI payloads; cat_
]. Provid_r_q _eve_al ;_mallec unit _odulet: that can effect: a
continual orbi+.al adju_;tmep.t.
Z. By carefully ]gcatinq the Pb impact point and calibrating the
depth add HE o|[ NE payload, the probability of catantrophlc
damaqe re the qE¢] will be limited. This will also sol-re to
mexim_ze _he mgmentum imparted tt, the NEO without cau._;ing a
ca_.._ot.roph_c dis:ruption.
3. The PD can avoid uselessly dissipating its energy on (surface)
%_egolith and breccia by boring into th_ NEO main mass (if it
exists), and thereby minimize the effects of the NEe surface
material 3iscontiruities near the surface
4. From an analysis of the asteroid's inferred composition and
dynamic characteristics, scaled depth, the critical amount of
energy _o modify the orbit can be computed.
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I. Inhomgeneity in both the large scale structure (cl_stalline
reservoirs) and the small scale structere (inclusions in
otherwise bomgeneou_ phases).
2. A very wide range of possible densities (0.5 to 7°_ gm/cm 3)
3. A very wide range of structural strength;
a) single cry_tai of FeNi
b) silicate i,_clusic',ns in FeNi
c) igneous stone
d) metamorphic stone
c) calbonaceous stone
d) a collection ,,f r ejol itb without [:tructu_al ir;tegrity
e_ large st.]r_y or metallic boulders io<)aely bound or orbiting
one another.
f) a col lectlon of sandy grains and dusty mdteli;_l loosely
q) a bur_t out comet nuc]eus
i_) an ice or re,thane ball with a stone or iro:i core
i) a m!xtu_e uf any )f the above
j) &omethinq different
4. A layered material that may nat reveal NEO major composition
5. A ,_as._ with disc_ntinuities that w;'_l spall off large fragments
6. Obtaining the correct scale depth.
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4. AVAILABLE VEHICLES AND PAYLOADS
Workshop Summary
TAe vehicles and plyloads working group identified three types of missions which could be
designed to deal _th potentially threatening NEOI ot to Imrform survey mignons to better
¢harsct_rL_ t_e NEO poptdsLion. The first type of mission is a r_onnaisgance prtcursor
tudn_ lightweight interceptor oomponents and launch v_hicles. The second type of mission
would be designed tc divert or fragment an asteroid of any size at ample distanees frcm the
F_rt_. A subset ofth,, type of miuion would _k to destroy large objects when the warning
time it shorL
4.1 M_lon Type L" Pr_u_or Miuion.
Early re_m,d.uar_ prob,_ go a va_ety of near.F.ar_ o_d_ to eAomc_¢,-_, a_r diL_-a_ry
_,-z r, ad/2y fens/hi, and/_My desirabi,. _tau_ of the wide vm ety of _ch objects, it is
reasonable that at |east 10 to 20 mis,dons would be rt_tmred to bqon to ©hamcterize details
of N_O physi_M and e_emie_! ¢_mposition. To be affor_ble, retch missions should be low
¢o_t_ which t_qO[est* small tightw_ght ;pacecnff_ and htmeh v_Aclet.
The L_rtm_ra of LM_r,_ has d, tadomd a mambtr _ Uaha_h, uc_s which can be
used for this tyro of mission. The mu_tabilit_ of tl_ _w t_eh_ t_hicl, s for vahmble
zp_ s_i,n_ was eo_firmed by a jo_rd NABA/I)OD workshop oonduettd in 1991 with
lkqtrt_ig)ation from both the NASA Offa_ ofSpsee :gek¢_ _d Al)p_ns and the Office of
Atnmata/er., K.t'_k'.eat/oa, and T_. 8m_ll lightweght _ceert_t s_n_n_, computers.
and p_ opulsion systems offer the p_u_biilty of capa_, _ within a m_lest mass and
volume envelope. If the existing Loch_ol ,;es are not dir_.ly tudtable for sn _sLero_d
mist/on, the components ¢,m be modified and ,_-.kag_i to m_t the nsech of the scientific
community. It has _ thown by l_ OD and NA_k that such probes _m l_rform a flyby or
rendezvous to a near-Ear_ uteroid at distances f_m the Earth letm Sham 0.2 AU in less
than three years from program initiation at • o_tt of k_ ti_t $70M _mch.
Flybys of NEOs can. in many ¢_ums, be done at relatively low specific energy (C_ < 5 k,_;/, t)
trod sho_ flight times (of the order of a few months). Communication distances sre also
modest by planetary mission standardm. Rendezvous mismons are mo_ difficult, involving C_
ranging from 18 to I00 kmi/s _ and substantial total tp_ &V ranging _om 4 to 7 km/s
after injection into low-Earth orbit. Ktnges will _ortmdly be lees t_an 0.2 AU for r_ut_ne
exploration, but if a thr_tening at#_roid is being in_amtig_ted, minions might exceed 2 AU.
These larger and more comple= missions may or may .not be s pa_ of Type I. A poss_le
Type, I scenario might involve several flyby missions of a variety of bodies and one
rendervous with a body offering the be_t compromise of_ of access _md tmientific inte_e_t_
The rend_us mission, which c_ptu_lly mi_t include a landi_ at _t_ final phase, could
provide a me_zure of "_trmmd truflC for _e flybys as we_ _ det_dl_ _mta o_ one NEO.
Use of rmall spacecrt_ e_,eci_Jly for low departure _ner_" flyby mi_ions, opens up the
optionof_tshtgs variety_fsmellier_nd i_ _xpen_i_ launch _hiel_s (cg.,Pegasus, Scout,
and derivatives of the Minuteman II and U! strategic mistier). The Peacekeeper missile it
a]tm an option; but. it is in. a sub_Lantially higher payload cttegoD" (potat_.ly for rendezvous
missions). Another optionwhich should not be ignored isto launch probes as _condsry
payloads on a largehunchar, e4.,Titan III/IY or Arian¢ hmachod forother purpo_.s. By
ridingalong with a later payloadwbbch aright, pay most of the co_t, a _idetoa t_o_Lionsry
t_anm'erorbitmight be h_d at modest cost.The propulsionrequirements to go from t.his
highlyellipticMcrt_t to Earth escape are modest. Tbe disadwnt_ge is _st the spacecraft
may have to wait in thisorbitfor weeks untilthe orbitproc_ue_ intothe proper l_tition
r_Ltti_ to the departure as ,mptote, whirr, may raisei_sues such as cryogenic_',_e_sLo_ge
and frequent traver_l oCthe Vtm Klisn belt_.
?t)?
Another payload-enhancingoptionis lunar t_ingby. At low-cleperta_energy,flybyofthe
Moon can be quiteeffec_veinin_g departure energy,thu_ allowingincreasedpayload
for a given la_mcb vehic_,e.A mpacecrsR latmched at Cs = 0 or slightlyless,couldhave its
energyenhanced tos positiveC_,c_mparab|e wi_ some NEe missions:by thismeans, thas
enablingan otherwi_ _! l_unchorp_vi&ng weightgrowth m_gin.
Type IImislionsare s_sutnedtobe activeeffortsto divertor fragment potentialimpacting
NEOs. In the caseofa very largebody which isdetectedwellahead oftime,the strategy
would probably be toattempt to change the orbitsufficientlytoenlt_e a mite. A few em/_
velocity, precisely appliedto the :NTr.X),would be r_rc_L _ w_uld probably occur with a
flightprofilelongerthan ayear,end couldbe done by using one _rseveralnuclearexplosives
engaging atthe appropriatepointinthe orbit.To shame the reqlfired,_reci_ion.the e,errier
spaceet_ would idea|lyrendezvous with t_he asteroid. Ur.favorable rende_ous
opportunities° however,rai_htrequireexc_uive _V, so a fastinterceptmight be n_'eu_'y,
with precise :_x_jectory ¢_rr_ction_ in the terminal phase to _m_r_ that the detos_t;._
imparts the requi_vd momtntum eha_gt. In cues requiring ts_ muele_z _e',_ _ _.-_,
spacecraR would be,required,up to an including the Tit_ rV or _e._. =_.-._T_ 4-_
n'ud_z_payloadweight.
_ _÷_'_ _,_overed Latewould require
btuncher_having pay|oad_:'_._'_. ;,_ t_,e _ fre_ Tita_ HI through _ to _hieve
both high ve_._ty end high nuclem y;.._d.
Other emerging technolot_vpoteil_litiesforType H NF.,Oflyby_degvousfmtzrc_t missions
were corsidered,usmg advanced propulsion _yat_ms sucE as nuclear and el_:ric (see
Chapter 6) N_clear rocket_willhave _ecific impu_e (I_p)approrimat_ly twi_ chemi_l
rocketcapability,with • feb'totof2 to 5 incre_e in btxrnlifeand thr,u_t.Trip time _qn be
decreasedapprexin_tte_y_0 per_nt_ togethe7with highlydesirablemcyt_Jteinthe intercept
dist_acefrom Earth. State,f-the-artnuclearpropud-ion devices _e currently4 to 5 year_
f_m initts]oporation_dca_R_lity.
4_ Mission Ty_e [II: D_trw_ L_w_e [_ami_ Ob_t on Sheet Notice
Altho_d_ large,str_._c r_i_siles(e.g., Minuteman II_lll _d Pea_ek_per) offerpoten_ia_ for
conversiontospacelaunch_there isno launch re_l>Ons_that h_ a h_t_hprobabilityof,tou'Jest,
and evacuation from in:p_ctareas may he the only respond. For purpost_ of disc_:s_ion,
however, the working group did followa "what if" lineof thought r_lativnto converting
_xb_tingstrategicballi,_icn,_is_il,_tospace launc_,ers.There _re t number r,f constraints.
Th_ m_uiles are designt_lfora 5,000to 10,000-milerange over the surfaceo_the F_rth. In
ordert_ achievelow-Earthorbit(I_0), some reductionin payload would be required.The
a_our,t of r_duction depends upon exact propellant and st_q_ing _rr_ngements. Such
mi_iles may alsobenefitfrom sul_titutionofhigher performance upper tq,._ges. Table 4t-2
shows payload capabilitytoI_;O fora largenumber ofvehicles,includingMinut_ntan If/Ill
and Peacek_eV_r.The guidance systems employed inthe _issilesuzuJtlly bare much hicher
Pay_md _e_
Weight Y_kJ
50 10
IO0 100
1,000 _.000
2O,0OO 100,000
_,d .z_hez__. T_ $_ _r_ ,Inuwt i_d tba® would be sufficient for mcpedited developmmt,
_ _ _r i_in_ t lower limit for newly medified hardware. _nch more _tduttian it
ue_Cl_ t_ _ _ can be da_ _th avail_e lan.nch_ (_'u:lwide) to identify t_
;'.[.)4
Table 4t-_ IAuneh vehicle l_yload weisht_
l__su,_:_ Yeh_t LEO
2 P_zm.m ll_
3 _ (Era,.. :37.7)
4 Peg,z.,m_XL-O 102S
_v_Ei/11lSTAR 37 11_
7 Taurus
_4 DoRa li 11000
15 AU.u +I _
16 _ 5370O
19 E_'_m +9400O
Solid
122 106
I_ 172
223 I'13
_7
24_ .....
2+mt+
2:S30 2189
3220 27_S
8ii69 6030
12351 10686
"La._,_,.,_ Vehicle Psylo_l W_d_
Vehicl_ & P_l_d_
NE0 Workshop, 14-18 Ja_'y
L.q_.dd
tb'.) ('t_)
i09 I_l
176 152
198 '170
2+..O _
2.4.4 20_
6212 S3_
S4t_
II00_ 9451
u_u_ _ _)
GTO Solid I..quk/
" ir r,
120 85 8,_
275 lg_ 1_
24O _6_ 16_
't_ °7(_. 700
4190 2958 2'_33
_ 2310
4010 2831 _7
6900 4_85 4130
';1000 77Cv_, 77OO
13000 917_ 91;0<)
28240 EJ_0
def_u_ _clmolozl_ for _0_1 _ogic_| moni_ria$.._ve_ _ _ _ DubeL l_ R_,ta,
conskteatble _ was made in th_ area. As figs chtm fll_ _ soplicabtlity of a
distributed_e_of _ tetellite_toglobalec.o!ogicaIrno_itocinghas ¢mealdemble potentialfo_this
purp,.'e,e__rtdIam c_'xd_katthttwe w_!ibe _bletopn:x_ux[_ this_ its_ t_extfew _ Bm
what I wo_d Like _ _ today ks the appllcatkmof tl_san_ _ seu:l_e _r u:clu_k_gi¢_
to the l,_lems d _ ex _ _ _'_eed, mo¢_ _ _ _y am
profe_t" Zichichi meedom_ ye_rday. That's t_ lX_flal talk, of nem'-_mh _et-d_ on
phmet I'd like to dttenu z fe.,ear:h pro6tm thtt the SDI ¢_$_r._on is _g. _ think It
has • lot of e_t_ictbi_ty m the lroblem_
Ju_ to review b_iefly, ne_roE_r_h a_ero_dsareob_c_ left over f_m the fc_-mation _ the
solar system. This is in _ of increasing concern in the Unii_[ States. At t_ insistenceof
Congress,the Nstioa_ Aeronautics and Space Admin_ held _ workshops in 1991
1992. The first one discussed the dctec_ion of theze objects tnd the _ one diu:ussed ff we
findthatone isgoing tostriketheplar_.thow does ,_qe_ot¢_ ag_ that.
Roughly speaking, thox m'e ix_ably 200,030 objo_s larger_ lot') metet'_ in dtameter
8",at could, pomntially _nke the Earth, Ooe of d_e_emikes r_ghiy _ _ _e_,m'y with mesatoo
elf, s. T_e la_ _ large sg-ike was in Siberia in 1908. h l_bly h_d the effective i_ of
between 5 _nd 10 megatons There axe ._orne tw_ thousa,-xl obje_._ that we be.litre I_ger thin one
kilometer in diart_t_. One of these stnke_ roughly every te¢_million ye.m_ _¢ so. "[.'hatwo_lk/be a
global cat_" ,xoph¢. ir_eed, it's genera) ,:accep_od that d_e dem'tv.-',iota of rite dinosam-s was dtu,. to
one such strike 60 million )'ear_ ago. There is _otrm con_m.a_y ov_ small objex.'ts in the te_t-_-
i.unedexi meter sir. range. The_ strike once _rr pear or rr_'¢ often. Wir3_ 0_e_ mere is r_vgb2y
equivalento4_t ki_on of _'f relc.a_:_.
I wtuat _ tmno_'._ that the U S+Dep_','.ax:nt of [K-'fen_e t_sor, did detect on the first of
October 1990 toughly I te_ kilo_m iml_t,.:t It wa._ _m ti_tr_ in t_ ceflttai l:_c:ific. I t_tt tile
xignificanc_ of this date b_.ause had thai strike oocurred m _ tm_ not in tile cemral Pacific, but in
the Middle Fm._t. it ex_0.1ldeasily have bc_'n mistaken for a nuclear dettmation a_d could ,have
_lit:
_nd c_cnroallyn_itlg_dono_ _,R¢.A"effects. We have a mis_ofl which t_ o_gzcingcalicothe
_cmcntirm pro_r_m_. It is dettgmed to checkout k,t deep space miuAlc _ tzmsors. Wc
anxious io find out form of the high radiation effec_ of our tensor. _ _ think we can do a
1o, of the things we pr_-vtously had to do in undergroun_ noclctr teams. We ate using she moon
bocausc wc thie& it is an ideal target WC ar_ also _ m fly by _ri _ with this mi,_sion
because _tt will c.hock o_ much of our mftwa_ for a_ n_i_tti,"m. T_ whole mission
wail cost 50 million doil_r, plus I_unch. Wc arc looking at F_ 19q4 ltuttc_ for the first
Clcmentinc pn ,e and about a year later for th, ms:oad oe_. Thc_ is subst_ti_l scientific _ttwn on
t,qis tnis._icm. NASA has organized a team of scientists who work wizh m m _etl us what is the best
cortfiguratio_ of t_c _nsors and how c'n wc best map zbe target. Tt is _, as I s._id by the
SDI organi_don. We're using sensors _Jpplicd by _ l,_wzenoc Livem, mre Natitwlal L_botatory
and rll briefly rcv/cw what those arc.
The Clementine _-pa_ft is being built by tbc U.S, Naval Resett_ L,tbo_tory. It will be
launched,as Isaidincazly 1994. k willdo a number ofpa-__e$throti_htheEaa'th'_radiationtmlts
to get high radiati(_ expostn_. It will thenbc insctt_ into |u_s.r orbit _ it will stay for
r_ughly five montVs and pcrfon'n a complete rmp of _e rmxm. "rbcn it will leave lunm-orbit, do a
swing-by of the Ea,_& with an injectionbum a_d t_cn i.nm:t'cept d,_ _st_'oidsC_wographoswhen it's
roughly 4 million ki_r_ from the E_th.
Ocographos is one,of the better-knownF.ar_h-crossingaste_ds. "r_ probe h_s about a
two-mo._th flight drnc in interplar_tary, sp,xe before it intsrcept_ C.mogmpho_. W, lmpc to get
_dthm a _cw kilometers of the asteroid "l'his will be t very cxtem_ve cbe,=k.out of our software to
prove that we can naviga_ tier accura.,cty.
The _ccc, rafl, as Tsaid, is a very _mall spacecraft The basic _E-tgx_ti,'m consi';ts of a
simple .spacecraft bus and solar navel with the _cnsors _ted hi a l_ylc_d bay _d a _'ust
package --a mthct ,%_d thrt,,st pack,,ge that vail _ve iis _'ve..t_l k_|Ol'lq(_'_eY'__ $O."tM'i(_Of delta
v,
()n_arrl the spacecraft, we're currently looking ati vadci), of _'nsc_. Again, _csc arc
the bask: scn,¢,c,s that _,ill be on strategic defen_ systems rtarting _Ath t_ lidsx which is probably
the rr_st interesting ,,¢,_#Jr. ]"his is a laser rar, gcr cxperirneut wit_ a rehttivc_y Isrgrc telescope cm it.
With _his instlurrm.nt, wc ought _o be able ro get nmpping of the n_'m with something like a few
meters _solution. If we can get a mnl clo_ct]yby of the as_err_id wt. cou2M achieve spatial
_(.)I
_,_lutio_ of _ f_ numbor of _a_ir_-K_t_. This will be the h!_ r"_w_2_c_ ph_sphs
_-fo_ing a_._erc,id. We will _ h_ve _n i.nfim'¢_l cam¢_ or_oixmrd. W¢_v¢ _:_,kc_iNASA _ _vc us
infcmmtt_m on _,¢ comptmttio, l of both the moo_ and tt_ _ L-t _k_idon, we will have an
ultra_4olct ted _-i.dblc camera that coors a _,x-Tybroad t_ ot_waveicm_hs. "rhig t_ addition to the
infrared will give us a ge_d _ map on the moon as well _ give m s preliminary idea of the
a.._crok_s oompottflcm. _ ff we ever mo_ to debug _ dtvt_ltm ty_tms, it it
vct'y itxllxa't_t tO }mow _ _orr_itlon beczm _ _e._t m move _ wo_d _vOt_
blowing<fir some M lb¢ tmffaco material either with a ncclem of eo_ventt_al explosion. There's
a ¢o¢_ide_bl¢ __ it, the dltect performas_ d_"l_c_h'.g _ th_ a._,_Nd'_ com13osifioo.
"l_ls tochtmiogy, l_e discussed _s _ppliod_le to the next step -- a sample remm from fl_ese
objects. Clcmentine is the low¢._ cost i_te_lancmry u_raio_ the United Stz.te..sha_ evt_'
undertaken. We Lhink that with zhe same _ sp_oc.ttfl, which weigh_ _bottZ 2(_0 kilogntms_ we
could adapt it to M'ing Nmk actually a tiny sample _.,f the_ Earth_ng astc_d_. A similar
_¢_m could be _ ff _ to divert an zmeroido
My _ point i_ that _hi._ C_emenfin¢ mL_oa ix an exsml_ _ SDi _'_d misgive
defense tcchnoloff3 ha., much broader applicatioe. Thank you.
_. ACQ?_'ITION, TI_CKLe_G_ AND 7-_9._P_G
&1 Workshop Sur_mary
The t_= O_i_c_ _nsorl for the acquilition,tr_kir_g, and homi:_g on n_ar.Earth ob_ct,
_:_z) #_re _ble cameras emd radars. Both have achievad useful level_ of performance
today. Current mouser technology is sufficient Imtentially to provide the dat_ necenary to
identify and determine orbits for the majority of threaterfing objects capable of approaching
the Earth. The orbital motions of these objects can mmally be _xapolated accm-ately for a
few decades into _ future.
TKi, chmpter agt_mes tast _overy dcqui_iff _n m _omp_sh_ by visible-light sensors. We
dSt_.us_ the employment of IX.St-di_.overy, toliow-up ob_rvations to esUtblish secure orbits
(tracking) and the ,.'_raes related t_ in_ercel_ting _reatening objects (homing).
5.2 V/s/bbe Cameraz
Vis-_ble cameras have been the most mmful _mr_rs for the _xeave_d of new l%_.A_sto d_ta;
t.bey ere al_ useful for re-_cqudsit_on, _v_cking, stud homing. Most _e_r_s to t_e have
been m_nu_d, but _h_,e-eaupled device (CCD) focadophme detector arrays have reached the
megapixel si_es needed for fa_', searches, end e_mputers have reached the gigaflop
computation rates needed for automatically detacti_ tracks on the=e larg_ focal planes. 'l?ne
NEO Det_'_ion Work_op recommended that megapixel CCD m-ray_ he _oupled with f_t
eampt_t_rs for semi-automated HEO _arc_.es _sing six tel_:_pes with aperture_ of 2 to 3
meters',su¢_ a program would have _a iui_Asl capita]eastof$48M _ith NA_A's _ntribution
r_mmended to be _wo of the _ t_|e_ope facilities.
Such camer_ would b, able to provide good thort_term tracking. Radars vould then quickly
pointat, the ol:,jectsmad providethe data necessary forpreciseorbitdetermination.These
cameras would also provide v_luable whole-sky searches that would be u_Cul for a variety of
other aztronomie_d parpom, among which is a systematic search for t_mtient phenomena
eu_ as _pernova explufion_.
Rsdia_ce_ and detector mmsitiviti_ are a_ orderofmagnitude lowerin the infraredtha_ the
visible,and detectorcostamay be one t_ two order_ofmagnitude higherper pixel.Ovvr_l_
visible s_arch tech_ques appear to he preferred, although further research is needed since
the background may be mere amenable _o infrar_ setmh, and NEOs certainly ha_ brighter
stellar magnitud_ ,_n the thermal infrsr_l (_ to _ micron_ wavelength) th_n they do at
visiblewavelengths_
Follow-upobservationprograms need tobe improved. Currently,_bout I0 percent ofthe
objectsdiscoveredare lostdue to inadeq_ateIbllow-up.Only a mod._stnumber ofibllow-up
ob, erv_tio_ are nec_amry to r_t3ne N'EO orbitsto _ pointwhere their r_covery i_ en_ured.
Once i_aplemented, the Spsceguard Survey program willproduce about 1 _00 _ove.ri_ per
month; ¢ommensurmtv follow-up observstion_ a_e _eeded. In Sexing of discovering the
popu.latiooflargernear-F._rth_roids and periodiccomets thatcoulde._usee_tastrophic
eol]i_ioaswit,sthe F_rth, _round-ba_ed tel_sc, ol_s sr_, ad_qua_. 8pace-basad detactors
wsuld be n_'_ssaryor d_ir_ble for the very. fiattam.ion times r_iuired forfirst aplmsranc_s
of long.periv<! eomet_ (LPCs) on Earth-c_)lIiding tr_jector_e_s. Space.bated detecto_ may _1_
be important for imFm_ng knowledge _ the At_n-type NEOs, which spend much ef their
time _tbin the Eerth's orbit. Gzotmd-bated telescopes are not able to view lsrg_ portions of
the sky for months st a time because glare fi_m the Sun in the day ak?' necessitates wait£ng
forthe Earth to move arotmd it_orbit;spece-ba_d telescopeswould greatlyreduce that
r_tridJon.
52_ _:_dar_
Radarsareuniquely.¢_pableofmeasuring range out tod_stancesofseveraltenthsofan AU
forkilometer-sizedNF.X)8at allangleswith respecttothe Sun as viewed from the Earth,
which isessentialforpreciseand rapid orbitdetermination. Racistscan also measure
reflectivity _nd polarization to _nstrsm surface characteristics such as roughness and
composition. They can al_ot_e Doppler and time gating to image, which givess clearer
pictureof the objectltobe interceptedand ofthe orientationand rotationofasymmetric
bodiespriortointe_eption.That isparticularlyimportantforirregularlyr.h_pedormultiple
objects. Radar is a mattu_ tech,_ology, but the range of existing facilities could be increased
by an orderofmagnitude. Radars with at]easttwicethe range ofcurrentinsqxumentscould
be built.There are optionsfor extendingthe rmnge q_,enfartherwith shorterwavelength
high-power radar Wstems_ Itisp_-edict_that a 5- to 10-MW, 94-GI_ freeelectronlaser
(FEL) _ith a 15-to_m antenna ¢x,uldtrackobjectsat _out I AU. A singleradar has been
estimated to costabout $100M, c_mp_r_le in con to conventionalradar systems. 'I_ne
poten-'A,lforin_ _ormancx; must be bal_cecl againstthe ine_ea,edcostrisk,as such
a radar has not yet been bttilL A carrot NABak re_ear_ _ ils_udyingFEI_ forother
spp]ie_tions wb.ich may lead to f_'tther _lvRn_ i_ the st_t_ of the
Hsnde er or re-acquisitionfrom di_overy e_n_rs to radar isuot an _uue; itearnbe done
r_pidly.Dat_ volume isa concern,however. Gk_vent _ can follow-upon only about
10 percent of discoveries.Dedicated rada_ with the currentArecibo capabilitiesin the
n_e_n and s_uthern hemisphe_ could lmndle most of the 1,000 d_scover_es per month
antidpated from the Spacegum'd Survey. No r_lar optimi_d forNEO ia_e_i_atione_ri_#e;
_u_ a facility would greatly b_crea_ the co_m_ of NEO _ ¢_me_.s.
Homing techniqueshave been $tudiedlem th_n thoseofdi_overy and t_sckin¢ Optic_]or
radar _n,or_ on the payload vehicle or on _mpanion probes could re-_stablish the
orientationofobjectspriortopre_ delivery.They _oald_Isopro_'idethe data necessaryto
vef_e the object'strajectory/brinte.rcept_at perihelionor el_where in the object'sorbiL
The raid-courseme_euver commands for rendexvou_ could be based o_ small,on-board
_ensors. The technologyfor flyby or rendexvou_ exist_ end h_s bee_ elemonstr_ted in
_nt_rpla_tery spac_on num_rou_ missions.
It does not, appear possible to command vehicles for be_minal intercep_ u_ing ground-based
trackingeyetem_. Rsdsr_ have beam widthsofedmut lOO ufic_radian_.H.;.gh_i_sl t_ noise
could be u_ed to divide the beam to 3 to i9 microrad_ans. But even at a range ofabout
1 million kilometers the beamwidth would be 3 tc 10 kin, which is t_o w_de for precise
targeting The interceptor vehicle could not guide upon the -%ject'. reflected radar beam
eflficfie_t]y becatum of the object'_ curved trajectory. Pre_ent optica_ tele_opea are limited to
about I microradian. At • range of. a milhen kilometers the error would be 1 kilometer.
whi_ i_ _ill too large for te.rraLr_l interception.
The interceptorcould be guided to within range of the object.,rodthen conLrolcould be
tr_nfferredover to enboard censors and cv,mpu_r_. Sensors could be eitherradar o__
i! 1L)
_._.a_;_',red _rcr.a _.z:A,, w_dch _ e_tima_ to be. typically _.'_ I(_ k_. SeercAmg that area
from a distance of 10,000 km would require A i_clar with A power.aperture product of about
1 Watt-m 2. Such A r_tar could _gily be incorporated into an intercrp._or. A telescope wi_ a
diameter of I0 to 20 am s,_d a taedest nmnher of detectort would alto _uffice. It sould
identifythe obje_ with respecttothe stars,and then use navigationaided by externaland
i_ternal_ensorstohome on the oL-j_2_Itwould have the additionaladvantage ofre_Iv/ng
the targetforpr_fiseimpactat the range closed.To assistthe interceptitwould be usefulto
mcorporatea low-power:puled laser_ntothe interceptorvehicleforrange measurements.
The above comments are fullyapplicable to _teroids. For comets, _,here is the _dditional
problem thatthe soma ofthe comet nay obscureitsnucleus,makmg impact predictionmore
d_.cult_ While the pmbe_ to I_llefa Comet in 1985 did _c_ in im_-dng the nucleus, it i_
not clearthat__pficalor radar sensor_would penetratea new come_'ssoma ,_oonenough to
make terminalg_dance feaMble_ If the interceptor had to wait until it penet_ _,ted well into
the co,as, the _esult_mg required terminal maneuver might be through a -_dde _ _g_e, which i_
diffi_ult at the high vel_t_e$ of the _.ncounter. Multiple interceFt_rs might h_,_ to be sent
in ae_es.This shouldbe A top_ formuch more _tudy.
&_ _umm_cy
The optical and radar _en_ors for aeq_fisi_ion, tracldng, and homing could l:ebuilt w"-th
_xiatingtechnology. Ccmput_r_ and algorithms couid support Automatic detectionand
tra-.Aing,and couldsoN_ curnmt defici_mcie_infollow-upobservat/ons.Radiantare v_u_ble
because _f their _bilityto quickly refin_ orbitalparsmet_r_ and measure phytical
chsrscterifaics_aspeci_llysize,Mmpe, spinvector,and multiplicity.Them are optionsand
technologies for increasing both the range and number of radar_ A few dedicated fadlitie_
could meet the expected discovery rates. I_ u_ould o¢ worthwhile to coe_idcr upgrad_ and
modq'wmions to ex_ dCftnse _ to su_po_ these obj_W¢_
Homing has been ttutLied !_. Optical and radar _amtcr_ could refine an object'a traj_ry
and establish its orientation far precise delivery. Ezitting technology i_ sthfficient to
a_complish distantinterceptsAt perfheliovor elsewhere. Ti_e_terr_ptor vehiclecotdd be
g_aided to within r_g_ of the object, and cen_ol transferred to on-board _nsor_ and
computers. Some combinationof..thes_sensor_ (r_clar, optical,laser)may be requiredfor
_ffective inl_rcept trajectories. There al_p_ara to b¢ a credib]_ thread through all _#
technologies for acquisition, tr_ekin_ and homing.
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ACOUISFI'ION _aND "f_A,.'K OF _E._K4_._TI! Ot'L_EC'TS
Gregory H C_mavan
Simple scaling _rgnamemts can be tt_..d to chara_leriz_ search m'M track by
optical and radar sensors, which have similar scaling. "rney can produce trajectory
informat_or_ and image D at d_tstances out to significant distances. Optical sensors
nxe. good for long-range search; radars are better for track ar,; characterization; thus,
their operation is largely cornpletm.entary.
I. INTRODUCTION
This note dLw.ussea the use of radar mad optical set.ors to acquire and track large ne.ar-e.arth
objects (NEOs). The di_us.vion of radars is based on the s_Smple radar equation, from which
optimized power-range relationships ate derived for search and track. Existing defense radars have
some capability for r_ar-Earth search md track. For track, shorter wavelength radars have
ackiitional advantages. They can produce trajoctory mfc_xation at a fraction of an AU. Search wi._
passive opdcal se.nso_ _ simflm'ty, F,tl"teie.nt visibkz tletector arrays appear feasible and
am-active. Radau' and optical se.a.sors have largely complettmnlary characlemtics. Optical sevsors
are good for long-ran_ search; radars are better f_ track and characterization.
II. RADAR ACQUISITION
If a radar has power P _ _diates into solid angle f_, at ,range R _e power de-_.sity is
P/12R 2. A target of cross section o them sc.att_'s power oPID.P, 2. A detector of area A at range r
receives a fraction AJ4m "2of il, giving a signal of S -- (oP/D.R 2) (AJ4m2)..his signal is to
_ompo.red to the noise, N = BkT, where H is the signal bandwidth and T - 100 o K is the noise
t....,'mpcratme of the rcccive.r. Thus, the sigmi-to-rml_ ratio (SJN) i_
S/N = P6AJ4r_D,.R2r2HkT. (1)
For given S./N ,,, !O for &v'.,vtJo:,.. :_e requi.md l_wer-aperture is
PA = 4_),R2r2BkT(SIN :/o (2)
I_:_ monostatic _tada.rs, which u_ _.Lesame aperture to both transmi: and receive, r ..-.:R. and 1
PA = 4147rl/R4BkT(.q/N} ¢'_ (.3)
"[heir fundamenta! scaling is tha, R _ (FAt 1/4. which means that range i_,crea__es only slowly _id_
radar system para, nemr_. Large radar:, a_e. t_tlmiztrd to mini_ize lo)al cost. lbe pr(_:e._s can be_
iih_t_-ared by a._unling th-_t the cost of power )s pP and the c_)s_ of aperture is aA, where I' and a
_re c,m._ta,ts. _.nd that o_;_r rxmt_ibutions to cost am smaller. The total va, gable cos_ C ks
minimized by choosing P = aA/p. Ttmn C = 2pP; PA = P21x/a; arid
p = _/[4_ti).R4BkT(,SJN)a/lr_3]. (.4)
212
Thedominantsc_.lingis PtxR2,so when power and aperture are _scal_ properly together, range
increases morn rapidly wi0_ system pewer th_ri is indicated by FZl. (3). Kno_,ing P, A can be
found from A --_pP/a.
Ballistic missile early warning radars (BMEWs) have P., 1 MWatt and A ,,- (100 m) 2
apertu_.'e, which gives PA ... 10 i0 Watt'm 2. Missile warning radars are designed to detect objects
with ver'y low cross sections in low-Earth orbit. Reentry vehicles (RVs) typicaUy kave cross
sections of i0-3-10 -4 m2o Expected RV trajectories traverse are. known regions, so Lhe BMEWs
radars only have to search a t,:gion of ,= 10 ° x ,tO° - 1 st. The RVs' trajectories can be, inmgrate_,d
for a few seconds, which giv_ B -- 1 Hz, The upper left curve on Fig. l shows the resulting
power requirement from Eq. (4) for a radar searching _ .- 1 sr for targets of cross section 10-3
m2 The curves axe for t_ aort_ma] perfom_ance parameters above and test parameters of a =
$5KJm 2 and p = ;5(FWatL For BMEWs' PA .. I010 Watt-re, i.e., power" P -, 1 MWatt mad area
104 m 2, R -, 6,o/.10 kin. which is ,_u_ _ range from the radars to uhc expected trajectories.
• Y_arch for smaJl objects involves ra ,.ges too smfll to be of ;.nmre_t for N_[_. _u,, F:.Zl.(4)
scal_ as P a l/'Jo, so fcr _ get objecL_ _he ranges are greatly extended. ,'The fl'tree middY, curves
on ):it:. i are for objex:*.:; wi_ radar radii of 39, 100, and i _O0t) m, for which the. detection ranges
are. a_,ut 50,0(D, 100.0(_. and 3.¢A),000 kin, respectivei: For NE.Os _ f_v kil_mcter_ diameter,
Lhe search raage would extend out to about the orbit of _l_e' r_<_on, so the 2_earch capab_ities of
er.t_ting defense radars are not e insignificant. Ti_cir radar pulse fonr,_ are. howev¢L sp_i",dized
for nomambiguous o_,"_tion a_ L_e sho:,.er r,_'_ges of smaller objects, so some modi ication would
be required for operation a_ longer range-s, St,.:h tad_rs.. _e also specialized to the characteristics of
RVs. so _te mformauc,_ _hey could provide on NEOs would be. fairly rudinientary.
I|l, RADAR T_ACK
! •
"lhe Fowe.r-ra;_ge F2,_ (4) scal_ _.s P _ "_fl, or R tx llfi 114, so another way to extend ::tnge
Ls to reduce ,he sohd angle searched. "ll_c limit of the rc.ducuon is the solid ang)c (w/D) 2 su_:,l,cnde,J
mstantant_u.,;!y t,y i3_c beam. where w is t;_e rat)at wavelength and D - _A is the eft'ec vvc di,_,rt,zter
of _he a_:nu,'c Tht.s is the reduction _n angie inveh,'e2! in tracing objexxs that have a:rt.ady bee2a
loca_d. The ,.lecrea._: m ar.gle is about a fact(', of l/(w/D) 2 _, I/( Ira/!00 r,,) 2 .- !(#, _"
mcrta._. _ m range is alx_ut a factor of (104) 1/4 - 10. ()plimizatioi_ of radars lot fvs,.'l: is sllgl-fly
dtfferem than that ft,r a'arch, but if tl - (w/D) 2 - w2/A is subsli_u_d inta rkl. (3_ the _sul, is2
PA 2 .-- 4_rw2R4BkT(.qJNl/o (5)
('_,st ts minimized by the. choice P = aA]2p, for which PA 2 = (2p/a)2p 3, and
p ._ 14rtw2R4BkT(_j)/c_(2p/a)2] 1/3 (6)
The dom:na_u scahng is P 0t R ad3, so power tncre.a.se..s le._s raptdly with range for track than for
w.arch ql;c curve for "BMEWs track" shows that dezrea._ing angle increa.sc._ range by another
factorof about10out to about3x106kin "f'h_ extension is useful, but _',ti,I produces range.,; of
only ,,-0.01 AU rather than the O!-1 AU desireA for tracking, fixi_ag, and interccixing NEOs.
The power mquirex! for search ts rod<pendent of waveler_gth, so BMEWs radars operate at
wavelengths ot",- 1 _, where RF power i:i _elatively cheap. For track, b_, Eq. (6) P ot w 2/3, so it
is u,sefd u'_o_rate at shot_r wave_engtks_ C_rmnt Gol_to_ ar, d A_ibo radarso_mte at
wavelengths of about 5 c_t.,, which extenc_s range by about a factor of l/,]w ,_ q20 _, 4-5, a.s simwn
by the fight haad curve (?a Fig. t. The cross_ slx_ the region covered by the upgraded Goldstone
and Are.cibo powers., giving a _range of about 107 kin, or ,. 0.1 AU.
The fine f_ t_ sh<n,,ec wavelength l'_dars also indicate that with. a power of about 10 MW
it would be possibk- to ,"each a nmge of ,_ I AU, which would be u._eful for quickly establishing
the man)" t,,'ajectorie:+ that coutd emex_:,; from an enhanced dete_ti _n system. _ are, howe_ver,
o'd_er ways t¢ take advantage Gf additional p_,wer. "Ihe resulting L_$her S/N at _ than maxhnum
range ailc,vs coherent, wide.-baMwid_h _ignals to be. broke_ up into many Doppler and delay bins
u., provide imagery of Oae NEOs+ ,Mad rather than increasing the range of a single radar, it would be
u_eful _o use multiple r_dars m both henaspher_ _ maltiph rune zones to decrease the access
_£-'a_ to various parts of dm sks; for directly approaching NEOs. T_ advantages of shorter
wa_iengt,Ss o_y ,_ply to uack. If shoaer waveleagth r'glars were used for search, that advantage
wo_d be, lost and the search ranges would drop to about _,'_se ghow'a for fl_e BMEWs radars.
IV. BL_TATIC RECEIVERS
,3",emonostadc geometries Lre2ted above, th_ raceivets are assumed m be colocated whh
the trmtsmitte_ _m the F.,,,.rth. The p_wer-ap_ure requirements are reduced in a bistadc geor_try in
which _ receivers are pu, t ha orbit closer to the NEOs. If the receiver con..,_tellation is at range- R
fr_rn the "Ea_ a_d the d_.st_rw_x,between receiw.rs is r, the total number of rece_w_rs nec_xl tot" fl .-
4_t, coverage i, ,, _R2/rt'r 2. F..a¢h receiver has area A, and _s assumed to cost CAA. There _m
4R2/r 2 (,f thea_, _, the total cost LS(4R2jr2)CAA. "fbe rece|ve_ antennas could have aJt areal mass
_nsity of ah_ut 3,3 kg/m 2. It costs abou_ $:_K.ikg to put ma.._s into deep space, so CA "- $1M/m 2,
which is _vetal c+tdcrs of ma.t;nitodc larger than fen"m_mc_slatic re_.ivers The transmitter on _a_th
would still co_t ()_ $.M)KP_'att. "lhu._, th,c total cost w,mld ha about
C = 4R2/c 2 ('AA + Cp 4nxqR2r2BkT(.KfN)/oA (7)
D_,cct<_t costs ._alc as I/: 2, [_wcr c,_sLs scale a_ r 2. 'I'hc_r ._un, i_ nfinimizt:d by the ch¢ .+co
ro :: [A2o'('A re.."p4rt2Bkq { ?;/N)] i 14 (g)
for '.h.e di.qlanc'e, betwe{m re_ civets. It _ales r-.,tl_., wezkl), on all parameters but A. For the optinval
separation, ro. the optimun_ cost ts
{?(, = 16(R 2/ra)_[r(.'ACI,BkT{ SIN)l, (9)
when" A droops out and cy is replacc_ by tt_e:asleroid areo. _ra 2 17o _:alex pn_narily on R2/ra In
companngthisresultwiff, thatfor themonostaticgeometriesdiscussedabove,theonly difference
for theop:im_zedsystemsis thatfor bistaticgeometries,a is replacedbyCA B_causeCA = 10-
I
100 times a, and Co o_"_CA, that means that for equivalent performance the cost of a bistatic
geometry is a factor of -_ 'Jr _,0- 100) ,,: 3-t0 highc.r. Thus, putting the transmitters in space can be
studied, but the gain in pel-forrnaxuze is modest and the problems involved in generating the large
RF powers n_ded in space would be formidable.
V, OPTICAL SEARCH AND TRACK
Search with optical se.n._)rs, which arc pas';ive and do not require active illu;nination, is
superfici',dly different thaJ_ that with radars The overall scalhlg of the. two is, however, quite.
similar. Tlus section derives the simplest forra _f the equations for optical ,search and ),rack, and
indicates their waling .and rough predZctior, s.
A. Search
ff each pixel of an optical wlescope has s_qid magle 02, to search ._ ,,yfid r.,@e gl in time T it
would need a dwell time t = T02_EL An array of i,, Jetecu_rs woul_ ":, ...... a ,_v,_,l/utve
t = O2NTII?I. (10)
The power received by a _._e,cx:ope of diameter D from an object at "_:'_:tgt-i_ .-_., ::,2__;j {watt&r) is
P = J(DFR )2 ( 11 )
In dtscussing IR detectm.'s it ks conventional to express detector noise ,_)v,a¢ ir ,e_m:. ,_f detecdvity,
so the signal to noise ratio of their output is detectivity times power. It is tbe w,t :;.revere..nt to
introduce the dete.,: _ors' specific delectivlty D , which is detectivity times _/(Ad/t), where Ad is a
detector's area and lit is its passband. Thus,
S ID ' '_)= /'q,,Ad/t))t = [D q(t/Ad)]J(I.)/'R) 2 = (D J/'qAd](DIR)243q(brrlfl). (!2)
The detrxztct s have diameters d - "lAd, so it is efficient to match _e size of t,_ pixels to that of the
cteu_:u_rs, f:,,c a u:lescow of f(_:al length f and f-number f#, '2nat mcan:_
d --,Of :_ t)f¢_D. (!?:
"_= [l)"J/4&l] (D/R)2((U'#D)_[(N"I'/f2) = (D J_"R2f# ) 4(N,/gl) ( 14/
3
};qt)a:i,.)g this nrstl]l puts it into:)a form u_qul for analysis
ND 2 : (SE_,'t) J)2_QR'IF,V. ( i 5)
,,via_,:h .,,,:ah:_ m oh a,, thc radar ._,_.arch (:qi_a_ion, pa_-ti(.ularly in its scaling or, [_R4/'T. For optic._. N
plaT', a r_)ic analogou'¢ to tha t of p<v,v,_'rm radars, hal thert: v, or_e diHerence For optical syswms
lhe ;l,.'l¢*_ l()rs a_(] ")[_:rltl)V mll',;l b_ co-located, s() ttm_ is no _malog to bista).lc geomemes.
|1. ( )[)l_rm/;jt_()n
Vh)', _.c;.:,,n cxpl()r(:.s the optimizati()r_ (,f the sensor, a.ssumi.ng that the proc.¢x,_ing
" I!)
s,pporung it is ._ capable that oniy the simple signal m detector noise need be consick_md.
Performance, NA in Eq. 05),, is bilinear m de_:lor number, N, and aperture area, A -, D 2. Cos_
linear ha N and A, so the total cost for a single sensor is minimized by the choice A = Nm/a,
where m is the cost per detector, for which E = N2m/a - A2a/m. Then, C = 2ran = 2_/(maE), E =
C2/4ma, and performance increa..,.,.,.,.,.,_sas the square of cost. With this scaling Eq. (15) becomes
* 2 . .N = "4[(a/m)(Sf#/D J)2IhR4/T] = (Sfqq3 J)_/(a.OdmT)R , (16_
from which D is _e_rmined by D 2 = A = mN/a. Detection typically requires S ,,,100 For NEO
detection, f_ ,,, 4n. !n the visible, D - 10 I3 cm-_Hz/watl, m MWIR, D -- 1011 cm-'qHT]watt; in
the LWr_R, D - 1010 cnn-,x/Hz/watt. Visible arrays of sevend milhon detectors are now available.
In the short- and mid-wavelength infrared (SW/MWIR), arrays of ,- 50_,000 de_ct,)rs are
available. 4 Mirrors of up _o a few meters are readily available in volume. Visible detectors cost
about $0.01tdetector; SW/MWIR detectors cost about $0.05/detector. Long-wavelength (LWL_)
de.tcctors cost several hundred dollars per Oetector on _ Earth, perhaps 10 times that amoum h_
space.- 5 It is as_.um_ below that vi.rdble detectors va)uld cost about $1/pixel installed.
The time allowed for sea_h depends on the range. At mo_L T = RF¢. where V -30 km/s
is the asteroid's velocity toward.,; the Earth. For R = l AU, that gives T - 1.5" 108 kin/30 kmJs ,, 1
month The calculations below _ "IF= 1 day for _ time. The sigt_d .i depends on the
wavek'.ngth, hi the visible _ signal is scatmr_ sunlighL The sun shines at ].c, 4x107 watt/m2-sr
at its sudace. At 1 AU, .IA "- Jo(Rsun/RAu) 2 _"4x 107 (7xlffSkn'dl.5x 108kin) 7_" 1 kwatt/m 2. An
asteroid of raaius ra scatters about lp_cra 2. For _.he er.._mple calculations below, NEO _fiectivities
are taken to be unity. Thus, Eq. (11) can be rewritten
N = (SfehtD JA)q(af_lmT)(R/ra) 2, (17)
The asteroid should also radiate ht the IR due. to it._ own _eamperature, which is set by its radiation
bahm_ with the sun. For a 2iX')° tsteroi6, at 5 vm JA - 0.01 watt/m2-sr-l.tm; at 10 lain, |A " I
,
war,/m2.sr.tJm. The important pmame'.e.r is D JA, whkAt is about a factor of I(X)" i,fF30- 10 `5
higher in the visible.
('. R(:sult_
Figure 2 shows vhe number og de.lectors needt-.d ,x,,a lunction o' range for visibi¢ dctect,,:_r
anays wil.h D = 1(}' cm-qH;qwat_ and 31>100 m a.ste.tmds 0.2 1.8 At! .',way. For the shonex
rang, as, vhe arrv.y sizes are. unde.r 106. For lhe iOOm asteroid they only rvach 1(}6 for canf,,es of
ab-u! 2 AI.;. For lne 3{) m a.su'roid _]ley re_:h ah_;ut It,)' t,y _hal range. Since C '-=2ran the c(xst i.s
ala_ indicated on the right ordinate. 'lhis is lu.st '&e hardware cost. fi)r gmunClba.wd sen.sz_ix.
t::ig,,re -¢ shrews the apenurc sizes mq_fire_I, which range from O. 1 to 1{I m 2. Since A ot N,
this is iust a rescahng ot Fig. I. Perhaps tim most inle._sting thing aboul tl-ie._', curves is the
indicat/on that the r tubers, sizes, and costs au"e not inc-rdinate wi_ visible sensors. Infrared
sen._ors would cost more because of their lower D s and higher dett,x:tor cost_s. That optical ser_sors
scale the same way on D.R4/T as radars does not mean that their costs a.,e comparable to those of
radar systems.
D. Limitations
This ,section assumes that the computer proce,_sing available is so capable that only _he
simple signal to detector noise need be corLsidered. That is not unreasonable. But if the asteroid
and background have significant motion with respect to the detector array, it is necessar3,, to sum
over paths to integrate the fitl_ signal. That can be done with simple track assembly; 6 it can be done
much more efficiently with neural nets. ./But both. require b;,lh, ms of floating point operation i :;
second. "Dins, it is useful to seek techniques which take out much of the moti;m with the optacs,
which is discussed elsewhere.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This note discusses radar and optical sensors for the acquisition a_d track of large NEOs
The dk_cussJon of radars is ba._d on the simple radar equation, from which or)tir,ai_,ed power
_ncreases as the .square of range for search and less strongly for track. Existing defense radars
could have some m_xle.st capability for r,_mr-Earth search and track For track, shorter wavelengths
a_e an advantage, ,and can produce trajectory informatior, and imagery at a fraction of an AU.
BL,;tauc geometries do not appear to offer aclvantages.
_.arch wi'& passive optic',d _rts_rs is superficially different than that with radars, but
_,cales smfilarly The detector number-apertttre area required scales on solid angle, range, and
search IJmc a.s do the power-a_.'tnu_e product for radar acquisim)n. Efficient visible de _ttxztor arrays
appear to be [ea.qible and atu-activ¢. Recent advantages in processing could n:duc," fal_;-tra,,'k
I_r,,;t:lcms. Rada_ ant! optic;._t sen._ors have largely c_mplementary characuMstic,;. ()ptical _-ns_rs
aw g_¢_! l_r ,_-a_h at tong range: _ndars arc _wlter for track and character_,,ation a' shorter ra_g_.
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On October I, 1990 at 0351z optical Bensors aboard two
qeostationazy satellites (1989-046 and 1984-037) recorded a very
intense flash of light over the _estern Pacific Oc_an_ The
san_ors, although optimlzad for the detection of nuclear bursts
in the atmosphere, neve_theles6 provided hlgh-quality data
concerning the luminous intensi%y/tlm_ profile of what most
likely wam a very large fii'eball of visual magnitude -2_. In
addition, it was bright enough to permit the companion locater to
provide a fairly precise geographical position (7.6'N, 14_.2E,
and 30km altitude) at l_ak signal.
To our knowledge, this particular event has not been previously
reported. Perhaps the remctani_s of the re_ion or weather
conditions at the time precluded visual conflr_at4on.
The i_str_,ments which provided the profile measurements were
no_-ima_ing tranmient radiometers conslsti_g of unfiltered
_ilicon photo_io_@_ with bandpass of 400--ii00 nanometers. The
des{gn o__ each r_4_ometel- is such that it view= the entire @_ LI,
disc p!_s a few degrees of surrounding _pace Photocurrent in
it_ _i_g!e sensing element is prr>portlona__ ,_ the amount of
e:,rtl, ight p_<asont, the vast majority of which is reflected or
scattered sunlight. Transient signals are Cmtected as small but
rapid chaDge_ in photocurrent.
-2-
Due to satelli_e rotation and non-uniformity of len_/_ensor off-
a_il response, there is appreciable cyclic m_dulation of thi_
"background" signal. In addition, _inca the satellite is in
qeostatlonary orbit, the background waxeB and wanes dlurnalSy.
Despite these va?iation_, thlu particular event was distinct
enough to be recorded with considerable precision.
Since background llg!_t from the earth Js a factor of many
thousands stronger than translen_ signals of interemt, i_ is
necessary to remove the DC coapcnent of the photocurrent it
produces to facilitate recordin_ of transients. Conseqllently,
the channel _rom which th_me data wer_ obtained co,trained a high-
pa_8 filter with a lower cutoff of about one Hr. To _econstruct
the input waveform from recorded data it was therefore necessary
to deconvolve the effects of the hlgh-pass filter an4 to subtract
any cyclic components aua to $ateilite rotation. Th_ resulting
wave_orms are shown in Pigures I and 2.
Am c_n be seen from the recommtructmcl wavaforms, the mignal.s at
the _wo sate!l_tes were quir.Q similar, implying a high d.greo o_
omn[-dlrectionali_.y in radlated _,erg¥. The_ satellite._ were
_ituated at approximntely 165"W a,_d ,_O'F, _o thei_ viewing all,j1e_
to the event were different by about 145 _ . The peak r_l._nt
intensity measured by e_'=h l"a(|!oseteC (am_umlng a source
t_mpe[atur_, of 6000"K) corresDcnd_ to a source power of
appxo_Im_tely J.5 X I0 II watts I)e[ ste_-adlan. Assuming thi,;
f_reb_ll event was isotr0p_c, the thermal energy r,dia_ied wa_
approximately 2.2 x i0 i2 )(_ules which 18 [he energy equivaler(t of
__00 to_._ o£ high 'xp.l_[v,s (}_F).
-3-
Fu_thQr, an aatlmat, _ the meteor pre-entry kinetic energy by
comparison of this recording with _everal _mal er fireball events
described in the literature is about 4 x I0 I_ joulem (i0 kilotons
of HE). A 20,000 metric ton meteor Impacting the atmosphere at
20 kilometers/second would 9er_erate the recorded waveform.
Similar optical detectors exist on currently deployed GPS
£atellites. However, there is no provlmion fo, _ownllnking
backqround data of %hls type. Addition of both a backgroumd
channel and a _own_ink capability arm Beln_ propos@_ for
inclusion on G_S Block fIR satellites. Thome satellites, when
deployed in the 1996-1999 tlmaframe, could then provide truly
global coverage of fireball events greater than a visual
magnitude oZ -15.
Although the propoled Block ;YR u_rad_ wouid not include an
Imaqlng-type locator, fireball avent locations could still b@
determined with varying degremm of praclslon using _Ime-
dlfferenoQ-of-arrlwal (TDOA) t%chni_em. Limltat!onm on the
accuracy of this m_tho4 would largely lle in the luminous
Ir_tensity waveform itself. ]if the waveform, over its span of
duration, has a number of regions of rapld amplitude change
(flares), then It may be possible with mult{ple-.satel[it@
obma_ation to r@allz_ location error's as s_all as ten _ilomete_s
an_| to even set|mate dirr.ction of travel. Ev@ntm with slower
tlme-lntens!ty profiles could still be located, but w_th less
precision.
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6. ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES
Workshop Summary
The tochnolog7 assessment worE_ng group was tasked to explore the overall NEO
intercept/on challenge From a creative and innovative point of" view. A wide range of
propulsion options that would enable/ntercopts of potontiaIly hazardous near.lhu'th o_ects
wm_ evaluated, to_tber with s ran_ of technology options for dedlecting or destrm/ing the
NEOL This asemsment was not bound to presently ava/lablo tschnolqji_, but sought ways
that _chnolo_ innovation might lead to improved capabilit/_. Kay f_tures of'mu:h of the
evakmted propulsien and dmqection/dm_zctien optimu are brie_ _ in the following
soetion8.
The following criteri8 were adopted at the outset to provide a 8yetematic basis for the
eva]uation of each candidate tochnolo(o_.
FenszTbility time frame fur application
(now, less than 20 years, more than 20 years)
Acceptability to the public/world fpTvernments
(on _ scale ofl0 [high] to 1 [low])
Development cost (millions of dollars)
Initial mass (tons) in low-Earth orbit (IMLEO) to socomplish task
TarZet accuracy (good, que_onabb, or needing further investigation)
Travel time to intercept (days)
Risk of undesirable consequences flow or high)
Del/verable energy capability (equivalent megatons yield)
The relevant critm-ia for both propulsion technologies and intercept/_/defloction methods
were ebesrved to be essentially independent of interception range, with the excopt/om that
travel _/me and deliverable energy become critically imporfamt for close-in intercept_ The
optieas cemiderecl therefore were arranged int_ four groups:
Propulsion options - Distant intercepts
Prop_sion op_ons - C"ioM_ln intercopta
Defleetion/deetru_on options. Distant interceptl
_on/dm_,zt/m options. CloN-in intm_pts
Table 6-1 fists all of the considered candidate technologies in enpoeted ardor ofdevelop_ont
t/me, with near-torm options at the top of each group and let-term options at the bottom.
The nature of ueh approach is described in this chapter. Those it4nns above the solid lines
are co_sidered essentially to be available now, while tho_ above the dashed lines are
considered to be available within the next two decades. Opt.i_nB below the dashed lines
probably will require development times greater then 20 years. While all of"the items
considered are possible from the points of view of physics and engineering, practical
considerations eliminat_ many of them firom serious near-term eonsideration. Nevertheless,
the exercise was felt to be important to point the way to _uture systems concept developmemt
and research guidance. The existing and near-term approaches using chemical re_ket_ are
sew explanatory. Several innovative coneopts an, desmlx_ below.
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&2.1 Nuel_,ar RoeJkets. Nuclear rockets with hydrogen propellant offer siLmificant
perfo_nsnee benefits over chemical rockets. The) have much higher specific impulse, on the
order of -I,000 seconds compared to 450 seconds for Ha/Or rockets. This high•r specific
impulse allows nuclear rockets to achieve substantially higher final velocities than chemical
rock•as, at least twice as Feat for comparable launch weight. Altemat/vely, for comparable
final velocities and payloads, nuclear rockets can be • factor of three to four lower in launch
I_8J8.
These performance advantages are of potantial benefit for NEO-intarception missions. For
close-in intercepts, high velocity translates into quicker intercepts, reducing the level of risk
and amotmt of ^V deflection required. For distant intercepts, lower launch mass translates
into Iow6r c_sL
Extensive tss_ng of nuclear en_nes has been carried out by the U.S. in the I_RVA
program, and by the former USSK The basicfeasibilityofnuclearrocket_has been well
established.F_c.ent!y,the SNTP particlebed nuclearrocketprogram has been disclosedby
the U.S. DepartmGmt ofDefense. This program isdevelopinga compact nuclearzocketwith
very high thsxtst/_'eight ratio. A prototTpe en_ne is scheduled for the late 1990s.
OJ Brillian_ Dart,. A cloud of hypervelocity panetrators with "rmsrt" terminal
guidance wL5 proposed by Hyde and Wood ILl.L]) _ and dubbed "Brilliant Darts." The idea
is suitable only for 8ma_l NEOs (less than 100-meter diameter). The repeated impacts are
supposed to fracture the object into small pieces that will either miss the F.arth or burn up in
th_ atmosphere at widely separated locations.
6.2.3 Lduers. The possibility of using laser energy to maneuver NEOs was proposed by
Phipps (see Proc_edin_, of the NEO Interception Workshop, available from Los Alamos
NationalLaboratory).Current developments promi_ eventuallytoproduce ultravioletlaser
operation in the multi-mepw•tt re, me with high efficiency and potenUsdly low machine
weight, Such a devicewould have to be put intoorbitor locatedon the Moon becatum the
Earth's atmosphere will not _ransmit ultraviolet light. Alternately, a longer w•velenf_h
laser could transmit from the Earth's su_ce, but would requlre proportionately ;,normous
opticsthere innovativelargeopticsmay be of significanthelp). Any such aevi_ could be
used to prcvids abLltio_-driven momentum transfer to an NEO on reputed near smcount_re
with the Earth _tt distances of about I0 s kilometers, provided a relatively lon_ time is
available for deflection or if th_ NE0 is not too massive (<I00 m in diameter). Since n_
known objec'.s mchibitappropriate parameters, the ids• was deemed t_:hnicsdly interasfing
but not •ppli_le.
6J __.¢_m In:sovatlw T_hnolol_ (l_. _Aan JO _s.-s)
8.3.1. Sp_'_ Gun PropuLelon. One way to move an object would be to use the object itself
u a rocketp_peli_nt. Nearly any kind ofobjectcouldbe used thisway by malxingbullets
out ofitand shootingitout ofguns. The "sparkgun propulsion"techniquewould do thisby
using the "slapper" tschnology developed by Sandla National Labor•aeries. The slapper uses
a brief, intense, electric spark as "gun powder" to I_ush • very small bullet. It would shoot
many times per second. The projectile would develop 600 s specific impulse at about
80 percent electric efficiency. This would require landing the spark 8_m device on the NEO,
and is thus appropriate only for s/tuations in which years of warninf_ are available.
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e.JJ Ma__r or Reaction Zn_ne. A reason engine approach could be based upon
a nuclear rocket landed on the surface of the NEO to utilize melted indigenous ice as
propellant for the rocket, thus providing thrust for deflection. This concept it clear!y only
viable for NEOs containing ices (i.e., cometary fragments). Alternately, a mass-driver
ruction m_l_ine (MDRE) muld be landed on the 1_O with an appropriate nuclear or solar
power generator. The MDRE _uld us, a "moving bucket" to electromagnetically accelerate
the loe_ surface regolith material of the NEO to the desired velocity and then release the
contents of the bucket, thus producing a reaction force on the NEO which would gradually
deflect its orbit over a period of time. Each time, the bucket would be decelerated and
returned to the starting point for refill. A system which would deliver a AV of 2 m/s over
eight years to a 1.kin object with a density of a.5 gin/era s might have the following
eharaemristies;
Material velocity:
Specific _apulse:
Length:
Acceleration;
Power requirements:
Mass flow:
8,000 m/s
815 c
1.1 km
5,000 g's
142 MW (90% eflSciency)
5 ke/s
This system could be manned, and a system mass including mining equipment, crew
quarters, etc., would be 2_00 tons for the outbound flight to the NEOn The raactic_-, engine
muld use spent tankage from launch as reaction mass. One benefit is that this system could
rotum large quantities of -.steroidal resources to cislunar space. Challenges include power
switching and conditioning, and physical control of a large object, including management of
angular an.4 linear momentum. Human supervision would be required for mining and
installation.
Super Orion. The ultra-high thrust rocket called "Orion" was extensively
investigated and _lvocited in the 1960s by Freeman Dyson, Theodore Taylor, and others.
This concept called for development of huge spacecrtA with tz,mnendous payload capability
driven by a high-thr_t, low-weight propulsion sys_*_m using low-yield nuclear explosions
with a shock absorber _ stem interposed between the small nuclear devi-.as and the payload
vehicle. This concept has been revived by J. Solem s for the NEO intercept mission, dubbed
"Super Orion" because it would _lso deliver a very large payload. This might be the only
possible approach that could produce the huge accelerations and high yields needed to
intercept a large NEO or comet detected too late for more benitm appro4tches to defense.
Ironically, thue tachnolofies are quite reachable because of the very large investment that
has been made in nuclearexplosivesover the put fiftyears,ana the costofsuch vetdcles
and payloads would be low,consideringthe magnitude of the job to be done. There arc,
however, important politicaland culturalproblems thatm_t be carefullyconsideredwhen
contemplatinga prejectofsuch a sensitivenature. Perhaps more acceptablewould be new
energy technologiesfartherin the futurebased upon antimatter nuclear deviceso,-other
conceptssuch u laser-initiatedfissionor fusion,ifeitherconceptproves feasible.Specific
impulse from the Orion myl em was estimated tobe in the 10' to10sNcon_. range, which
dwarfs otherpropulsionconcepts.
6.4 Lent.term Innovative TeehnoloEiee _Ermter than #0 year_)
6.4.1 KlnGtic Launch from the Moon. The Moon might be used in a beneficial way to
enhance late-warning time co.,nterrneesures against ITEOs. For example, the l_ck of an
atmosphere would make mass accelerators and laura more effective, and in addition, the
much lower ,scape velocity wouJd enable launch of a large mass if a kinetic enerlD' intercept
is to be considered.
NASAhas already studied several concepts which are lunar-based. Crucial to lunar-based
operations is Gmer_ generation and storage. The generation of energy could be provided by
judiciously locat_d solar collectors. Short, term energy storage could be provided by batteries
and flywh_ls but these may be prohibitively expensive. Long.term storage of significant
quantities of eneqff for launching of laq_e payloads on demand may be more _mcult; it
_msmnes that hydrogen and oxTgen can be mined on the moon. Supposing that the energy
problem can be solved, then a heavy-mass launch can be conceived by such means as gee
funs, an ,]ectromqrncti¢ rail gun, or a rocket. The mass so laun_ed wou|d then be plamd in
the path of' the approaching astsroid. Additional leverage might be obtained by means of
putting several large kinetic payloads into lunar orbit with a rocket propulsion system
capable of accelerating the payloads. Th/s approach assumes that a suffScient amount of fuel
could be stored with the rocket to make a sudden diversion and approach to the target object
possible.
In terms of risk, the methods described are reachable from currentJy available technologies.
However, the mining of hydrogen and oxygen may be problematic. The cost of enerl[y
production and storage is assumed to be the meier item for the rocket launch. Using a price
of $50M per ton transported to the Moon, the cost of putting a 100-ton solar power plant on
the Moon would be $5 billion. Other items can be scaled appropriately, and would c]_trly fall
i_to a multi.billion-dollar cate_ry. The NASA 8po_'e F,xplorc_ion Initiative Office should
oonsic_r re,e# o[ tAe moon for N£O detection and de_,ction mumioa.,. While we fully realize
that this degree of lunar development lies well into the 21st century, such capabil/t/e, will
eventu*lly emerge. The NEO interests could provide another impetus to accelerate lunar
development.
6.41.2 Sohu" Sa_l Propu_ion. A very barge, low-weight, reflector "sail" could be anchored
to the NEO, which would then have it8 orbit altdred by solar radiation pressure, which is 9.8
Nfkm s at 1 AU. Drexler, st. al. e, have proposed space-based fabrication of very large,
microlayer solar sails for asteroid retrieval. The material of the NEe it2mlf mi_t be used for
this purpose. Such capabilitiu clearly depend upon much expanded human operations in
space.
6.4J ICinetlc Encrty "_iHiar_ _hot'. This concept would employ slight deflection ors
rslat/v_iy small NEO by any means to cause it to impact ard alter the trajectory of a
considerably larger, Earth-threatening NEO. Clearly this is only pract/cal for distant
intercepts, and requires very accurate celestial mechanics capability, including the ability to
predict collision consequences. It would greatly reduce energy delivery rlq_irement,
however, for dealing with the largest thrcatening objects (10-kin class) because the kinetic
energy released in the collision would do the job.
K_.4 Brilliant Mou._tainJ. "Brilliant Mountains" refers to the concept (proposed by
T Zuppero I°) of using nuclear rockets to return large quantities of cometary or asteroidal
material _rom near-Earth objects to Earth orbiL Masses on the order of 1,000 to 10,000
metric tons could be parked in Earth c_bit, using water propellant obtained directly From the
object itself. The orbits oi"these masses could then be adjusted when necessary to provide
close-in intercept of s danlplrous NEe headed for an impact with the Earth. This may be one
of 0_e few possible options for dealing with very late detection of a large object. A la_e mass
would be shi/_ed in the way of the incoming NEO at such a position that most of the rusulting
_qrments should miss the Earth. An interesting variation ot' t_is ides might be to use
r,gol/th material t_rom the Moon, provided that substantial l_'_ar operations become feasible.
&4L_ _dtmatter,Enerty _mre_. Recent experiments hive demonstrated that for eech
proton incident on an antimatter element, 16 _,sutrons are produced in addition to the
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annihihttion event. It is estin_ted that this number can be doubled with approp_,ate design.
Protons can be stared for long times in penning traps. Production of -mtioprotons can occur
in a mode_ mod_catio_ of the Fermi Lab's accelerator. If'anti-protons can be produced with
_tly high yi41ds, this mi_t be use_ for a small 0rion-type device or for initiating a
low-weight, hizh.yiold nuclu7 device fo_. deflecting or destroying an NE0 object. The
po_ib_t_ at"8t_rin4r anti-protons in condensed matter for such an applicaUon is else being
omsidor_
&d.8 DHe s _ion Driver. Another high specific impulse system that was proposed is
the DHe 8fhsion con_pL A hulp current is induced in t levitated copper ring with external
winding to snergi_ a poioidal magnetic field which provides a favorable confiiluration for a
DHe s plasnm. The fusion ruction produces predominantly protons instead of neutrons,
which would then be mu_auged throu_ a magnetic nozzle thruster, providing an I_ of l0 s
seconds with low neutron _fiuion. This would be a low-thrust system attached to the NE0
and would have to opm-ate/'or years.
ea Samma 
For distant intsrcepLs, Table 6-2 aummariz_ the Technology working f_oup'8 aueuments
for the propulsion optione end Table 6-3 the assessments for the deflection/des_uction
op_ons. For clcae-in intercepts, Table 6-4 summarizes the use_mente for the propulsion
options and Table 6-6 the asuumente for the deflection/destruction options The panel used
pnerally similar criteria to ,valuate the various propulsion and deflection/destruction
options for both d/atant and clo_-in intercepts, with the addition of travel time as a
propulsion criterion and m_mqW deli_ capability as a deflection/destruction criterion for
the case of dose-in intercepte.
Clearly, distant intereepte would be less difficult than close-in intercepts, and thus appear
practice! using a wide ran_ of propulsion and deflection/destruction options. Distant
intercepte afford greater rmq_onse times and require smaller deflections. These factors also
provide the opportunity to "shoot, look, shoot." Existing options include the launch of
chemical rockets carrying nuclear uploaive payloads. In the near-term--within two
decad¢o--iaJera, mass drivers, or "steam propellant" technology may be available. Beyond
that. the use of mlar earl propulsion or d_lection of"smaller objects in the path of"larger
obj,ct, may be fusible. In summary, a m_or development program does ._ot appear
required for distant intercepts, although an option beyond nuclear explosives probably should
be developed to minimize risk ofbrukup of the NEO.
As extensively discusNd in this report, dose-in intercepts would be much more cha]len_ng
than distant intercepts, as they would require large deflections (and therefore subetantial
laonch velocities), afford shorter travel times (and thus short response times), and limit
"shots" to one or two. Fewer t_hnololU options exist given these constraints, and all have
degrees of'risk much higher than the technologies assessed above for distant intercepts. The
nature _ the risks varies with the option, 8uc_ as whether or not the NEO may be shattered
an.d still remain _ngeroum, as with nuclear explosives, or whether the option is technically
or politically feasible, as with Super Orion.
For close-in intercepts, which always appear to be a possibility due to long-period cornels or
prcviously undiscovered NEOs, the development of advanced propulsion and
deflection/destruction options appears desirable. The development of nuclear rockets could
greatly cut travel time. If Super OHon were to pro e feasible, it would provide by far the
shortest intercept time, and thus maximize the chance for • successful intercept. Close-in
intercapte require mur_h more detailed study to determine best choices and probable
_3_
development times and costs. Such studies should be csrri_ out in advance of any effort to
develop • close-in intercept Cal_tb_.
Tht _ ltn_ _ that chemical or nuclear rockets w_h nuclear LTplofive8 ar_ _he only
p_ or Mar.term t__ optio_ a_tab_ t_t _ s_u_t probab_ of aucctu
Table 6-2. Propulsion options for distan_ LuSts
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T/ble _ Propulsion options for cimm-ln f=tmroeptl
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rockets
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R
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OD_ons Descriotionl:
1. Chemical: Chemical n_ktt launch from LEO or moon to intm_ption point, followed by
mcpiosio_ _ nuclear I_yload (stand-o_,
2. Nuclem" rocke_,: Nuclear rocket launch f_om LEO, low-lunar orbit (LLO), or O.,qran_an
point 5) (15) to intm_ptSon point, £ollowed by ,xplosion of nuclm_r payload.
3. Super Orion: _r_lm _nuclMr iszplo_ons for sprinting h'om LLO or L5 to tntm, ception
p,Jint, followed by kinetic _er_ impact, or ezplodon of nuclear payload.
4, Loit_rinl[ system. (Brilliant Mountains): Lm_e (-10_T) mas_s in E_rt_ orbit, directed
into the pith of _e approaching objecL
5. Hyp,rv,locity: Moon.ba_d irud_m or al_croma_t/c launcher for smart masses to
impact with .pproachin¢ ob_'t.
$. Lssm_ (_m_ll obj4_): Laser pro_ll,d kunch from LEO or the Moon to intercept an
apprtmch_j object.
" Development cosM: Low < SIOB
Medium - S10B
l-li_h • S10B
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Table 8.6. Toehnololy options for dooe-i,u defloodono or destruction of ICEOs
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ABSTRACT
Earth-crossing _teroids (ECAs) are small and exhibit strong backscattering, so they
are usually discovered near opposition during close approaches to Earth. This opposition
effect produces large biases in Earth-based seaxches for ECAs, particularly for Atens. A
space platform closer to the sun than the orbit of the Emth, such _ a satellite orbiting
Venus, would be less b_ased. All Atens that cross the orbit of the Earth would be ob-
servsble near opposition from Venus, so a survey from _. satellite around Venus would not
systematically re,iss any large ECAs. A satellite in a halo orbit _ound the Lagrangian
point between the Earth and the sun would be, particularly effective in detecting objects
that are about to hit the Ea_rth including _teroids mad long-period comets that are ap-
proaching Earth from the sLmw_t side. Sp_,cecr_i't have observed low-frequency radio
emission produced by the wiggling of the magnetic field in the solar wind as it sweeps p_t
a comet. Comets present huge cross sections to the solar wind because of their outgassing.
Radio emission at lower power levels is expected from _steroids. This radiation may be
observable by a radio m-ray in space or on the m_n)n.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Earth-crossing asteroids (ECAs) found todate have diameters ranging from less
thaal i00 meters to a maximum of about 10 kilometers. Such small objects a_e difficult
to detect except neaz close approaches to the Earth. They also show a strong opposition
effect: at a given distac.ce from the Earth, they are much brighter when observed opposite
to the sun in the sky. At opposition their disks are fully illuminated by the sun; they are
full in the sense of the f_dl moon. They also have strong bax:k scattering that is similar to
that of the moon. Backscattering causes the hill moon to be. about 10 times more luminous
than _he quarter moon even though it has only twtce it8 illuminated area.
The opposition effect produces a bias towards discovering asteroids that spend most
of their time beyond Earth's orbit. It is much more difficult to discover the Aten asteroids,
ECAs with semimajor axes less than that of the Earth that have orbital eccentricities large
enough to make them Earth-crossing. Space-guard, the major asteroid survey proposed by
the San Juan Capistrano workshop stt_nmary group, would only detect about 90% of the
Eaxth-crossittg asteroids one kilometer or larger in diameter _'ter 25 years of observing
including only 60 % of the Atens (Morrison, 1992). Aten asteroids are especially treacher-
ous since they are likely to hit the Earth from the day side with no warning. Long-period
comets approaching from 'he dayside also may hit with no warning.
I propose two solutions t_, these selection effects using spex:e-based observations: An
optical search for ECAs from inside t'ae orbit of the Earth and a low-frequency space array
to observe radio emission produced when the solar wind hits comets and asteroids.
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II. NEW SEARCH TECHNIQUES
A. Satellites and Space Probes inside the Orbit of tile Earth
The optimum place to optically search for Ea_-th-crossing asteroids is from a spacecraft
orbiting the sun in the ecliptic plane well inside the orbit of the earth. During the course
of a few orbital periods, this spa_ce platform would see all Earth-crossing asteroids near
opposition including those that have aphelia on the order of I A.U. Such objects are hard
to observe from Earth because they are not seen at opposition except during a near miss
encounter with Earth. A good position for such a platform would be a satellite orbiting
Vet:us because it is in darkness when it is observing near its opposition _,int. Another
good position for a space platform is in a halo orbit around the Lagrangian equilibrium
point lying between the Earth and the sun.
The Sp_eguard survey would use a battery of telescopes about 2.5 meters in diameter
to detect asteroids down to magnitud,_ 22. The number of new asteroids discovered per
year with the Spaceguard search program is predicted to decrease greatly after the first
,5 years (Morrison, et. el. 1992), which greatly increases the marginal cost of discovering
each new asteroid. It suggests that the Venus orbiter or other space platform should be in
place about 5-10 years alter the start of the Earth-based Spacegua.,d survey,
At some point, all ECAs will approach opposition when observed by the Venus satel-
lite. When observed at opposition from Venus, an _,steroid 50 x 106kin away with an albedo
of 0.20 is at magnitude 13 if it is 1 km in diameter a_ld at magnitude 18 if it is 100 meters
in diameter. This distance is greater than the minimum separation of Earth and Venus.
A telescope 40 centimeters in diarncter would rear& magnitude 18 with the detectors pro.
posed for the Spacequard teh,_scope. The Venus satellite survey with a telescope of this
size would not only fill in the gaps in the large ECAs (dimmeters greater tk_n 1 kin) left
by the Spaceguard survey, but it would detect most ECAs w_t'_ diameters down to 100
meters.
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While a satellite around Venus may be ideal for finding and cataloging tile larger
Earth-crossing asteroids without systematic biases, it may not be the best platform for
detecting those long-period comets that hit the Earth from the direction of the sun. A
satellite at the sun-Earth Lagrangian halo point would be particularly effective at detecting
objects shortly before they strike the Earth. It coul,_ be the outer "eye" of a terminal
defense system against impacting asteroids while radar would be the inner "eye" (Hills,
1992). A satellite at this Lagr_ngian point would see all intruders at opposition (full phase)
as they approach Earth. It could easily detect objects 10 m acroas as they cross the orbit
of the Earth.
B. Low-Frequency Radio Emission
When the solar wind impacts an asteroid or a comet, it dxapes its magnetic field around
it. Wiggles in this magnetic field produce Affven waves that propagate through the plasm_t
as radio emission (David Westpfahl, New Mexico Tech, in a LANL Seminar) . This low-
frequency emission has been observed by spacecraft passing near comets. Urffortunate!y,
it cannot be observed from Earth because it casmot penetrate the ionosphere.
Galen Gisler (SST-8, LANL) estimates that the radio emission is in the range of a
few hundred to a few thousand Hertz zor asteroids. The Galileo spacecraft passed near the
asteroid 951 G_pra in October 1991. The spacecraft has a plasma probe, with a frequency
response up to a few megahertz. This probe presumably saw as3y electromagnetic radiation
coming from the a._teroid. This d_ta is not yet available, but it would provide a good test
of the possibility of using ,ow-frequency radio emission to detect asteroids.
To detect asteroids and comets by their low-frequency radio emission wottid require a
large radio array in Earth orbit or on the moon. Such a_q array could be built very cheaply
on the moon (excluding laundl costs). Uaf,'_rtunately, it would have to many hundreds
or thousands of miles acros_ to produce an image in the low-frequency radio with any
appreciable resolution.
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There rem,'xin large uncertainties in using low-frequency radio emissio,x to detect
comets and asteroids. We need a clearer theo-etical understanding of the observed phe-
nomenon, more measurements of the radio emission from comets and asteroids by spare-
craft passing near them, and a better understanding of the expected background emission
from other sources at ttm search frequencies.
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ABSTRACT
Nuclear _'Xlq,)sivrs may be used to capture small asteroids (e.g., 20-50 meters in di-
ameter) into bound orbits around the earth. The captured objects could be used fi_r
construction material for manned and mlmasmed activity in Earth orbit. Asteroids with
small approach velocities, which axe the ones most likely to have close approaches to the
Earth, require the least energy for capture. They are particularly easy to capture if they
pass within one Earth radius of tile surface of the Earth. They could be intercepted with
intercontinental missiles if the latter were retrofit with a more flexible guiding and homing
,'apability. This asteroid capture-defense system could be ;mplemented in a few years at
low cost by using decommissioned ICMs. The economic value of even one captured asteroid
is many times _he initiM investment. The asteroid capture system would be an essential
part of the learning curve for dealing with larger asteroids that can hit the earth.
r. FLUX AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALL ASTEROID INTRUDERS
An asteroid 100 meters or larger in diameter (such as the Tunguska impactor of 1908
or the nickel-iron one that produced Meteor Crater in Arizona) hits the earth about r:'erv
200 :,'ears (Shoemaker, at. al. 1991). If we can ignore gravitational focusing, this rr_luiros
that such an msteroid pass within 10 earth radii (10 R_) = 64,000 km abou_ every _tllrr
year and within the orbit of the moon every month. An asteroid 30 meters in diameter
hits the earth every 5 years, passes with 10 R÷ about 20 times a year. and passes within
the c_rbit ,_f the m,_on every day. Since about 5% of the asteroids are nickel-iron, we eXlWCt
a nickrl-ir,,tl I,l,,t,,,r_id 30 meters or more iil diameter t_ pass within 10 12,;, every x,,ar
S_wll ar ()l;jm't hits the earth about every 100 vears and passes within 1 earth-ra(Iius _t
the sllrface ()f the earth ab, mt every 25 ve_trs. Th,." capture of such a mckrl-ir_m mrtr_)rit_,
into ,_rbit about tl_e earth would l')e a maj_r asset for futllre manned acti:'irv ill :q_acr
If tile approach velocity. V _, _f an asteroid whrn it is far from the earth i_ smaller
i
thaI_ the escape w'locity, V,,_, from the earth, th:' asteroid is particularly easily ,'aptllrr_l
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in close approaches to the earth. The velocity of the object at its closest approach distance.
d. to the center _)f the earth is, from energy conservation,
Here V_,c = 11.2 km/s. About 15 % of known NEAs have V_ less than \:,,¢ and some
have V,,, less than 6 km/s (.derived from table provided by Shoemaker, et. al_ i991) . If
\'_: = 6 km/s and d = Re, then V_, = 12.7 km/s. This object would only have re be
slowe,i by 1.5 km/s at distance d to bring it into a bound orbit around the earth (to get
V,t below V¢,__). (If a meteoroid is found with an approach velocity of 1 km/s, the req,tired
reduction in velocity for capture drops to only 0.04 km/s).
II. CAPTURING THEM WITH NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES
The only feasible way of capturing such an asteroid into a bound orbit around tile
earth is with nuclear explosives. Fortunately, such explosives and the means to d,-!iv-r
thehl to an asteroid passing near the earth are readily available at small marginal cost (hw
to the continued decommissioning of many American and Russian. ICMs. Even asteroids
passing within the orbit of the moon can be reached by adding a single extra stage to an
ICM. This would be particularly easy for Inissiles with MIRVS such as the NIX that could
t)o reduced to one explosive charge.
lZroperties of nuclear explosions and their capabilities for changing the vrl(_citie._ _f
asteroids have been outlined in this conference by J. Solem and C. Phipps. We fi,und rarlicr
that t_ capt,tr-all asteroid with a velocity at infinity of 6 km/s req,,ires that we (h'cn'asr its
vrh),'ityI)v()nl_ l.Skm/sifit makesaclr)seencounter t_) the earth. We considercapt_wino_
an iron motroroid with a diameter of 35 n_eters, a density of 7.5 grams/era a. and a ma_s
_,f 17 x105 metric tons. The energy needrd to capture this object into a boun(t(_rt_it i_
150 kt if ?0 _, of the asteroid mass is bh)wn off in the forward direction aad aU thr rn,,r_y
(_f the bomb goes into ejecting this mass (at 6.2 km/s) (Tile energy reqmrement dr,)l)S t,)
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30 kt for a 20- meter asteroid. It would drop to less than 1 kt for the larger aster_id if ,_i',,'
could be found with an approadl velocity _f 1 km/s or less. ) "file bomb has to 1)e s,,x,,r',_.
times this ,r.ininmm value because of various inei'liciencies, but this illu_trati_n show_ that
the capture of a nickel-iron asteroid is tmssible with r_:adily available techn('l_)gy.
The materi:_l blown off the front (in the direction of moti,m) of the asteroid i)v th_ .
eXl)losion has a hyperbolic veiocity and escapes the gravilational field of the earth. Because
c_f its high tensile strength, it will not i)e difl'_cult to hold the captured nickel-iron a_.toI',n_t
in _ne piece Stony asteroids are m_re fragile. We may wish to capture only lh,_se with
very low approach velocities with respect to the earth to minimize the required explc_,i_n
energy. Some development work is ne_'ded to better understand how nuclear expl_siv,,s
couple to asteroids of various comp_sitions. We also need to develop blankets for nuclear
explosives to "cool" them: minimize the gamma rays, x- rays, and neutrons they emit. so
the,," do not harm satellites and the magnetosphere of the earth. We may wish to practice
intercepting the asteroids at lunar distances before attempting to intercept one in a cl_,;e
approach to the earth. The ability to capture objects with nuclear explosives is ,'learlv
achievable sad could be implemented in a relatively short time at a relatively low cost
using decommissioned ICMs and nuclear explosives.
A captured asteroid would be a major asset. It costs about $106/metric ton tc_ launch
tc low-earth oxbit (LEA) and much more to higher orbit. To launch the mass of a 35-
meter nickel-i:_,n meteorite into I,OA w',mld cost about $ 2 x 10 l: or 10_/ of the' GNP ,,f
th,, U.S.A..Alt_'rnatively, to capture it into earth orbit may take only _)ne s_Ul)lu_ l('.Xl
and warhea,t if lh- closest approach ()f the _t)ject t(_ the" s_rface of the earth i_; ,)m' (._rt}l
ra_ti,,s _)r 1,",> If tt_,-s,, missiles amt ,,varh_.a,ts a_, _che,luled to },e decomissi_)n_,_l 1,v tl,.z_tv.
ttl_. mar_aal c¢)sl _,f fitting each for this mi_;si,m may 1,_, les,_ than $107, which t,,_t,._ti;_ll_
R;ixos a return _m the initial investnleilt its high as 10,000 to 1 Developm_,nt c_)sts ;_,[ tll,.
n,_,',[ f_r re(lund mt missiles will reduce this rerurl_, tmt is is still substantial.
Th,' captured NI asteroi_l WO_lld be a s_mrce _f mat_,rial fi_r future a,'tivitv i_ ,ira,', ,
It ,'(,_ld be hatlow_'d out to pro,hw_" a large spat,, station. ()})jects fir_',l _ff[ tt_. ,';_i,t_,,l
d4_
asteroid at its closest approach to earth would be given a boast by being within the
potential well .,)f the earth. A rail gun could be used to eject the objects. This physical
process is the reverse of tile one that allowed the capture of the asteroid into earth ortnt.
If the object is ejected at 1.5 km/s in the direction of motion of the captured asteroid at
its closest approach to the earth, its escape velocity from the earth is 6 km/s. The rail
gun could be used to launch cheap probes to the larger earth- crossing asteroids (NCAs).
A number of these probes are needed to characterize the x-arious types of NCAs and short-
period comets.
The metal in a captured nickel-iron asteroid could be melted using a solar furnace. A
good candidate may be tile gas lens (a large plastic balloon shaped like a lens and filled
with gas) mentioned in this conference by Claude Phipps. A lens several hundred feet
across would l_ lightweight and cheap.
III. DETECTING INTRUDING SMALL ASTEROIDS
An object 35 meters across could be detected with current military radar within ifJ:'
km of the earth (Greg Canavan, this conference). The U.S. aud Soviet strategic radars
cover a large fraction of the sky above the earth. Currently, the radars only see objects
near the earth to reduce computer processing. The computer software clips off (ignores)
signals with long delay times that correspond to objects far from the earth. Because the
maxirn,,ml possible number of Soviet missiles that car, be directed to the U.S. is decreasing;
as the result of arms control agreements, the U.S. Air Force radar has decreasing processing
Ile-(ts. _'h_' in,:rea._in_ly a_filablc pr,_cessing capability makes it possible to search a larger
v,,ltnlte aro,tnd the earth. I prow)se using existing ra..tars with their (tela._'s c.:.:tended s_) thrv
can _)bservr ,)l).iects (,_:t t.) at least 105 km. "Ft,:,_ would allow us to detect asteroids several
hours before the)" iut the earth. It would also provide a scientific ret,lrn by accurately
determining the ¢)rbital element:s ¢,f meteor(,id:; that. pass near the rarth, their sizrs an,l
impact velocities. Because of its all-weather capability, radar is likely to be part _)f thr
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terminal defense system for asteroids. Ultimately, it would be desirable to buiht radars iu
the southern htqnisphere to provide all-sky coverage of asteroids approaching the earth.
A satellite with even a small aperture camera equipped with a large CCD placed in
a distant orbit around the earth (at the moon's distance or greater) could detect small
_teroids approaching the earth. A satellite at tile Lagrangian L2 point, which lies inside
the earth's orbit around the sun, would be particularly effective. It would always see
tile asteroids approaching the earth as fi_ll (in the sense of the full moon), so they woldd
appear at their brightest (the opposition effect). It would see much smaller objects at
large distances from the earth than is possible with radar, which suffers from the r -_
dilution effect. It would not suffer from weather or the inability of detecting asteroids
that are approaching from the direction of the sun, which are the primary limitations of
earth- based camera systems.
IV. HOW SItOULD THIS BE IMPLEMENTED ?
The asteroid-capture program could be operational in less than five years. It also
would be the first terminal defense system for asteroids that approach the earth unde-
tected until the- pass within the range of the defense radars. This would provide valuable
experience for buildhag a more robust system to protect us against, all asteroids.
In the first phase of the program, some ICMs that otherwise would be decomissioned
under the arms control agreements would become asteroid interceptors. These leconllllib-
sioned rockets would be used both to capture small asteroids into bound earth orbit aml
tt, provide a rudimentary defense against inc(_ming small asteroids. The first such missile's
w,,uld br ICNIs witb upgraded guidance and homing capabilities. Their nucl_'ar ,,xpl,_siv,,
w,nll, i not t),, put in a re-entry vehicle to assure that they cannot be exploded within t lt,.
atm,_si_here of the earth. Instead, they would t)r encased in a blank_'t provided by tt_, ";a-
ti,_l_al Laboratories to c_>_)lthem sut'ticiently that x-rays, gamma rays, and nelitr¢_Ii,i fr,:_lll
th,'m ,are n,_t a hazard to spacecraft in earth orbit These missile:_ would lik_qy be sl,,t,jr,'t
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to continuous international inspection to assurethat they are not converted to weapons
use. We would invite the Russianstate to institute a similar program with someof their
decommissionedmissilesand nuclearexplosives.Their progr,'unwouldbe coordinated with
ours.
The second phase would be to add another stage to tile larger decommissioned ICMs
st:oh as the MX. This would extend the range of the missile to escape velocity fl'om the
earth. This would allow asteroids to b(, intercepted much farther from tile earth, i.e..
at the distance of the moon or greater. This may provide a large enough lever arm to
allow ma_:y asteroids in collision orbits with the earth to be deflected away from the earth
before thev strike it. Otherwise, we could only blow them into small pie('es and let the
atmosphere provide the final defense. This second phase would have the goal of defending
against asteroids up to ] .k-m in diameter that axe only detected in their final a,oproach to
the earth. It also would allow small asteroids to be captured into large semimajor axis
orbits around the earth, which would allow them to be used as way stations for manned
intrusions into the solar system.
The phase 2 work would dovetail into the proposed earth-based survey to find nearly
a]l earth-crossing asteroids with diasneters greater than 1 km over a 20-year period. These
large asteroids ca.n only be deflected away from earth, if they are hit with nuclear explosives
several orbitM periods before they would otherwise hit the earth.
A Phase 3 or Phase 2b program may be the development of tailored made rockets
and nuclear explosives to deal with the asteroid threat. This progr,'ml can be implemented
faster if II:l_:_ia joins the program. The Russian Zenit 2 rocket -vc, i;M be partic_flarlv
effective for cl()se-in intercept because it is designed to be fired off oa sh,>rt notice. It is
,:aid to have a )),.nit-in flexiMe guidance, system that allows the operator t() dial in "_n\
t)obition and velocity within the energy capai>ilities of the rocket.
Later, it would be t,, des;rable t,') _'xtend the catalog; of asteroids with kn_wn (>rI_it_
d()wn to those with diameters well below 1 km, s_) dangerous (me,_ can he deflected at _,_,t:'r
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distances from tile earth. New surveys based on observations from satellites orbiting V,'nus
and at the L2 p,_int of the earth (discussed by the author in another report in the Confer_'nc,'
Proceedings) -vou!d be used to fill in the systematic gaps left by the earth-based survey
and to extend the survey to much fainter asteroids. These satellites would also warn of the
approach of long-period comets that currently could hit the earth without warning from
the direction of the sun.
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Discovery in Near-Earth Space"
= Fuel, Food, Shelter & Close
...._;:;__ii ;_.:: !::Formation of Never-Far Comets
(Yeomans-Wethen I Formation)
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DISCOVERY IN NEAR-EARTH SPACE
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From Wetl'_nll, G W. , "End Pro,:Juct$ of Cometary E_r_ut=on
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P'O_t H_lNey Er'o, Vol I. 1991 Kluwer Ac_Je,_ l:_b_',,.,het's
"Ilae discovery in 1991 ofa km sized object
containing what appears to be so much water ice that
asymmetric evaporation pressure is changing its orbit,
and at the .same distance from the Sun as Earth, was like
discovering a gushing oil well.
This discussion shows that 1. we apparently found
rocket fuel objects in the space near Earth; 2. the
objects are "clom" compared to planets and as_roids;
3. the) are "easy" to acce_ and exploit, in _e sense of
the complexity of space machinery; and 4. aa_
affordable prospecting plan can have small early costs.
• fuel
• close
• easy
• prospecting
plan
The objects are comet cores. Observauons of the comet
Halley lead us to believe that comet cores contain water
ice (-85%), CO and CO2 (-10%), ammcnia (-0.5%),
.some percent stones or dirt, and are covered, by a layer of
.sooty tat" with thickness between 0. ] za_d 500 meters.
These are the raw material_ to make rocket fuel, plant
food and construction material.
Comet co_es belong to formations whose objects are
never far from Earth (never-far cornels, NFC's, t). The
Jupiter Family of comets feeds the formation. This
family contains about 150 acti,,e comets and are also
"never far" because their farthest distance from the Sun
is typically near Jupi_r's orbit. A typical closest
approach is somewhere between Mercury and just past
,Mats.
Wethenll* predicted the formation. He calculated that
an entire formation of spent comets should exist with
average semi-major axes of 2.2 AU (Earth is at 1 AU
from the Sun) and with high eccentricities, above 0.5
(Earth has near 0). "['he gravity of the planets modifies
the semi-maJor axes of the Jupiter Family comets so that
d_ey either crash into a planet, or be.come ejected from
the Solar System by encountering Jupiter or Saturn, or
migrate to the Comet Cemetery. When Jupiter Family
comets die, some go to the Comet Cemetery.
Yeomans" found that Icarus at I AU ,'rod Apollo, at
about 1.47 AU both haw; orbit features unique to comets.
In other words, hc fo,.F,l wh_t appear to be billion-ton
steaming fuel objects m _!ie prctticted formation, near
-'F_.arth.
• Ye(>man_. Dr .Oon, Jet Propu_tw_ L=IP.x'ltc._y, Cakf0o'_a iflStltut_ Of Iechnolo_y, (81B) 35,_ _127
• Welhenll, Dr Ge_r_ W. Dr:nl(tmend Of Tel';ic%t_tal l,_c_t_../n, CMe, e_m l_'_l_lute of W_,-.Iw.*_t(3_. (20_) 6Bf, '|! ",
l ZuoOefo, Or Antf'_tTy, SO_.e Nuclew Sy'.tem_, Idld'_o Nat_onag En_eeong Lal:_atoPit, (2'08) 526 538Z
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Comet Cores Are
Very Convenient Resources
Heat
Comet Core
• k3es • A
Hydrogen
+ shaft
\•chem_.als Liquffiedfaodstoeg Hydrogen &Oxygen
= plant food, rocket fuels,
propellants, construction materials
Simple Fuels From Comets Can
All Give Big Payback Ratios
Comet cores ate fuel, extremely useful and
valuable, massive and accessible because of
low gravity.
Their water ice is the basts for rocket fuels and Fa'opellants.
The wate¢. CO2 and ananmnia are the three key plant foods. The
ice and tar mixtures are easily thawed and frozen in,o space
sti'i_ttlzes.
Heat alone liberates water Heat alone oonve_ a mix of soot
and water into ,hydrogen and oth= ga.sses.
Pauting wau_ over 1200 kelvin carbon (soot. tat) taken from
the comet outside md heated by. nuclea_ or soi_ source olives
,.._ "gas shift re=ctio_" which produces CO _cl H2 directly.
Passing steam tk,zo_gh i _.rbine using the ice heat sink
lxodmes the sl,_tl_ ptanping power needed to ca_capress and
liquefy these gaases on the comet.The comet ices provide the
heat sink needed fot the refrigeration process.
Heat sinks designed to _o,rk in the vacuum of space weigh too
much. and we don't mind them on a comet. This sanplicity is
crucial for ind_sl#.al or commercial space processing.
Even though a I km sized object conuun.s about 1 BillJo_
metric tons of material, its gravity is so low that a space tanker
needs ordy small retrn rockets to land on or leave _CA Billion
torts is about 100 000 tames what we have launched in the history
of space ( 10 000 torts). A space tanker hauling 20 tunes this
maount away from such a small corn,', core would need a rocket
with only 10 tons thrust.
It would take a 1 000 years to exahust jugt one such cornet if
we extracted a Million tons per year. A Million teas would make
md fuel 10 space ships each holding 10 000 work.s going on
safe., fast trips to comet cores. Only people, seeds and tools need
be. launched. The comet cores would provide the food, fuel and
_eltea.
PAYBACK RATIO
P_yload delivered
140. _elr ship + e_gine + tank
4096_
100.
Slush . ZTH?_,,v,_,_.__.-'_,_.,, ':_180.
.J-_c_,,_r'n LOX_I'I2--" IT3_ "TANK PERFORMANCE"
60. I II'/.." k'/.-" Slush |z8- tons fuel per ton tank
/ . #," ,)
40. ,_/:,.. /_". LH2 NTR 64 ...._.._
20..I. " ....--"""
,L A5 .19 28 .43 65 1. 15 2.2 3.4 5.2 8.
ROCKET PERFORMANCE: Lsp, KILO-SEC
_lg • _ N'amN_Wlmm 5
Or, liquid hydrogen tied oxygen can be used in conventional non-nuclear rockets.
Electricity would be produc_l from _ cornet water turbines It would split the wate_ into
hydrogen and oxygen gasse.s. The gasse$ would be completed and cool4_1 as for the liquid
hydrogen rocket. This would allow tts to keep the nuclear systems m deep space and yet
cieliv_ pure rocket fi_els to Earth orbits.
The never far comats are "easy"
to access because their materlads can
be simply conv_md into familiar rocket
fuels or {_opeilants,and in mass
quantities. For example, water from
cornet ice can be u_ci ,., a nuclear
heated steam locket. The reactor would
operate at a somewhat "low"
tempeaanu'e of 1200 CeLsius, develop a
"low"specafic impulse (Isp) of 235
seconds, consume 20 mn_ more water
than the mass of payload delivered, and
still deliver 100 times _ much a._lhe
space tug sent out to get the payload.
Or. liquid hydrogen can be o.sod tn _t
nuclear thermal rocket, like t NERVA
rocket. Hydrogen gas would be
produced in kiloton quantiues by
i:mssmg 1 0(_ Celsius _,ale_ tM'ough
orange-hot, I 000 Celsa_ts_oC It would
be compressed snd liquefied using
pumps lx_we_od r_ comet wate_
turbines using the -50 "Celsius comet ice
as heat sink No ciecmc generates
would be need_. And the resulting
rocket would provide the high n'dsison
veloctty re.qutred for hun-,an translx)_
Earth Capture AV Reasonable
for Never Far Comets & N EO's
Some Comets In
Jupiter F_nlly
_ose._ _ to Sum.
I Fartt_( _ From Sun. A.U.
I I Orbit plane, degrees
I I I F,anhcapua_ Vo_
! I I i Velocity at c,on_t
I I I I k.m/s I AV Iml/$
P/d. .... i12 4.s 2.9i 8.6 0.6 5.5
[ , .. P/F'mlay 1.e 6.1 3.7 9-3 0,2 5.9
P/Neujmin 2 1.3 4.9 5.4 8.7 0.9 i _.9
P/ruttle-(3iaz:obird-Kxe,s_ 1.1 5.1 9.2 9.2 0.5 6.0
P/HowiJl 1.4 4.9 4.4 8.7 1,2 6.2
...... Pmm_-Cnpo, 1.3 5.6 4.9 9.t 0.8 6.2
o9 5.2.1T .4_- o6 6.3
P_V_ 1,1 5,1 ll.7 9.4 0.6 6.4
P_"huryumo wC,er asinw,nko 1.3 5.7 7,1 9.3 09 6.5
Pn:ort_ 14 53 7a 9.1 13 6.6
A
[ P,rrritton 1.4:5.4 7.0 9,2 1.2 6.7
P/WUd 1.6 53 3,2 8.9 i.5 6.7
'" P/Kopff{ 1.6 5-_ 4.7 9.0 L5 6.8 7
P/Clak 1.6 4.7 9.S 8.9 1.7 6.9
P:rempel l 1,5 4.7 10.6 9.0 1.5 6.9
t ..........
P/du Toit-NeuFain-Delpone 1.7 5.2 2.9 8.8 1.8 6.9
Comet Cemetery , _
Apollo, o.6 2.3 6-3] 5.7 z2 4.5
0:,4 3.3 1.4[ 7.1 3.2 6.7
0.2 5.0 7.s
Near Eanl_ Astoroicls
R, Sh_m(,_._ o._ 1.2 15.s 4.4 3.6_ 4_
...... i'98'8'TA (type 0.8 2.5 2.7 5.8 1,2 3.6
1979VAitype 1.01 4.3_ 2,8 8.2 o.i: ' 4.6
....... _9_ JK(type o,9 4.71 2.) 8__ 0.4 - 5.2
...... 1987 PA (type 1.2 [ 43 _-f(i _ 9.4 ].2 6.9
" :9s3 SA _,p_ r___2 7.2 _018' x_.4 L'I L IL9
More
WBoeth_, t,] 9._ 5.2 _o-3 0.4 7.1
- _qZ_.,,.k_.S__-3 s.9 9.0 :_7,_ 7.3
prs_,,,.,_,_.w._,_2 z_ 4._ s.s 8._ 2.61 -_S
P/Kojirnt
How far qway are lhe Never Far Co'nets?
"Close."
Tt_ AV need_ tobringa loadback toan orbit
around Em'th flora one of them is one answ_. We
have toknow _ AV todesigna space lankea to
haul fuels or materials back from the objecm If
the total AV is less _a.n about 7 km/s _cn the
object is "ciose."
The mission consists of a thrust at the comet to
leave it an head toward Earth and of another thrust
at Earth to cause capture, The thrum at the comet
is the easicr of the two because it can be
performed over a long time, d order monO_s, and
because it ts usually smaller, with a velocity at th_
comet of order less than 2 Irzn/s.
The flm_ at Earth cal_ur¢ is more difficult
•becaa_ it should be perfonnext all at once and at
the point of closest Earth approach.
The Earthcapturevelocity,V,_,can bc achieved
by a flu_stdcve|_pinga much small_ velocity
lhethrustispcrformcd atckoscstapproach. A real
vehicle carrying a _rgc, 10 000 ton payload would
takesevezalhoursof thrusting,which is impexfccL
A somewhat intperfect mancuv¢_ can t¢_alt in a
capture _V that is as liUle as 50% mo_ than the
smallea', minima-'.AV.
The table gives the total AV for such imperfect
_vcts. It is tl_ sam of tl_ velocity at the
come_ and the velocity of an imperf_t,
50%-over-minimm_ capture maneuver thv.a
achieves V_.
No_ that a good fraction ofthcob_c_ inthcmblc
have le,_sthanabout7 km/s AV. "thismeans at
least a dozext known fuelobFcts are"close."
zb3
/Simple Tanker Can Use Water
Propellant To Deliver i 0,000 Ton Payloads
Meteor armo_ng
/ . bags to hold ice
structures _- 63 meters _l / -4 tom
= payload: _ ,// Insul_on,gas
3840 _ Ii _:_ tonswate,- W _ Hydt_tatic and vapor
pressure bladder
,o.:\ 11!1 ,oi, 31dl ~23tons
.v.o\ r_iil _ p.ylo,d= _r_
__. f _ 2 trt_
Uq_d.y,h-o_o_ I_k _ _ -16
•_Randumks _ x _ _
steam NTRs, total 8,000 MW. 235 _c I_,
--I?tons
ati200Celsius,deliverIOMN nmx tILn]st
t'ayload (2.: Million poeads force)Watc_ Tanker
~ 10,240 tons -63 tons
- 150 tons
Tanker Could Push Killer Comet
Out Of Earth-collision Orbit
The comets are "easy" because we can design
_mple ships to use ctmw,t ice as payload,
stracture and propellant. S_h a sh;.i, would
deliver about 100 times its weight as useful
payload to an .Earthorbit.
The cornet water is exceptionally convenu:nt
becaa_ we can use it directly in a nucle_
reactor. We must only be sure to very
carefully clean it from rocks, dirt "and
minerals. It is also very convenient because
we can conlain liquid, cold water in very _ow
weight bladders. The water has very low
v_t_ prc:ssure. It is very convenient again
"bccatde it fi,eezes eastly in the cold of space
into a moderately hard structural material
Bladders shaped like the saucture we want
can form the water inw rigid ice containers,
shields and plmgorms.
This example shows that about 23 tons of
bladders would hold about I_ 000 tons of
water propellant. Anottwr 4 tons of bag3
world hold 10 000 tons of ice to bc used as
mcmo_ amldebrishic!ds,andalsomake up
thelO000 ton_yloedand a"shipplatform.
Tit rocket engines world be ,_clcareactors
heatingwaterintosteam,and _ steamwould
go directly into tl_ rocket nozzle.
Though this is an iqefficient use of ,an
_t resource (comet ice) it may t_maout
_obe the most efficient use of expensavc,
hardwa'c.
190 000 tons
propellant
235 sec Isp rocket
== 2300 m/s exhaust velocity
The tanker can push the oomet trot of an orbit that wo_dd
otherw_ hit Earth.
The Tanker would lust push agaaast the coma instead of
pushing i_self into _ Earth orbit Tbc 190 0130tons of
I:m:_p¢ll_t exhaust moving al 2300 rots would cause a 0.44
m/s ch_ge in the come_ orbital velocity.
Though this may seem sTaall it _smore 0tan enough to instm_
that the comet orbit misses Ea_Otif it _sperformed one orbit
early. F_" example, a 0.43 m/._AV change in aphelion velocity
t,f tbe Nevm'-Far-Comet ?/Schwas=unann-Wach_ 3 would
cause it's pert_lion to change by 3 [:.arch Radii. Since its
pethelion is _ the orbit of Earth this could assure a near
miss. Three Earth radit is close, but n_ collision.
We would necd abo_t a dozen ye_s n('_ce.
;'54
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LASER DEFleCTION OF NEO's
Claude Phipp6, Los Alamos National Laboratory
NAKA Near Earth Object Inter_ption Workshop
Paper F3, Candidate Technology Alternatives, J. Powell, presiding
The energy de1_:ty of kinetic objects with relative velocities in the 5 - ,50 km/s range
typical of NE, O's exceeds that of hot chemical reactions, more nearly resemblip4_ the
energy density of laser-ablation plasmas. When warning time is short (as it will usually
be prior to acam_tJe NEO orbit determinations), efficient response dictates addressing
the NEO with an energy density similar to its own. We will introduce the idea that the
smaller NEO's (which, collectively, produce the most blast damage) can be deflected
with high-energy, Earth-based pulsed lasers - especially ff the NEO has a well-define]
orbit which permits it to be deflected a year or so in advance of collision.
The Ground.based Ta_._er Altertmtiy._
While nuclear explosives can deflect even the, largest NEO's, and their use may be dic-
t_tecl by economics ibr the largest ones, hazards during launch as well as construction
are unacceptable if alterriatives exist. Mass drivers have the disadvantage of requiring
installation on the NEO, an awkward task with rei_tive velocities of 5- 50 km/s . La-
sers have the advantage of instant response, can be non-polluting, and can deliver
energy at an operatLr_ cost of about $2/MJ. Laser disadvantages are mainly those of
achieving the required range, requiring either expensive short-wavelength lasers for
conventional optics, or a bre2,ktkrough in larger optics to use cheaper infrared gas
lasers. Just such a potential breakthrough is provided by the gas lens. concept of M.
Michaelis 1. We will f_us on the approach we believe will be most frui_ in each
circt_nstance, e.g., cheap DF lasers with gas lenses or ultraviolet KrF lasers.
Kaage
A major consideration in choosing laser wavelength is focusing optic size, which is di-
rectJy determined by the necessary range. For propagation of a laser beam which is "p-
times diffraction-limited', Kogelrgk-Li theory gives for the Rayleigh range to the beam
waist:
.D2o
zl¢ = ..... cm [ 1]
4_k
_Su
Where D_ is the Earth-based optic diameter, and k is the laser wavelength, the mini-
mum irradiation spot diameter at the beam waist D, will be D_ N2 when the lmmch
mirror is located a distance z_ from the bean waist. We can let the laser spot on the
NEO have diameter D 2 >D o at the cost of increased laser energy (determined by the
necessity for achieving surface plasma formation threshold on the NEO surface), for
which case we obtain an increased range
ZZ=ZR {1+_/(D2/Do):-1 } cm. [2]
FOCUSING oPTIc _
(DF.PICTED AS KEFLFC'FIVE
l_OR VISU ALIZ.ATIO_,
Bt_'r MAY BE GAS L.E._S) _
In the following table, we list the results of calculations for 5 cases at infrared and
ultraviolet laser wavlengths, assuming normal optics or gas lenses and a beam quality
factor _=3. Note that the table shows minimum single-pulse energy for the laser to
achieve sigmficant momentum coupling to the NEO.
Laser Range _4th Normal Optics [Dt=10 m] or Gas Lenses [Dt=lkm] end Pulse Energy
Needed with Target dia. D, and Pulsewidth 1: to Reach Mhfimum Intensity for listed C
Wave_
(gm)
4
RanlF z£[beam
quality _=3]
4
Launch
Beam dia.
D l (m)
Tar_ Beam
dia. D2(m)
F_am_ pc_r
Pulse
w L (J)
2.2 G]
Pulse
D_a_,m
z(ns)
Targa
Intensity
ls(GW/cr n 2)
I .
Coupling
Czeff,c,ent
Cm(d.sF_
1 km
d
50,000 km 10 m 107 50 0.5 2.1
0.248 50,000 km 10m 7.1 10MJ 50 0.5 ,1.8
710 100GJ 50 0.5
lkm0.248 31
710
0.22 AU
0.22 AU 190MJ
100GJ
1
3.5 ALl
50
5O0.248
0.5 i 4.8
+.
lkm t: 4.80.5 t
Zb7
The cases shown illustrate the importance of the successful development of gas-lens
technology (or, possibly, of certain phased-array mirror concepts) as enablers for laser
NEO deflection. Further, even though 4-pro laser energy is less costly than ultraviolet
energy, the Table shows that much less of the short-wavelength, short-pulse energy is
required to give efficient momentum coupling by laser ablation at the NEO surface.
This must be considered "uncooperative" in the sense that we cannot enhance the
coupling coefficient, nor mount a receiving mirror on the NEO to capture and concen-
trate the laser beam as we would do m, e.g., the case of laser-stabilization of geosyn-
chronous satellites. The energy is, by Eq. [1], essentially proportional to k'_,with other
conditions fixed. In forming the Table, we have held the quantity I k _r_ constant, as
an approximation to the threshold for vacuum plasma formation.
In the 4th row of the Table, we have used focusing - that is, the launch mirror is posi-
tioned several times z k from the beam waist. For the case represented in that row,
50,000 laser shots of 190 MJ (10 Hz, 80 minutes) are necessary to g:ve a transverse ve-
locity increment _,f 5 m/s to a 37-m..diameter stony NEO with density 3.4 g/cm a. 'Vhese
figures are consistent with the expected first-time detection distance for a NEO of this
size on a collisioncourse with Earth at 25 km/s relative velocity,and with its successful
deflection2.In this size range, we believe lasers can be 5uil¢ which deliver laser energy
at an operating cost of 50¢ - $2 per MJ. For this case, then, the cost of deflection would
be $5 - $20M. A significantfraction of this cost is the cost of dectridty in the KrF laser
case - at)oct 40 GW continuous power for 80 minutes. Of course, the capital cost of the
laser facilitywould [_ quite high, tJerhaps as much as $20B for a KrF laser.Since KrF
does not penetrate the atmosphere, the laser would best be constructed and operated
on the moon or on a geosy_chronous platform.
In contrast, the shorter-range DF laser is more effident in convertir_g electricity to
light and costs less to build, as well. per unit output. We conceive of a 3ystem in which
D and F are electrolytically recycled with high efficiency. The overall electrical effi-
ciency of this system is then close to the laser's chemical ettidency of 20% In addition,
DF laser physics penv, its us to propagate relatively high output intensity (4 GW/cmD ,
leading to a small laser device for the energy _, and the electrical driving point efficiency
is ext_mely high (200 -- 1,000c/_.) because it is a chemical laser. For these rea_ns, the
Lb_
capital cost of a 190-MJ-per-pulse DF laser would likelybe an order of magnitude
smaller at about $2B, an advantage which fails to offset the limited range, as the cases
illustrated in rows 3 and 4 of the Table demonstrate.
Lsser  em  Rgl t
Most of the time, the laser would not be used for deflection. To justify cost of construc-
tion, we inqmre whether the laser could be useful for searching the skies for NEO's.
Using the samp case described in row 4 of the preceding Table, and assuming reflectiv-
ity R into 2_ e,_rradians and that the laser footprint D 2 is amaUer than the NEO, the
size of the received signal expressed in photons - where W L and t are defined as
before, z is range and D w is receiver diameter in consistent units - is:
B = 6.3 x 10 21 R I_WL _. photons. [3]
Z 2
It is seen that a 190-MJ-per-pulse, 50-ns KrF laser will deliver a 50-ns pulse conta;n-
ing 100 R photons into a receiving aperture of diameter DR(m) meters at a range
ZDET = 3.6 DR(m) AU. Laser intensity on the NEO sLmf.acewould obviously exceed solar
illumination intensity within the laser bandwidth by many orders of magnitude at any
reasonable range. As the Table shows, the laser footprint D 2 is smaller than a 30_m-ch-
ameter N'EO when z is smaller than 0.22 AU. For larger or farther NEO's, increased re-
ceiver diameter is necessary to compensate, e.g., 5-m-diameter for Z_r = I AU.
However, for the case we are discussing (row 4 of the Table), the time to search 1 ster-
rad at 10Hz laser repetition rate is 4.5 x 10 _ yr! The laser would only be useful for
sea.n-ahing a very spedfic area of sky. The laser wou/d be useful for accurately tracking
an NEO which has been located by some other means, or for determi, fing its surface
elemental compositlon by l._ser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy CLIBS).
'll_e following Figture reproduces calculations which show how many pulses of an 830-
MJ laser op_ratmg at 10Hz are required to pr_)vide Av=10 cm/s vs. NEO diameter,
c_)nsistent with 1-year oollision warning time, and accurate NEO orbit determination.
!. M, M Yl_.l'_clts, c! al., " A ga_.,iat_ Icic,_pc," N_ufe, 3.{_1,.147 (1991)
2. C. R. l_ipI_, "Dyrmm_:s of NEO Inlct_q_on," Prvc..cedmgs of this cc_fe'zc_e
3. C. R. Phipps, "Ctmcep_ual de,sign _ a 170-MJ hydroge_ flutride la_x for fu._m." lxt_er attcl Partic_ Beam.s, 7, 835
(1989)
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Required laser energy (J) for
Providing enough _v to avoid collision with 1 year prediction
(Calculation based on Cm, 2.5 dyne-sJ, p=,lg/cc and _v =10 cm/s)
h=
C
L_
,.J
I x 1022
lx10 21
1x 10 2o
Ixi019
lx1018
lx1017 i : : : : ;
lx1016
Ix1015
lx1014
lx1013
...... "_ ...... i" i..: '
•,v'tXtn12 _ _
...... _ _ ...: ..... :.._ _..
1 xlO 11 .....
lx10 lO
Ixi0 9
lx108
lxi00
÷
10Hz
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830 MJ
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830 MJ
10 6
lx106
...... i .,,_...;..,L.L
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lx104
1xlO 3
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I xl 01 1xl 02 I xl 03 1xl 0 4
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7. FUTURE DIRECTION FOR RESEARCH
VALUE OF SPACE DEFENSES
by
Gregory H. Canavan
Los Alamos National Laboratory
ABSTRACT
The economic value of defenses against near-Earth object (NEO) impacts is
bounded by calculating the expected losses in their absence, which illustrates the.
contributions from NEOs of different sizes and the sensitivity of expected losses to
impact frequencies. For nominal impact frequencies, damage durations of a few
decades, and normal economic costing, small NEOs make little contribution,
intermediate size NEOs make a bounded but potentially significant contribution, and
large NEOs make a bounded but large contribution. Increased persistence of
damage with NEO size shifts emphasis to the largest NEOs and greatly increases
expected losses and the value of wanting and defenses. Currendy, tmcertainties
appear to be larger than mean values of losses for all but the largest NEOs.
1. Introduction
This report discusses the value of defenses against near-Earth objects (NFOs) by
calculating the value of the losses expected in their absence, which are estimated from the product
,of their impact frequency and expected loss, summed over all NEO sizes. It gives an approximate
calculation of those expected losses, using simplified models for NEO impact frequencies and
damage Its goal is not to estimate these los.ses prect_ly, but to illustrate the contributions made by
NEOs of different sizes, show the sensitivity of expected loses to imperfectly known empirical
information, and suggest fruitful areas for further theory and experiments.
Section 2 adapts a standard damage model to estimate, the area of destruction from a NF./)
of given mass and energy. Section 3 estimates the expected loss for a given area of destructio.n
._tion 4 use.s empirical data to model the probability density function for the NEO impact
frequency, varying the power law tit to show the _nsitwity of the lo_ses to experimental
uncertainties..Sections 5-7 convolve it with the expected loss as a function of diameter for small,
intermediate, and large NEOs, respectively, to calculate their contributions to the total expected
h,ss. Section 8 studies the effect of variable persistence of damage; Section 9 assesses tlw_
_nsitivity of results to experimental uncertainues; and Section 10 summarizes the main insights.
2b I
2. NEO Damage Radius, Area, and Fraction
Hills and Goda argue that stony NEOs tens to hun&eds of meters in diameter can cause
damage on the ground, even if they break up in the aunosrhere during entry, by depositing much
of their kinetic energy in the atmosphere as fl,ey rapidly decelerate at an altitude of about an
atmospheric scale height. 1 The strong shock produced by this energy deposition gives an
approximate radius of catastrophic destruction of
R _- bY I/3, (1)
where Y = mV2/2 is the kinetic energy of a NEO of mass m and velocity V and b _ 0.047 (m-
s2/kg) 1/3 con'esponds to an over-pressure of 2 psi, which would destroy most buildings. 2 If the
NEO's density is la = 3 kg/m 3, and its diameter is D, its mass is m = 41a(D/2) 3, and Eq. (1) gives
R = b(laV2/4) 1/3D, (2)
which is proportional to D. In this approximation, the damage i_dius depends only on the NEO's
energy. R also depends on the NEO's composition, through the stresses that it can withstand
during reentry. Those complications are studied by Hills and Goda; this note primarily L'eats stony
NEOs, which comprise about 95% of the objects striking the Earth.
The scaling of damage radius R with initial NEO radius r = D/2 is shown by Fig. 1. The
points are taken from Hills and Goda's predictions for stony NEO velocities of 11 °2, 20, and 30
kin/s; the straight lines are from Eq. (2) tor those velocities. The scaling damage radii lie close to
the detailed predictions for small r, but exceed them by 10-30% for large r and small V, which is
adequate tbr the rough economic analyses below. The Tunguska event is interpreted by Hills and
Goda to have been a stony me_onte with V = 20 kin/s, D = 80 m, and Y = 40 MT. For those
conditions the detailed and scaling results give 44 and 50 km, respectively, for the radius of
destruction. Preliminary Skywatch data suggests a shift to a higher fraction of higher-velocity,
long-period comets at large radii, which would reduce the discrepancy. 3
The scaling of Eq. (1) is only approxim..a_; blast waves cannot remain spherical over
distances large compared to the thickness of the Earth's atmosphere. Damage out to the radius R of
Fxt. (2) corresponds to destruction of a fraction of the Earth's surface of about
f = nR2/4nRe 2 .= b2(ptV2/32Re3)_3D 2 = CD 2, (3)
where IL: is the Earth's radius and C - 6x 10-10/m2 for a typical V of 20 km/s. This result is
intended for u._ for f << _ but a rough estimate of the NEO diameter required for catasm'zphic
destmcuon can be obtained by taking f to be unity, which gives D .-- I/',,/C = 40 krn, which is
consistent with the values inferred by others from the limited data and theory available, apart from
unquanti,Smd global climatic impact. 4
d6L
3. Expected Loss
The US GNP is about $5T/yr, which is about a quarter of the Earth's total gross product,
G, that is u_d as a surrogate for the total loss. With warning, evacuation and preparation could
reduce loss of life and limit damage to the loss of production for the period of time required for
recovery. For an impact that renders a fraction f oft he Earth's s_,'face unproductive for a time T, a
geometrical phase-space estimate of the expecled loss is fGT, Sections 4 through 7 assume a
recovery time of T - 20 years for NEOs of 'all diameters, which is also the reciprocal of the real
interest rate of 5%/yr u._sezlby governments to discount or cap_talil, e losses of comparable
uncertainty. S,t;ction 8 studies the impact of variable persistence of damage with NEO diamete.r.
4. Impact Frequency Distribution
Morrison's "Impact Hazard" pre_nts summary figures of NEO impact frequency data,
which show that over 9 orders of magnitude in energy, the impact frequency can be approximated
by a ,:ombination of power laws. Figure 2 is the ._ond figure from Morrison's paper, with two
lines added to show that its impact frequencies ,scale as I/Y for Y smaller than about 10 MT, and as
1_ "ZI3 for Y bctw_;n about 16 a_qd 10` `6MI'5 Each r_ge can thus _ represented by a power law
apt_roxirrmtion to, the cumulative probability density function for the num_r of impacts per year by
NEOs with diameters greater that D. which is
N(D) = f D Dmax dx n(x) = KotD -ct, (4)
where Dmax -- 2 km is the maximum diameter of NEOs that do _ol do cata_trophic, global
damage, and Kot is a constant, whose value depends on the value of ct.. For the scaling in Eq (2),
Y o_ D 3, so Morrison's figures imply ot = 3 for Y < 10 MT---or D < 40 m--and ot = 2 for D up to
about 2 km. Becattsc the data is sparse and its interpretation is not without controversy, a is
tamed as a parameter below. Differentiating Eq. (4) gives the NEO impact frequency probability
density function
n(D) = -dN/dD = O_KotD "(°t¢ t ) (5)
which fa!ls off with d_arr__eter one power more strongly with D than does frequency N. Morri_n's
figurc:_ can also be used to estimate the constant in Eq, (4). Inverting it yields
Kot :: DfZN(D). (6)
For D --: 20 m, Morrison's second figure gives a colli,;ion frexluency of N = fd)l/yr. That diameter
is at dae 1 MT b,,;ak b,ctween the two power Jaws ; _nce. it can b_ used to evaluate consistent
values of the c(mstants for each range. For ot _- 3, a/_ese, p_-..m_e_ers give K3 = ND 3 = (20 m) 3
(I.01/yr = 8(J m3/yr. For ot = 2 they give K2 - ND 2 = (.2(11m) 2 0.Ol/yr :-:4 m 2/yr. These
constants, when in_rted into Eq. (5), then detennine tlw. NEO imps! frtatuency probability
density function net';dcd to estimate e,conomic h)sses.
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5. Expected Loss from Small NEOs
Integrating the expected loss over the NEd impact distribution function gives the expected
loss from a given range of NEd diameters, which this section does for the smallest NEOs.
According to the Hills-Goda calculations the smallest stony NEOs that can cause damage on the
ground have a minimum diameter of about DHG _' 50 m. That is above the transitional diameter of
DT -- 20 m, which separates the two power laws in Morrison's figures. Thus, stony NEOs in the
ot = 3 range make no contribution at all to the expected loss.
Metallic meteoroids of diameters down to DHGmet = 6 m, which is well below DT, could
cause, damage, but they are greatly reduced in number. 6 If it is assumed that they comprise a
fraction 13-- 0. I of ti,e NEd total and that their collision frequency in the ot = 3 range is BK3 D-3,
their expected loss is the integral of the loss, fGT, over NEd diameters from DHGmet to DT:
Lsmall = _ DHGmet DT dx B n(x) fix) G T
= o,BK3CGT[(DT) 2ix- (DHGmet)2"°q / (2 - ct), (7)
for cz _ 2. For ot = 3, the loss from small NEOs reduces _o
Lsmall = 313K3CGT[ !/DHGmet - ItTW], (8)
which is sensitive to the smallest NEOs that can cause serious damage. For the loss parameters of
,Section 3, the numerica] v'edue of the loss is about
Lsmall = 3 x 0.1 x 80 m3/yr 6x 10-10/m2$20T/yr 20 yr[l/6m - 1/2(hn] -- $0.7Mtyr, (9)
which would only justify, a re.search program on NEd defense against small trte',.ailic NE(_ of
about that magnitude. Since such NEOs would be difficult to detect, it is unlikely that useful
warning, let alone defenses, could be developed for that amount. If the sensor system was only
at.', to detect N'EOs down to 10 m in diameter, it would be unable to detect most of the small
NEOs, and its value in warning would drop to -- $0.2M/yr.
6. Expected Loss from Intermediate NEOs
For NEOs with intermediate diameters, DT _ 20 m to Dmax = 2 km, Mon-ison's figures
indicate that the impact frequency is charactcriz_:d by a power law with ot = 2. Hills and Goda's
calvulataons apply for stony NEOs with diameters from DHG = 50 m up to a maximum of about
250 m NEOs of greater diameters surviw: to impact ',.he ground, so their damage mechanisms shift
to a combination of conventional hyl_'rvel,,city irnpact, which have been studied extensively. 7 and
novel mtx:hanismx such as Tsunamis and t)thcr phenomena, which have not. 8 Nevertheless, the
analysis below axsumes that the dzanagc raOit_, cononucs, t(_ _alc as _q. (2) for NEd diameters all
the way up to Dmax _- 2 kin. an a.,;.su)_apl)<,,a that is apparently also shared by other analy._,s. 9 With
this .scaling the cxpccw.d _o_s f,'om intt'rrr_ediatc :,i.,_ NEOs is
2,34
Linter = _DT Dmaxdxn(x) f(x) GT
= _DHG Dmaxdx n(x) f(x) GT = 2K2CGT In (Dmax/DHG)
= 2 x 4 m2/yr 6xl0"10/m 2 $20T/yr 20 yr In (2 km/50 m) = $TM/yr, (10)
which justifies a more substantial premium. Moreover, it is quite, uncertain. The actual losses could
be much higher, as discussed in. Section 9 on the sensitivity of results to uncertainties in the data.
Note that the intermediate loss is equally sensitive to NEOs of all diameters; each octave in diameter
contributes about equally. Thus, NEOs of all sizes must be detected and protected against for
maximum benefit. If defenses were developed that could only detect NEOs larger than 300 m in a
timely manner or could only intercept NEOs smaller than 300 m in diameter, the expected loss and
resulting value of the defenses would be cut about in half.
7. Expected Loss from Large NEOs
In general, the expected loss from the largest NEOs is treated as the product of an infinite
loss and a small--possibly zero--probability, l0 The standard economic model used here assumes,
instead, that with warning and evacuation, loss of life could be limited, and the damage from even
large NEOs could be bounded by the economic value, of the facilities destroyed, the supplies
needed to survive the recover)', and the pr,. Auctie_r: lost during the time it took the Earth's
atmosphere and civilization to recov,--, w_,_ch ts _,:yen by the product of the Earth's product G and
the recovery time of about 20 years as ,reed above. In that case the loss from large NEOs is
l.large = I Dmax °° dx n(x) f(x) t., T = GT _ Dmax " dx n(x) 1 = GTN(Dmax). ( 11 )
Morrison's figures give a collision frequency for the NEOs of diameter Dmax of about one impact
evcry million years, or N(Dmax) ---10 -6. Thus, the expected loss from large NEOs is about
Llarge = $20T/yr x 20 yr 10-6/yr = $200tvYyr. (12)
This is ebout a factor $200M/yr / $7M/yr -_ 30 times larger than the nominal losses from the
intermcdiatc size(i NEOs discussed in the previous section. Indeed, the losses for the largest NEOs
can be treated by extending Drnax to include the possibility of NEOs a few hundred kilometers in
diameter. Then the benefits of intercepting larger objects would increase with their size roughly as
could the cnergies, technologies, and costs of the means required to intercept them.
This argument must ultimately b.'eak down for NErDs of sizes that could literally fracture
the Earth and dissipate its atmosphere., but that would require NEO diameters orders of magnitudes
greater than the few kilometers Chapman a&sociates with global catastrophe, by which he actually
just means global climate impact. Within the context of the standard model u_d here, insurance
can bc purchased and is valuable for NEOs of those sizes. The truly catastrophic cvcnt.,_ would
_,ccur on time scales perhaps 1002 = 104 time longer than tho_" of the Dmax-Si,'cd NE()s of
current concern. I'hey could literally require placing life away from the Earth.
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would give an expected Io_ of about $60M/yr from intermediate siz_ NEts, which would appear
to justify a significant program for them, too. If that con.stunt is used to evaluate large NEts, their
losses would increase to about 8 x $200M/yr = $1.6B/yr. With persistence of "damage, they could
be even larger.
In addition to this uncertainty about me absolute magnitude of rite coll;,sion frequency, there
is also more recent data from the Spacewatch program that questions even tim break points in the
collision frequency data. Figure 3 gives its collision frequency as a function of diameier
experiments as well as data from lunar craters, comet fragments, and bright meteors, l | Thw scaling
from Morrison's summary figures is also penciled in. The Spacewatch data merge wel! Jr:to
Shoemaker's lunar crater data and MorrLson's summary curves for NEts with diameters greater
than 100-300 m, but lie significantly above them for smaller NEts. At a diameter of 30 m, the
discrepancy amoun_ to about a factor of l ,(300. If confirmed, the Space, watch data would tend to
enhance the los._zs from smMl and intermediate NEts relative to that from large ones.
The impact can be as_ssed with slight modifications of the analysis above. Section 5
indicates that for small stony NEts, although their collision frequency is greatly increased, their
contribution would still be _gligible, since none of the small I'_Os in this range would produce
damage on the surface. But the impact of metallic NEts would be increa,_.d by the ratio of the
collision frequencies, which is about a factor of 103, to about
LSWsmallmet = 103 x $0.TMlyr = $700M/yr, (16)
which is quite large; although, a.s noted alx_ve, this estimate depends directly on the assumed
fraction of metallic NEts at small diameters, which is not treated carefully here.
The Spacewatch data essent:,Mly breaks the intermediate NEts up into two gro.ups, which
are differentiated by the change of the power law at the transitional diameter of DSW = 250 in. The
first group is from 20 to about 250 m; the second i_sfrom 250 m to 2 kin. For the _-.cond group,
the .scaling is about ot = 2, as hefore, and the magnitude of their collision frequency is about the
.same as that in Morrison's figures, so the previous integration can be halved to produce a loss
from the second group of intermediate stony NEts of
LSWinter2 = $3.5M/yr. (17)
For the first grot, p of NEts with d)ametcrs from about 20 to 250 m, the scaling appears to Ix;
slightly stronger than ot = 3 out to the transitional diameter DSW, The !o._ from t.hi,, first group of
intermediate NEts is given by m_difying the; limit_ of Eq. (10) to _e intcvval DHG to I)SW:
LSWinterl = J DHG DSW d× n(x) f(x) G T
:: ¢xKswCGT[(Dsw)2 -or - (DHG) 2-or] / (2 - _), t18)
for ot #. 2, where KSW is the collision frequency from the Spacewatch data. F_r _ = 3, it can be
_6o
8. Variable Persistence of Damage
The sections above assume a persistence of damage of T = 20 years for all NEd diameters_
That probably overestimates the impact of small NEOs, for which damage could probably be
reversed in a year or two, and underestimates the damage from large ones, for which it could
persist thou._nds of years. Logically, T should increase with D. lust how it would increase is not
known. T_e impact of varying T with R is illustrated below b,, assuming T = l'of, i.e., that T is
proportional to D 2 or R 2, which corresponds to diffusion-like recovery. The calculations take To =
1 milfion years for neeu--tota.l damage. Compared to the constant T calculations above, this
assumption reduces the loss expected from small NEOs and increases the loss from large ones.
The crossover diameter is where " = CD 2 = TfTo = 20 yr/106 yr, or D = _/(2x 10-5 / 6x10-10/m2)
= 180 m, which is at the upper end of the stony NEOs treated accurately by Hills and G_xla. This
vmiablc T gives an expcx:te..d loss of
Lvar = _ DHG Dmax dx n(x) f(x) G To f
= otKGToC2(Dmax 4-°_- DHG4-Ot);(4 --¢x) (13)
for ct # 4. For ct < 4 and variable persistence, the loss scales most strongly on de largest NE¢_,
and because Dmax >> DHG, it reduce_, to
Lvar _" o.KGToC2Dmax 4"ct / (4 - o0. (14)
For the very large NEOs to which this estimate is mos_ sensitive, ot is 2 or less. For ot = 2 and the
parameters above,
Lvar = 2 4 m2/yr $20T/yr 106 yr (6x10-10/m2)2 Dmax2 / 2 = $30/m2 Dmax2_ (i5)
which for Dmax = 2 km, gives a loss of about $120M/yr. "l'he los:_es would increase with the
.square of the diameter of larger NEOs. Thus, losses with persistence can be an order of magniiude
larger than those from the largest NEOs ignoring persistence,, which justify would justify an
accordingly larger program, if these losses were unavoidable. With variable persistence, large
programs wouid be jusdfied even for modest maximum NEO diameters. Persistence of _age
shifts the strongest scal;,r._g from the smallest to the largest NEOs and greatly increases the exw.zted
annual loss. More detailed calculations of global damage wo_d essentially vary To, presumably
producing losses and vMues of defenses intermediate between the extremes in _ctions 7 and 8.
9. Sensitivity of Results
The results of sections 5 through 7 indicate that smzll NEOs produce smMl Io_s;
intermediate NE()s produce intermediate losses; and large NEOs prodt_oe large losse,_. They arc,
however, uncertmn due to the _mewhat sparse and new data on impact f_...quencie.g as a fimction
of size. While Moni_on's figures tmply K = 4 m 2/yr in the ot = 2 range, the text states d'tat
"Bodies about 100 m diameter and larger strike, on average, several times per tizillenniam," which
implies a constant in the collision frequency of K2 = (100 m)2/300 yr = 33 m2/yr. That is larger
than the value used in the estimates above by about a factor of about 3?/4 .. 8. The larger value
(100m)3 x 3xl0"3/yr _,3x103m3/yr, f.':rwhich Eq.(i8) reducesto
LSWinterl = 3KswCGT[1/(DHG)- I/(Dsw)]
= 3x3x103m3/yr6x10-10/n,2$20l/yr 20yr[ 1/50m - 1/250m] = $35M/yr, (19)
which increases the contribution from the fh'st group of intermediate NEOs by about an order of
magnitude over that from the esumate using Morrison's rates. As an aside, it might be noted that
adding the metallic NEOs in this rift group could roughly double this loss, because thmr = 10-fold
smaller minimum diameter would just compensate for their _ 10-fold smaller number. Ignoring
them mud adding Eqns. (17) and (18) for the two groups gives the total expected loss from the
intcrmeciiate-size stony NEOs under the Spacewatch collision frequencies, which is
LSWinter = LSWinterl + LSWintcr2 = $35M/yr + $3 5M/yr_ = .D._,_'u_r,"""""' ' (20)
wtuch is about a factor of $39M/yr / $7M/yr = 6 greater than ,._hetotal estimated from Morrison's
summary figures. Becausc the Spacewatch data does not alter the estimate of the loss from large
NEOs given in Section 7, the ratio of the losses from intermediate and large NEOs becomes about
$39M/yr / $200M/yr = 20% under the Spaccwatch collision frequencies.
Thus, while Morrison's summary collision frequencies produce the result that small NEOs
pmouce smzdl los._.:s: in ,terraediate NEOs product intemaediate losses; and large NEOs produce
l-:,_gc 1."-_,c,,, current uncertainties in the data considerably complicate this simple evaluation. The
uncc_',_ntic.s i_ _.hc absolute magnitt_de of the collision frequencies discus.sed _,n Morrison's text
woulJ lead _<_k_ses from the into[mediate size NEOs that wen: worth dewx:ting and defending
a,,-insk A;_O the rooent Spa,:cwau h data produce tx)th a different path to this conclusion and to a
strong suggestion that the cot,tribution hr).ra _:,m,,ll me_d!ic NEOs." could be even larger, although it
could be quite difficult and expe.-.nstvc _,')detect )hem. Unfo,_unately, this analysis does nol serve to
bound ',.his .seemingly dominant contribution from small metallic NEC.)s, since it assumes a |airly
simple and monotonic scaling of damage radius on NEO diameter, which is appropriate for s;ony
NEOs, whereas the HiUs-Goda calculations indicate a complicated and non-mo_totonic behavior for
small mctahic NE()s that could produce significantly diftemnt _-aling. It _,culd ccz-tamly appear
u._fui to ,ake their curves tbr small metaliic NE()s and can-,,' out t_ type of analysis done here fo:
stony NEOso
While these _'nsltivity analy._s art." sumulating, about all that. can l×" said with c,.mfidence is
that on the ba.,ds of the collision freqtmncy, c,_m[_siti_;n, _md calculati,mal infomaation now m
hand, the erro- bars are as large or larger than the m,.3an cxpcctcd loses for all but the largest
NEOs. The proper priorities R_r research to right _,s sittlati_m would appca_" to Ix.' us deiermint, the
c(;llision frequency and comlx}sition more carcful!y f,'r NEtR with diameters _.':1o_' aNm_. 25(} m
and to better estimate the ex,a:nt and [x'rsistcnce of ,he damage from NE(£ of diameters ab,wc a
few kilometers, l.est it se_.'m that interrnediau: NE()s wmh diameters tx:twecn 25{} and 2,{I(R} m are
beingignored, it might be noted that their damage mechanisms do not appear to have been
quantified at all, and all estimates just seem to assume the continuation of geometric damage radii in
the face of obviou_ geometric argtmaents to the contrary. There would not seem Ix) be arty lack of
f=xiifful ate as for theory and experiment
10. Summary and Conclusions
"Ibis note bounds the economic value of defenses against NEO impacts by calculating the
expected losses in their absence by summing the product of their expected impact frequency and
expecte_i damage loss over all NEt diameters. The analysis is primarily directed towards stony
NEts, asing the recent damage calculations of Hills and Goda. It uses a standard economic mtxlel
of expel:ted loss that produces a bounded contribution from NEts of all sizes. This process
illustrates the contributions from NEts of different sizes and the sensitivity of total expec_d losses
to composition and impact frequencies, suggesting fruitful areas for theory and experiments.
For nominal parameters, the analysis identifies three diameter ra,.ges of interest. The
smallest stony NEts with diameters below about 20 m, where the collision frequency falls most
rapidly with diameter, cause no damage according to Hills and Godas' detailed calculations. Small
metallic NEts might produce losses of about $1M/yr, but that is probably too small to be of
interest, given the difficulty of detecting them.
Intermediate stony NEts with diameters from about 20 to 2,000 m appear to produce about
t_xtual contributions per octave to an expecteA annual loss of about $7M/yr, which would justify
defenses costing about that much. Defenses that could only detect large N-EOs or intercept small
ones would have proportionally reduced value.
The largest ,'_.Os with diameters over about 2 kin, which are usually as._ciated with
global damage, contribute an expected lo_s of about $200M/yr, which dominates the analysis.
When persistence of damage with NEt size is taken into account, it shift.,, emphasis even more
strongly to the largest NEts and increases the expected annual losses by an order of magnitude.
Unfortunately, these simple results are. very sensitive to impact frequency data, which is
sparse and new The unce_ainties in collision frequencies discus._d in Morrison's text would lead
to losses from the. intermediate size NEts that were worth detecting and defending agairtst, and
recent Spacewatch data prc_luce both a different path to this conclusion and to a strong suggestion
that the contribution from small metallic NE(_ could be even larger, which this limited analysi_
cannot bound. It would appear useful to ,epeat it with Hills and Godas' detailed calculations for
small metaUic NEts and the Pest data on the composition of small NEts.
Currently, the error bars are as large or larger than the mean expected losses for all but the
largest NEts. It wo,_id aopear appropriate to study the collision frequency and composition of
NEts with diameters below 2_) m, t,_ beater estimate ihe extent and pe_istence of the damage
from large NEts, and to quantify the damage mechanisms of intermediate-size NEts. There
269
seems to be no lack of fruitful areas for theory and experiment. Both will have to be significandy
refinedbeforetherelative importance of NEOs ofdifferentsizescantbe assessedwithconfidence.
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"Why Now?"
Text and paraphrase of an after-dinner speech by
Dr. Edward Teller
on the occasion of his 84th birthday
January 15, 1992
Los Alamos National Laboratory
There are two answers to the question "Why Now?"
In the last three years, very remarkable changes have occurred in the world.
One of them is that I can visit ttungary. What has happened? Nobody present,
nobody in the world, had foreseen it. Now, for the first time, incredible things can
really happen, including international cooperation an a subject like defense against
asteroids.
I cannot pass over, in talking about this subject, the indirec_ but powerful
ways our national laboratories contributed to what has happened. Nuclear energy
did not have the possibility of remaining undiscovered. That it has been discovered
and has been used -- probably not without mistakes, but without major mistakes --
has persuaded people w'ho had been previously impotent and unforthcoming to find
leaders to take them .'me big step toward peace. l'hat the Russian people stood up in
incredib!e numbers m defend their own freedom and that of others...this was made
possible by the magnificent fact that nuclear power rested in the hands of ,hose wF,,,_
did no_ misuse it in a truly major way, in the hands of our government which is in
tac_ dedicated t_ peace. I am encouraged in the argument that we can work on
knowledge of every kind leading to higher technology in the confidence that people
will use it properly.
The role of the national laboratories in bringing this about cannot go
unmentioned. The big changes in the world give a reason for "why now," and "why
here" (at Los Alamos).
There is another reason: a remarkable number of technological developments
have made it possible to do something about meteorites. Computers, radar, lasers,
nuclear energy,..each of these has contributed. We are now facing a problem that
before the Tunguska meteorite could not be addressed. These methods were not
available. Now they are.
I would like to make my main statement. It will be brief, but the consequences
are long_ Here is my recommendation about what to do with the opportunity that is
here. We must proceed in four separate phases, one at a time. We must give the lion's
share of attention to the first phase: knowledge.
First, we should find out about meteorites. A lot is known today. Very much
more remains to be found out. In what ways? Many are obvious. I'll mention two
special points which have not received detailed emphasis as yet in this meeting. One
is the incredible developments in Livermore in the improvement of lasers. We can
now concentrate a lot of illumination in a narrow spectral region for a short time,
with laser pulses a hundred times cheaper than before (in appropriately exaggerated
terms of megabucks per megawatt). Powerful lasers have already been h,,cused on
the Moon. With the help of rockets, or even from the Earth, we can illuminate a
meteorite that passes closer than the Moon. We could heat up the surface and watch
it cool, yielding reformation about its conductivity. The importance of this subject is
now evident to me today, much more than yesterday.
A second question. Shall we look at the meteorites from |_rth or fr_m space? I
don't know. But I will give an argument to look at them from spane, because it is not
completely obvious, if we put the telescope _m a (low} orbiting satellite, it can see all
of the sky anti with no disturbance fr',T:l the atm_sphere. Clearly one nf the
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important properties of meteorites is their changing brightness because of their
rotation and changing position. These intensities can be measured from the ground.
They can be measured more quantitatively if the atmospheric disturbances are
corrected, but it is best if we are outside the a'mosphere and no correction is needed.
We need to measure intensitites to O.1%, which can be done by charge coupled
devices, CCDs. Unlike photographic plates, which are clumsy and old fashioned, CCDs
report directly' to a computer, and then you can perform miracles. With fifty bits to a
hundred bits, you can get accurate positions of stars and spectral lines. The Sun
changes its intensity by' 1/2% to l% every eleven years. We have similar
information to date on a few dozen stars, l.et's get stellar variability to O.1% for a
n-illion of them, iO 8 bits. Ask the computer to check the catalog. We don't want to
know this to find out about the long-term variation of energy productio: _, in stars -- it
has been a million yeaa's from the production of energy to when it is emitted. Wha_
we see on the short term is due to hydrodynamics, which we don't t, aderstand (except
for cepheid variables). We are ignorant about the smaller variation. Why do we
want to know about them? I'll tell you after I find out. Galileo said, "Look first, then
find out what the problems are." From space, you have a better possibi!ity of
learr,ing about meteorites and also about this entirely different branch of science.
This project might he done internationally; a national effort would be difficult
and expensive. But the public interest exists for this first step of knowledge.
lhe second step is experimentation. Every year, one of these potentially
dangerous meteorites comes chaser than the bloon. We should send OUt satellites to
discover them, try' to do what v¢_1 would d_ for defense if you needed to, whether
nuclear or n_._-nuclear. It w.e use a nuclear explosion while the meteorite departs,
we can give an abs_lute guarantee thai we will ha_e no detectable radioactivity on
the liar'h. The <clestial object could be stones, rubble piles, a comet, chondrites, iron
meteorites -- whatever -- you take the best look at _hem and experiment. So if and
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when a real danger occurs, you have already practiced. Do it internationally. The
United States should pay less than half the cost; this is not to save dollars, but
criticism from other nations would be much more constructive if they were paying,
The planning, the money, the actions should all be international. If a threat occurs,
the knowledge from our experimentation can be used.
The third phase is defense against a meteorite that is going to hit. One might
think about starting to make plans about who decides what to do when it happens.
Perhaps, it is good to make plans. 1'i1 say' why it might not be good. I hope that we
will have more than three months' notice, not about a hypothetical object, bot about
a real one that will hit. Maybe we should evacuate 1,000 people, or maybe we should
use one of the me:hods we have already practiced. If the decision on how to decide is
made in advance, it _,'ill oe made by' bureaucrats, if the threat is happening, the
people will decide; I trust the people. After the object is deflected, then we can face
step number four.
As step four, we can make plans for the safety' of the whole future. It would be
advantageous if the first use would be on a small meteorite. Actually. there is a q9%
t h-race that a small one will come before a big one. So this is ,,he optimal approach.
In this extraordinary time, which is the end of three )'ears of miracles, we are
io_,king into the possibility of a better future, be,'ause there arc big and different
changes for different people in l<)q2. l'his is a crisis for which the Chinese use a
symbol c<_mpc_sed of two parts which mean d.mger and opportunity, l)efense against
meteor-ires _s ,me way to use lhc oppa)rtunity and avoid the danger.
l _'il[ make a more general remark about h{_ the opp,.)rtunity sh_mh_l be ust?d.
l'he right solution was pr_p_sed it_. carl) 19-1{_ to the I!.N. Its <n, lsl_mding
characteristic was I_ ',eek smuriT3 iv, c{_,',perat_,m alibi _}penness {I1_I secret.v). It was
called the lJlienthal Rep_rt. It was pr,_p_sed by ()ppenheimt.'r, _vh{_ was nol a right-
w,inger; by garuch, _vb._ was not a h,ft-_vinger. It was presetltcd 1_; the Ilnited
Nations. All political parties supported it, But it came to nought due to the veto of
Stalin. It involved an International atomic Development Authority with limited but
sufficient powers. I think we can succeed now.
We cm_ solve the problem bot',l of war and of meteorites. But we shall not lack
problems. Man has been called a problem-solving animal. Maul and woman should
ly2 called i_roblem-creating animals. We will have _ problems to solve.
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Appendix A
7. PROGKAM/POLICY OPTIONS
7.1 Cattlori#s of lmpact Hazard and Correspond_r_ Amelioration Effort
The first of the two NASA-sponsored workshops found that there is a definite worldwide risk
of dange1_us effects from im_acts on Earth by asteroids and comets larger San I km in
diameter. Smaller objects produce more loca|ized effects. Such impacts occur infrequently,
but have potentially serious consequences that justify an effort at mitigation.
Three different categories of impacts merit attention:
Large asteroids (greiter than approximately 1 _nn diameter)
Large, Iong_veriod come_s
Small asteroids and comets (approximately 50 m to I km diameter)
Most objects smaller than 50 m diameter break up, vaporize, and therefore deposit most of
their energy very high in the atmosphere. A small percentage (3-5 percent) of such objects
are of dense metallic composition and will strike the surface of the Earth, the larger ones
producing cra_ers.
Most large asteroids ran be readily detected wi*.h an augmentation of current ground-based
t_chnology. If one were on a collision course with Earth, it probably wou|d be found decades
in advance of any collision, after which an orderly scheme of characterization and mitigation
could be implemented. These large asteroids are judged to be the most dangerou_ NEOs in
terms ofglobaleffects on life.
According to the first workshop, large long-period comets have approximately 20 times lower
probability of Earth impact t_han do large asteroids. But because of their higher impact
velocity, the overall hazard of _rious global effects from comets may be about one-quarter as
great as that from asteroidimpact. Most large long-period_omete probably willnot be
detecteduntillessthan a yearbeforecollision.The responseformitigationmust thereforebe
rapid,and comets may be inherentlymore difficultobjectsthan asteroidstodeflect_Both of
these factorsmake mitigaticneffortsmore expensive,more difficult,and potentiallyless
certain.
Dmdng the next decade,small (50 m to I kin)objectscouldbe found onlywith an advanced
technologyapproach todetectionthat,iftheythreatenedcollisions,would discoverthem just
days to weeks beforeimpact. (On a time scaleofcenturies,some ofthese smallerobjects
would eventuallybe found by the ccnventionalsurvey forlargerobjects.)These sins]let
objectsconstitut__ a hazard only to localregionsofthe Earth,and the annualized average
casualty rate is thereforelower than for the larger impacts, which have worldwide
corsequences. The impact of a small objectin a heavily populated area would be an
enormous caLas*.rophe,however. As in the caseoflong-periodcomets,deflection/destruction
assetswould have to be already in place and thus might be controversial.For localized
impactsevacuationmight be a possibleresponse.
7_ l_wl, of Effort and _quence
Both NASA-sponsored workshops concurred regarding *.hefirstelement of a program for
addressing the threat: identifyingthe threateningobjects.The nature ofthe long-period
comet threatisleastwellunderstood,particularlybecause ofour lackofknowledge about the
basicpropertiesof comet nuclei. The environmental (not tomention economic) effectsof
impacts by largeobjects--whetherasteroidsor comets--arepoorlyunderstood because they
involvegreatextrapolationsfrom known phenomena. Therefore,furtherstudy ofthe hazard
ismerited.
Prior to dcvelopir_g an operational mitigation system, it will be necessary to characterize the
physical properties of the potentially threater_ing objects because of the extremely broad
diversity of these objects (ranging from mono,_'ithic metallic objects to icy rubble piles). Of
course, if an object is actually found to b,t on c_collision course, it will become an urgent and
high priority requirement to characterize it as well as possible in the available time.
The shorter the response time, the mort diffwult the mitigation. Therefore, it is prudent to
consider improving the detection capability to increase the warning time before investing
heavily in specifw short.response mitigation systems.
Possiblelevelsofyrogrammatic effortdepend on the new resourcesthatthe nationmakes
availableto address the impact hazard. In order ofincreasingcommitment of resources,
theseare
(1) Observational,laboratory,and theoreticalstudiesand analysisofthe NEOs and of
mitigationtechnologies(estimatedcost,severalmilliondollarsperyear)
(2) Constructionof dedicatedtelescopesand other instruments to dramaticallyincrease
the detectionrateofNEOs, and augmented laboratoryand theoreticalstudies(several
tensofmillionsofdollarsper year)
(3) In additionto (2),roboticspacecraftmissionstocharacterizea sample ofNEOs thatis
representativeoftheirbroad diversity(about$100 millionper year). Such missions
may evolveintopreliminaryexperiments,as by kineticimpact,to perturbsmall NEOs
and observetheresults
(4) Once the characterization effort and analyses of mitigation techniques have defined
appropriate mitigation system requirements, tun implementation decision can be made.
Our present concepts of what an implementation phase might consist of include a
launch infrastructure, an interceptor vehicle, a target acquisition capability, and
nuclear explosive devices. An implementation program, including system tests, might
cost several hundreds of millions to billions of dollars. More advanced and quite
different mitigation systems may be developed on the time scale of two decades or more
7.3 Policy Frt_m_work
T_,_n3tvre of the hazard i._globalin scope. The United Statesisbest situatedto take a
leadershiprolein d_velopiP.gan internationalprogram to detectthe NEOs, characterize
them, and mitigate_hehazard.Recogni:ingth, sensitivenatul-eofthiscot:rseofactionand
the dramatic internationalchanges iv,recentyears,Jtis appropriate and opportune to
establisha climateofopenness and in_rnationalcooperationfrom the beffinning.
Within the United States,the government-owned facilities,capabilities,and expe,-t;_sefor
beginning thisprogram are distributedprimarilyamong thr_efedera;agencles--NASA, the
Department ofEnergy (DOE), and thc Department ofDefen_e(DOD). Other agencies,such
t_sthe FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the StateDepartment, can also
make significantcontributions.The scientificand technicalcommunity willalsobe deeply
invo;ved. The most sensible management of thts effort is to form a national joint program
o,_ce to implement the approprtate U.S. response to the NEO threat. At ftrsz, it may be most
effwient to structure this as an augmentation to an extsting structure of this lype. Since the
early phases of the recommended program primarily involve exploration and characterization
of the bodies that pose the threat, it is natural and appropriate that NASA takes the lead
within the context of the joint program offwe to begin this program. Eventually, during the
implementation phase, prime responsibility may shift to another federal or international
agency.
7.4 Conclusions of the Program/Policy Options Working Group
Tb.,ethreatfrom impact ofEarth-approachingobjectswas lastformallyaddressed ata 1981
workshop in Snowmass, Colorado. In the decade sincethen,therehas been a major shiftin
perceptionof the hazard to human life,arisingin part from a vast increasein evidence
linkingextinctionof speciesto impacts on Earth. Simultar.eouslythere has been a great
increaseinthe rateofdiscoveryofNEOs, includingsome which have made near passesby
the Earth. The present workshop has concluded that there are technically credible approaches
to preventing an impact catastrophe.
Presently there is no organized program to address the NEO hazard. A decision to proceed
should not be delayed in anticipation that new data will soon substantially modify, our present
understanding. The estimated level of threat merits a near-term response. We should begin
nOW.
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MEMORANDUM
John Rather, Jurgen Rahe, and Gregory Canava:,
Planetary Science Inst./SAIC
2421 E. 6th St.
Tucson, AZ 85719 USA
[Phone: 602-881 0332; FA_\: 602-881-0335]
[F-maih cchapman Inasamcui); 5470::._GR (SP_N)]
8 June 1992
"Near-Earth-Object Interception Workshop" Report
On June 3rd, I received the latest version of the report with a
request for comments to be returned just two days later. I've worked on
it as fast as I could. I have read the new version of the report and
noted a number of changes. But I note, with considerable sadness, that
you have ignored most of my suggestions -- both large and small ones --
that I provided in my memo of 8 April.
Answers to the questionnaire are provided at the end of this memo.
I find that the present report, while containing some important
material, is generally bias . and technically flawe.d. While I know that
others may choose a different course, i consider the document to be so
flawed that I do not wish my name associated with it. I note that you
have tried to say in the new Preface that Chapters 2 through 7 are the
responsibility of only the Working Groups that wrote them. I, however,
think that inclusion of technically fallacious material or bizarre recommen-
dations an.vwhere within the report casts a shadow over all participants in
the Workshop. Since you have chosen to risk the loss of credibility that
will result from your inattention to the criticisms of myself and others, I
ask that my name be removed from the report. I will be happy to
acknowledge in a broader forum that I attehded the Workshop and devoted
much effort to trying to help you prepare a responsible report, but that
the ultimate product of the Workshop turned out to be skewed and
seriously flawed.
I will make one last-ditch attempt to critique the report, in the
hopes that you will be responsive. I will not repeat all of the construc-
tive suggestions contained in my memo of 8 April, but will re-emphasize
some of the most important ones.
Executive Summary
First, I have a major procedural objection to the Executive Summary.
The Executive Summary of this draft report differs from the one that was
submitted to the Congress. In particular, a direct comparison of the
Executive Summary in the March 18th draft, the "Summary of the Findings
of tbe NEO Interception Workshop" [text as provided April ist by the
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Space Subcommittee], and the latest draft Executive Summary reveals that
objectionable material that had been removed prior to submission to the
Congress has been re-inserted into the latest Executive Draft. For
example, the words recommending "that an appropriate experimerttal
program" be undertaken were deleted -- appropriately, I believe -- from
the submission to Congress, but reinserted in the latest draft. Since
these words generally refer to the controversial idea that tests (nuclear
and otherwise) be undertaken to deflect asteroids, I think that this
italicized recommendation is inappropriate. There are, of course, numerous
other differences between the proposed Executive Summary and the one
provided to the Congress. I think that this is most peculiar, and the
Congress might find it to be peculiar, too.
preface:
Pp iii-iv The Preface implies, in a fuzzy way, that Chapter 1 somehow
represents a broader conscnsus than do the other Working Group
chapters. This is false. As I describe below, Chapter 1 is seriously
biased and in no way represents a consensus of the members of the
Workshop. Quite the contrary: one of the major disagreements during the
Workshop concerned the relative importance of the "Tunguska-class"
impacts versus the larger ones. As has been extensively discussed in the
course of developing the report subsequent to January, and as the
Detection Workshop Report makes clear, the prime threat from impact comes
from the objects about I km in diameter and larger. John Rather has not
only superimposed his own biased and incorrect evaluation of the relative
hazards in Chapter I, but he has virtually ignored the larger objects
altogether.
I cannot see how any member of the Steering Committee or
participant in the Workshop can, in good conscience, agree with the
representation of the Preface that Chapter I involves "an overall
consolidation of opinions and technica/ results" nor agree that it "shows
the full scope of the deliberations, results, and opinions."
Execut,v_ Summary:
Pg v i/vii: As elaborated on in my 8 April memo, it is by no means "futile"
to search for and find potentially hazardous objects in the absence of
potential nuclear technology for mitigation. Evacuation and non-nuclear
alternatives could be very important, even if they aren't the most effective
means of mitigation. This statement is not only in the "Energy Delivery"
paragraph but remains, where Rather previously insert,:d it, in the
"Program/Policy Options" paragraph. In particular, I object to its
inclusion in the latter; as a participant in the "Program/Policy Options"
group, I have been particularly cognizant of that chapter, and the
statement about "futility" nowhere appears in that chapter and never did.
so it should be excised frc,_ the Executive Summary.
Pg vii: In my 8 _pril critique, I objected to th- inclu,.)on of the phrase
"eventually do deflection experiments" in step (3). The word "do" has now
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been changed to "consider." This not only makes that sentence
ungrammatical and nonsensical, it does not address the problem. The
Policy group carefully considered a 4 element program. Items (I) through
(3) were not ordered temporally but involved different magnitudes of
funding. Item {4), implementation {including tests) was carefully selected
to follow step (3}. It was also carefully worded not to recommend
implementation but, instead, to say that a "decision [on implementation and
tests] could be made" at that time. John Rather, as l_dJtor, unilaterally
inserted a testing phase into step (3} and has left it there.
Section 1.
This is falsely represented to be a consensus "introduction and
systems overview." It is not. The biggest arguments at the Los Alamos
Workshop were ber.ween {a) those (like the Detection Workshop members)
who argued that the greatest hazard is due to objects larger than about I
km that would have globally destructive consequences and {b) those (like
John Rather and Edward Teller) who argued that small Tunguska-scale
impactors posed the greatest hazard. Teller et al. were simply in error.
They had relied on a _echnically erroneous Livermore report by Lowell
Wood, Rod Hyde, and Muriel Ishikawa (UCID-103771, May 1, 1990, "Cosmic
Bombardment If"). At the Workshop, Hyde gave a talk that substantially
corrected his previous errors, but John Rather seems not to have factored
that into his consiaerations.
The present draft report contains new material (one lengthy
paragraph beginning on pg. 4 plus two full-page diagrams, Figs. I-3 and
1-4} that elaborates on correcting just one of the numerous errors in the
original Livermore report {Wood et al. had ignored the fact that most small
objects explode high in the atmosphere and have minimal consequences on
the ground}. This new material, while qualitatively correct, h_s not been
peer-reviewed, despite its highly technical nature; it is peripheral to this
report, merely correcting a single earlier error, and it should not be given
such prominence in this report.
Despite correcting the one earlier error, Rather -- by conscious
omission of essentially any discussion of >1 km bodies -- grossly distorts
t_,isreport on the central issue: should the limited resources of the world
be ased to address the larger objects or the smaller ones? Elsewhere in
this report {Section 7), Rather has now omitted the statement that had
been in the original about the hazard of small impactors being less by
several orders of magnitude than comparable natural hazards like
earthquakes and cyclones.
Figures 1-3 and 1-4 do not even extend to sizes larger than 100 m
and 400 m diameter, respectively. This is just one example of how the
chapter is dominated by issues that wholly ignore the larger, more
dangerous objects.
In order to illustrate that this imbalance in Section I is deliberate, I
quote below what I wrote in my memo of April 8th; it is apparent that my
comments were ignored:
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"The report implicitly and explicitly emphasizes the importance of
protecting Earth from small projectiles in the 10 to 100 m diameter range.
In fact, such impacts have a high probability of doing no appreciable
damage and, as John Pike has demonstrated, are down by several orders
of magnitude compared with other natural disasters {e.g. earthquakes,
floods, cyclones} in their chances for destroying life and property.
Instead of emphas_z,ng the qualitatively different, and quantitatively
greater, hazard due to projectiles >1 km diameter, the italicized conclusion
on page 4 says that it is "clearly sensible" to protect Earth from "these
very rare but very deadly events" because the "stakes are so high." The
context of this recommendation concerns 10 to 50 m objects, since the
recommendation immediately follows three paragraphs discussing objects in
the 10 m to 50 m diameter range (Tunguska, Revelstoke, and the Gran ._,
Teton fireball}."
"In view of the extensive discussions at Los Alamos about the
qualitatively and quantitatively greater danger posed b v civilization-
threaten:,ng objects >1 km diameter, this conclusion appears to be
intentionally misleading. Wood, Hyde, and others drew this erroneous
conclusion in a Livermore report distributed in advance to Workshop
members; the conclusion was echoed by Edward Teller during the first
morning of the Workshop. Later discussion by many attendees emphasized
the errors in that analysis, and the presentation of Hyde et al. at the
Workshop corrected many of their earlier re,stakes. Yet this report
continues to emphasize the smaller impactors. The report should, instead,
honestly describe the low overall danger from asteroid impact and the still
lower danger from the smaller, more frequent impacts. It should also
honestly describe the fact that the danger from the smaller impacts is
down by several orders of magnitude compared with other natural
disasters."
Fig. 1-5 of the new draft remains unchanged. ! said in m) 8 April
memo that the figure should be annotated to emphasize that the "< 3
months" track is much less likely than the other tracks. Otherwise. it.
too, gives undue emphasis to just those short-warning-time events that
Rather would like to have his standing armada of interceptors ,vaiting to
shoot down.
I said before {8 April memo} that the discussion of precursor
missions {e.g. Table I-3} is very skimpy, does not adequately address
mission objectives, does not distinguish between goals that can be met
from the ground and those that require spacecraft missions, etc. The
discussion remains inadequate in the latest draft.
I said before that the italicized recommendation (pg. 13} to build or
retrofit radars for NEO purposes was costly and that the costs should be
justified. No justification has been appended.
_ection 3.
This chapter continues to discuss methods that have littleor no
utility or which are inappropriate. Section 3.2 states that klnetic energy
interceptors are applicable mainly to small objects {< 70 or I00 m
diameter); but they are so small that they pose little hazard on the
ground. The authors of Sect. 3 hr.d evidently not seen the new Fig. i-4.
Section 3.5, entitled "Consensus of the Energy Delivery/Materials
Interaction Group Members." I DEMAND that my name be removed from any
connection with this FALSE representation. As shown on pg. xi of this
draft report, I was a member of that particular group. As I will quote
below, my memo of 8 April emphatically disagrees with the conclusion that
remains in the latest draft that "...we consider terminal defense to be as
important as remote interdiction...[so] it will be imperative to have ground-
based interceptors available for use on relatively short notice." While the
wording has been changed from the origined {"...itwill be imperative to
have an armada of interceptors on standby status...") the meaning is
ess_.ntially the same. ("Ten" has been changed to "severed," but these
interceptors would still carry 100 megaton nuclear weapons.)
Not only have my objections been ignored in falsely reporting a
"consensus," but --- in a new paragraph toward the end of this section --
the unsupported statement has been added that the hazard of accident or
misuse of these weapons would be small compared with the hazard from
those exceedingly rare asteroids or comets that might require their use.
Unnamed "uninformed critics" (presumably people like me!) are taken to
task for suggesting that these dangerous interceptors would be costly.
Admittedly, cost is in the eye of the beholder, but no cost estimate has
been provided in this report; by my reckoning, the cost of these
interceptors is bound to greatly exceed the cost-to-benefit ratio
appropriate to address this extremely low probability hazard.
As an (ex}-member of this group, I now quote below the objections
in my 8 April memo, as proof that tne material does NOT represent a
consensus:
"The principal conclusion of this report {italicized although buried on pg.
20} is that "an armada of about i0 interceptors," each with "about 100 MT"
fusion bombs, should be "on standby status." This is a preposterous
recou_mendauon. It would be extremely costly, would threaten accidental
nuclear war, and would destabilize the world. The recommendation is out
of a/l proportion to the minuscule threat of impact by a large, not-
previously-discovered comet, which would be the only justification for
such a "terminal defense" system."
and
"Having, as Chapter 3 describes it, "an armada cf interceptors on standby
status" presents a danger of misuse and/or accidental war -- which we
thought had diminished due to the end of the Cold 4_r -- that is
enormous compared with the NEO hazard. It is incoz.ceivable that the
risks of such misuse/accident can be reliably reduced to less than those
exceedingly small risks posed by the NEO's that might require such a
system for mitigation."
and
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"Pg. 20, italicized section. I strongly DISAGREE that "we consider terminal
defe_e to be as important as remote interdiction." Furthermore, I
disagree in the strongest possible way w:.h the conclusion that "it is
imperative to have an armada of interceptors on standby status." It would
entail enormous cost and hazard of accident or misuse. The report
nowhere develops the important conclusion that. we need "about 10"
interceptors nor why the bombs _hould be "about 100 MT.""
Section 4.
Very little revision has been done to this section. It still has two
major problems. First, it presents an inade_luate {I would also say
incompetent} discussion of precursor missiom. I have been a member of
several past NASA and National Academy of Science committees that have
prepared mission recommendations {including COMPLEX, the CRAF Science
Working Group, and the NEAR study group} and am thoroughly familim
with how mission options should be evaluated in a report such as this one.
As I wrote in my critique of 8 April:
"The report shows a bias toward SDIO spacecraft and ignores all NASA
studies of NEG missions. This is a strange approach for what was to be a
NASA recommendation to Congress. Table I-3, which describes "strawman
precursor mission measurements," is incompetent and for that reason &lone
should have no place in this report. It is dubious whether spacecraft
developed by SDIO are capable of making the detailed measurements
necessary to address our deficiency in knowledge about the physical
natures of _'s. This section of the report fails even to distinguish the
kinds of measurements that could be made with groundbased optical or
radar telescopes from those requiring spacecraft fly-by or rendezvous. To
be useful, the strawman measurement requirements should be based on at
least a preliminary assessment of what instruments would be necessary to
achieve measurement goals dictated by the needs of the deflection
technologies. Then it could be determined what the required instruments
might be and whether or not inexpensive, lightweight spacecraft are
capable of meeting the weight, power, and data-rate requirements of those
instruments."
"The approach just descrlbed is the basis for the National Academy
of Sciences COMPT.EX recommendations for the study of comets and
asteroids, in which it was argued that rendezvous rather than fly-by
missions were probably necessary for the kind of in-depth study that we
may expect will be necessary to achieve the kind of characterization that
would be desired in the interception context. NASA has made many
relevant studies of asteroid and comet missions in the past (e.g. CRAF,
NEAR, the Discovery Program}. At a minimum, this section of the report
should draw on, or else contradict, those earlier studies. The reliance
{pg. 23) on an apparently unpublished, possibly secret study by a
"NASA/SDIO workshop" is inappropriate."
Min*mal improvements to th_s section have been made in the latest
d raft.
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Second, the report contains material related to a crazy and
dangerous option of outfitting the world's arsenal of rockets with the
world's arsenal of nuclear weapons in order to address an aspect of the
NEO hazard. As I wrote in my critique of 8 April:
"Sect. 4.3: OMIT THIS SECTION on destroying large incoming objects on
short notice, This is a greatly watered down and _bscure version of the
idiotic proposal in the draft of this section that proposed having more
than 1,000 missiles on standby, equipped with a significant fraction of the
world's nt',cleararsenal. This was strongly objected to on the final day of
the Workshop and the consensus was that hf recommendation would be
deleted from the report; later that day, Pete Rustan assured me personally
that it 'would be deleted. Despite shortening and removal of many of the
lightning-rod words, this material is no less defensible in its muted
versic,n than it was in the original. It is a place-holder for a totally
crazy idea and should be omitted."
Section 6.
This section is an outrageous, often technically incompetent, and
generally irrelevant embarrassment to everyone involved in the Workshop.
I know that many Workshop attendees have criticized this section, yet it
remains virtually unchanged from the previous draft. I won't repeat here
all of my technical criticisms, but my overall reaction to this section bears
repeating:
"The listing of a variety of highly speculative and/or irresponsible
technologies in Chapter 6 is inappropriate. While I do not dispute the
"bottom line" conclusion of this chapter, great emphasis given here to
such concepts as "Super Orion" and "anti-matter" detract from the
credibility of this report and/or lend undeserved credibility to these
speculative and/cr irresponsible technologies. I would not oppose a one-
sentence mention of each of the options evaluated by this sub-group, but
the material as it stands has no place in a serious government report. Let
the amplification occur in the separate Los Alamos Lab proceedings."
SectiQo 7.
Pg 45: The report of the Program/Policy Options group has been
deliberately distorted to emphasize John Rather's skewed goals of
addressing smaller, less dangerous impactors. The major change that has
been made to this chapter since the last draft is the omission of an
important sentence ("These objects constitute a hazard only to a local
region on Earth; the annua/ized casualty rate is much lower than for thp
larger impacts and orders of magnitude less than for other natural
disasters such as floods and earthquakes.") and replacement by several
sentences whlch change "much lower" to just "lower", omits the potent
comparison with other natural hazards, and then states that such an
impact by a small object could be "an enormous catastrophe." These
changes represent one part of a deliberate attempt to tiltthis report in
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favor of using military technologies to address what are, in reality, the
less-threatening, smaller objects.
290
Ap_ndl_ C
Memorandum
To_ Gregory Canavan
Clark R. Chapmar_
PlanetaD" ._ier, ce Ingt./SA1C
2421 E. 6th SL
Tucson, ,',2 85"119 USA
Date: 3 l)ecember 1992
Subject: UpdatevJ Comments on Interception Workshop Reports
_Ihank you for inviting me to submit comments for inclusion in the Proceedings of
the lntercepOon Workshop. _.have accepted your suggestion to include my memo of 8 June
19c)2 as an Appendix to ibe Proceedings° 1 have accepted your suggestion to include my
memo of 8 June 1992 as an appev, dtx to _.be proceedings. That memo was the second of two
critiques _hat _ addressed :- John Rather and others connected with preparation of the
official report of th,e Wm-ksiaop. I see evidence in the draf_ Proceedings that you have
dealt _ith a number of the criticisms raised in my menno. Although @aese Proceedings
rer_roduce parts of the latest draft ._f the Rather Report, you have sensibly removed some of
_he most _offen3ive portions. | wisia that John Rather had been similarly responsive earlier
in this process.
As of _he date of this ,memo it appears that -- in addition to the Proceedings - an
official report in the interception Workshop will be published by NASA and transmitted
to the Congress in the nex_ week or two. ! would hope that the official Rather Report would
correct the technical flaws and absurd reconm|endations that were present in the last
draft made available to rrm, similar to the changes you have made in these Proceedings, my
understandiP.g is that further modifications of the report will _be minor (including
excision of my name from the report). Therefore, I feel that is may serve a useful purpose
to have my critique of that report published in the Proceedings: for example, !n the latest
dr'air, you have retained - unjustifiably, in my view - a large amount of questionable
sp,_de.tion and pure nonsense in the section on "Current and Future Technologies".)
1 would like to add a few observations about the impact hazard from the
perr, l_.',:live of another si:_ months since I wrote my critique.
P u >_li_ci_ in t_h_ ._a_s_.s H edi_a
The impact hazard has received considerable publicity i;_ the news
media chiefly in response to an announcement by Dr. Brian Marsden, of
th, _, Int_rnational Astronomical Union's Central Bureau, that Comet
S_ift/T_lttle has a tiny bu_ possibly finite chance of encountering the
Ettrth eat_y in the 22nd _:entury. [ believe that Marsden's original
announcemeht was not well considered, and I understand that he now
agrees that the impact probability is far smaller than the 1 in 10,000
chance that he estimated for The New York Times. Regardless, there was
extraordinary amplification of the impending disaster in the popular media,
including a cover story in Newsweek. I think it is incumbent on everyone
involved in commenting on the asteroid/comet impact hazard to emphasize
the extremely low probabilities of impact and to do whatever is possible to
restrain the news media from their tendency tx_ sensationalize this subjczt.,
The. public, and national policy leaders, need sober assessments of this
hazard so that they may consider responding to i_ based on rational
comparisons with many other potential priorities. If proponents of
part.icular responses -- ranging from telescopes to SDI defense systems --
exa_'gerate this threat based on self-serving motives, then it will surely
ba_ kfir_,. There is already m_,:h _'ynicism among th*, public and the
pl_dit.s, some of it well justified in my view.
What Should We Worry About: Big lmpacts or Small Impacts?
One of the major debates that took place at i.os Alamos concerned
the relative importance of two classes of impactors:
A. The "Tunguska class" of impactor may be defined as those objects that
are large enough to cause a local disaster and impact frequently enough to
have a modest chance of doing so during our lifetimes. The minimum size
for this class (excluding rare metallic projectiles} is about 50 - 60 m,
according to Hills and Goda in this volume. SLlch impacts, with energies of
10 - 15 MT, occur at least every two centuries and perhaps as often as
every few decades, somewhere on the Earth. We might take the maximum
size of the "Tunguska class" to be the 10,O00-year impactor, which
approaches a 1% chance of occurring during a human lifetime. Such
objects are about 200 to 300 m in diameter and would explode with an
energy exceeding 1,000 MT.
B. The "globally catastrophic class" of impactor has been defined in the
Detection Workshop Report (Morrison, 1992) as one big enough to cause a
global climate change (from stratospheric dust} equivalent to that studied
for "nuclear winter." Althe, Jgh _stimates of the threshold for global
effects are uncertain, the Detection Workshop Report considers it to be in
the range 0.5 to 5 kin, probably near 2 kin. Such impacts occur on Earth
approximately every I million years with an explosive force exceeding half-
a-million MT.
At the Workshop, discussion was strongly biased towards the
importance of Tunguska-class impactors. This was due, chiefly, to a
technically erroneous analysis by Wood, Hyde, and others that had been
distributed prior to the Workshop. That analysis failed to consider the
atmospheric shield that protects us from the smallest impactors and drew
absurd conclusions about mortality due to frequent, small events that -- in
fact -- never kill anyone. The latest draft of the Rather Report included
corrected calculations by Hille and Coda on atmospheric shielding, but
retained an overall bias towards interception of small projectiles. These
Proceedings include more sensible analyses of the relative importance of
the two classes of impactors.
My own view is that the Tunguska-class impactors are not worth the
cost of insurance, if by "insurance" we mean implementation of programs
that identify most threatening projectiles and intercept them (for purposes
of diverting _r destroying them). I think that global'.y-catastrophic
impactors may be worth the cost of insurance, by which I mean
implementation of a telescopic survey like the proposed Spaceguard
Survey, followed by implementation of an intercept mission or_ly if a
threatening object is found. Let me describe my reasoning:
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The damage from a Tunguska-class event will usually be minimal (if
it is an airburst over the ocean, or if it. is a groundburst in an
_ninhabited portion of the world, like Tunguska in 1908}. With very low
probability (<<1% of Tunguska-class events, occurring no more often than
every few thousand years and more likely much less often than that), a
population center might be struck, in which case the death and
destruction would be massive. Even sach a local tragedy, however, would
be unlikely to cause more death or destruction than some of the other
major natural disasters of the 20th century. For purposes of comparison,
there have been 11 natural disasters during the 20th century that have
killed more than 100,000 persons each (4 earthquakes, 4 floods, 2 droughts,
and 1 cyclone); estimated deaths exceeded 1 million for several of these
disasters.
The analysis by Canavan in the chapter on "Values..." implicitly
assumes that a small impactor will have economic consequences in
proportion to the fractional area of the Earth that is within the radius for
destruction. This is very unrealistic because the economic valL_e of
portions of tbe Earth's surface is highly skewed, just as is the population.
The most likely loss _rom a Tunguska-class impactor is probably zero.
The benefit/cost ratio is particularly poor for insurance against
Tunguska-class impactors not only because of the modest hazard but
because of the high expense of effective interception. Detection of
Tunguska-class impactors, _hile technically feasible, is nevertheless a real
challenge, involving far mot. _ expensive technology than that necessary to
detect globally-catastrophic impactors. Moreover, it is unlikely that most
Tunguska-class impactors c,qn be detected years before impact. Therefore,
the "insurance program" would have to include development and
implementation of an intercept capability that could respond in near-real-
time. Whether or not an "on-the-launch-pad" capability is required, the
costs of a defensive system against these objects would be appreci:_ble.
The available numbers suggest that the inherent hazard of g_,cbally
cat._strophic impactors is at least an order of magnitude greater than for
the Tunguska-class impactors. On the other hand, if the prelir,_inarv
results of the Spacewatch Program are correct about an enhanced number
of 50 - 100 m objects, and if the threshold for global catastrophe is near
the upper end of the range of uncertainties, then the annualized risk of
fatalities might actually be dominated by Tunguska-class impa(:tors. I
would still argue, however, that the globah_" catastrophic impactors
deserve our attention far beyond their strictly numerical hazard. That is
for the simple reason that if civilization is threatened, then all of history
and everything that is important to us is at risk. Human society can
recover from devastating plagues and wars that kill tens of millions and
destroy whole nations. But we may be unable to recover, as a civilization,
from a globally-destructive impact disaster -- even though the destruction
falls far short of what would render our species extinct. ]_his is the kind
of hazard that bears thinking about because of the profound consequences
if _e are unable to recover from the disaster. IIn a sense, _his attribute
is partly handled by the "persistence" analysis in the chapter on
"Values..." by Canavan.) A large portion of this "ultimate r_sk" can be
insured against through construction of a network of telescopes at
moderate cost and without development of an intercept capability (unless
and until a threatening object .s actually found, which is very unlikely).
Therefore, the benefit/cost ratio is dramatically higher for the globally
catastrophic case than for the Tunguska-class case even if the numerical
risks were similar.
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Appendix D
THESCIENCE
56
tcnme_ _creamlng out ,4 the
sk_ like ,*he _k'ud from hell.
bigger ,*hana mountain and
packed with more ener_
than the worlds entire nucle-
ar arsenal. It hits th, atmos-
phere at i00 times th,_ ve]ocl-
t_ of a speeding bul'et, and
ivs_ than a second later sma, ks into
tl,e ground with an explosive force of
I!X_ million megatons of TNT. The
shock _ave from the crash !anding,
traveling '20,000 miles an hot' r, iewJs
every .hing wuhm 150 miles.._imulta-
neously a plume of val_ru_.d stone
sh,_ets up from the impact s:te. blast-
_ng a hoie through the atmosphere
and ',,entlng hot debris. The, aporized
r_k ,.'eels condensing back into hun-
dreds of mllholis of tiny _tones. As
the) _treak to the groum, over the
next hour. they heat up. aad soon the
_ery a;r glows hot pink.
"-;r,,am hl_s from green
.,.a_e_,. buildings and
"' ",q _ r_eS _UrSI Intf,
flame Ni',r)g_fland,)xy-
_:,,n :n the atmosphere
"qbi.qo ;,qto nl`*rlc acid
_:: -:;r_i',!ng',:fe trawl
' _ ;' ( a hurrc)w ,)r
,*',- ¢_.t., pel',od w;th a
Space is filled
with objects that
threaten Earth.
Researchers are
scrambling to
ensure that
worlds don't
collide.
BY SHARON BEGLEY
_:" q_. "aq_*'lr 3_ _'he _tcl_ in a car battery
I'ha: - ',_hat ast r, ,n.m,.r Hen r) Melosh of the l "'.,l_er_ltv
t \r:.',,r3:_, el, ,ia`*e_ v_',i[jld h,_lp[_n If _)me_hing six miles
, r .... h.ll (r,_, 3paceand_mackedlntoEarth Sixmile_ls
,,.,z,.,,f' h ...... met ._']l,,x _,d t,> hase hit the planet 6"3roll' on
•.,ar_ ag,, kil:_r,_ of[the dlm_saur,_ and two thirds of all hfe.
- , -r,_ .. ,,._ F_-,I_.m. ,,h*,_h_probable,_lzeofrheSw_ft.
." ',. ",,mt't <sift Tut!le _s _he ]_:rlDa_tic ('lt_?.,endirt ball
that an astronomer last month de-
clared has a 1-_n- 10,000 chance of hit-
ting Earth on Aug. 14.21'26.
AIi an astronomer need do is _9Y the
pockmarked surfaces of planets and
our own moon to reahze that _ts a
cosmic sheeting gallery ou_ there
Mercury., Venus, Earth and dozens of
moons have been cratered over the
eons by a blizzard of falhng asu._rold&
comets and other stuffthat can't man-
age to s_y m it_ own orbit.a! lane, But
it dawned on _ientists only recent-
ly-in the 1940e--that th_a pinball
china hasn't stopped. An estimated 20
tons cf particle, moat no bigger than
grains of sand, fall on the ground each
day. Of course, sometimes the mis-
siles at- bigger than sand grains.
Thousands of meteorites as big as a
lump of coal fallevery year, uoually
harmleuly. But one smashed through
A deadly e,_isk)n couki suck out the atmosphe_, scorch the Earth and she_d the p_a_et in dust
a garage r,_of m llhno_s _n 1938,and another totaled acar ;n a
New York City suburb last month (no Injuries in either ca_!
Ironically. the m_ses are more worrmome that, the hits _)n
March 23. 1!t_9, an a_termd a half mile acro_ missed 'l'l_rth
by lust 700.000 miles. N.-ne ,,taw it corn ing: if it had arrived a
mere s_x houri later it might have wiped out ¢lvdizat.m
"Earth fans, !l_ courr.e ai_mt tht. ,_un in _t _;irw1 ,,| ,t_t,.r
o_4s," *.'_v* astronomer Donald Yeoma ns of NASA ,_.h.r Pro
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Halley tarter the l';':h-cent u_" English astronomer who predicted
its return). But no one knows how man.,,, never-before-seen comets
are headlr_g our way. "For those coming in from the far reaches _e
t he solar system [for the first time], we have virt uall,, no chance cf
seemgthem unul they get close," saysastronomer ClarkChapman
of Science Apphcations International Corp. in Tucson. Ariz. "We
could disc_,ver every asteroid and still 10 percent of the threaten-
ing objects wuuldnt be found" until they were literally upon us.
Comet Swift-Turtle is not among that 10 percent--its been
observed at least twice before---but it could still po6e a consider-
able thr,,at Last seen m 1862. it was spotted by a Japanese
amateur astronomer again m la'e September. On Nov. 7 it passed
within 1 lO m_lhon miles of Earth--not even a close call. (Swift-
Turtle ca uses the Perseid meteor showers every August:as it orbits
the su n. ht tie bits flake off. When Earth creeses this path. the litter
streams through the atmosphere and glows.) Brian Marsder.. of the
Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics has calculated that
'J' r II
distances[14 milliun miles]on t, agust 5, 2126 There Is n_evidence
for a threat from Swift-Turtle in 2126 nor from an)' other known
comet or asteroid in the next 200 years." But Marsden still thihl.'-
the grandch:ldren of today's toddlers might N. in for a nasu, shock
in their old age. "There are still unanswered qoestion_ " he sa',-
"That's why I 're said to ast ronome rs, 'Get more o0se r" at vms' "
Swift-Tuttle is only one of thousands of potenhal doomsda.
rocks. It's not exactly prudent to wait for the sky to fall. so m
January the NASA pane; called for the creation of an cari_
warning system. Usingsix two-or three-meter telescopes, astrtm_,.
mers could spot more than 90 percent of the asteroids bigger than
about a half mile. It would cost $50 million to build "the Space-
guard Survey" and $10 million a year to run it. Thats a 4-cent.,.-
per-Americl:n insurance policy. But there could still be unpteas
ant surprises. There's no practical way to get an early warning
about smaller asteroids or many comets.
Once astronomers calculate orbits for the thousands of asteroids
Swift.Tutti,. sill return, after sv,nn_ng out past Pluto in a 134-
_ear,,rb_t , _; Aug 1.1.2126 On that vlmt. lt will come much clo_er
to Earth than _t d,d tL._s year And Marsden said last month,
betau_. S_ufi-Tuttle s leLs might nudge It ever so shghtly off its
appc,inh.d _(,urge. It m_ght even hit F_#_rth
Ever sire _. t h,.ci(_lrTly,dd _,faxesand Emafl have been fi)lngat the.
,pe_<l,_filj:ht N _,,h'l,qsdon t msputethat cumeLserupt _lthjeL_as
the. '.,.;n _arrn- th_.ir ,_uriace Like thrusters on a spacesh|p th,.
ert'ptJ(m_,shift ,h_.t,me'-,_rbl!e_er_shghtI?. But i,.thererea
_m t(, th_nk >i_ lit ] utth- ,. le_ will push It onto 8 colllsmn c(,urs_."
T_, _,. lt'l., 'f,.,_man, u,ied the observations (,f lt_._2 and iN_2
t(, (.lth ula_,. Nwlft-Tutt[_ ,, orbit [;sing that orhn. he calculated
h_, io_.I h. ( ,,met _,,ud have cnmetothegun In It._;pre,,lousv1!;It
m 17'37 a_.'._ni_nl¢ n,, mysterious "our._. altering jets B_ng(_ h_,
hal I_d th,. act ual, ,that t(, within a day l the l .,37 (_r bit _,aa recorrh.d
h_, a .h-,..,ll ml_,q,,nar,, in ( 'hlnal This seemed to establish that s,,
far a' ira,: ";_tl Tutth.,(,rb_t ha_ not been shaped by/eL,,nfthe
kind ,,r -tr-ngth that mlgh,, cauP_ a c-lllslon m 2126 Yr(,mans
(_n( ;u¢h.- Th, , ,,rm.t _11 pas_nc_clo_ertotheE.arththanBOlunar
and comets whose paths intersect Earth's. the_ wdl almost cer-
tamh find a fe_ that are on a collision course The, ,'xtent of
Earth'sdangerdependr of course.on thes_z_.oftht, nb_ect hket_ to
strike _t
I W'IR'_ rJze: Such colhsions come at h'ast _,_,rx decade But
anything smaller than '3() feet across (u' so, though packlnK the
wallop nf .5().(X)_)tons (_fT), 1', usually fralzments and burn, up ill
the. atmosphere Such an asteroid _r cum_'! ma_ t.)r(_'hlt v ;i m_,'.e
eric tirrhall--a burst of bNht and heat--hal _t _ u,ua[l', t .... high
in the ;,tnm.,,ph,,re t,, ause stgndicanl damage.
I Bmldin_ size: _ rock_, aster(ud with a dlalm,t,.r h,,la,.un 3(_,_nd
'311_ feet bh_ws tp In a bhndlng flash when It smark, Int,, _hc
atm(_pherr, a_ d_d the comet or asterrud that rxpl(,d*.d, ,x..r Tun
guska. S_berla,one,lune murnlng in 1_1_ l(xpl,,(hng h_,. m_Ic:, up
with the' h,rc,. (d 12 mega/(,ns. 11 anmh_lat,,d r_,in(h,er 3tt miles
away, tgnlh.d th,'ch,thes(da man Be mll,.,s a_a_ and h.x,.h.d more
than 7(11 ,,._quare miles ofSl[_rlan fore.,.t A Murdi_,r ash'r(ud role
made nf nickel and mm rather than _t-m. _nuld plung, _,, the
grnund _lth,ut _-xphwilng If(m,. th,. '.,izr (,fth,' Tunguska r,,¢ k hit
',t _A -'A I-t k X,,\ [ \_i I , ' ' 59
_-l!
the rural [.'niled Status. calculates John Pike. director of space
pohc_v for the Federatmn t)f American Scientists. it could kill
atmost 70 ;_)O people and cau_ S4 billion in property damage It
could also flatten buildings 12 miles away. according to the NASA
panel. If It hit an urban area. there would be upwards of 300.000
deaths. If Lt hit m a smsmw zone It could trigger earthquakes
topping - 7_ou the Richter scale.
• Mountain size: Objects larger than 30,1feet acro_ hit Earth
once ev_ ev 5._* ,_ years or so. If an asteroid 600 feet acro_ fell tn the
mid-Atlantw t*cean, calculates astrophysicist aack Hills of Los
Alamus Natamal Laboratory, It would produce a m_ssive tidal
wave. ,,_,_ fi_et high. on both the European and North American
coast. ,ttfll> .pe.'uiates that just such a hit wiped out the fabled
Atlant:,._ l._' :ger asteroids, half a mile across, hit every 300.000
T tyear_ . ha_ kind .ff colhslon, says Pike. "would surely rank
as th_ .,:_.,ate._t cat astrophe n human histom,.'." Timnks to tbc cloud
of d..-" .qro_vn up by this rail-
hen :?:t.gat,)ll explosion, there
woo :J he I>_cr,_ps anywhere for
a year In contrast, acomet of
th> -,zv qnce its ice and frozen
_a,e_ tragment easily, v- .ld
pr, .!,aNy break up in the at rues-
phi.r,, aud explode like the Tun-
gu_-ka hit.
• gity size: Asteroids or com-
ets larger than three miles
a_r ,-, hke Swift-Turtle. hit
e_.r) I0 million to 2,0 million
_vars According to one calcu-
i ,
.a._on it the dinosaur comet--.
th, ught to have been about six
r-_ les across--hit in the Gulf of
\Iexlc-. it would have created
a _a_e three miles high. Nine
hundred miles away. the mam-
moth wall of water would still
be 1,500 feet high. Such an
asteruid landing in the .Gulf
of Mexico would cause floods
in Kansas City. The impact
would make entire continents
burst into flame, block sun-
hght and make agriculture im-
Ix)sslble. Human- might go the
way of the trilobites.
At a conference this year at _ Alamo., researchers had no
shortage of ,deas about how to protect against cosmic c_tastrophe.
_me of the more Ingenious came from weapons selent_sts. Shoot-
ing down a comet [s not so d_fferent from shooting down an ICBM
texcept that the ICBM is c]o,,_r, and thus easier to _pot, and slower,
_,, easier t. hit) And _wen the pr,,me_,d deml_ of the Star Wars
pr,_gram under the Clinton admmlstratmn, shifting over to antl-
t'_Jmet deten._' maY not be a bad ,areer move
At thv c, ,nfe r,m'*.. I'.d ward "Felivr, al led for the development of a
N_mhl,_rl_t; >.,;rn,_rel_,_werfulthananythlnglnt_tay'sarsenal
( )n,, r..,.a r,h,.r : ._tght dr_pplng a ntlmatter,mt_ the t hreaten_ng
a..h.r Id .,r ,_n_,. v.uld (t_ the trick when antimatter ravels
matter "h_,'. ,_nnlhliateeach,_th_,r 1,1 a __ff_,fpure,'nergy I|te
d ida ; ,,[n'_ if". h_,w t,, g_'t anti matter up to the astermd sln('e at the
m.mvnt r,. kvts or. made ,,f mat ter. not antimatter, and so _,,uld
b*. ,t*.-t r,,'.,.d ._ _,.,n a_, thv antimatter cargo _as I.a(h'd ) ()r. a
r,. kvt, ,,uid ,ir,,p a .,dar soft ,,nt_, an ast_.r(nd or _umet the _I
'*,,,uht, ,u, h th*', harg_'d part[, h,s c,,nqantlv _tream_ng out tr,,m
'r>-uu an tthu.alt,.rthv,A)le_tsc,,ur_!.carrvlngthethreatsafely
!m_t t'lut,, N .... n*, ha._ figur_.d -ut h.w t- deIwPr the _,ml. th,mgh.
'It, [.[,1!1_ '_ hval .,our('e ,,fs,,rnv k_nd ,)ate a c.m..t hmks g(_l on
: ,:,,r _,_, _h_'h,'at w.uldtnducvwtsthat Ilkethrusters, wm_ld
|
steer the comet away from Earth (an asteroid doesn't have enough
volatile ingredients to make jets). But jets a e not predictable.
They might accelerate the comet mu'ard Earth
Such sticking points help explain why the motto of the D)s
Alamos conference was. as one enthusiast cheered.' Nukes forev-
er!" So far, the only source of ener_' powerful enough to deflect a
mountam-stze rock traveling at 15 miles per second--54.1X)O
miles an hour--is nuclear. The basic idea is to use a ma_swe
explomon to deflect the aste,'oid or comet from _ts earthbeund
path The sooner the better: a push of even a few hundred feet. if
applk , millions of miles away, could work Wamng until the
killer rock was closing m would require more energy than any
nuclear weapon ever built.
Where to deliver the bomb depends on what the object is. A comet
_sfragile. A blast on the surface coo ld s ha t te r t t In to h uge pieces t_at
together could Mll even more earthlings than thv ,_rlgmal The
NASA panel therefore en-
dorsed a "stand off" blast (dia-
gram). One or more nuclear-
tipped missiles, launched on an
American Titan 4 or a Russian
Energm rocket, would home m
on the comet opticallyor bv ra-
dar.The missiles would be pro-
grammed to exph._te the bombs
beside the comet, kicking it off
its earthbound path either di-
rectly or by inducing orbit-al-
teringjets.
No one would argue against
deflecting an asteroid or comet
capable of dooming all agricul-
ture for a year. let alone one
able to cause the extraction of
mankind. "But ;.here is deep
disagreement over whether we
should also protect against the
impacts that happen every
'ecade or so. like Tunguska."
says Clark Chapman. "Even
these small events can kill peo-
ple. but they are a thousand
times less likely tu do so than
are quakes, floods and the oth-
er things that kilt people al!
the time." Expense is one factor. Because an early-warning sys-
tem could not detect objects 1,50 feet across more than a few
weeks ahead of thmr arrival, to protect against them would
require keeping dozens of nuclear.tipped r,×'kets fueled up,
armed and ready to go 24 hours a day That would cost several
billion dollars a year Even then. success against a fast ch,s_ng
object would be far from certain, especially SlllCe the nwkets
would get only one chance to scoreahlt Ktu'pmgnuc',ear-npped
r¢x'keu_ at the ready would also be dangerous. AccMenu_ happvn.
Terrorists happen, too.
[luring a human lifetime, theres roughly a 1 in lU I_, hance
that _>.rth will be hlt by _omethmg blg en,,ugh to _,I_' out cr,,l_
w<_rldwld o and [._.ks_hly forcv survivors to return tl+ t,}w _,a_,s ,fl"
Stone Age hunter-gatherers Those are the _,hts ,I ,tying from
anesthesia durmg surgery, dying in a car <rash _n a,,v .qx month
period or dying of cancer fr,_m breathing the au t,_m,+_h','x ha ust.n
t he Ix)s Angeles freeways every da_ K d h,r aster(nds:_n d c(_m,'t._ a re
,,_t t here. Andsomeday.,me _,'111be-n a c.I hslon _,'ors. with Earth
I)fa[l the spe('u's that ever crawh.d, walked, th'_, .r swam ,,n Earth,
an estimated two thirds bocameextmct N.causv,ffan m_pa,t from
space Ma,,kmd may w,t meet that late, t_, But _,,rv th,. mdv
species that can even c.n tern plate ,t a,M, Iust ma _ t,, d,, s<,m,,t h lng
to prevent _t •
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